Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames and Lord Forsyth of Drumlean

Monday 18th July 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, the other place has rightly rejected these amendments because they rest on a fundamental misconception that, merely by enacting legislation that is not time-limited, Parliament is seeking to bind its successors by passing permanent legislation. That proposition needs only to be stated to demonstrate its falsity. The Bill contains no entrenching provisions. It does not seek to restrict in any way the power of any subsequent Parliament to amend or repeal it. If the next or any future Parliament wishes to reconsider the provisions of this Bill when enacted it is free to do so, relying on the normal processes by which we consider and pass legislation. In 1885, Dicey defined the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty on this point as the right,

“to make and unmake any law whatsoever”.

Nothing in this Bill as unamended infringes that principle.

These amendments, with their ungainly hybrid of a sunset provision and what might appropriately be called a Lazarus clause—rather than a sunrise clause—would kill off the effective provisions in the Act after the next general election automatically and without any parliamentary consideration whatever, contrary to the assertion of my noble friend Lord Cormack. They would then allow one or any number of future Parliaments, by simple resolution of both Houses, to reinstate the legislation for a single Parliament at any time and at any stage of the Parliament in question. That would not then be a fixed-term Parliaments Bill; it would be no more than an unedifying muddle with no clarity for the electorate—or for parliamentary candidates, for that matter—when they go to the polls.

The amendments offend against constitutional principle on three main grounds. It is notable that your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, led by the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, did not at any stage suggest a sunset and sunrise clause in the form proposed. The first offence against principle is that the amendment threatened to remove from Parliament the right to insist on full and detailed consideration of any proposal to repeal or re-enact the legislation by introducing a mechanism for re-enactment by resolution of both Houses. That re-enactment, as my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness pointed out in opening, would apply to the Schedule, which contains historic and important repeals, and would apparently be reversible by a resolution of both Houses.

Secondly, the amendments would increase the power of your Lordships' House beyond that generally permitted by the Parliament Acts because they would give this House the power to thwart the will of the other place, not merely to delay its implementation, if a resolution were passed by the House of Commons but denied passage by the House of Lords.

Thirdly, the amendments would offend against the Salisbury/Addison convention, if not in the letter certainly in the spirit. Both the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats had commitments to fixed-term Parliaments in their manifestos, which were then agreed by the Conservatives in the coalition agreement. The settled view of the House of Commons, expressed on two occasions, is that this Bill should pass. Yet these amendments seek to time-limit it in a way that would remove its impact altogether. I say that because as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, and a number of other Lords pointed out at earlier stages of this Bill's passage, no legislation whatever is required for this Parliament to last until May 2015.

As always, the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, put his argument seductively and persuasively, but the reality is that far from being asked to act in this House as guardian of the constitution by these amendments, we are in fact asked to challenge the primacy of the elected House and to usurp the revising and scrutinising role of this House by effectively emasculating this Bill.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

Perhaps the noble Lord could help me with a point. I may be wrong, but I believe that we still retain the power in this House to prevent the other place from extending the life of a Parliament. Is there not a parallel there?

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I do not accept that there is a parallel. There is indeed the exception in the Parliament Act for a Bill to extend the life of Parliament, and that was the case with this Bill, with the power to extend by two months. That is not the case in respect of these amendments.

House of Lords: Reform

Debate between Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames and Lord Forsyth of Drumlean

Tuesday 21st June 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

Certainly I accept that, but I do not accept that it follows that the Parliament Acts will somehow be changed without further statute because of the passing of this draft Bill, or something like it, concerning the composition of this House. The powers of this House are determined and limited by the provisions of the Parliament Act passed, as the noble Lord suggests, in 1911 for the purpose that he sets out.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

I wonder whether the noble Lord might reflect on a more recent example, because his argument is that the powers as defined by statute will determine behaviour. I refer him to the Scotland Act, which makes it perfectly clear that the Scottish Parliament will not have the power to call a referendum on independence. Yet the Liberal Secretary of State for Scotland is telling us that we must acknowledge the reality that the SNP has won a majority in that Parliament and therefore that we ought to let it get on with it and not determine the position. Is that not an example of how political reality and lines set in statute come into conflict and that, in the end, the political reality wins?

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, what happens about any referendum in Scotland is a matter for the future. I have no doubt that the noble Lord will be taking a great part in the argument in relation to Scotland. However, the Parliament Acts are statutes passed by Parliament and they set a clear limit to the power of this House. It is within that framework that this draft Bill will need to be considered.

It is not only statute that would continue to guarantee the primacy of the House of Commons. The structure of the two Houses envisaged in the Bill will do much to reinforce that guarantee. First, the new House would be elected—or elected and appointed—in thirds, which would ensure that only the House of Commons represented the will of the people most recently expressed in a general election. That is because only one-third of the House, or slightly less, would be subject to election or appointment at the time of each general election.

