House of Lords: Reform

Debate between Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames and Lord Campbell of Alloway

Tuesday 21st June 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, what happens about any referendum in Scotland is a matter for the future. I have no doubt that the noble Lord will be taking a great part in the argument in relation to Scotland. However, the Parliament Acts are statutes passed by Parliament and they set a clear limit to the power of this House. It is within that framework that this draft Bill will need to be considered.

It is not only statute that would continue to guarantee the primacy of the House of Commons. The structure of the two Houses envisaged in the Bill will do much to reinforce that guarantee. First, the new House would be elected—or elected and appointed—in thirds, which would ensure that only the House of Commons represented the will of the people most recently expressed in a general election. That is because only one-third of the House, or slightly less, would be subject to election or appointment at the time of each general election.

Secondly, following a general election, the new Government would take office on the basis of results of elections to the House of Commons. It follows that Ministers in the Commons and in the Lords would be appointed on the strength of those results. The House of Commons will therefore control the composition of the Executive. Furthermore, the legislative programme will be the Government’s legislative programme and, therefore, dependent on the elections to the House of Commons.

Thirdly—this is particularly the case on the basis of the continuing presence of the Cross-Benchers, if we were to go for an 80 per cent elected House—it is most unlikely, although not impossible, that any Government would have an overall majority in the House of Lords. The likelihood of such a majority is further reduced by a proportional system for the election of Members. A number of noble Lords, often those strongly opposed to proportional representation—the question asked by my noble friend Lord Cormack is perhaps apposite to this point—have argued that election by proportional representation will give this House a democratic legitimacy that the House of Commons lacks. However, as a democrat, I accept the people’s verdict. It appears that the AV referendum result—

[Lord Campbell of Alloway]

My Lords, perhaps the noble Lord will forgive me, but this is the 20th time that he has referred to his concept of democracy. Quite frankly, does he not realise that the people do not understand the Lib Dem concept of democracy?

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, if I believed that the people did not understand the Liberal Democrat concept of democracy, or our national concept of democracy, I would not be here or arguing here at all. I believe that democracy is about elections and the expression of the popular will; it is about determining the composition of Parliament in a representative democracy on the basis of the popular will. It is as simple as that.

I accept the people’s verdict on the AV referendum, which has ensured that first past the post elections to the House of Commons will be a feature of our democracy for a while yet. I also accept that the electorate regard that as a legitimate system for electing MPs. It is therefore likely that we will have two different systems for election to the two Houses. Of itself, that will not undermine the primacy of the Commons; rather, it is likely to safeguard it. It is also significant, I suggest, that the link between individual Members of Parliament and their constituencies, which lies so much at the heart of our unique representative system, is a factor that will tend to sustain that primacy, because the link between elected Members of this House and their multi-Member constituencies, will, inevitably, be that much weaker.

The final point in this area is that MPs will be able to point to the fact that they are accountable to their personal electorates in having to face re-election. Elected Members of this House, elected for a 15-year single term, will have no such direct, personal accountability. They will still have, as the Leader of the House pointed out, the independence inherent in that system; it is not the same independence that they enjoy on appointment for life, but it is substantial independence none the less. I suggest that that independence is a good thing for the job that this House does.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames and Lord Campbell of Alloway

Tuesday 8th February 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, that is precisely the point. The intervention of the noble Lord illustrates that the Boundary Commission makes decisions, taking into account recommendations of the commissioners that may be inconsistent, which negates the importance or effect of the public inquiries. Amendment 43 empowers the assistant commissioner to,

“adjudicate between the arguments and to make a final recommendation on proposed boundary changes”.

As the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, explains, there is no explanation anywhere of how that would work or what the precise status or effect of the recommendation would be. Presumably, as he says, the Boundary Commission would have to take that into account but that would—again with respect to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf—open up the public hearings or inquiries to judicial review, possibly not as to the content of the recommendation but as to the procedure adopted before the public inquiry.

Then there would be the difficulty that any departure by the Boundary Commission from the recommendation from a public inquiry would be challengeable as irrational. That itself would be fruitful grounds for judicial review hearings. The amendment does not state how these problems would be dealt with. I give way.

[Lord Campbell of Alloway]

My Lords, could the noble Lord explain what on earth a public inquiry subject to judicial review means in practice in the courts?

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, what it means is that there is a difficult and delaying process at that stage because there is the interposition of the public inquiry; that is, with a public hearing as proposed by the Government, there is a hearing which is essentially, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, explained, an evidence- and argument-gathering procedure, orally in public, prior to a decision-making process by the Boundary Commission which, as I say, we should trust.

The government amendments quite properly exclude this unhappy intermediate stage in the decision-making process. Furthermore, the cost of the public inquiry proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, is considerable. It cuts out a substantial and essential element of transparency from the system proposed by the government amendments. The opposition amendments would remove the requirement to publish the records of public hearings to enable informed public comment.

In terms of timing, the proposals of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and the noble Lord, Lord Bach, would total 26 weeks in cases where there were proposals to revise recommendations—six for written submissions, 16 or 17 for public inquiries and then four for further inquiries. The proposals of the government amendments are much shorter overall—12 weeks for written submissions and public hearings, four for a period of secondary consultation and eight if revisions are proposed: so, 16 weeks rising to a maximum of 24 weeks. However, the amendments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, keep his timetable down to 26 or 27 weeks only by cutting from 12 weeks to six the period for public written submissions; by cutting entirely the four-week secondary consultation period proposed by the Government and by allowing only four weeks instead of eight for the public to make written representations on any revised proposals.

At the heart of our position on these amendments is the notion that members of the public are more likely to make written representations than they are to attend long public inquiries, which would largely be the forum of the political parties. The amendments proposed by the Opposition favour a return to a long, cumbersome, legalistic and expensive decision-making process of public inquiries going before the Boundary Commission’s recommendation, a process whose status is entirely uncertain because its effect on the final decision is not clear.

Finally, an entirely lawyerly point, Amendment 27GH of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, inserts a reference to subsection (4)(b) of government Amendment 27G which, by Amendment 27GD, they have entirely deleted. That is a small point by comparison with the central point. The public hearings proposed by the Government amendments are essentially creatures of the public with longer timescales for written representations and a shorter, simpler arrangement for public hearings with all the evidence and all the argument then considered by the Boundary Commission, which we ought to trust. I urge the House to accept the government amendments and reject those proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer.