Historic Sexual Offences: Investigations

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Wednesday 4th March 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I read the words of Diana Brittan. I hope that the whole House will take comfort from the fact that, when the House of Lords Appointments Commission decides whether people will come into your Lordships’ House, it should consider whether that person will bring the House into disrepute.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, does the Minister not agree that complainants should always initially be cared for as genuine survivors of sexual offences but investigations should always be an objective search for the truth, and that there is no contradiction in such an approach?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I think that the noble Lord knows that I agree with him.

European Arrest Warrant, Europol and Eurojust

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Monday 2nd March 2020 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Paddick]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what is their assessment of the impact of the UK withdrawing from participation in the European Arrest Warrant, membership of Europol and membership of Eurojust.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, the UK stands ready to discuss an agreement on law enforcement and judicial co-operation in criminal matters. An agreement in this area should support data exchange for law enforcement, operational co-operation between law enforcement authorities and judicial co-operation in criminal matters. This agreement should equip operational partners on both sides with capabilities that help protect citizens and bring criminals to justice, promoting the security of all our citizens.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, the Minister has not even attempted to answer the Question. Not being a member of Europol or Eurojust relegates the UK to observer status, rather than driving and directing pan-European law enforcement operations and intelligence sharing. The Government say that they want a similar agreement to that reached by Norway and Iceland to replace the European arrest warrant, but that agreement took 13 years to negotiate and implement and does not allow extradition of an EU member state’s own nationals. Is it not inevitable that the UK will be less safe and less secure if we withdraw from these arrangements?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The first thing to say is that the Norway-Iceland agreement might have taken 13 years but the initial agreement took very little time at all; it was the commencement that seemed to take so long. It did not take very long to get agreement on this. The agreement we are negotiating should provide for co-operation between the UK and Europol and Eurojust to facilitate multilateral law enforcement and criminal justice co-operation. The agreement with Europol should go beyond existing precedent, given the scale and nature of co-operation between the UK and Europol. For example, the UK was the highest contributor of data to Europol for strategic, thematic and operational analysis in 2018.

Pre-charge Police Bail: Time Limit

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Wednesday 26th February 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

As I said to the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, we fully intend to put this on a statutory footing. RUI has increased following the legislation we passed some two or three years ago, sometimes to more than what bail would have been. We have to look at this area, but I take what my noble friend says.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, when this matter was debated before the Government placed restrictions on police bail, police chiefs, the Police Superintendents’ Association and we on these Benches told the Government that these limits and restrictions were unrealistic. As a result, in 2017-18, 46,674 people were released under investigation in London alone, which is the worst of both worlds: allegations hang over the accused indefinitely with no power for the police to impose conditions. When will the Government start to listen to those who know what they are talking about?

Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2017

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Thursday 21st December 2017 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, the threat level in the UK, which is set by the independent Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, remains at severe. This means that a terrorist attack in our country is highly likely and could occur without warning.

While we can never entirely eliminate the threat from terrorism, we are determined to do all we can to minimise the threat to the UK and our interests abroad, and to disrupt those who would engage in it. Recognising that terrorism is a global threat that is best tackled in partnership, it is also important that we demonstrate our support for other members of the international community in their efforts to tackle terrorism wherever it occurs. Proscription is an important part of the Government’s strategy to disrupt terrorist activities.

The four groups we propose to add to the list of terrorist organisations, amending Schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000 are, first, al-Ashtar Brigades. This includes a number of aliases of this group: Saraya al-Ashtar, the Wa’ad Allah Brigades, the Islamic Allah Brigades, Imam al-Mahdi Brigades and al-Haydariyah Brigades; secondly, al-Mukhtar Brigades, including Saraya al-Mukhtar; thirdly, Hasam including Harakat Sawa’d Misr and Harakat Hasm; and Liwa al-Thawra. This is the 22nd order under the Act.

