Debates between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Judge during the 2015-2017 Parliament

Tue 25th Apr 2017
Criminal Finances Bill
Lords Chamber

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Mon 12th Dec 2016
Policing and Crime Bill
Lords Chamber

Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords & Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords

Criminal Finances Bill

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Judge
3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 25th April 2017

(8 years, 9 months ago)

Lords Chamber
Read Full debate Criminal Finances Act 2017 View all Criminal Finances Act 2017 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 124-I Marshalled list for Report (PDF, 103KB) - (21 Apr 2017)
Lord Mackay of Clashfern Portrait Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)
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My Lords, I support these amendments. I first came across unexplained wealth orders in Inland Revenue fraud proceedings where people had been accused of not paying their income tax. One of the methods of revealing that is by demonstrating that they suddenly have more wealth than their Revenue account suggests. Therefore, there is a question about whether the assets came from taxable income. That was the presumption at that time. That was before the terrific expansion of other forms of unexplained wealth that could arise. The explanation that someone had done something unlawful would not be a particularly good answer to a tax inquiry but perhaps that was not thought of. Certainly, that was a very useful tool in the armoury of the Inland Revenue in days past and is still so today. It is a very valuable method of dealing with this trouble. I find it very hard, however, to understand what is meant by purported compliance. As has just been said, it seems to me that you either comply or you do not. I must say that the explanation given in the draft practice system does not enlighten me any further. It suggests, indeed, that purported compliance covers certain aspects of non-compliance. It is a difficult definition to put in. I would have thought the measure would be better without it.

I raise questions with regard to the register. It is required to be done within six months of the passing of the Act. However, the commencement provisions of the Act allow the Act to come into force in accordance with regulations or orders made by the Secretary of State. I assume that the passing of the Act in this amendment is intended to refer to its getting Royal Assent. Strictly speaking, however, the Act comes into force only in accordance with orders made by the Secretary of State under the commencement provisions except in relation to certain aspects of that.

Lord Judge Portrait Lord Judge (CB)
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I wish to add a few words of my own on purported compliance. I am not quite sure what we are supposed to cover. Obviously, there will be the individual who is potentially made subject to this order who will try his or her best to produce the necessary information. That may not be good enough, in which case the court will allow an adjournment so that a genuine attempt to produce the information can be made. That will then be compliance. On the other hand, some people will obfuscate and deliberately make life difficult to avoid the true facts coming to light. They will say, “That is purported compliance”, but it will not be—it will be a failure. Therefore, the words “purported compliance” simply do not apply and will not help.

Policing and Crime Bill

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Judge
Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 12th December 2016

(9 years, 2 months ago)

Lords Chamber
Read Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 72-III(a) Amendment for Report, supplementary to the third marshalled list (PDF, 54KB) - (9 Dec 2016)
Lord Mackay of Clashfern Portrait Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)
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My Lords, the issues raised by these amendments are extremely difficult. First, in view of all that has been said, it is difficult to distinguish, from this aspect, between sexual offences and other offences. There is much to be said for the view that if pre-charge publicity is to be outlawed, it should be so for all offences.

My second point relates to the safeguard, embodied in the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Marlesford and the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, of application to a magistrates’ court for an order. I think I am right in saying that in respect of both Lord Bramall and Sir Cliff Richard there must have been a warrant to search their homes. A warrant of that kind must have been based on some sort of evidence that was accepted by, I assume, a magistrate. There is, therefore, a question about whether it is a sufficient safeguard for a magistrate to give the order. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has said, if a judge has said that there is enough to go forward, there is a slight difficulty in the clear way to a trial because a judge has already come to some point of view. However, that point of view is not that the accused is guilty; it is that there is sufficient difficulty in the evidence that in that judge’s judgment it would be right, in the interest of justice to all parties, for publicity to be allowed. There is a lot to be said for the view that publicity, up to the moment of charge, should not generally be allowed for sexual offences or others.

I have not found it easy to come to a conclusion about this and I have thought about it a fair amount. I have come to the conclusion that Amendment 182 is better but I would like to see a possible modification, in the light of what I have said, of the responsibility for allowing the matter. As I said, I think there were magistrates’ warrants for search in the two cases I mentioned: they turned out not to be particularly satisfactory.

Lord Judge Portrait Lord Judge (CB)
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My Lords, I have been quoted on both sides, so I want to say something for myself. The most shocking aspect, to me, of the issues we are discussing was the BBC helicopter flying overhead while Sir Cliff Richard’s home was searched. There are many different aspects. Many of your Lordships have spoken today of your concerns about individuals you have known or individuals about whom you have known, who have been, in effect, traduced and brought low by publicity in the way in which we have been discussing. I do not support any such publicity, but I respectfully wonder whether we are addressing the wrong remedy in the wrong Act. For example, what is there to prevent a simple Act of Parliament that makes it a criminal offence for a police officer to disclose the name of any individual who is suspected of a crime, before he has been arrested? It should not be too difficult.

I do not want to repeat what I said last time, but the problem I invite noble Lords to consider is this. An arrest has to be justified. An arrest that is not based on reasonable grounds for suspicion is unlawful. Notice that I pick the moment of arrest—I am not talking about the allegation or the police officer telephoning the local press to say, “We are about to arrest the local schoolmaster”, or whatever it may be; nor am I addressing the issue in the context of sexual offences. The same story should apply to all offences.

An arrest must be lawful. Please can we bear in mind what the consequences of a lawful arrest are? You are detained. You are removed from your home, if that is where you are on arrest, or the street, the town or the city, or your office, or even when you are out having a drink with your friends. You are removed and you are not a volunteer: you have to go. If you resist arrest, you are committing an offence, and down to the police station you go, if that is where they take you. But you are completely in the hands of the arresting officer, and you go through a process. You remain detained, either while further investigations are made or until such time as further evidence emerges or it is decided that, after all, you can be allowed to go, for now, on bail. This is a process that nobody goes into voluntarily. Please can we remember that it is the first stage in the operation of the criminal justice process—and often, of course, culminates in a trial, conviction and sentence.

My concern about both these amendments is that they fail to address the problem that arrest is part of the criminal justice process. If they are adopted or if either one is adopted, we end up not with a situation that is incommunicado, if I may say so to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. We end up with a veil being drawn against any reporting of the fact that one of our fellow citizens has been arrested. I find that troublesome.

The idea of criminal justice being secret is abhorrent to all of us in this country; we do not want formal trials to be conducted in secret. This part of the process, I suggest, should not be seen as a private matter. The exercise of the power to arrest and the consequences of it are public matters. There are many hard cases we have heard about and there has been much abuse of the process, but these issues should be addressed in a different form of legislation.