Youth Unemployment

Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts

Tuesday 20th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Smith of Malvern (Lab)]

The noble Lord is talking about the Government’s job guarantee, which will come in after 18 months with a guaranteed job for all those on universal credit. However, it is not the case that there is no action under the youth guarantee before that. The new youth guarantee gateway will ensure that if, after 13 weeks, a young person is not earning or learning then they will have a meeting followed by four weeks of intensive support. During this period, they will receive tailored guidance and be offered up to six options, which could be work, work experience, sector-based work academy programmes, apprenticeships, training or learning. There will be 300,000 more opportunities funded by this Government to support young people long before they get to that 18-month point. However, that point is a guaranteed jobs backstop.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that, but what assessment has been made of the impact of poor mental health on young people’s ability to enter work? How joined up is the Department for Work and Pensions with the NHS—if it is joined up at all?

[Baroness Smith of Malvern (Lab)]

There are certainly larger numbers of young people who, by virtue of mental health issues, are not in the labour market. That is why we have asked Alan Milburn to focus on this issue, why the Secretary of State for Health has initiated a review into the growing numbers of young people experiencing mental health problems, and why the Department for Education will ensure that there is a mental health professional to support every single school. That is joined-up government.

Pension Schemes Bill

Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 19th January 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I will say a little more in our debate on the next group about how surpluses should be used, but we must recognise that employers in defined benefit schemes underwrite defined benefit scheme finances; they are the ones who have been putting in very large sums of money to keep these schemes going for the past 20-odd years. It is only right that we should recognise the interest that employers have in taking money that is no longer required within a scheme.

We have had so many years of deficits in pension schemes that we have rather forgotten that this was like an everyday happening in the pensions world, if you go back to the 1990s, when surpluses arose. Indeed, pension schemes were not allowed to keep pension surpluses; there were HMRC rules which made that rather difficult to do. These were perfectly ordinary transactions in the pensions world which we have just forgotten about because of the deficits that have existed for the last 20 or 30 years, which employers—not employees—have had to bear the burden of.

On the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, I understand the technical point about removing assets rather than surplus, but surplus is the language that has always been used in the context of pension schemes; it is in the 1995 Act. The noble Lord’s amendments amend only this Act; as I understand it, they do not go on and amend the earlier Act. It is just language that has been used for a long period; I think people know what it means, and it will be very confusing at this stage to change the language.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for putting these amendments down and speaking in detail about them. We also heard good words from the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. I almost thought, “Is there any point in getting up and speaking?” but I am a politician.

This group goes to first principles. What is a defined benefits pension surplus and what is it for? For us, DB surplus is not a windfall or an accident, as I think others have said. It is a result of long-term assumptions, member contributions, employer funding decisions and investment outcomes—all those—but above all, it exists within a framework of promises made to members in return for deferred pay. We are therefore concerned about renaming—we keep on coming back to this—“surplus” as simply “assets” available for redistribution.

Language matters here because it shapes both legal interpretation and member confidence. Treating surpluses as inherently extractable risks weakening the fundamental bargain that underpins DB provision. Our position is not that surplus should never be accessed, but that it should be considered only after members’ reasonable expectations have been fully protected. That includes confidence in benefits security, protection against inflation erosion, and trust and accrued rights not being retrospectively interpreted. I have always thought that with DB pensions you need prudence. How far do prudence and good governance go?

Finally, the question for Ministers is whether the Bill maintains the principle that DB schemes exist first and foremost to deliver promised benefits or whether it marks a shift towards viewing schemes as financial reservoirs once minimum funding tests are met. In that case, one has to think, “What is the minimum for the funding tests?” We shall come on to that in an amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, has put down later in the Bill on where companies fail. It is a question of when those surpluses are available, if they are ever available.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

My Lords, when I entered the department in July 2019, defined benefit pension schemes did, on occasion, report surpluses. However, those surpluses were neither of the scale nor the character that we are now observing. If one looks back over the past quarter of a century and beyond, it is evident that both the funding position of defined benefit schemes and the methodologies used to assess that funding have changed materially.

The surpluses reported today are not simply large in absolute terms but different in nature. They are measured against significantly more prudent assumptions, particularly in relation to discount rates, longevity and asset valuation, than would have been applied historically. It is therefore right that these emerging surpluses are examined with care and transparency. Bringing them into the open is necessary, and I say at the outset that the Government are right to have raised this issue explicitly in the Bill.

That said, we consider that the Bill does not yet fully reflect a number of the practical and operational issues faced by both trustees and sponsoring employers when seeking to make effective use of those provisions. In that respect, our position is not materially distant from that of the Government. Our concerns are not ones of principle but of application and implementation. We recognise that issues relating to potential deadlock between trustees and sponsors are important, but we are content for those matters to be considered at a later stage in the Committee’s proceedings. Our immediate focus is on understanding how the proposals are intended to operate in practice, how decisions are expected to be taken within existing scheme governance arrangements and how these new powers interact with established trustee fiduciary duties and employer covenant considerations.

This is a busy group, and noble Lords have done a sterling job in setting out their reasoning and rationale. I shall, therefore, not detain the Committee further by relitigating those points but will speak to my Amendment 25 in this group. Like a number of our amendments in this part of the Bill, it is a probing amendment intended to seek clarity. Clause 9 inserts new Section 36B into the Pensions Act 1995. The new section gives trustees of defined benefit trustee schemes the ability by resolution to modify the schemes’ rules so as to confirm a power to pay surplus to the employer or to remove or relax existing restrictions on the exercise of such a power.

The clause contains one explicit limitation on that power. New Section 36B(4) provides that the section does not apply to a scheme that is being wound up. In other words, wind-up is the only circumstance singled out in the Bill in which the new surplus release modification power cannot be used. Amendment 25 would remove that specific exclusion, and I want to be clear that the purpose of doing so is not to argue that surplus should be released during winding-up; rather, it is to test the Government’s reasoning in identifying wind-up as the sole circumstance meriting an explicit prohibition in primary legislation.

