Voyeurism (Offences) (No. 2) Bill

Debate between Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames and Lord Faulks

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 26th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

My Lords, I too apologise for not having been here at Second Reading, but I have had the opportunity of reading the short debate.

In Section 67 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, there is a mens rea, as it were, simply for the purposes of obtaining sexual gratification. Unfortunately, one has to pose the question of why anyone is doing this at all—I think it used to be assumed that it must be for some form of rather strange sexual gratification—and this addition of “humiliating, alarming or distressing” is added to cover the possibility that there might be some other motive. Those words are familiar and often interpreted in one context or another in the criminal law, whereas I am unaware—I will be corrected if I am wrong—that the concept of invading privacy finds much resonance in the criminal law, although of course it is reflected in other aspects of our law, not least in Article 8 of the European convention.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, rightly said that we do not want anyone who should be capable of relying on a defence to have one in circumstances where it would be unattractive if they did, and he cited a particular instance of someone having a laugh. He then gave the game away by saying it would be unfortunate if they could say this despite the distress that might be caused to the individual who had been the victim of this. Whose laugh are we talking about? Presumably we are talking about misjudged humour on the part of the perpetrator, not the amusement of the victim of this invasion. I take the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, that if there is to be a purposes clause, it is sufficiently wide. I think a magistrate directing himself or herself with the addition of a clerk would have no difficulty in considering this; nor would a recorder have any difficulty in directing a jury to consider this, so that if somebody said in their defence, “I was only doing it for a laugh”, they simply would not be believed.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I agree with what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. I am not sure that invading privacy is not just as much a purpose as an activity. I shall be brief in support of Amendments 2 and 3 in my name and in the name of my noble friend Lady Burt of Solihull.

I made it relatively clear at Second Reading that I would have preferred the specified purposes provision to be omitted altogether, and in that regard I go further than the agnosticism of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, and the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. That would mean that an offence would be committed by anyone taking upskirting images without the consent of the victim, though I would add a different proviso: so long as the action of taking or recording the images was not accidental. This could have been quite easily achieved in the legislation by the use of a word such as “deliberately”, and would have constituted an acceptable required level of mens rea—or guilty state of mind—to constitute the behaviour criminal. But my chief concern, and that of my noble friend Lady Burt and others, has been to ensure that no one is permitted to avoid criminal liability by running the defence that he lacked the required purpose. The amendment by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, is designed to achieve that end.

I would add another problem that has not been covered. There is a concern that the specified purpose in new Section 67A(3)(b)—that is “humiliating, alarming or distressing” the victim, would be entirely absent, not only in the case of the robust constitution professed by the noble and learned Lady, Lady Butler-Sloss, but also in a case where the perpetrator intends to avoid detection by the victim by taking or recording the images without the victim knowing. If the victim is not to know of the behaviour, then she cannot be humiliated, alarmed or distressed by it. In such a case, the only remaining—

[Lord Faulks]

I thank the noble Lord for giving way. The distress may not be something the victim is aware of at the time it takes place, but were they to become aware—which ex hypothesi they would in the case of a prosecution—surely then they would suffer humiliation and distress, having found out what had been done to them.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

I do not accept that, because in some cases these images would be published and a prosecution would follow without the victim ever being traced. The victim may not know the images are of her—there may be distinctive parts, there may not—but there may be cases where distress can come either with the prosecution or later. In the proposed new section as it stands, the prosecution has to prove that the intention of the perpetrator was to bring about that distress. That seems an unnecessary complication and hurdle to erect in front of the prosecution so that it has to prove that purpose to secure a conviction.

There may well be cases in which the perpetrator can say that sexual gratification, whether for himself or another person, was not his intention or purpose—the example has been given of “having a laugh”. In Amendment 2, we have identified financial gain, where these images are to be published to make money, as another intention. In Amendment 3, we have identified entertainment or amusement, which is another way of saying “having a laugh”, as another.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, has argued that financial gain will be achieved by the creation of these images or recordings only if they are to be sold for someone’s sexual gratification. I am not sure that this is entirely true. I believe that, in some circumstances, financial gain may be made by unscrupulous individuals peddling sick humour arising from such images, with no intention on the perpetrator’s part to secure sexual gratification for anyone, whether others may view them for that purpose or not. The purpose of the perpetrator must be proved, not the coincidental fact that others may get sexual gratification from viewing such images later.

The amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is elegant and cleverly covers our point. However, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, indicated to us that he might look on that amendment favourably even if I have not persuaded the Government—I am not sure that I have persuaded the Minister—of the merits of our amendments. I hope that I have done so; I do not see the difficulty in accepting our amendments. We regard them as improving the Bill by specifically outlawing taking or recording images for financial gain or for entertainment or amusement. Our amendments can be taken with those in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, which I hope the Government will accept in any event. The point is to avoid people who clearly should be convicted of offences under this new and welcome legislation unjustly running defences of absence of the relevant purpose and getting away with it.

Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames and Lord Faulks

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard continued): House of Lords
Thursday 10th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

Absolutely not. The Judicial College can respond, and be required to respond, to political guidance if Parliament chooses to legislate on the level of damages. I do not say that that is what is wrong. My concern is about the fairness and comparability of picking out whiplash injuries in an attack on fraud and reducing the compensation to genuine claimants accordingly. My point about the £225 and £450 figures—

[Lord Faulks]

Does the noble Lord accept that if you reduce the amount of damages, it provides something of a disincentive to those who are fraudulent?

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

Of course I accept that. It is a question of whether the cost in unfairness is worth paying. It is a dilemma that the noble Lord himself correctly outlined in his speech. We are simply saying that we ought to try every other avenue before trying this drastic avenue of introducing an unfair system for genuine claimants. I will see if I can get beyond the next couple of sentences.

My point about the £225 and £450 figures is that they represent a cliff edge. They compare to £1,800, which is the expected award set out in the Government’s impact statement for such injuries of less than three months’ duration to date. The Government’s response to the outcry that these damages are so low has not been to meet the outcry at all but to reduce them from £235 to £225 and from £470 to £450.

One of our problems with the present proposals is that there is no evidence base for a recent increase in the number of fraudulent claims. We entirely accept the case that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, made both at Second Reading and today that there is a wide prevalence of fraudulent claims that we have to tackle. However, there is not a wide base of evidence for an increase in such claims, nor is there sufficient evidence of how many claims are fraudulent or genuine. There is certainly no evidence that only the fraudulent claims would be deterred and that the genuine claims would continue. That worries me seriously, because the noble and learned Lord suggested earlier today that a genuine claimant might continue whereas a fraudulent one might be deterred. We simply do not accept that. It is just as likely—and I say this also without an evidence base—that genuine claimants would be deterred because the amount at stake had become so low, even though they had a fair claim.

We entirely agree with the Government that the proposal for compulsory medical reports discriminates between genuine and fraudulent claimants. I repeat my declaration at Second Reading that I have just concluded some litigation about compulsory medical reports and the operation of the pre-action protocol. However, there is no corresponding evidence of discrimination in the case of these drastic cuts in damages, which we say are unjust, unfair and fail to give fair compensation to genuine claimants. They discriminate unfairly between injuries sustained in road traffic accidents by drivers and passengers in motor vehicles and those sustained in such accidents by cyclists and pedestrians. Who would receive the traditional level of damages? Passengers and motorists would not, even in genuine cases. They discriminate unfairly between accidents which are covered by the Bill and accidents at work or accidents caused by, for instance, a council’s negligence. Those can also be a source of fraudulent claims.

If the Government are determined to have a tariff, we are worried about the cliff edge. I see no fundamental reason in principle against a tariff; it is a question of weighing the advantages of certainty outlined by the noble and learned Lord against the fact that you have a cliff edge where those cases that are very close to the three-month level produce very large discrepancies in damages. If we are to have a tariff, let it at least be one that does not penalise genuine claimants by allowing them an award that is far too low. That is the basis for our alternative Amendments 13 and 96. We do not put them forward as a preferred option, but they are more acceptable than the Government’s proposals.