Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Bill

Debate between Lord Mann and Mark Durkan

Wednesday 22nd January 2014 Commons Chamber

[John Mann]

Hansard will prove whether or not I did, and it may even identify the Minister.

Such things are almost incongruous to us in this House; perhaps it is less clear to people outside the Chamber that that is how business operates here. If someone says to me, “I’ve got a great idea to amend legislation. How do I get it through?”, particularly if my party was in power and I therefore knew and could track down the special advisers, the first thing I would say is, “Here’s the list of the people with influence. You’ve got to get to them, because Ministers’ time is so dictated by civil servants—it is deliberately jam-packed—that if you want any serious dialogue, you’ve got to get in first.”

Ministers of course ratify decisions and good ones ensure that their decisions go through, but, frankly, I can think of numerous examples where that has not been the case. Going to special advisers and civil servants, although usually with general ministerial consent—perhaps not from the particular Minister, but from No. 10 Downing street or the Minister’s boss—is precisely how someone can get changes made.

Anyone who has participated in a Public Bill Committee knows that. My hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North (Mr Allen) will remember that we sat on the Committee on the Criminal Justice Bill for what seemed like a year. I tabled an amendment about endangered species and wildlife. External bodies wanted it, and the Minister and colleagues from both sides of the Committee were very supportive of it, but the Minister’s response was, “Well, we need to check the details.” The only reason we got the amendment accepted was that we sat down with a special adviser with access to civil servants, and with the civil servants themselves, to clear every dot and comma so that when I got up in Committee, with support from all sides, the Minister said that the Government accepted the principle and would come back with their own wording—strangely, it was identical to mine—and it was later presented as their amendment. That is how it works here. If we are to control these lobbyists, of course the special advisers and civil servants—whoever is in power—have to be included.

I will finish by raising one other issue. I have in my possession documents showing that in recent times a senior, well-known lobbyist has set up a fake company—or a real company, but using a false name and date of birth. How will the Minister deal with that under the Bill? When such a case eventually comes before him and other Ministers, how will they deal with its unethical nature, and how will they respond to the influence of such a lobbyist over the Government? Does he agree that anyone who does that should automatically be prevented from having any access to any Ministers?

[Mark Durkan]

I rise to support amendment (a) to Lords amendment 1 which was tabled on behalf of the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, of which I am a member, and to address the specious Government amendments (b) and (c), as well as to deal with the choices presented by the different amendments.

Let us be clear that amendment (a) builds on the amendment made in the other place so that special advisers are rightly caught within the scope of the part 1 of the Bill. Many of us argued for that during earlier stages of the Bill. Contrary to what the Leader of the House implied, we did so seriously; we did not press it to a Division simply because of time constraints and to allow debate on other matters. Only amendment (a) gives us the opportunity to make sure that senior civil servants and special advisers are within the scope of the Bill.

Amendments (b) and (c) to Lords amendment 1 almost amount to an act of misdirection by the Government. They may allow people to satisfy themselves that special advisers might be brought within the scope of the Bill. They will, however, leave senior civil servants outside its scope, which is exactly their aim. Of course, they may not even bring special advisers within the scope of the Bill. Amendment (b) is a fig leaf for the Leader of the House, who tabled it, and a figment in the minds of its supporters: there is no real risk that it will bring special advisers within the scope of the Bill. Those supporting it have clearly set their face against special advisers. Today and on previous occasions, they have given all the arguments why special advisers should not be included. We are fooling ourselves if we think that they will reconsider that issue in a matter of months between now and the election or some other time. That is absolute nonsense, and we would make real fools of ourselves if we fell for it.

Amendment (b) not only says that regulations “may” amend subsection (3) of clause 2, but is worded carefully to provide that

“communications made personally to a special adviser are within that subsection.”

When I see highly qualified and specific wording such as

“made personally to a special adviser”,

I wonder whether it is done deliberately. Perhaps there are all sorts of other forms of communication that can take place with a special adviser. For example, other parties like donors who do not have a direct interest or who are not consultant lobbyists, but who are friends of other businesses or interested parties, could communicate with a special adviser.