By proposing to remove subsection (4), the amendment invites the Minister to explain whether the Government consider wind-up to be genuinely the only situation in which surplus release would be inappropriate or whether there are other circumstances where the use of this power would also be unsuitable. If those other safeguards are already captured elsewhere, it would be helpful for the Committee to have that clearly set out on the record. Equally, if wind-up is used here as a proxy for a broader set of concerns, the Committee would benefit from understanding why those concerns are not addressed more directly.

Surplus release is a sensitive issue. The way in which the boundaries of this new power are framed therefore matters. Where the Bill chooses to draw a line in the legislation, it invites scrutiny as to why that line has been drawn there and only there. This amendment is intended to facilitate that discussion and to elicit reassurance from the Minister about how the Government envisage this power operating in practice and what protections they consider necessary beyond the single case of wind-up. On that basis, I look forward to the Minister’s response and any clarification she can provide to the Committee.

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I take the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, about history, but the whole point is that we can rewrite history. We do that here all the time; it is called progress. In fact, I have quite a long speech on the point of principle, which I am already drafting, for my Amendment 203. The world has changed, and fairness demands that something is done for the pre-1997 pensioners. The two proposals of the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, are a very small step towards achieving the justice that the people concerned deserve.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

This seems like a good moment to come in. I first ask the Minister: do the Government agree that a responsible use of surpluses should strengthen confidence in DB schemes and not leave members feeling that prudence has benefited everybody but them? In this, I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, because people do feel aggrieved.

I have three amendments here. Amendment 32 is designed to ensure that regulations take account of the particular circumstances of occupational pension schemes established before the Pensions Act 1995. Members of pre-1997 schemes, so often referred to in this debate, are often in a different position to those in later schemes. These schemes were designed under a different legal and regulatory framework. Current legislation does not always reflect those historical realities, creating unintended iniquities.

Amendment 32 would require regulations under Clause 9 to explicitly consider—that is all—these older schemes. It would allow such schemes, with appropriate regulatory oversight, to offer discretionary indexation where funding allowed, so it would provide flexibility while ensuring that safeguards were in place. It would give trustees the ability to improve outcomes for members in a fair and responsible way, and it would help to address the long-standing issue of members missing out on indexation simply because of their scheme’s pre-1997 status. It would also ensure that members could share in scheme strength where resources permitted. Obviously, safeguards are needed, and Amendment 32 would make it clear that discretionary increases would be possible only where schemes were well funded. Oversight by regulators ensures that employer interests and member protections remain balanced.

My Amendment 41 is about advice. When you are as knowledgeable as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, you do not need the advice, but many pensioners are missing it. This amendment would allow a proportion of pension scheme surplus to be allocated towards funding free—

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

The amendment talks about surpluses, so it is talking specifically about defined benefit schemes. It is not talking about DC schemes because such schemes do not have surpluses. I just want to be clear.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

I thank the noble Lord; it is just that impartial pension advice for members is not always available to everybody. Many savers struggle to navigate pension choices, whether around a consolidation investment strategy or retirement income. Without proper advice, members risk making poor financial decisions that could damage their long-term security. If you are in the business, you have to take the good with the bad, but we would like to give members a bit of advice if the money is available. Free impartial advice is essential to levelling the playing field.

Surpluses in pension schemes should not sit idle or be seen simply as windfall funds. Redirecting a small—I stress “small”—proportion to fund member advice would ensure that surpluses are used in a way that benefits members directly. Amendment 32 would not mandate a fixed share; it would simply give the Secretary of State powers to determine what proportion may be used. This would, I hope, create flexibility and safeguards so that the balance between scheme health and member benefit can be properly managed. Further advice from surpluses reduces the need for members to pay out of pocket and it builds trust that schemes are actively supporting member outcomes beyond the pension pot itself.

Amendment 44, to which my noble friend Lord Thurso referred, would insert a new clause requiring the Secretary of State to publish

“within 12 months … a report on whether the fiduciary duties of trustees of occupational pension schemes should be amended to permit discretionary indexation of pre-1997 accrued rights, where scheme funding allows”.

It aims to explore options for improving outcomes for members of older pension schemes. I maintain that this amendment is needed because many pre-1997 schemes were established before modern indexation rules. Trustees’ current fiduciary duties may limit their ability to avoid discretionary increases, which is what this amendment is about. Members of these schemes may be missing out on pension increases that could be sustainable and beneficial. I will not go on about what the report would do, but there would be many benefits to this new clause. It would provide an evidence-based assessment of whether discretionary indexation can be applied safely; support trustees in making informed decisions for pre-1997 scheme members; and balance members’ interests with financial prudence and regulatory safeguards.

The amendments in this group are clearly going to progress on to Report in some way. Sometime between now and then, we are going to have to try to amalgamate these schemes and take the best bits out of them in order to get, on Report, a final amendment that might have a chance of persuading the Government to take action on these points. Many of the amendments in this group—indeed, all of them—follow the same line, but there needs to be some discipline in trying to get the best out of them all into a final amendment on Report.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, for their amendments in this group. I also thank other noble Lords for all their other contributions in Committee so far this afternoon. Our debate on this group has stimulated a most valuable discussion. Of course, I look forward to the Minister’s responses to the points that have been raised.

I wish to start off by saying that I thought it was helpful that the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, steered the Committee—my words, not hers—towards a focus on scheme members. The debate went a lot beyond that, but I just wanted to make that point at the outset. I wish also to take this opportunity to set out our stance on indexation, as well as some of the related questions that we for the Opposition have for the Government on this point.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, said, these amendments raise understandable concerns about fairness, inflation and the use of defined benefit surpluses. But our core line is simple: mandating how trustees and employers use DB surpluses would be overly prescriptive and risks being actively anti-business. Many employers are already using surpluses constructively, improving DC provision for younger workers, supporting intergenerational fairness, strengthening scheme security through contingent assets, SPVs or insurance-backed arrangements, or reducing long-term risk in ways that benefit members as well as sponsors. Employers have also borne DB deficit risk for many years, as we have heard a bit about this afternoon. If they carried the risk in the bad times, it is reasonable that they can share in the benefits in the good times, provided that decisions are taken jointly with trustees.