Proscription sends a strong message that terrorist activity is not tolerated wherever it happens. Under Section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000, the Home Secretary has the power to proscribe an organisation if she believes that it is concerned in terrorism. If the statutory test is met, the Home Secretary may then exercise her discretion to proscribe the organisation. The Home Secretary takes into account a number of factors in considering whether to exercise this discretion. These include the nature and scale of an organisation’s activities and the need to support other members of the international community in tackling terrorism. The effect of proscription is that a listed organisation is outlawed and is unable to operate in the UK. It is a criminal offence for a person to belong to, invite or provide support for, or arrange a meeting in support of, a proscribed organisation. It is also an offence to wear clothing or carry articles in public, such as flags, which arouse reasonable suspicion that an individual is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation.

Proscription sends a strong message to deter fundraising and recruitment for proscribed organisations, and the assets of a proscribed organisation can become subject to seizure as terrorist assets. Proscription can also support other disruption of terrorist activity, including, for example, the use of immigration powers such as exclusion from the UK where the individual is linked to a proscribed organisation and their presence in the UK would not be in the public interest. Given its wide-ranging impact, the Home Secretary only exercises her power to proscribe after thoroughly reviewing the available evidence on an organisation. This includes information taken from both open sources and sensitive intelligence, as well as advice that reflects consultation across government, including with intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The cross-government Proscription Review Group supports the Home Secretary in her decision-making process. The Home Secretary’s decision to proscribe is taken only after great care and consideration of each particular case—but, given the impact the power can have, it is appropriate that proscriptions must be approved by both Houses.

Having carefully considered all the evidence, the Home Secretary believes that al-Ashtar Brigades, al-Mukhtar Brigades, Hasam and Liwa al-Thawra are currently concerned in terrorism. As noble Lords will appreciate, I am unable to comment on specific intelligence, but I can provide a summary of each group’s activities in turn.

The first group that this order proscribes is the al-Ashtar Brigades and its aliases. The al-Ashtar Brigades is a Bahrain-based Shia militant organisation that was established in 2013. Its aim is to overthrow the Bahraini al-Khalifa ruling family through violent militant operations. It lists the ruling al-Khalifa family, Bahrain security forces and Saudi Arabia as targets for attack. The group has been responsible for numerous attacks in Bahrain for which it has claimed responsibility, including a jail-break of 10 convicted terrorists which led to the death of a police officer in January this year; an IED attack in a bus station in Sitrah, which was claimed by the group under the name Wa’ad Allah Brigades in February; and an attack on a police vehicle near the village of al-Qadeem in July. More generally, the group has promoted violent activity against the Bahraini Government, as well as the British, American and Saudi Arabian Governments on social media.

The second group is al-Mukhtar Brigades, also known as Saraya al-Mukhtar. The al-Mukhtar Brigades is also a Bahrain-based Shia militant organisation that was established in 2013. It lists the al-Khalifa ruling family, Bahraini security forces and Saudi Arabia as targets for attack. The group’s activities include the continued promotion and glorification of terrorism via social media throughout 2017.

The third group to be proscribed is Hasam and its aliases. Hasam is an extremist group targeting the Egyptian security forces and the overthrow of the Egyptian Government. The group announced its creation on 16 July 2016 following an attack it conducted in Fayoum governorate, Egypt. In September 2016, the group claimed responsibility for the attempted assassination of assistant prosecutor General Zakaria Abdel-Aziz, and the attempted assassination of the former Grand Mufti of Egypt, Ali Gomaa, a month earlier. The group has claimed responsibility for over 15 attacks. Between March and September this year in Cairo, it carried out small-arms fire attacks in March, May and July and IED attacks in March, June and September; the latter exploded close to the Myanmar embassy in Cairo.

The last group to be proscribed is Liwa al-Thawra, which is another extremist opposition group using violent tactics against Egyptian security forces, and seeking an end to the Egyptian Government. It announced its creation on 21 August 2016, following an attack in Monofeya, Egypt. The group has claimed responsibility for attacks, including bombings and assassinations. They include an attack in Monofeya, Egypt, in August 2016; the assassination of Egyptian Brigadier General Adel Regali in October 2016; and, in April 2017, the bombing of the Egyptian police training centre in Tanta, Egypt.

In addition to adding these groups, we propose to remove Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, which is an offshoot of the political Hezb-e Islami Party, formed in 1977 in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. HIG is anti-western and desires the creation of a fundamentalist Islamic state in Afghanistan. Since 2001, its main objective has been the removal of western forces and influence in Afghanistan, as well as restoring Islamic law. HIG has been proscribed in the UK since October 2005. However, on 22 September 2016, the group agreed a peace deal with the Afghanistan Government. After careful consideration, the Home Secretary has concluded that there is not sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that HIG is currently concerned in terrorism as defined by Section 3(5) of the Terrorism Act 2000. Under Section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000, the Home Secretary also has the power to remove an organisation from the list of proscribed organisations, if she believes that it no longer meets the statutory test for proscription. Accordingly, she has brought forward this order and, if approved, this means that being a member of, or providing support to, HIG will cease to be a criminal offence on the day the order comes into force. The decision to de-proscribe HIG was taken after extensive consideration and in light of a full assessment of available information.

The Government do not condone any terrorist activity, and takes a cautious approach to de-proscription. De-proscription of a particular group should not be interpreted as condoning any previous terrorist activities of that group. The British Government have always been clear that HIG was a terrorist organisation. Groups that do not meet the threshold for proscription must remain within the law and are not free to spread hatred, fund terrorist activities or incite violence as they please. The police have comprehensive powers to take action against individuals who engage in such activity under the criminal law. We are determined to detect and disrupt all terrorist threats, whether home-grown or international. Proscription is just one weapon in the considerable armoury at the disposal of the Government, police and security service to disrupt terrorist activity. The Government continue to exercise the proscription power in a proportionate manner, in accordance with the law. We recognise that proscription potentially interferes with an individual’s rights, in particular the rights protected by Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and should be exercised only when absolutely necessary. The order before the House today demonstrates that, when proscription is no longer necessary, we are prepared to act to de-proscribe groups that are no longer concerned in terrorism.

In conclusion, I believe it is right that we add the four groups, the al-Ashtar Brigades, al-Mukhtar Brigades, Hasam and Liwa al-Thawra, and their aliases, to the list of proscribed organisations in Schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000. Equally, we believe that it is proportionate to remove HIG from that list. Subject to the agreement of this House, the order will come into force on Friday 22 December.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, noble Lords will be pleased to hear that I will be brief. However, these are very serious matters. As the Minister just outlined, this measure can interfere with people’s human rights. Therefore, I have to ask: can she tell us any more about the four organisations being proscribed? I understand that the first group has been involved in attacks in Bahrain and is suspected of financing terror in Qatar; the second group has also been involved in attacks in Bahrain; the third group has been involved in attacks in Egypt; and the fourth group has been involved in attacks on the army and the police in Egypt. However, clearly, this order primarily has effect in the United Kingdom. Is the Minister able to say whether there is any evidence that these groups are active in, or have supporters in, the United Kingdom that would require such draconian steps to be taken? However, I understand that it may not be possible to give those details for security reasons, as she said.

As regards the group being de-proscribed, again it is good to see that the Government are actively considering groups that have been proscribed in the past, and are prepared to de-proscribe where the evidence suggests that is merited. My only concern is that the reasons the Minister gave for de-proscribing the organisation to which she referred raise questions about the amount of evidence available to support the proscription of the other organisations, bearing in mind the alternative measures that can be taken against individuals, in particular, who might be supporting terrorism in the United Kingdom.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for her explanation of the purpose of, and reasons for, this order, which we support, and which proscribes four groups based in Bahrain and Egypt, and removes one group from the list of proscribed organisations. Fortunately, I do not have to go to the same lengths as the Minister in giving the full names of these organisations.

The order, which is the 22nd proscription order under the Terrorism Act 2000, went through the House of Commons two days ago and will come into effect tomorrow, subject to it being passed by this House today, as the noble Baroness said.

