Employment Rights Bill

Debate between Lord Murray of Blidworth and Baroness Jones of Whitchurch

Committee stage
Wednesday 18th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I begin by saying what a pleasure it was to be chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Fookes, who is celebrating 55 years of public service today. I congratulate her.

Back to the not-so-inspiring business: I am responding to the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, on his amendments relating to civil proceedings and the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, and the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, for giving notice of their opposition to Clause 113. The Government are committed to ensuring a fair playing field for all employees and businesses. This includes enabling the fair work agency to challenge breaches of employment rights and labour abuse where individuals may not be able to pursue this for themselves or where these cases are not suitable for other enforcement routes.

I am sorry to hear that some noble Lords cannot envisage the circumstance in which these powers might be necessary but, as we rehearsed on a previous group of amendments, many vulnerable workers, especially migrant workers, are reluctant or unable to bring their case to the tribunal to enforce their employment rights. Rogue employers exploit this, break employment law and get away with it. That is unfair for the majority of businesses that do right by their staff. It is unfair for the vulnerable workers involved in being denied their rights. It is unfair for British workers who are denied work opportunities due to illegal practices undercutting them. That is why, in the plan to make work pay, which was a manifesto commitment, we set out that the fair work agency will have the power to bring civil proceedings to uphold employment rights. This is why the Secretary of State will have the power to bring proceedings in place of a worker. It will mean that all employers are held to the same standards.

I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, and the noble Lord, Lord Carter, that these provisions on civil proceedings are modelled on the Equality Act 2006, which allows the Equality and Human Rights Commission to institute legal proceedings that are connected to the commission’s functions. This includes bringing proceedings for breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights and assisting individuals who are party to proceedings related to the Equality Act 2010.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

If the noble Lord lets me finish this point, I may answer his question.

The Employment and Human Rights Commission does not need consent for this and has issued proceedings in its own name before. When acting as an intervenor, the EHRC has also previously received court approval to take over conduct of an appeal on behalf of an appellant when the appellant decided to withdraw from the legal proceedings. This was done with the consent of the Supreme Court in the case of MS (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department. I give way.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am grateful to the Minister for reaching the end of that paragraph. She agrees that the power for the EHRC to intervene in proceedings is not a power to take over and institute proceedings if people do not want to. Instead, it is a power to intervene and carry on proceedings in the event that somebody wants to withdraw. That is not based on any statutory provision; this is still extremely novel. I am sure that the Minister will agree that there is no statutory precedent for the kind of power that the Government want to take in Clause 113.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

As the noble Lord has more legal expertise than me, I am happy to write to him on that point because it is an important point that we need to clarify. Of course, these are relatively new powers that we are taking on board, and we are taking them for very good reasons. I am sorry that noble Lords opposite do not see the case for this, because, certainly, an awful lot of workers are being exploited out there. At the moment, they do not have the power to speak for themselves in the way that many others who are better informed can do.

While I respect the intention of the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, behind some of his amendments, I must state they are unnecessary. Some of the provisions of the amendments are already provided for, either within the existing drafting of the specific clauses or in other clauses of the Bill. Regarding Amendments 271D, 272ZZA and 272ZZD, as I mentioned on Monday, normal practice would be for the Secretary of State to bring proceedings with a worker’s consent and involvement. However, in the worst cases of serious exploitation and intimidation, workers may fear the repercussions that they may face from their employer should they be de-anonymised. By allowing the Secretary of State to take a case forward without consent, it would be harder for employers to attribute blame to individual employees. Therefore, limiting this power in the way that these amendments seek to do could prevent the Secretary of State pursuing serious breaches in some of the most egregious cases.

Amendment 272ZZB is an unnecessary amendment. Legally privileged material and confidential information is already protected under the Data Protection Act, as well as under usual legal rules and principles that apply to proceedings.

On Amendment 272ZZC, normal public law principles already take account of all considerations referenced in this amendment, including the best interests of a worker. This is therefore another unnecessary amendment.

Amendment 272ZZE is yet another unnecessary amendment. Clause 113(6) does not provide a blanket exclusion from all liability, and it is self-evident that the Secretary of State would be held accountable if they undertook actions that were unlawful. This is a basic principle of the rule of law.

On Amendment 272ZC, it is clearly in the interests of enforcement authorities and all parties that the most effective and proportionate means of enforcement is chosen. The Bill already provides that civil proceedings cannot be initiated where a notice of underpayment has been given. It would be inappropriate to impose hurdles on the fair work agency’s use of its powers; it should be able to decide how best it will use this and its other powers to enforce labour market legislation in each case.