I will explain this through a simple analogy—I say at the outset that it will not be up to the standard of the buckets analogy utilised previously in Committee by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, but here we are. The employer and members walk into the casino together. The bets are placed and the investment strategy, funding assumptions and longevity risk are collective decisions overseen by trustees. If the bet goes wrong, the employer must cover the losses, often over many years, through additional contributions and balance sheet strain. If the bet goes right, however, some argue that the employer should be excluded from any upside and that all gains must automatically be distributed to members.

That is not, we believe, how risk sharing works. In any rational system, the party that underwrites the losses must surely be allowed to share in the gains—I know there are other arguments, but I believe this was the one posed by my noble friend Lady Noakes—otherwise, incentives are distorted, future participation is discouraged and employers become less willing to sponsor schemes at all. The fair outcome is that neither the employer nor the members take everything and that surplus is discussed and allocated jointly by trustees and employers in a way that balances member security, scheme sustainability and the long-term health of the sponsoring employer. I think this was the central argument of the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, and, in a different way, my noble friend Lord Fuller. Legislation should support that partnership, not override it.

My noble friend Lord Willets made an interesting point. He asked whether it is fair that, in DB schemes, current employees often contribute to enhancing or rescuing the surplus position of pension schemes, making up for past mistakes—or deficits, perhaps—and the potential consequence of that linking to lower remuneration for those current employees. I add one more thing, which is probably a bit unfair because it is slightly hypothetical: if that current employee, having perhaps been paid less, is then made redundant, that is a double whammy for them. The question is whether the surplus should be used for helping current employees or giving them a better deal, as well as, or instead of, looking to help the pre-1997 members. That is the way I look at it.

Against that backdrop, amendments that would make benefit uplifts—whether pre-1997 indexation or lump sum enhancements—a statutory condition of surplus extraction raise real concerns. Automatic uplift would ignore wider economic impacts, including higher employer costs; increased insolvency risk, ultimately borne by the PPF; knock-on effects on wages, investment and employment; and potentially higher PPF levies.

For PPF schemes, mandatory uplift is manageable because the employer covenant has gone and Parliament controls the compensation framework. Imposing similar requirements on live schemes risks destabilising otherwise healthy employers. Uplift should therefore be an option and not an obligation. That said, focusing on choice does not mean ignoring power imbalances. In some schemes, there is genuine deadlock. Trustees may be reluctant to deploy surplus for fear of sponsor reaction or member backlash, so instead sit on it and de-risk further. That may be a rational defensive response, but it is also a deeply inefficient outcome. The Government should be looking at how to enable better use of surplus by agreement, rather than mandating outcomes.

My questions to the Minister are as follows. How do the Government intend to preserve flexibility while avoiding blunt compulsion? How will they support trustee-employer partnership rather than hardwiring outcomes into legislation? What consideration has been given to mechanisms for breaking deadlock—including overprudence, if that is a term that can be used—so that surplus can be used productively rather than simply locked away?

To conclude, these amendments raise important issues. Our concern is not with the objectives but with the method. Choice, partnership and proportionality should remain the guiding principles. I look forward to the responses from the Minister.

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Moved by

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill]

45: After Clause 10, insert the following new Clause—
“Independent review into state deduction in defined benefit pension schemes(1) The Secretary of State must, within three months of the day on which this Act is passed, commission an independent review into the application and impact of state deduction mechanisms in occupational defined benefit pension schemes for banks.(2) The Secretary of State must by regulations set out the terms of reference for the review, including the bank or banks to be investigated.(3) The regulations in subsection (2) must make provision for the terms of reference to include —(a) the origin, rationale and implementation of state deduction in bank pension schemes,(b) the clarity and adequacy of member communications regarding state deduction from inception to present,(c) the differential impact of state deduction on pensioners with varying salary histories, including an assessment of any disproportionate effects on—(i) lower-paid staff, and(ii) women, (d) comparisons with other occupational pension schemes in the banking and public sectors, and(e) the legal, administrative, and financial feasibility of modifying or removing state deduction provisions, including potential mechanisms for redress.(4) The Secretary of State must ensure that the person or body appointed to conduct the review—(a) is independent of the banks investigated and its associated pension schemes,(b) possesses relevant expertise in pensions law, occupational pension scheme administration, and equality and fairness in retirement income, and(c) undertakes appropriate consultation with—(i) affected scheme members,(ii) employee representatives,(iii) pension experts, and(iv) stakeholder organisations.(5) The person or body conducting the review must—(a) submit a report on its findings to the Secretary of State within 12 months of the date the review is commissioned, and(b) the Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before Parliament and publish the report in full.(6) Within three months of laying the report before Parliament, the Secretary of State must publish a written response setting out the Government’s proposed actions, if any, in response to the report’s findings and recommendations.(7) Regulations under this section are subject to the negative procedure.(8) For the purposes of this section—“state deduction” means any provision within a defined benefit occupational pension scheme that reduces pension entitlements by reference to the member reaching state pension age or by reference to any state pension entitlement;“defined benefit pension scheme” has the meaning given in section 181 of the Pension Schemes Act 1993.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into clawback provisions in occupational defined benefit pension schemes, for example, the Midland Bank staff pension scheme.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

This proposed new clause would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into the application and impact of state deduction mechanisms in occupational defined benefit schemes. It is a very narrow request that focuses specifically on clawback provisions in the Midland Bank staff pension scheme.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Morgan of Drefelin) (Lab)]

My Lords, there is a Division in the House—we all knew it was coming—so we need to adjourn. If it is acceptable to the Committee, we will adjourn for 20 minutes because there is, I believe, a number of Divisions coming.

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[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I will try to make this quick. Proposed new clause in Amendment 45 requires the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into the application and impact of state deduction mechanisms in occupational defined benefit pension schemes. It focuses on the clawback provisions, particularly in the Midland Bank staff pension scheme and associated legacy arrangements.

Why is this review needed? State deduction provisions can reduce members’ pension entitlements, sometimes in ways that are complex or unclear. There are concerns about fairness and transparency and a disproportionate impact, particularly on lower paid staff and women. It ensures members, regulators and Parliament have clarity about the origin, rationale and effects of these provisions.

The review will examine the history and rationale for state deduction in a Midland Bank staff pension scheme and assess clarity. It will be conducted by a person or body independent of HSBC and associated schemes. We will also try to ensure that it must consult affected scheme members, employee representatives, pension experts and stakeholder organisations. I beg to move.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

My Lords, we are broadly supportive of the purpose behind this amendment. It raises an important set of questions about whether members of defined benefit schemes have been given clear, timely and accessible information about state deduction or clawback provisions, and whether the rationale for those provisions has been properly explained to them over time.

Of course, individuals must take responsibility for managing their own finances and retirement planning. But that responsibility can only be exercised meaningfully if people are properly informed in advance about what will happen to their pension, when it will happen and why. When changes or reductions are triggered at state pension age, members need adequate notice so that they can make sensible and informed financial decisions. In that context, a review of the adequacy of member communications, the transparency of the original rationale and the accessibility of this information is welcome. While we may not necessarily agree with some of the more precise parameters and timetables set out in the amendment, as a way of posing the question and prompting scrutiny, it is a reasonable approach.

That said, we have spoken to someone who has intimate, working knowledge of the Midland Bank pension scheme and has experience of the workings of the scheme. They confirmed to us that they were fully aware of this provision, because it was in all the literature they were sent when they were enrolled. Given this, can the noble Lord give some more insight into why he thinks some members of this scheme were aware, and others not, and how could this be addressed?

I would be interested to hear from the Minister whether she has any initial views on the issues this amendment raises. In particular, how accessible is this information to members in practice today, and what steps, if any, would the Government or Department for Work and Pensions take if it became clear that these arrangements are not well understood?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, for introducing his amendment and drawing attention to this issue, which is of real importance to some members in integrated schemes. After a lifetime of work, people rightly expect their pension to provide security and stability in retirement. For many, their occupational pension forms a key part of that.

Integrated schemes can feel confusing or unexpected to those affected, particularly when their occupational pension changes at the point when their state pension is paid. These schemes are designed so that the occupational pension is higher before state pension age and then adjusted downwards once the state pension is paid, because the schemes take account of some or all of a state pension when calculating the pension due. However, if it is not clearly explained, the change could come as a surprise. I acknowledge that and the worries some members have expressed. It is important to be clear that members are not losing money at state pension age. The structure of these schemes aims to provide a smoother level of income across retirement by blending occupational and state pension over time.

Concerns have been raised that deductions applied within integrated schemes may represent a higher proportion of income for lower-paid members, many of whom are women. This reflects wider patterns of lower earnings during their working lives, rather than any discriminatory mechanism within the schemes themselves, but I appreciate why this feels unfair to those affected. The rules governing these deductions are set out in scheme rules. Employers and trustees can decide on their scheme’s benefit structure within the legislative framework that all pension schemes must meet. The Government do not intervene in individual benefit structures but do set and enforce the minimum standards that all schemes must comply with.

Although this type of scheme is permitted under legislation, it is essential that members understand how their scheme operates. Therefore, it is extremely important that people have good, clear information about their occupational pension scheme so that they can make informed decisions about their retirement. What matters just as much as the rules is that people understand them. Good, clear information is essential so that members are not taken by surprise when they reach state pension age.

If a member believes that the information they received was unclear or incomplete, they are not without redress. They can make a complaint through their scheme’s internal dispute process or, if needed, escalate their case to the Pensions Ombudsman for an independent determination.

The Government absolutely share the desire for people to have confidence in the pensions they rely on, but, given the protections already in place and the long-established nature of schemes, we do not believe that a review is necessary. For those reasons, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

I thank the noble Baroness and withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 45 withdrawn.

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If, however, the employer was not in robust financial health and questions were raised about the financial strength of the employer, that contingent liability would almost certainly be treated by bankers—and probably trade creditors as well—as an actual liability in the calculations that are done on decisions being made on advancing or maintaining lending or advancing trade credit. That would then amplify the problems for a company that was perhaps struggling financially, which would in turn increase the possibility that the employer would be tipped into insolvency. This amendment is potentially very risky, and I hope that the Government will not accept it.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

This amendment raises a very important point. The question, though, is when the surpluses could be paid out. If the company seems to be in a robust way, there is no reason why the pension fund should be overprotected. While everything in the garden is lovely, there is no reason to give them a 10-year position when things may have deteriorated in subsequent years. So, I agree in principle with the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, but 10 years is far too long, because in those 10 years, all sorts of things can happen. If it was five years or fewer, it would be very good, but while everything in the garden—in the company—is lovely, the pension fund should not be overprotected for the extent of 10 years.

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have enormous sympathy with the thoughts behind the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka. However, I share the concerns expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, in that it is not clear how that would work, because this would then need to be a contingent payment or some kind of conditional payment which can be recouped, and that would impact creditors or debt holders of the company as well. Does the noble Lord feel that if, as a consequence of the surplus payment, members also got enhanced benefits, that would in some ways compensate for the future eventuality of what he is concerned about?

Finally, in the days before we had a Pension Protection Fund, I was very much in favour of increasing the status of the unsecured creditor position of a pension scheme. But in the current environment, where there is a Pension Protection Fund, and where the Bill will be improving the protections provided by it, it is much less important to increase the status on insolvency of the pension scheme itself than it would have been in past times. I certainly agree with the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, that if there were to be any such provision, it should be a lot less than 10 years.

Youth Guarantee Scheme: Evaluation

Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts

Tuesday 13th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Smith of Malvern (Lab)]

The noble Lord is right that I have been able to speak to Make UK about the important role of apprenticeships in delivering engineering skills for young and older people. I understand the concerns raised about the funding rates for engineering apprenticeships. That is why, as I said when I met Make UK, we will continue to monitor that in order to ensure that they meet the costs of training. We will continue to find other ways to encourage people on to apprenticeships, such as removing some of the bureaucracy associated with them, supporting the reform of end-point assessment, and removing the requirement for separate maths and English qualifications for adults.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, although we welcome the youth employment scheme, can the Minister say whether the Government will monitor the employment of 26 and 27 year-olds? If you are a small business and you can get someone at 24 for nothing, will that reduce your employment of 26 to 27 year-olds? We do not want to displace the unemployment from the 24 year-olds to the 26 year-olds.