Secondly, following a general election, the new Government would take office on the basis of results of elections to the House of Commons. It follows that Ministers in the Commons and in the Lords would be appointed on the strength of those results. The House of Commons will therefore control the composition of the Executive. Furthermore, the legislative programme will be the Government’s legislative programme and, therefore, dependent on the elections to the House of Commons.

Thirdly—this is particularly the case on the basis of the continuing presence of the Cross-Benchers, if we were to go for an 80 per cent elected House—it is most unlikely, although not impossible, that any Government would have an overall majority in the House of Lords. The likelihood of such a majority is further reduced by a proportional system for the election of Members. A number of noble Lords, often those strongly opposed to proportional representation—the question asked by my noble friend Lord Cormack is perhaps apposite to this point—have argued that election by proportional representation will give this House a democratic legitimacy that the House of Commons lacks. However, as a democrat, I accept the people’s verdict. It appears that the AV referendum result—

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames and Lord Forsyth of Drumlean

Tuesday 29th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I rise with some diffidence in view of the speeches from the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, the noble Lord, Lord Martin, and others that we have heard. First, I think we all believe that the notion that the courts should be able to interfere with the Speaker’s certificate when this Bill is enacted, if it is enacted in its present form or in something similar to it, is one that we would abhor. No one is suggesting that that is a desirable or acceptable outcome in any way.

In moving his amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, discussed the evidence before the Constitution Committee in some detail. I do not propose to rehearse that evidence. However, I would point out that Professor Bradley, an old friend with whom I would be hesitant to disagree, expressed the conclusion that the judiciary would surely accept that this was an area for political judgment which the courts were not qualified to make. That was the conclusion of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee.

This is not simply a matter of the evidence of Mr Harper, which has been dismissed in quite strong terms by others who have spoken. In the light of the careful note of the Clerk of the House of Commons, the Constitution Committee spent a great deal of time analysing all the evidence on this point. The conclusion to which it came was that the risk of judicial interference was very small. It went further in concluding that it was so small that it was not sufficient to warrant the rejection of Clause 2. The assessment of what risk might or might not be acceptable is a difficult area. I align myself with the view expressed by the majority of the legal evidence to the effect that the chances of interference by the courts would be so small as to be insignificant.

That is not to say that we can ever stop anyone bringing a misguided application. However, as Professor Bradley also pointed out, misguided applications can be dealt with quickly and given short shrift. That is what I believe and would expect to happen. The result is that in theory an initial challenge could be brought to the Speaker’s certificate. However, it is the judgment of the Constitution Committee, which I invite your Lordships’ House to accept as well founded, that that challenge would not lead anywhere—a judgment that was made in the face of, and on consideration of, the evidence of the Clerk of the House of Commons, to which a great deal of respect was given.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

My noble friend is obviously an expert in these matters. As the argument is about the degree of risk, can he explain why it is necessary to take the risk at all?

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, this is a matter we have canvassed before. My noble friends and I put forward a suggestion in an amendment as to the definition of votes of confidence which might mitigate the risk still further. One problem with the later amendment of my noble friend Lord Cormack is the complicated definition of votes of no confidence. Of course, when it is clear that there is a vote of no confidence, it is very difficult to imagine the issues for the Speaker to determine—that there has been such a vote and that there has been a lapse of 14 days—being justiciable. While I can see that part of the wider argument of the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, and the noble Lord, Lord Martin—that it is important to avoid the Speaker being drawn into political controversy —is absolutely right, nevertheless the amendment is concerned with the question of justiciability.

The next question for your Lordships to consider is whether the words of the amendment add anything to the words of the Bill. As the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, pointed out, the words of the amendment are drawn from the wonderful and eloquent words of the Bill of Rights, which states that,

“the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament”.

That is a general statement of the principle of parliamentary privilege.

The words of more recent statutes which outlaw judicial interference have been more similar to the words adopted in this Bill. The Parliament Act 1911, in dealing with certificates, uses the words “conclusive for all purposes” and,

“shall not be questioned in any court of law”.

The phrase is “shall not”, not “ought not”. I suggest that, for a modern approach to the construction of statutes, the phrase “shall not” is much more useful than “ought not”. The House of Lords Act 1999 simply uses the provision that the certificate shall be “conclusive”. In this Bill we have the words, “conclusive for all purposes”.

Taking that body of statute law as a whole, I suggest that the right conclusion is that, with the possible exception now of “ought not”, those phrases “shall be” and “shall not be”—the imperative form—are effective to provide as much protection from judicial interference as we are likely ever to be able to achieve. It is a matter for the courts, and the balance between Parliament and the courts, as to whether in any conceivable circumstances the court could, at some stage, accept an invitation to interfere with parliamentary privilege. Given the state of the statutes at the moment, this is the best guarantee that we are ever going to get. On the history of the courts’ approach to these matters, I cannot in a million years agree that the courts would interfere with such a certificate, although they cannot prevent a challenge being launched at the outset.