National Security Bill

Debate between Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames and Lord Carlile of Berriew

Committee stage
Monday 19th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I have not yet spoken to Amendments 9 and 10, which I was proposing to do before my noble friend spoke for us. Before doing so, I join my noble friend Lady Ludford in opposing the protection of all trade secrets without any requirement for there to be prejudice to the interests of the United Kingdom. That amendment, which has been proposed on behalf of the JCHR, seems to me to be sensible. I also share her bemusement, and that of others, that trade secrets are included in the Bill, because the way in which they are included is extremely wide.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has pointed out that Clause 2(2)(b)—he read it aloud, but I will not repeat doing so—is so wide that it effectively covers any information which has any commercial value of any significance. Of course, that information is important, and, to that extent, I accept the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. However, state actors may also steal, or act nefariously in respect of, trade secrets—as may others, be they state actors or not. They may be from the United Kingdom or abroad. They may be connected to national security, but if the Bill will deal with trade secrets, they need to be defined in such a way that it is confined to trade secrets that present a threat to national security. The Bill goes far too wide if we include wide threats to trade secrets in the criminal proceedings—which, as my noble friend Lady Ludford said, carry very heavy sentences—without the need to prove the threat to national security as an element of the criminal offence. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, threats to trade secrets are normally dealt with in the civil courts, where the protection to intellectual property is customarily and very frequently dealt with every day.

It is absolutely right, as the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, pointed out, that there is a requirement that the foreign power condition must be met. However, the foreign power condition in Clause 29 is not a very difficult hurdle to surmount. The present drafting does not require any prejudice to the security, defence or other interests of the United Kingdom. It is met if conduct is carried out not by a state Government but by any entity controlled or financially assisted by a foreign power—so that could be a commercial organisation that happened to be state-controlled. For “foreign power”, we have to read that as any power or any other state, including any friendly Government from anywhere in the world.

Our Amendments 9 and 10 tighten up the wording on trade secrets in Clause 2, but only in a limited way: by requiring that a trade secret must be subject to measures to prevent it becoming generally known or available to rival experts in the field. We suggest that it is simply not satisfactory—

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I have been listening very carefully to the noble Lord, whom I always listen to with great respect. Can I take it that he or his party will put down an amendment to the Long Title of the Bill in due course? Perhaps he has not read the Long Title in full, because, as far as I can see, it covers all these amendments in the exact way in which they are intended. We are in danger of over-sophisticating a non-existent definition of national security.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

I am bound to say that I discussed that before the noble Lord came in. Since, in my opening speech on the first group of amendments, I quoted specifically from the Long Title of the Bill dealing with Part 1 offences, I do not accept the criticism that I have not read it. Nor do I accept the criticism that it is apposite to threats that have nothing to do with national security, because the Long Title—which starts by dealing with Part 1, as far as the first semi-colon—is about making provision about threats to national security. My point is that, if you protect trade secrets in these very wide terms, it may include threats to national security, but it is not limited to threats to national security and it may go far wider.

It is not satisfactory for trade secrets to qualify for protection just because the information in those secrets might be reasonably expected to be subject to measures to prevent them becoming known generally. What would the measures be? Would they be imposed by a court, by government or by regulation? That is undefined. Perhaps the Minister, in replying, would explain what those measures might be. How does it help to protect trade secrets that are not subject to any protective measures, as the Bill specifically envisages? The clause raises far more questions than it answers.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames and Lord Carlile of Berriew

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Report stage
Wednesday 8th December 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I am puzzled by the mechanism that the Government are trying to use to increase sentences, which, in some cases, should rightly be higher, in relation to the deaths of emergency workers. After a long period of development, we created a completely new mechanism: the Sentencing Council. Judges must have regard to sentencing guidelines in every case, and those guidelines are complex. They give examples of levels at which sentences should start in certain circumstances.

I see a number of noble Lords around this Chamber who have either acted as police officers or have prosecuted and defended manslaughter cases. In my case, I have done, on one side or the other, a number of one-punch manslaughter cases, in which there was a conviction, and perhaps a sentence of three or four years’ imprisonment. One can imagine circumstances in which that could have arisen where the person who died was an off-duty emergency worker trying to help someone, and the perpetrator of the offence had no idea that that person was an emergency worker.