[Baroness Smith of Malvern (Lab)]

Of course we do not want to displace the unemployment, but, as I suggested in responding to my noble friend, there is something particularly challenging and important about young people who do not even get the opportunity to get into the workforce and to have the chance of a successful future. That is why, although there will always need to be an age cut-off for a scheme, the youth guarantee, with its additional investment from the Budget and its focus on support from school onwards, will be effective in getting young people into the workplace, and keeping them there when they get to the age of 25 or 26 as well.

Pension Schemes Bill

Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 12th January 2026 Grand Committee

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, I support this amendment, which was so well introduced by my noble friend Lord Younger and so well spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted. The Bill is very complicated. It is not absolutely clear to me what it means. It is also, as my noble friend Lord Younger explained, a skeletal Bill without a clear purpose to improve the outcomes for savers. In particular, looking at the value-for-money part of the Bill, it is not clear how this is going to work, what the metrics will be and how they will be assessed.

I think it is right to table this amendment in order to understand the purpose of the Bill. I am not clear that the Bill is primarily intended to improve the outcomes for pensioners or to find ways to fund government initiatives to make certain investments with pension savings that the trustees and managers might not have decided to make, which may require them to compromise on what should be their complete and clear duty to exercise their fiduciary responsibilities.

Can the Minister tell the Committee how the Bill is certain to improve outcomes for pensioners beyond what they would have been without government interference in the management of these funds? The Bill interferes with the trustees’ fiduciary duties not only with the mandation powers to direct investments, which apply only to very large DC schemes—the kind to which less well-off pensioners have contributed—but with the powers to require the 93 local government pension schemes to pool their funds together. How is this going to work if, at the same time, the Government are forcing many local authorities to merge or demerge under local government reorganisation?

I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response and approach to this amendment.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank everyone for their contributions. I do not intend to go on at length.

It is a novel view, is it not, that a Bill should have a purpose? This ought to be applied to many other Bills to show what their purposes are. This Bill has a wide range of powers affecting consolidation, investment, surplus extraction, defaults and retirement outcomes, but nowhere is a clear statement of purpose listed. I do not think that is symbolic; it is very useful. I have a simple question for the Minister: what is lost by clarity? We are looking here for a piece of clarity that does not undermine the Bill in any way but sets out what people are meant to see and expect from the Bill. It would set a pathway for other Bills to set out their purposes. From these Benches, I support this amendment.

[The Minister of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Baroness Sherlock) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, for introducing his amendment, and all noble Lords who have spoken. It is a particular delight to hear from so many colleagues so early in Committee.

I should begin by saying two things. First, I am a member of the parliamentary pension scheme, so I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, for his service and urge him to give the scheme even greater attentiveness in future; I would be very grateful for that. Secondly, I am about to disappoint most Members of the Committee, but I may as well start as I mean to go on. Many of the points made and questions asked will come up in subsequent Committee days—that is what Committee is for—so I hope that noble Lords will forgive me if I do not go into the detail of how surplus operates, how value for money operates or how asset allocation will work; I will come back to all of those. I should probably apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, because I cannot promise to go back to Star Wars figurines, but I will try to pick up most of the rest of the points at some stage.

The Bill delivers vital reforms to strengthen the UK pensions system, safeguarding the financial future of around 20 million savers while driving long-term economic growth. The Bill focuses on improving value and efficiency for workers’ pension savings, with an average earner potentially gaining up to £29,000 more by retirement. These measures will accelerate the shift towards a pensions landscape with fewer, larger and better-governed schemes that deliver for both members and the wider economy.

To support market consolidation, the Bill introduces superfunds, megafunds and Local Government Pension Scheme pools, creating scale and resilience. The value-for-money framework will ensure that schemes provide the best outcomes for savers, while guided retirement provisions will help members when accessing their savings. Other measures in the Bill will enable pension schemes to operate more effectively by streamlining governance, improving transparency and reducing unnecessary complexity. The reforms delivered through the Bill will create a more efficient, resilient pension landscape; they will also lay the foundation for the Pensions Commission to examine outcomes for pensioners and set out how to develop a fair and sustainable system, ultimately benefiting both individual savers and the UK economy.

To achieve these ambitions, the Bill makes a number of essential changes to the framework of law relating to private pension schemes and the LGPS, rather than pursuing a single overarching objective. To insert a purpose clause could cause legal uncertainty as a court could assume that a provision included in a Bill was intended to have some additional operative effect. The practical effect of the requirement to have regard to the purpose of the Bill, as expressed in this proposed new clause, is unclear.

The purposes of individual provisions are instead made clear through their drafting and the accompanying explanatory material, including the Explanatory Notes and the impact assessment. There is no need for an additional new clause at the start of the Bill setting out the purposes, as this is covered elsewhere more appropriately. This approach is in keeping with established practice; for example, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 was twice the size of the Pension Schemes Bill. Like the Bill, it deals with a complex legal landscape and made a number of separate and necessary changes to the law relating to financial services and markets. There is no purpose provision in that Act, just as no overarching purpose clause has been included in the Pension Schemes Bill. We will return to matters related to secondary legislation in the debate on a subsequent group of amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey.

I will pick up the point made by the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, about this being a framework Bill; he used that as an argument for a purpose clause. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, that, if he has not seen a purpose clause debate, he has not been in many debates in the Chamber recently, because they have appeared; unfortunately and inadvertently, they mostly resulted in long Second Reading debates at the start of many other pieces of legislation. I stress that that was neither the purpose nor the result here, but many of those debates have happened.

We do not consider this to be a framework Bill. The noble Viscount mentioned the idea of setting legislation now and setting policy later. Manifestly, that is not what is happening. The Bill clearly sets out the policy decisions and the parameters within which delegated powers must operate. It brings together a broad package of reforms in pensions into a single piece of legislation. Many of those reforms build on long-established statutory regimes, where Parliament has historically set the policy in primary legislation and provided for detailed measures that will apply to schemes to be set out in regulations. The policy direction is clearly set out here.

As we all know, the successful implementation of pensions depends heavily on trustees, schemes, providers and regulators, which makes engagement and operational detail essential rather than optional. There has been extensive consultation and there will be further extensive consultation. I do not think that this matter will be solved any further by adding a purpose clause.