The effect of proscription is that a listed organisation is outlawed and unable to operate in the UK, with it being a criminal offence for a person to belong to, invite or provide support for, or arrange a meeting in support of, a proscribed organisation. The assets of a proscribed organisation can become subject to seizure as terrorist assets. As I understand it, some 51 people have been charged with membership of proscribed groups and 32 have been convicted.

I also thank the Minister for the letter she sent to me at the beginning of this week setting out the reasons why the Home Secretary had come to the conclusion that each of the four groups is concerned in terrorism. As the noble Baroness said, having reached that conclusion and belief, the Home Secretary then has to decide whether to exercise her discretion to proscribe each organisation, which she has decided to do in each case. One of the factors that the Home Secretary takes into account in considering whether to exercise that discretion is the need to support other members of the international community in tackling terrorism. There are, however, four other factors the Home Secretary has regard to in deciding whether to exercise her discretion to proscribe: the nature and scale of the organisation’s activities; the specific threat it poses to the UK; the specific threat it poses to British nationals overseas; and the extent of the organisation’s presence in the UK.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rosser]

I do not want the noble Baroness to regard this as a challenge to what she has just said; I am merely asking for confirmation. Is it really regarded as a security issue to give any indication of which of the five factors set out in the Explanatory Memorandum weighed with the Home Secretary in her decision? I ask that in the context of the noble Baroness’s opening statement, when she referred to supporting international partners in the fight against terrorism, which is one of the five factors. One could take it as a pretty good hint that that was a factor, but that would then be inconsistent with the noble Baroness’s statement that she cannot say which of the factors weighed in the mind of the Home Secretary on this issue.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, perhaps I can assist. I do not know whether it is beyond my pay grade to suggest something to the Minister but perhaps she could consult after today’s proceedings and, if there is any other information that she can possibly put into the public domain, perhaps she can write to us.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

That is a very helpful suggestion from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, will understand that I am cautious on these occasions. I would not want to breach national security at the Dispatch Box, but if there is any further general information that I can give, I will give it.

UK Borders: Surveillance

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Monday 18th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Lord makes a valid point about our offshore patrol vessels—and there are no plans to get rid of them. However, my point, which I hope I was not making lightly, was that the most effective work we can do at the border is intelligence-led work that is successful at pinpointing areas of high risk.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords—

[Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con)]

My Lords—

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach (Con)]

It is the Lib Dems’ turn, and then we will hear from the Conservatives.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, in April last year the then Home Secretary, Theresa May, confirmed in the other place that in 2016-17 the Border Force agency’s revenue budget, which covers staffing, would be 0.4% less compared with 2015-16. However, the Government insist that Border Force spending has been protected because spending on technology such as electronic passport gates has increased. Can the Minister explain what happens at many of the ports of entry where there are no electronic passport gates in the light of the reduction in Border Force staff? Can she also confirm that most of the time, even where there are electronic passport gates, there are not enough staff to keep them open?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

On the first part of the noble Lord’s question, he is absolutely right that we have invested in technology such as e-gates, and just before the Calais clearance, my right honourable friend Amber Rudd in the other place stated that £36 million would be committed to support France in the Calais camp clearance. However, on his main point, which is about people being at ports and borders at all times, if we lined this country wall to wall with people, it would still not be as effective as going after the intelligence-led risk, which operates so well.

Refugees (Family Reunion) Bill [HL]

Lord Paddick Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Friday 15th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I support the Bill and commend my noble friend Lady Hamwee on her tenacity and stamina in trying to improve the lot of refugees and asylum seekers. The Bill is just one example of the work she does in this area. It is also a great privilege to follow the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, who has perhaps done more than anybody in this House in this area.

My noble friend talked about moral obligations and our humanitarianism. Call me cynical—after 30 years in the police service you tend to become a bit cynical—but, for me, often in politics the number of votes a measure is likely to win or lose determines whether a Government will support it. However, with some issues, our desire for political advantage should take second place to our moral obligations and humanitarianism. This is one of them.

