Victims and Prisoners Bill

Lord Meston Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 18th December 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, the Bill covers a lot of ground, and I agree that in some respects it has benefited from the extra time allowed, having been carried over from the previous parliamentary Session. I also agree that there is more to be done.

The valuable definition of victims at the start of the Bill is clearly the product of careful thought and is welcome. That definition helps to dispel the notion of victimless crime. It focuses on the impact of harm, including the effects of domestic abuse on children. When dealing with such cases in the family court, it is still surprising to realise how people do not recognise or grasp the misery and insecurity caused to children in environments where abuse occurs and where children have to accept it as the norm. That is not just distressing in the short term but damaging in the long term. Domestic violence begets violence and, it is now well understood, creates intergenerational problems when witnessed by children. I support the suggestion that has been made in this debate that there is scope for including reference in Clause 1 to exploited children. I also ask whether there is scope for referring to developmental harm caused to unborn children by domestic violence inflicted during pregnancy.

The intention of Clause 15 is welcome, providing for guidance to independent domestic and sexual violence advisers. In the family court, there is already specific provision for such people to accompany parents into court, and the judiciary and practitioners have become aware of, and value, the practical and emotional support provided, particularly by IDVAs, in cases in which abuse is a feature. If nothing else, such advisers can manage expectations. However, I suspect that the availability of such advisers is patchy and I assume that the hope is that guidance will provide some consistency. It would be helpful if the Government could clarify the expected nature and benefits of such guidance. It is also, as other noble Lords have suggested, a real opportunity to consider whether there should be a role for such specialist independent advisers specifically focusing on children affected by abuse.

I also wish to welcome the introduction of Clause 16, otherwise known as Jade’s law, which will require the Crown Court to restrict the exercise of parental responsibility by a parent who has been convicted of the murder or manslaughter of the other parent. There are few more difficult and sensitive cases for the family court to deal with than when one parent has killed the other. A range of immediate practical, legal and emotional problems arises for the surviving family, and for the children most affected. In such circumstances, it is inconceivable that a perpetrator without parental responsibility would then be granted it. Accordingly, if that perpetrator does already hold parental responsibility, typically by being named on the birth certificate, it is surely right that his status should be curtailed. In effect, the bereaved child has suddenly lost both parents, and will be traumatised, confused and in need of immediate expert support.

If the child is fortunate, there are capable grandparents or step-parents who come in, or the local authority will have taken responsibility under established guidance in case law. However, if the child is less fortunate, the surviving relatives may lack insight into how best to meet the needs of that child, and they may compete for control. Such disputes are utterly wretched. Clause 16 should at least ensure that arrangements and decisions that have to be made for the child, or children, cannot be impeded or complicated by the perpetrator. In principle, the surviving relatives should not have to deal with the perpetrator when making such arrangements and decisions, whether important or less so. Clause 16 should relieve them of that possibility.

My initial thoughts about the scope of this new power, and how it would work in practice, related to whether it could be extended, perhaps in discretionary form, to other situations which I and others have come across—for example, when one parent has caused the death of the other by dangerous driving in a car in which both were travelling, or where there was a conviction for a very serious assault which did not result in death. However, on reflection, I do not think that the Crown Court should be expected, as part of a sentencing exercise, to make automatic prohibited steps orders in these less extreme cases. The Crown Court will not have, and cannot be expected to have, a full appreciation of the family’s structure and dynamics, and of the circumstances of the children concerned, and will not have input from Cafcass.

That said, there was a worrying report on the Radio 4 “Today” programme on 20 November about the very costly struggle a mother had in respect of the so-called parental rights of her former partner, who was in prison as a convicted paedophile. I would ask if the Government have taken note of that case and have considered whether in future any steps can be taken, by way of legal aid or otherwise, to assist a mother who might find herself in that position.