Finally, the Long Title of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 was also described in neutral terms—

“to make provision about the regulation of financial services and markets”—

rather than providing a practically unworkable narrative explanation of the purpose of that legislation. The same applies here.

While I welcome the comments and look forward to returning to many of them in our debates, I hope that I have made the case not only for the Bill as a whole but as to why it is unnecessary and unhelpful to add a purpose clause. I ask the noble Viscount to withdraw his amendment.

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[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I had basically finished—I just wanted to say that, if we are not going to turn the £400 billion or so into a sovereign wealth fund, it would be preferable if the Government did not try to direct the investments.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

I simply ask the Minister to explain how local accountability will be preserved, how fiduciary duties will be protected in practice and why so much of this is not in the Bill.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for these amendments in the names of the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Stedman-Scott, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted and Lady Altmann. Before I proceed, as we have had a bout of putting things on the record and making declarations, I should say that I served for a mercifully short time as a councillor in the London Borough of Camden from 2010 to 2014 and, as a consequence, am a member of that council’s pension scheme, but I think that has pretty scant bearing on our discussions this afternoon.

On Amendments 2 and 6, I recognise the intention to preserve the independence of the Local Government Pension Scheme administering authorities and to reduce the burden of regulation on their function. I will say now, so that I do not forget, that I appreciate that the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, asked a great deal of questions on amendments not just in this group but in groups to come. It was very helpful to have his explanation about degrouping; we are very happy to debate the Bill in the way the Committee sees best. I also put on record the welcome recognition by many Members who spoke on this group, particularly the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Fuller—although in slightly different ways—of the importance and success of the LGPS. It is worth being clear that the Government are determined to make sure that success continues.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 8, I will speak also to Amendment 13, in my name. The aim of this amendment is to focus on the flow of money going into these schemes, rather than just the investment of the stock of assets that are already held, which has been the focus so far and is generally the focus of everything else in the Bill. Both are important.

Take, for example, value for money for taxpayers and members. With so much money going in each year—the latest estimates are £10 billion a year of employer contributions alone, let alone the members who are local workers—there seem to be strong reasons why we should expect targets to be set. If we are setting targets for other types of areas of investment, and for the investment of new contributions, we should have a local or national focus, or both.

This is obviously a probing amendment. As I declared at Second Reading, I support all private pension schemes also having an incentive to invest a certain percentage—I have suggested 25%—in UK growth assets. I have described UK growth assets in Amendment 13 as including listed and unlisted equities, infrastructure and property, as we have been discussing, all designed to boost long-term UK growth. I hope that the Minister will be able to explain whether the Government have specific objections to this idea and, if so, why?

If the Government are intent on mandating specific asset pools to invest in certain ways, why would they be reluctant to set certain aims or requirements for the new contributions of what are, in effect, publicly underwritten pension schemes? If we are intent on having mandation, requiring asset pools to invest in certain ways and requiring these funds to invest in them, and if we are not, as we will come to later, looking at ways of permitting employers to either significantly reduce their contributions or have a contribution holiday, would it not be sensible for the Government to look at directing those contributions—which are being paid into a scheme that does not need the money, as far as the actuarial certifications are concerned—to invest to boost long-term growth? I beg to move Amendment 8.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

This is an important, basic matter. Directing investment by asset types raises difficulties. If pension funds or individuals knew which assets were going to go up, there would be no problem, but there is no guarantee of that, so, my question to the Minister is: are pension funds primarily long-term investors acting for members or instruments of policy delivery? The answer matters a lot for confidence in Local Government Pension Scheme governance. I am all for productive investment, but it can be a slippery slope if you get it wrong. I wonder whether the Minister can give us some guidance on that.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, for her two amendments in this group, for the remarkably brief discussion that has been prompted and for the opportunity that they provided for her and us to probe the Minister on these important issues. Noble Lords will be pleased to hear that I will not rehearse the arguments at length, as I touched on them in some detail earlier. However, I wish briefly to reiterate what I regard as a central and non-negotiable principle: the Local Government Pension Scheme exists first and foremost as a fiduciary vehicle. Scheme managers are under a clear legal duty to act in the best financial interests of members and beneficiaries, and that duty must remain paramount.

Against that background, Amendment 13 raises a particularly important question, one that has been put to us repeatedly by industry representatives from a wide range of backgrounds; namely, what type of assets do the Government have in mind in which funds should be directed to invest? I think this is the essential argument of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. Is the intention to focus on infrastructure, debt servicing or supporting new towns and similar developments? The noble Baroness also raised the point of what percentage should be invested in UK assets. As she pointed out, perhaps 25% should be invested in UK growth assets, and, therefore, what is the definition of growth? Lots of questions arise from the noble Baroness’s amendments.

I recognise, and I think the noble Baroness alluded to this, that we will return to this issue in greater detail when we come to consider the reserve power, but like the noble Baroness, I wish to flag this matter at this stage as it has been a theme this afternoon on this first day of Committee and a live and pressing question not only for us but, I reiterate, for the many third-party stakeholders with whom we have engaged.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

I have always reckoned that the duty of pension fund managers is to the members. What we are trying to do now is say that they have other duties; however, it is not very clear where the borderline is.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

I know how frustrating it is when Members keep getting up to ask questions, but I have to do this. The Minister referred to a backstop. For what purpose? In what circumstances would it be used? Can the Minister help us understand that?

Pension Schemes Bill

Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 18th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

Yes, my Lords, we are getting towards the end. I thank all noble Lords who have who have spoken. My particular thanks and congratulations go to the noble Baroness, Lady White of Tufnell Park, who made a marvellous first speech, which I am sure will be one of many.

There is much to welcome in the Bill; let us start positively. My noble friend Lady Kramer—as noble Lords know, she cannot participate today because she is at a funeral—is seeking the detail and the risk profile of the assets that will qualify under the Mansion House compact. Most people contributing through auto-enrolment into default funds have few resources and should not be in high-risk investments, certainly not without their permission.