It is difficult to imagine the trauma of being separated from your family, your children or your parents, for example, in any circumstances. Knowing that they are still in a dangerous part of the world where they could very easily be killed or seriously injured and that the already painful separation could become permanent must be even worse. Imagine having to take the perilous journey across the Mediterranean and across Europe, eventually seeking asylum in a foreign country far from home where you may be unable to communicate very easily and where you feel hostility from a Government who express the wish to make the UK a hostile place for illegal immigrants, and then to be given little or no hope of ever seeing your family again.

Some of us, apart perhaps from the noble Lords among us who are lawyers, would hesitate to engage in any formal legal process involving a court or tribunal without legal representation, even in this country. Imagine being stranded in a foreign country where you have no knowledge of that country’s legal processes, cannot speak the language and cannot afford to employ a legal representative. What chance would any of us have of navigating complex legal processes in an attempt to be reunited with our family?

Now imagine that all those scenarios are happening at the same time: separated from your family, traumatised by the dangers which you have fled from and which your family members still face, still traumatised by the perilous journey you have undertaken, arriving in a hostile foreign country and being faced with a legal process you have no understanding of and no help in engaging with. If that were not bad enough for an adult to cope with, unaccompanied asylum-seeking children, as we have heard, have no recourse to bring their parents or other family members to join them unless there are exceptional circumstances. Of the 28 European Union countries, only Denmark and the United Kingdom do not allow applications for reunification from asylum-seeking-children—something that, as the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, has just mentioned, the Home Affairs Select Committee described as “perverse”.

Talking of perversity, it is only while someone is a refugee that they are able to bring other family members to the UK without having to have a sufficiently high income to qualify to do that. If a refugee does everything this country asks of him or her and is granted British citizenship, they are then prohibited from bringing their spouse to the UK unless they reach the spousal visa income threshold. If they were to string out their asylum application, they would not have to earn a high salary to achieve that end.

This Bill addresses all those issues. It allows unaccompanied refugee children to sponsor their family members to join them; it allows former refugees the right to sponsor family member asylum seekers under the refugee reunion rules; and it reintroduces legal aid for refugee family reunion cases. What are the Government’s objections? The 2017 Conservative Party manifesto, on page 65, says that,

“solidarity is a Conservative principle, growing out of family, community and nation—all things that Conservatives believe in and work to conserve”.

If the Government truly believed in family and truly worked to conserve the family, they would support this Bill. As the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, has said, we are not talking about large numbers here. I support the Bill and I ask the whole House and the Government to support it as well.

Online Hate Speech

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Thursday 30th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, in his tweet criticising our Prime Minister, President Trump talked about “radical Islamic terrorism”. Does the Minister agree that there is a difference between Islam, a religion, and Islamism, a violent political ideology that seeks to overthrow democratically elected Governments and liberal values, and that the expression “Islamic terrorism” is both a contradiction in terms and deeply unhelpful? We must clearly differentiate between violent criminals and the followers of a religion.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Lord is absolutely right to make that distinction between Islam and Islamist extremism. I make the point that the overwhelming majority of Muslims in this country are law-abiding, peaceful people who abhor Islamist extremism. The Prime Minister has always been clear that where these ideologies exist, they must be tackled head on. That is precisely what the UK Government are doing at home and in co-operation with our international partners. For example, I previously mentioned the co-operation to remove terrorist content from websites. The noble Lord is absolutely right to point out the distinction. We must all see what has happened for what it is.

Drug Dealing Telecommunications Restriction Orders Regulations 2017

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Wednesday 29th November 2017 Grand Committee

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, these regulations were laid before Parliament on 12 October. The drug dealing telecommunications restriction orders—DDTRO—respond to an operational requirement of the police and the National Crime Agency to support them in tackling the issue of “county lines” drug dealing and its related violence and criminal exploitation.

As noble Lords probably know, “county lines” is the police term for urban gangs supplying drugs to suburban areas and market and coastal towns, using dedicated anonymous mobile phone lines. We are particularly concerned about this form of drug dealing because of the high-harm nature of this activity. County lines gangs target and exploit children and vulnerable adults, who are then at high risk of extreme physical and sexual violence, gang recriminations and trafficking. In the National Crime Agency’s latest threat assessment of county lines, three-quarters of police forces in England and Wales reported exploitation of vulnerable people in relation to county lines, including children as young as 12.