Having heard earlier contributions, I can see there is a potential argument for extending this to the removal of parental responsibility from fathers whose child is a product of a rape. However, of course, he is unlikely to have parental responsibility because he is unlikely to be named on the birth certificate—but it may arise in cases of marital rape after a conviction. Subject to that, the balance is well struck and the new Clause 16 is limited to extreme cases.

Finally, the impetus for the provision to prohibit serving whole-life prisoners from forming a marriage is well understood and may be justified in some cases. It is subject to the possibility of permission from the Secretary of State in exceptional circumstances. That is no doubt to reduce human rights problems and may manage to do so. Following what was said by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, can the Minister indicate the type of situations in which permission might be granted? There may be a case for allowing marriage in cases of terminal illness, but I am afraid I cannot think of many others and I look forward to hearing a response on that point.

King’s Speech

Lord Meston Excerpts

Wednesday 8th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, it feels strange to stand and speak here for the first time after 24 years. In 1999, when many of us left—not expecting to return—what was to follow was then being described as the transitional House. Having come back, I have to observe that it seems that the transition has been only gradual and may well have some way to go. Meanwhile, it is good to see again some friendly and familiar faces, so remarkably preserved by the rejuvenating qualities of this place.

In the intervening period, I have worked as a full-time judge, latterly exclusively in the family courts. I was fortunate to work for some time on the Western Circuit when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, was the popular and highly respected presiding judge. He was seen as a mainstay of judicial independence, the importance of which was conveyed so well by his maiden speech.

Today’s sad news leads me to add that, long before that, like so many of my generation, I was trained as an assistant recorder by Mr Justice Judge, as he then was. He ran training courses with firmness, good sense and good humour. Like many, I am for ever grateful for the confidence that he instilled in me at the start of my judicial career. Later, in this House, he showed care for the quality and viability of legislation, as do all judges and former judges who are the direct consumers of legislation produced by Parliament. As so many have already said, Lord Judge will be greatly missed.

I turn to the gracious Speech. Experience in the family courts leads me to welcome and support the proposed introduction of what has been called Jade’s law, which is expected to provide for the automatic suspension of the parental responsibility of a parent who is convicted of the murder or voluntary manslaughter of their child’s other parent. I pay tribute to those who have pressed for the implementation of this measure.

There are few more difficult cases for a family court to deal with than having to decide the best arrangements for a child or children when one parent has killed the other. In reality, the child concerned will have lost both parents. The child will be traumatised, confused and in need of immediate expert support. Sadly, there can sometimes be competing claims to care for the bereaved child from within the wider family; sometimes there is also a necessity to consider placement away from the surviving family.

Both short-term and long-term arrangements for the child or children are always required. These certainly should not be impeded by the unreasonable or inappropriate exercise of parental responsibility by the perpetrator or alleged perpetrator of the killing. However, it should also be recognised that the need for the family court to make swift and informed decisions in the interests of the child can still be hampered by the slower pace of the criminal proceedings, particularly if they are prolonged by applications to appeal or, as I have experienced, applications to the overstretched Criminal Cases Review Commission.

This is not the time to anticipate detailed consideration of how the new provisions will be aligned with established best practice in the family courts. It simply needs to be understood that Jade’s law will not resolve all difficulties or complexities, but it should help to provide some finality and certainty for the children and surviving family members.

Wishing to be brief, I will not take up much time on the more vexed question of dealing with defendants who will not come into court for sentencing. That is behaviour which plainly dismays the victims and their families. Having myself been sworn at over the years by a number of defendants, usually when leaving the dock just after sentence, I simply suggest that whether or not and how to react to the behaviour of a defiant or recalcitrant defendant who will not get into the dock in the first place should still, so far as possible, be left to the discretion of the responsible judge. I am not alone in being concerned about imposing a duty on custody staff to manipulate and manhandle defendants into court. However, I accept that there may well be a case for an additional penalty to mark disapproval of deliberate and unjustified refusal to go into court, even if, in reality, that has little or no meaning for defendants already due to receive very long sentences.

I hope that these problems will receive further thought and debate when the Bill comes here.