My noble friend Lady Bowles, with great expertise, emphasised that fiduciary duty must remain the overriding principle of pension governance. She warned that mandating specific investment vehicles risks undermining trustees’ discretion, encouraging herding and discriminating against proven structures such as listed investment funds. Drawing on lessons from the LDI crisis, she argued that statutory preference cannot guarantee financial benefit and may expose pension members to unnecessary risk.

My noble friend further highlighted the Bill’s unjustified exclusion of listed investment companies and trusts, despite their track record in financing UK infrastructure and growth businesses. She also cautioned that lobbying pressures appear to have shaped the preference for long-term asset funds and urged that legislation should not be dictated by sectoral interests. Her message was clear: fiduciary duty must not be subordinated to lobbying or legislative preference, because it is pension members who will ultimately bear the cost.

My noble friend Lord Sharkey raised many important matters, many of which I will mention, including mandation, DB surpluses and DC master trusts. My noble friend Lord Thurso, who cannot be present—he is up in Inverness—was particularly keen to ensure proper guardrails and governance in relation to DB surplus release, mandation and adherence to the stewardship code, as well as seeking to improve the lot of pre-1997 pensioners who have not benefited from inflation uplifts. He will pursue these matters. Noble Lords can therefore see a lot of amendments lining up.

We will need to consider any action in the Bill to remedy pre-1997 pension erosion. The absence of discretionary increases for pre-1997 pensioners has clearly resulted in an erosion in the real value of their pensions. That is not the only injustice that has impacted on many pensioners. I draw attention to the AEA Technology Pensions Campaign’s work fighting for pensioners who were misinformed by the Government and ended up losing out as a result, as recognised by the Committee of Public Accounts in its June 2023 report on this issue. Although that is not the only example of injustice in our pensions system, it illustrates the challenges many pensioners have faced uniquely. Therefore, we will look to scrutinise these elements of the Bill in detail.

Legislation to formalise the framework around defined benefit superfunds is long overdue and is in the Bill. A main question is how the gateway test for DB funds—in other words, which DB schemes are allowed to enter them—compares with other options such as a buy-out. I hope the Minister can elaborate when she replies on when a new option is created, so that what might be considered the appropriate schemes use it and the wrong schemes do not.

The Bill provides for master trusts to have a default retirement solution so, having built up a pension pot, schemes need to assist in managing it. Can the Minister provide details on how the new advice or guidance will work in practice? The noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, made that point. Broadly speaking, extraction of surplus funds from DB schemes as if in surplus is mostly paid in by the employer. At present, it is difficult to access the surplus. Can the Minister elaborate on, and perhaps estimate, whether these new powers will be taken up? Will they just be there to be looked at?

Creating defined contribution megafunds sounds okay, but can the Minister elaborate on schemes being too big to fall, and whether new entrants will struggle to enter the market? We need to have the value-for-money framework elaborated on. In Australia, where there are league tables, there is evidence of investment herding, as mentioned in another context, where everyone invests in the same way. That is hardly a dynamic, competitive market, which is what seems to be one of the purposes of the Bill.

We will, I am sure, discuss mandation at length. Mandation is a reserve power to force pension schemes to invest at the whims of the Government, but I state clearly that I oppose this, as it crosses a dangerous line. It is fine saying that the Government do not plan to use the power, but we have to provide for the actions of future Governments: for instance, a Government who do not believe in climate change, a point made by the noble Baronesses, Lady Stedman-Scott and Lady Hayman.

The Bill’s idea of auto-consolidating small pots of less than £1,000 sounds good, but it is a big effort resulting in very little change and not much happening until 2030. Perhaps I have that wrong, but it was a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and I wanted to emphasise it.

The pensions system is evolving. We see what is happening; we are trying to let it evolve in the correct way. There are few easy solutions and, as noble Lords have mentioned, there will be a lot of scope for amendments to the Bill to make it absolutely right. I hope we can work collaboratively, throughout the House, on improving the Bill so that it can be built on and relied upon by pensioners, pension funds and everybody else.

Universal Credit: Two-child Limit

Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts

Wednesday 10th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, my noble friend makes a really important point about the scarring effects of poverty. Our aim is to make sure that everyone who can work, does, with all the help they need to do that. That is what this Government have been doing. We are investing heavily in childcare to make it possible to work, making sure wages pay enough so that work is a good thing, and supporting children.

We know that when children grow up in poverty, things get worse for them. They are less likely to work as adults, and they earn 25% less at the age of 30. Even if some parts of the House are not persuaded on the grounds of the importance of the individual child, this is an investment in the future of our country. No other G7 country has a policy like this and there is a reason for it. We cannot compete on the world stage, grow our economy or create prosperous futures for our kids if we do not enable them to grow up thriving and healthy.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

Does the Minister agree that this is not about getting people back to work; it is about improving living standards and making sure children are safe, and that this Question, which tries to link people getting into work with this benefit, is completely ridiculous?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I think I have made my views clear on the impact of this policy. It is, in essence, a failed social experiment which has been pushing 100 children a day into poverty. We simply cannot allow that to happen. We want to support families. Most parents want to work to support their kids. Already, 84% of parents are in work—that is what people do. I used to work with single parents, who would say, “Even when it’s really a struggle, I want my kids to see this is what you do when you grow up”, but many people face barriers to work, and it is our job to make that possible. If you cannot afford childcare, how can you get to work? If you are not paid enough to be able to make life even bearable, how can you do that? The social security system should be there to support those who cannot work, but for those who can, to make it possible and to help them have a decent standard of living when doing so.

Young People not in Work, Education or Training

Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts

Monday 8th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Smith of Malvern (Lab)]

The noble Lord makes an important point. It is absolutely the case that children who are absent for periods of time, or who are in alternative provision by virtue of behavioural needs, are more likely not to be in education, employment or training. That is why, as part of this plan, we will have a particular focus on those children, to identify much earlier who is likely not to be able to find a college place or job, and to intervene at that point to prevent them becoming NEET in the first place.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I welcome the Minister’s comments, but this is very much a top-down approach to getting young people back into work. Can she give further assurance on how the Government will encourage tradespeople—the plumbers, electricians, brickies and others—to take on people as apprentices and trainees? This starts at the bottom. This does not start with all the courses that young people can do part-time; they have to be employed by a plumber, a builder or an electrician. What are the Government doing about it?