The mobile phone line is central to county lines activity, with some prominent lines making in excess of £5,000 per day. However, the phone number has limited personal data associated with it and the handset is typically located well away from street-level drug-dealing activity. Such factors make it hard for the police to gain possession of the handset and to pursue criminal prosecutions against an individual for the activity on the line. Where it is possible to do so, and where there is sufficient evidence, the police will pursue prosecution. However, where prosecution is not possible, the police and the NCA have been clear that closing down the phone lines will seriously disrupt county lines drug dealing and the associated violence and exploitation.

With that background in mind, I turn to the details of the regulations before us. The DDTRO Regulations are made pursuant to Section 80A of the Serious Crime Act 2015, which sets out the power to make regulations which enable courts in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland to issue DDTROs. In essence, the regulations provide the civil courts with the power to make a drug dealing telecommunications restriction order, and set out the process and procedure for doing so.

The applicant for a DDTRO—that is, the police or the NCA—will have to satisfy a court that on the balance of probabilities the device has been used, is likely to have been used, or is likely to be used in connection with drug-dealing offences. The court will also have to have reasonable grounds to believe that the order would prevent or restrict the use of a communication device in connection with drug-dealing offences.

It is important that the initial DDTRO application hearing is conducted in private and without notice to ensure that the phone owner does not know that their line will be closed. If forewarned, the phone owner is likely to take action to negate the order by changing phone numbers in advance. The regulations also provide a number of safeguards to ensure swift resolution if a phone owner is impacted in error. This includes the ability for the applicant authority to disapply the order of its own volition, as well as the right of an affected person to appeal an order at a public hearing.

I hope noble Lords will approve these regulations. They will give the police a vital tool in their efforts to tackle county lines drug dealing and protect vulnerable individuals from being exploited by county lines gangs. I therefore commend these regulations to the Committee.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her explanation. I have some specific questions about these orders and a general comment about the Government’s approach to illegal drugs and related issues. We support these measures but we have wider concerns.

As the Minister has explained, these regulations allow law enforcement agencies to make an application to a court to disconnect mobile communication devices, such as mobile phones, where there are reasonable grounds to believe that an order would prevent or restrict their use in connection with drug dealing. These orders can be made without notice to the people affected, in private and at the request of the applicant, without any details being disclosed to anyone. I can understand the need to protect covert human intelligence sources who may be involved in supplying information to the enforcement agencies and I also understand what the Minister has said—that if people were told in advance, it might enable them to change their telephone numbers in advance—but surely this is going to be only a marginal benefit, as it will soon become apparent to the drug dealer that their phone has been disconnected. Unless I do not understand the issue fully, it would not take very long not only for an alternative number to be secured but for the suppliers and clients to be notified of what the new number is. What is the real advantage of keeping the whole process secret—other than protecting sources—set against the benefits of having, as far as possible, an open justice system? Can the Minister explain how these measures present any more than a minor irritation to the drug dealers? In her explanation, she talked about these measures seriously disrupting drug dealers, but surely it would be very quick and easy to re-establish their lines of communication.

Moving on to wider issues, these measures are symptomatic of the Government’s approach to illegal drugs—tinkering around the edges in the vain hope of appearing to be doing something. But the inescapable fact is that there is an insatiable demand for illegal drugs, from young people who smoke small amounts of cannabis to the rich and famous who use cocaine. The fact that these drugs are illegal is no longer a consideration for millions of recreational drug users in the UK. As with most forms of prohibition—as we have learnt from history—stemming demand is clearly ineffective and, as a result, the law is being brought into disrepute. Addiction to illegal drugs, on the other hand, should be treated as a health issue and not a criminal justice issue. It is the sufferer’s addiction that is the issue and not the drugs that they are addicted to.