Surely the better mechanism is to use the flexible, living instrument of the Sentencing Council, and the sentencing guidelines, and not to inhibit the discretion of judges. The Sentencing Council and the judges will, of course, respond to the pressure that rightly arises from the awful case that has given rise to this discussion and this amendment. With great respect to the Minister, relying on “exceptional circumstances”, a description that is always determined in a restrictive way—rightly so—by the Court of Appeal, seems to be the wrong mechanism to achieve the right result.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, on these Benches we share the shock and revulsion at the death of PC Harper and the way that it came about. We support the principle that a life sentence should be available, and even possibly the norm in serious cases, for the manslaughter of an emergency worker. But where we part company with the Government is in sharing the concerns of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and everybody else who has spoken. We are unhappy with the proposal that such a sentence should be mandatory unless a judge can find “exceptional circumstances”.

The word “exceptional” has been seen in the past as requiring circumstances that are quite out of the ordinary. Frankly, I took issue with the Minister when he treated the word as allowing more latitude than the usual interpretation of “exceptional” would permit. The MoJ press release uses the phrase “truly exceptional” to describe what is required. In that connection, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, rightly made the point about legislation by press release—a point echoed by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, when he talked about the knee-jerk nature of this type of legislation in particular cases.

We would have far preferred the amendment to permit judges the discretion to depart from the life sentence where the circumstances and the interests of justice required. The Government’s determination to prevent judges exercising discretion, as seen throughout this Bill, is frankly depressing. This is despite Victoria Atkins MP saying in the other place only yesterday, in answer to a question from my right honourable friend Alistair Carmichael MP, that:

“Fundamentally, the judiciary and magistrates should be trusted in their sentencing decisions.”—[Official Report, Commons, 7/12/21; col. 206.]


Frankly, we agree. I made these arguments in Committee in connection with my amendments to the minimum fixed sentence provisions in Clause 101—now Clause 102 —and I will make them again when we come to debate my amendments later on Report.

The Explanatory Note to these provisions asserts that they require a court to impose a life sentence on an offender who is convicted of unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter against an emergency worker. That is misleading. There is no requirement in the proposals that the manslaughter be dangerous, in the sense that there was danger to the life of the victim, as there so obviously was in the Harper case. The requirement for danger in the case of unlawful act manslaughter, on the cases and in the CPS guidelines to prosecutors who apply those cases, it is very limited indeed. It is necessary only that the unlawful act exposed someone—not even necessarily the victim who died—to the risk of “some harm”.

I take a hypothetical case, similar to that mentioned by the noble Viscount, of a bad-tempered 17 year-old suspected by a shopkeeper of shoplifting. The shopkeeper accosts him. A row ensues, which turns into a fight—not serious, but serious enough to draw a passing police officer to come into the shop to intervene. The officer tries to arrest the youth. The youth resists arrest. He throws a punch at the officer—not hard, but plainly an assault on a police officer in the execution of his duty and enough to be obvious to everyone that it could cause some harm. The officer falls backwards and sustains an injury that turns out to be fatal.

All the elements of unlawful manslaughter are there. The guideline sentence would probably be two to four years. The required sentence under these proposals would be life imprisonment. Are these circumstances “exceptional,” as that word is known to the law? No. is the sentence just for that 17 year-old, whose very bad behaviour had such tragic consequences? I would suggest clearly not, when one considers the overall criminality of the offence and the offender. Of course, the death of the victim would significantly aggravate the sentence. That is true for all manslaughter cases. And of course, the fact that the victim was a police officer acting in the course of his duty would be another seriously aggravating factor. But should those circumstances lead to detention for life for a 17 year-old?

The manslaughter excluded from the operation of these provisions is, as the Minister helpfully explained, manslaughter by gross negligence—a very sensible exclusion—or manslaughter mentioned in certain sections of the Homicide Act or the Coroners and Justice Act, which cover diminished responsibility by reason of a recognised mental condition, suicide pacts and loss of control, reducing murder to manslaughter if the specified conditions are met. But that leaves the whole area of unlawful act manslaughter within the provisions, and any such manslaughter of an emergency worker would attract the mandatory life sentence.

The current sentencing guidelines mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, which came into force as recently as 1 November 2018, suggest a range of sentences for manslaughter of between one and 24 years. They divide culpability into four ranges, from A at the top to D at the low end. The factors indicating lower culpability are as follows:

“Death was caused in the course of an unlawful act … which was in defence of self or other(s) (where not amounting to a defence) OR … where there was no intention by the offender to cause any harm and no obvious risk of anything more than minor harm OR … in which the offender played a minor role,”


or where the

“offender’s responsibility was substantially reduced by mental disorder, learning disability or lack of maturity.”

Those factors, or some of them, could quite easily be present in many cases of manslaughter of an emergency worker. So these sentences might—perhaps even often—cause serious injustice.

A further point was alluded to by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. When a life sentence is passed, the release date is ultimately in the hands not of the courts but of the Home Secretary. Any Home Secretary, not just this one, is subject to political pressures. Were a victim, for example, the holder of a Queen’s Police Medal, and there was a campaign to keep the offender in custody on that account, how easy would it be for this or a future Home Secretary to succumb to pressure to keep the offender subject to a life sentence in custody, for far longer than would be just?

Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill

Debate between Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames and Lord Carlile of Berriew

Report stage & Lords Hansard
Wednesday 3rd March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I should like at the outset to acknowledge the assistance that I have received from the Bingham Centre in preparing the amendment and the courtesy of Ministers in this House and their staff in discussing it. I will briefly give my reasons for the amendment.

First, I am clear in my belief, which is shared by many others, that some men and women imprisoned for terrorist offences—I repeat, some—represent a threat to public safety and national security beyond the length of their sentences, and that the consequences of that risk may be the death of innocent citizens. Some examples of such people can easily be identified and are well known, but it is clear that others who present such a risk are much more difficult to identify.

It is to be noted that the recidivism rate for terrorist offences is extremely low compared with that for most other offences—under 3%, on the most recent figure that I have seen—and that a fraction of the recidivism rate therefore applies to terrorist offences. Their recidivism rate is a fraction of that for other offences, including serious offences such as armed robbery. So far, at least, projects in prisons to achieve deradicalisation or even recognition of the wrongness of the acts taken as radicals have been difficult to assess. It is extremely difficult to know whether prisoners are deradicalised and such efforts to assess prisoners have suffered significant failures. The room for erroneous judgments is high. I shall give only one of several examples, that of Usman Khan, the Fishmongers’ Hall terrorist.

As part of the effort to identify whether prisoners remain a serious risk to the public, I support the use of polygraphs but only as one instrument of assessment—one component only in such determinations. It has been proved in other areas—for example, in relation to sexual offences and in the context of some immigration matters—that polygraphs can provide useful corroboration, though one should be careful not to use them as primary evidence.

A great deal of work has been done to enable terrorist prisoners to be assessed because it is known that, to date, the evidential analysis of such prisoners has proved fragile. It has been extremely difficult to assess the threat that they may present on release. Where has most of the work been done in relation to making judgments about such prisoners? I emphasise that we are talking about judgments. It has been done by the Parole Board and it is about its potential role that I am mainly speaking.

The Parole Board in its ordinary duties deals at present with people who have been sentenced for terrorist offences and, indeed, with prisoners who have become radicalised in prison, though not sentenced for terrorist offences. To deal with that, the Parole Board embarked on an extensive and detailed training programme so that its members—chairs and lay members—could fulfil empirically their existing role with that cohort of prisoners. The board is recognised as offering a fair procedure that is legal and justiciable in a way that is familiar to prisoners and their legal advisers, and is understandable to commentators and us parliamentarians.

I have met the argument that it would be a mistake to extend the role of the Parole Board beyond its present functions. However, given what I have said about the training that it has given to its members in relation to terrorism offences, and looking at what the board does in a more rounded way, I suggest that it is entirely fitted to have its range of responsibilities broadened to deal with wider issues. They could properly include a possible extension of sentences within appropriate statutory limits. Those decisions may not be made by the Parole Board if the Government or others do not find that acceptable, although, in my view, the board is well suited to making such decisions about the possible extension of sentences. For example, it could refer certain cases to the Court of Appeal Criminal Division or the Senior Presiding Judge for England and Wales, so that if a sentence was to be extended beyond its temporal determination, that could be done by a senior judge or judges.

Given the very serious risk posed by a small percentage of terrorist prisoners, there is a danger that the majority who have been reformed may become the victims of the 3% or so who are unreformed. That should be avoided if at all possible, for I am sure that we would agree that what may seem like a failure to recognise that a prisoner truly is reformed and remorseful may create the very opposite effect and leave them to become reradicalised.

The aim of my amendment is to attempt to persuade Her Majesty’s Government to change the architecture of the process of extended sentences in relation to terrorism offences. I accept that the amendment does not complete the task, which is why I will not press it to a Division. However, I hope that it will be possible to discuss this matter further with Ministers before we reach the end of the procedures of the Bill.

I suggest that the changed architecture, as I have called it, should allow, first, the sentencing judge to inform and warn a defendant at the time of sentence—no ifs, no buts—that at the time when otherwise they may or should be released, they will be subject to assessment by the Parole Board and that that assessment will be based on whether they represent a serious and continuing risk to the public. It should be clearly said by the judge at the time of sentencing in accordance with the discretion of judges, who as has been said earlier, not least by the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, are used to dealing with sentencing scenarios.