On Amendment 272AA, Clause 92 already provides for the fair work agency to prepare and publish an annual report, which we would expect to cover all of its activities. It is simply not necessary to require individual reports on individual powers.

We strongly resist Amendment 272AB. Ultimately, the business of the next Parliament should be for that Parliament to decide and not for us to dictate now.

Briefly on Amendment 272AC, only officers with appropriate knowledge and training will carry out these powers. Clause 87(6) already clearly provides that a person can exercise the powers of an enforcement officer only to the extent specified in their appointment by the Secretary of State. This amendment would duplicate that existing provision.

To summarise, Clause 113, together with Clauses 114 and 115, delivers a manifesto commitment. It provides a new power that will enable fair work agency enforcement officers to bring proceedings to an employment tribunal in place of a worker. It is designed to address situations where a worker has a legal right to bring a claim but, for various reasons, including fear of retaliation, lack of awareness or language barriers, they are unable to do so. This clause enhances the state’s ability to support the most vulnerable workers in accessing justice and will be particularly valuable in cases involving labour exploitation or breaches of minimum employment standards.

It will bring broader benefits. The fair work agency will be able to bring multiple complaints simultaneously. This will save time and costs for workers and employers alike. It has the potential to reduce the burden on the employment tribunal system over current practices, where most claims are brought individually.

Importantly, the clause is tightly drawn. The fair work agency’s tribunal proceedings will follow the same process as if they were brought by workers. This includes a requirement for ACAS consultation. Additionally, the power cannot be used in cases where a notice of underpayment has been issued under Section 100. This ensures that there is no duplication of enforcement mechanisms. Both the Secretary of State and the worker can appeal a decision, recognising that both parties have a legitimate interest in the outcome. The clause includes safeguards to ensure that the Secretary of State cannot be held liable to the worker for how they exercise this power, reflecting the discretionary and strategic nature of enforcement.

This clause forms a crucial part of the fair work agency’s toolkit, enhances the effectiveness of labour market enforcement and delivers a manifesto commitment upon which Members in the other place were elected. It should stand part of the Bill.

Employment Rights Bill

Debate between Lord Murray of Blidworth and Baroness Jones of Whitchurch

Committee stage
Monday 19th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

I thought I had explained that in my description, and I do not really want to have to repeat it. I explained the grounds that would be considered when comparing harassment with acceptable behaviour.

Amendment 85 also seeks to significantly reduce the scope of Clause 20 by excluding the hospitality sector, sports venues and higher education. This would create a disparity and a hierarchy of protections across employers and sectors, leaving swathes of employees without equal protection. This cannot be justified, given that employers in these sectors will be required only to do what is reasonable, and this will depend on their specific circumstances.

Amendment 86 seeks to reinstate the three-strike rule that was repealed in 2013. However, as I have explained, an isolated or one-off incident is much less likely to amount to harassment than continuing acts. The recent Free Speech Union campaign against this clause stated that

“when the Equality Act was originally passed, it included a clause making employers liable for the harassment of employees by third parties, but it was repealed in 2013 because it proved to be so costly and difficult for employers to comply with. We mustn’t make the same mistake again”.

We agree that we should not make that mistake again. We cannot see why the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, would wish to impose on employers the unnecessary costs and burdens that this amendment would bring. By contrast, the Government’s approach will make it simpler for employers to understand their obligations and will ensure that victims can be confident that they are protected by law.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

In relation to the last passage of the Minister’s speech, it appears to be the Government’s position that it is not accepted that carve-outs for three strikes are necessary because that would impose a burden on business. The Explanatory Notes to the Bill, and to the Equality Act, specifically state that in determining the effect of the unwanted conduct, courts and tribunals must balance competing rights on the facts of a particular case—the point that the Minister has just made. Will she not accept that the effect of the provision, as presently drafted, will be for a sensible employer to take overly defensive approaches to prevent actions being brought against them under these provisions? It is that reaction which will cause a stifling of free speech, and this Committee should be very worried about that.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I cannot see why we should carve out some of the most customer-facing sectors, where the sorts of harassment we are talking about are probably more prevalent. I cannot see the point of that. Surely every employee in this country has the same right to be protected from harassment, and that is what we are attempting to achieve. Most of the pubs and sports grounds that I frequent already have these policies, so it is a minority of pubs—obviously the sorts of pubs that the noble Lord, Lord Young, likes to go to—that do not have them. I think most people would like to frequent places where they feel that the employees are treated with respect and are protected.