As with any insatiable demand, there will clearly be a supply. The only effective way to deal with illegal drug supply is to take out the whole distribution network from source to street. During the period of the “peace dividend”, between peace in Northern Ireland and the rise of Islamist terrorism and the far right, the police and the security services were able to mount a limited number of operations that did just that—take out importers, distributors and street dealers. The combination of the diversion of the security services back to their core function of anti-terrorism and the reduction in police resources means such operations are no longer possible.

There was a story in the Times this week on this very issue of county lines, which reported:

“Thousands of children and teenagers are being used by criminal gangs as drug runners ... The National Crime Agency ... believes that the ‘county lines’ drug trade, in which urban gangs move Class A drugs and cash between inner-city hubs and out-of-town locations, is out of control”.


I spoke a few weeks ago in Parliament to some young people whose lived experience is that drug dealing, with all its inherent risks and dangers, presents the best way to make money as far as they are concerned, whether to support a reasonable lifestyle or to put food on the table for their families. Prison was seen by them as a place where they can meet with their friends. As one young woman recently released from Holloway prison explained, it was somewhere where she had “the best time”, to quote her exactly. She added, admitting the irony, that when her local police station was the base for a safer neighbourhood team and she saw uniformed officers on a regular basis she felt safer, but not anymore.

In a society where discrimination against the young, and black and minority ethnic people, persists in the job market, where young people’s lives are blighted by criminal records acquired at a young age, and which, from young people’s perspective, gives them little or nothing and no hope of making a decent living by legitimate means in the future, they believe drug dealing to be a legitimate option. All this creates a parallel society where young people feel they have to arm themselves with knives and guns to make themselves feel safe, whether they are engaged in drug dealing or not, resulting in record numbers of young people dying on the streets from knife crime and of people dying on our streets from taking illegal drugs because there is no control of the strength or composition of the drugs they are taking. What is the Government’s response to this alarming picture? It is to cut off the phones of drug dealers, if and only if they find out what numbers the dealers are using—something that can be rectified by drug dealers within hours.

There is a crisis in this country enveloping increasing numbers of young people. Of course we should make life difficult for drug dealers and these measures may have a marginal impact, but a major rethink about the legalisation and regulation of drugs, the treatment of addiction, the incarceration and criminalisation of young people, providing opportunities for young people to earn decent money legitimately, and the decimation of community policing, is desperately needed.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, for her explanation of the regulations before the Grand Committee. I am fully supportive of them as far as they go and I welcome the action being taken here, although more could be done.

I have spent a few Fridays and Saturdays with the Metropolitan Police over the last few months, looking at a variety of the operations it undertakes and how it has to work in some very challenging circumstances to keep us safe. This whole issue of drug gangs crossing county lines was the subject of a briefing I received recently. I remember visiting one particular unit that explained how a number of young people from their area had been apprehended in a coastal town with drugs and cash. They had gone from their London base and they were dealing stuff there. It is absolutely right that this exploits some very young, vulnerable people. It potentially drags young people into a life of crime. There are other risks for these young people of being groomed and sexually abused, and of being subject to other forms of violence. It is a very depressing thing to see.

I also went on a raid of a property being used as a drugs den. Across the table there were about a dozen mobile phones. If you are a drug dealer apparently you have loads of phones, which is why we have these orders. That highlighted to me the importance of these phones to the operations.

This is a serious issue and the orders have my support but my problem is that the phones can be bought with minimal information. You can just wander into a high street store or supermarket and do not need to provide anything and you can get a mobile phone and off you go. If you are a drug dealer I suppose you buy loads of these phones. I think you can also buy the mobile phone credit with minimal information. There are lots of circumstances where if you want to do things in this country you have to provide ID—to buy goods, to buy services, to get access to credit. This week I went to the post office because a parcel had arrived, we were not there and a little card was put through the door. To get the parcel, which was for my wife, I had to produce the card, our council tax bill and both our passports—just to get a parcel that was legitimately ours. But apparently someone can go to the high street and buy a mobile phone with no indication of who they are—and go off and set an operation up.