Further, I suggest that the changed architecture should allow the following: if a prisoner presents a serious and continuing risk to the public, the ensuing procedure, founded on comprehensive evidence from both sides, as happens at Parole Board hearings, could result in the sentence being extended further, and possibly on more than one occasion. In my view, such an architecture would provide for a fair process that is clearly understood by a prisoner at the time he or she is sentenced. I suggest, therefore, that such a procedure would be fairer and certainly more capable of review before the courts, and safer for the small cohort of very dangerous prisoners envisaged by this Bill.

I also invite the Minister to confirm in his reply that the Parole Board has been consulted about any additional roles it might take, either along the lines that I have described or in the general context of this Bill. I would, as I have said, welcome further discussions with Ministers.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]]

My Lords, it is a great privilege to follow the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, particularly given his deep and long experience in counterterrorism and the legislation in this area, along with his wide experience of the workings of the Parole Board.

Clause 27 was the subject of considerable controversy in Committee because as it stands, it would remove the role of the Parole Board from the determination of whether, and at what stage, a terrorist offender should be released from custody. Without wishing to repeat the arguments that were canvassed in the debate on the clause at that stage, many of us felt then and continue to feel strongly that the Parole Board has had, and should continue to have, an important part to play in determining whether and at what stage even dangerous terrorist offenders should be released on licence.

The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, refers to prisoners who are serving extended sentences and applies after they have completed their custodial term, thus changing the architecture of extended sentences, as he has put it. Such prisoners’ release would be contemplated only after the custodial term, at which stage their cases would be referred to the Parole Board for consideration, as they then would on every further anniversary of the completion of that custodial term.

As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has explained, before the board could direct release, it would have to be satisfied that two important conditions had been met: first, the prisoner did not represent a grave risk to the public, and secondly, it was no longer necessary for the protection of the public that the prisoner should be confined. We would have preferred that the amendment went further and applied more widely for the reasons that we expressed in Committee, but we regard the work of the Parole Board, whose members are specialists in the field, as extremely valuable. We are firmly of the view that a full hearing before the Parole Board is the best way to determine whether a prisoner should be released after a suitable minimum custodial term, having regard to the elimination of the threat that the prisoner posed to public safety and to such progress as might have been made in the prisoner’s deradicalisation, rehabilitation and reform.

I should emphasise that throughout our approach to this Bill, we have maintained the position that hope of rehabilitation should always be part of the process of punishment, even in severe terrorist cases, and that sentences which offer no hope are counterproductive. We recognise that all prisoners are likely to be released one day and that rehabilitation is more achievable in the context of a release on licence than it is in the context of continued incarceration. That is a position that was rightly taken and recognised by the experts who briefed a number of Peers at the Joint Extremism Unit drop-in session that was arranged for us by the Ministry of Justice. Those who attended found it to be interesting and informative, and we are all very grateful. For my part, however, I confess to remaining perplexed that the Government have decided to cut the role of the Parole Board in the way set out in Clause 27. This amendment would reduce the impact of that particular cutting axe, and I therefore support it.

Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill

Debate between Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames and Lord Carlile of Berriew

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 26th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, that we are dealing with the determination of licence conditions in the context of terrorist prisoners having been sentenced to longer sentences. However, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, who has very considerable and relevant experience, and with my noble friend Lord Anderson of Ipswich that the Parole Board has an important potential role to play in these cases.

It is said that the determination of licence conditions can adequately be dealt with by prison governors. That may be true in some cases, but prison governors do not have the range of expertise, the judicial discipline and the clear legal accountability of the Parole Board. It is therefore my view that this task should be undertaken by the Parole Board, which has all the relevant qualifications to do it. If the Parole Board was placed in that position it would command the confidence of the public. Indeed, those who believe that too much control is being taken of prisoners by government would be able to see that there was a thoroughly independent, accountable, quasi-judicial organisation dealing with these cases empirically and on their merits.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]]

My Lords, this amendment incorporates significant changes to Clause 27. In particular, as pointed out by the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, with all her experience of the Parole Board, and by other speakers, the suggested replacement for Clause 27 would preserve the Parole Board’s role. I regard the amendment as entirely helpful on the basis that, with some exceptions, the Parole Board has had an extremely good record of balancing the safety of the public with the need to rehabilitate offenders in society.

I will largely cover what I have to say on the principles involved in this amendment in my part in the next group. However, it seems to me that the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, made the very important point that Clause 27, as drafted, involves automatic release on licence without any assessment of the safety of that release by the Parole Board. I accept that prison governors would be involved, but that, in my view, is no substitute.

In summary, it is my view that this amendment would be an entirely acceptable way to address the problems with Clause 27 as drafted, the most important of which are its removal of the involvement of the Parole Board from the release process altogether and the concomitant results that offenders under Clause 27 would be automatically released, less likely to be rehabilitated and also more difficult to manage while in prison.