Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Cash (Con)]

I am grateful for that reminder. It is another point in support of the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Walney. The overall position of the group is much more easily managed by the police when there are deliberate attempts to evade any type of prosecution.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, we have had a difficult and long debate on a major group on public order. Because it is so late and because there have been some central points, I shall confine what I say to a few of those.

I turn first, if I may, to Amendment 370A, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Walney, on extreme criminal protest groups. I accept, and indeed agree, that, at first consideration, it appears beneficial to have an alternative to proscription that does not involve the Terrorism Act and does not involve branding peaceful protest as an offence of terrorism. That would, of course, be the effect of Amendment 370A. I note that, in answer to an intervention from the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, the noble Lord, Lord Walney, confirmed that it was his clear view that that would be the position. Indeed, I have spoken on a number of occasions against the use of the Terrorism Act to make any support for a proscribed organisation, however peaceable, an offence under the Terrorism Act.

The designation provision in the proposed new clause from the noble Lord, Lord Walney—designation as an extreme criminal protest group—is not the problem, because there is a condition in proposed new paragraph (a) that

“the group has as its purpose, object or practice the deliberate commission of imprisonable offences, including but not limited to sabotage, criminal damage, obstruction of critical national infrastructure, or serious public order offences”.

At proposed new paragraphs (b) and (c), it refers to

“the intention of influencing public policy”,

and “democratic functions” and

“a risk of serious harm to public safety”.

The effect is the concern, not the designation as an extreme criminal protest group. The effect would be to criminalise extreme criminal protest groups’ activities to include in the formulation of offences under the proposed new clause, particularly at paragraph (b), public advocacy or the dissemination of groups’ materials, and those are offences that would be similar to the offence of support for a proscribed organisation under Section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, or offences of being a supporter, which can be proved by suspicion.

Amendment 370A would, I suggest, constitute a curb on free speech and on the legitimate freedom of expression, and would therefore run the same risks as the Terrorism Act of prosecutions of peaceful protesters. I am afraid I question the view expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, that criminal behaviour of the kinds that he described is not covered by other criminal legislation. I note the views of the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, that other legislation may cover such behaviours but may not be implemented by the police. That may highlight a need for an alternative approach to policing, rather than for new legislation of the kind advocated by the noble Lord, Lord Walney.

Although I understand and applaud the aim of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, for a less serious alternative to the Terrorism Act, also advocated by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, in practice, I doubt that it would be an attractive alternative to proscription under the Terrorism Act. Indeed, I do not believe that the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, had an answer to the intervention by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, on the chilling effect of limiting freedom of expression with the criminal law. I doubt that the amendment would have the effect that the noble Lord, Lord Walney, seeks, so I do not support it.

The second area of concern that I would like to cover today is Clause 124 and the amendments to that clause—Amendments 371A to 371F—persuasively spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, and the noble Lord, Lord Hain. I support the analysis of the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, of the word “vicinity”, also supported by the noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti and Lady O’Grady. It is quite simply too vague. For my part, I am not convinced, for a number of reasons, that a 50-metre limit would produce the intended result either, so I agree with the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, on that.

As I understood it—I will be corrected if I am wrong, and I invite the Minister to comment on this—the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, contended that the words “may intimidate” should be changed to,

“has the purpose of intimidating individuals accessing that place of worship … and would intimidate”.

I suggest that that may not be right. This part of the clause may be saved by the words in subsection (2)(c). Again, this is a point I would like the Minister to consider, because the clause requires that for an offence to be committed it must be

“in the vicinity of a place of worship and may intimidate persons of reasonable firmness with the result that those persons are deterred from … accessing that place of worship for the purpose of carrying out religious activities”.

The result has to be achieved before the offence is committed.

However, it is quite clear, as my noble friend Lord Strasburger said, that it is completely right to protect the rights of worshippers to worship at their synagogues, mosques or other places of worship—although as my noble friend pointed out, Clause 124 may be unnecessary in view of other legislation. But subject to clarification and limitation, the purposes of Clause 124 seem to me to be right.

The third argument that I wish to consider concerns government Amendment 372 and the whole question of cumulative disruption. For my part, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, that the principal object appears to be a legitimate one to avoid repeated disruption on successive occasions of particular areas where there are places of worship, as in the streets around synagogues. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, mentioned protests and assemblies on repeated Sabbath days in the vicinity of synagogues.

Weighing the right to protest in balance against the interference with the rights and freedoms of others, as we all agree that we must, it is plainly right that the freedom of Jewish people to go to synagogue on successive Saturdays without repeated protests amounting to harassment of them should be protected. If that is what cumulative disruption is to mean then it is plainly right to take account of it. However, the use of the word “area” is, I suggest, subject to the same flaw of imprecision as the word “vicinity” that we considered earlier. I invite the Minister to consider between now and Report whether the use of the word “area” is appropriate.