Randox and Trimega Laboratories

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Monday 27th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank the noble Lord for his questions. He is absolutely right: it is indeed a very serious matter and the Government do not take it lightly. He will have noticed that the WMS of 21 November was a fulsome Statement and there is now an investigation going on which will take some time. He questioned the abolition of the FSS. The alleged manipulation predates the closure of the FSS, which was never involved in family cases—that was Trimega. He talked about Trimega being part of Randox. I must make it clear that at this point Trimega was not part of Randox. Trimega closed and Randox set up: yes, the two individuals were employed at Randox, but Trimega was not part of it.

The noble Lord also asked whether the numbers would ever be known. They may never be known accurately, but we think that approximately 10,000 tests were affected. The nature of what allegedly went on here means that we can never make this fool-proof because, as the regulator herself said, no reasonable set of quality standards could be guaranteed to prevent determined manipulation by skilled but corrupt personnel.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, while we agree that determined, skilled and corrupt practitioners in the public sector could equally have produced such a scandal, and that the performance of the former public sector Forensic Science Service was not without criticism, what lessons have already been learned, and what new safeguards are already in place, to prevent this happening again? The Minister said that the Government are considering what lessons can be learned, but surely there are immediate steps from the initial findings that can be implemented—and should have been implemented by now. What action have the Government already taken to reassure the public?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

As the noble Lord points out, because this is an ongoing investigation the full lessons of what went on here cannot be appreciated yet. However, the Government have, of course, taken steps since January 2017, when we found out about this alleged manipulation. We supported the police’s initial response to the news of manipulation, including officials advising of the impact on the marketplace and the regulatory impact. The Home Office advised the NPCC in the creation of the silver groups working on the operating protocol for forces, the forensic service providers and the CPS. We facilitated the agreement of commercial terms between Randox and the independent testing companies and sat on the technical advisory group of forensic experts which advised the gold group on the retesting strategy.

As the Statement said, the DfE has liaised with local authorities in England to review their records and will consider what action needs to be taken from there. The MoJ, together with the DfE and HMCTS, has worked closely with the police to identify family and civil court cases where a toxicology test was undertaken by Trimega. We have advised the NPCC gold group and the team that is working with the CPS to ensure that the appropriate disclosure is made. We have asked all forensic toxicology suppliers to review their practices and have asked the Forensic Science Advisory Council to consider a number of measures to strengthen provisions to reduce the risk of malpractice and to help rapid detection. We are supporting the UKAS internal review and have briefed the Lord Chief Justice and the President of the Family Division of the High Court. We have done a lot since we found out about this.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 15th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom (Con)]

My Lords, I hope I will not add to the troubles of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, when I say that I am troubled by a couple of his amendments, Amendments 108B and 180A. The former suggests that the Government should not be permitted to,

“amend, repeal or revoke the GDPR”.

I know the Government will have responsibility for the provisions of the GDPR, but these are surely provisions for which the regulations either are or are not. They are European Union regulations, and I would not have thought the Government would have the power to amend or repeal them.

I am also confused, as so often, by the fact that we have already discussed whether Clause 15 should stand part of the Bill but are now considering an amendment to it. No doubt that is just one of the usual vagaries that leads to my confusion about the procedures of this House.

I move on to Amendment 180A, which suggests that the Secretary of State must consult not only the commissioner but data subjects. I am not sure how on earth he could find out who those data subjects were in order to consult them. Therefore, due to practical concerns, I hope the noble Lord will not press the amendment to a Division.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I will briefly comment on Amendment 108B. Taking up the position of the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom, is it not the case that if we leave the European Union, the GDPR will then become, by means of the repeal Bill, part of UK law and therefore could be changed, which is why the amendment makes sense?

However, while I agree with the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, that if parts of the GDPR were amended, repealed or revoked after we have left the EU, this may affect the adequacy decision of the European Union. Presumably, if the European Union makes changes to the GDPR it would be advantageous for the Government to be able to respond quickly by means of secondary legislation to those changes to ensure that we can continue to have adequacy—that is, when the change is on the EU side rather than on the UK side. Perhaps the Minister will clarify that.