[Baroness Smith of Malvern (Lab)]

I am sure that the noble Lord will therefore welcome the announcement that we also made today of fully funding small and medium-sized businesses to take on apprentices. These are the businesses that are more likely to take on young people, including disadvantaged young people, and they are being supported by this Government. That will help to turn around the 40% decline in young people starting apprenticeships over the past 10 years.

Carer’s Allowance: Overpayments

Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, what I said last time we discussed this is absolutely the Government’s position. For the reasons I explained then—I will not go back into them again—carer’s allowance is traditionally not a classic means-tested benefit, so we want to find ways to tackle this. It will take time, because everything about the system has been built in ways that were designed around a simple, non-means-tested benefit. However, we have already done significant things to make a difference; one of the most important of those was to raise the level at which people could earn by the largest cash amount since the benefit was created. This means that if you earn less than 16 hours a week at the national living wage, there is no problem at all. We have also gone through to make sure that most of the ways in which people have fallen foul of the system can be corrected. For example, we have taken action on guidance and communications, and we are now checking automatically all the data that comes in directly from HMRC. We are doing all the things that can be done in the short term.

Much as I do not want to say this, the noble Lord will have to be patient. To be able to remove a cliff edge, the first requirement is to automate earnings coming from HMRC, which cannot be done overnight. We have already begun the work and we are looking for all possible workarounds in the short term. This problem has been around for a long time and no one paid any attention. We spotted it, we are taking action and we will sort it.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that. The Sayce review identified the problem. I am reminded, sadly, of Lewis Carroll’s “jam tomorrow”, a promised reward that is often postponed. I am not really encouraged by the point that it will be dealt with in 2026. I ask the Minister to be more definite and give us a date in 2026 when this will happen, so that it is not, in Lewis Carroll’s words, “jam tomorrow”.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, if I could give the noble Lord a precise date on which all the computer systems and all the systems will have changed, I would be glad to do it. Let me put this in context: we estimate that about 15% of people who get a carer’s allowance payment are also in paid work and 90% of people who reported earnings did so without difficulty, so we are talking about a very important but specific subset of people, most of whom had fluctuating earnings, which this is designed to address. The biggest challenge in the short term is to make sure that we have clear guidance, we communicate with people, they know what to tell us and we are able to manage that. There is a big prize at the end as we modernise all DWP systems to get this right. A lot of the improvements will be made by really old-fashioned analogue systems—by making sure that we have the right information, communicate well with carers and make it as easy as possible to get the information. Those recommendations may not be exciting, but they actually make a lot of difference.

Carer’s Allowance: Overpayments Review

Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts

Tuesday 18th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful for my noble friend’s patience; I am afraid that I must ask her to be patient for just a little longer. On the important question of earnings-related overpayments, we are very conscious that some carers found this extremely difficult—hence the need for the report. As I said, we have committed to keeping the weekly carer’s allowance earnings limit pegged to 16 hours of work a week at the national living wage level. That meant that, last April, there was a record jump in the earnings limit from £151 a week to £196 a week. We will announce the new earnings limit from next April in the next few weeks. I hope the House appreciates how difficult this has been but also that we are determined to get to the bottom of it. Carer’s allowance is an unusual benefit: if you earn £1 below the threshold, you get the lot; if you earn £1 over it, you get nothing. It has taken quite some work, but we hope the report will be out very soon.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reassurance, and we will of course wait for the independent review. In the meantime, what steps are the Government taking to ensure that carers are not unfairly penalised for minor or unintentional breaches of earnings rules? Will they consider writing off historical overpayments where department error is a significant factor?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am afraid the noble Lord will also have to be patient for just a little longer to hear what the Government will do in response to this. It was a very detailed report of over 100 pages, with lots of detailed recommendations; we have been through it in an equally detailed manner and will publish a proper response very shortly. In the meantime, the Government have done a number of things to make a difference. For example, we have already improved guidance to help staff make judgments about the way they treat overpayments in earnings. The crucial thing, which my noble friend just asked about, is that increasing the earnings limit by so much will mean that a lot of people will not be caught by this issue at all and, by the end of this decade, another 60,000 people will be able to claim carer’s allowance. We have already taken significant steps to improve things and will do more in the months ahead, but for the details I am afraid he must wait for the response to the report.

Jobs Market

Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts

Thursday 13th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

This is a really great question that is obsessing most government departments and most employers, as the noble Lord will know. I think the impact depends on the sector and on the individual job, but the evidence is quite clear, which is that, across the piece, it is better for businesses to embrace AI than not to. The biggest risk to our country is in not embracing artificial intelligence—if we do not take the opportunities it offers.

The World Economic Forum has forecast that AI will create 170 million new jobs globally over the next five years and displace 90 million. We will find that there are jobs out there, but they will be different. In our country, we have to make sure that we get those good jobs in the UK. What we are doing as a Government is analysing that very carefully and supporting businesses and individuals to make sure they have the skills they need to move on to the next area. We have reformed skills; we are bringing skills into DWP for many young people; we have a brand-new skills academy; we are looking at developing apprenticeships and we are focusing on supporting education to give young people the skills they need. There will be jobs there in the future; we just want to make sure our people get them.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her statistics, but the latest ONS figures show unemployment has risen from 4.8% to 5%—the highest level for four years. On that basis, can the Minister share concern that the UK’s sluggish productivity growth and skills shortages are still holding back economic recovery? What further measures are being considered to invest in adult skills and retraining? We will keep coming back to this. I thank the Minister for what she has said, but I would like a bit more information.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

On the unemployment figures, different things are going on under the surface if one digs down into the figures, which I am sure the noble Lord has done. For example, he may be aware that two things are going on. On the quarter increases and on the unemployment level, a chunk of that is driven by young people aged 16 to 24, including those in full-time education. Crucially, falling inactivity has contributed to increase in unemployment. We are tackling people who are economically inactive, but as people return to the labour market, they move from the figures of economic inactivity into the figures for unemployment. One thing that has happened is that the significant rise in economic inactivity down to ill health has been flattened, and that is really significant.

I would love to talk to the noble Lord at a greater length about skills. As he now knows, I have the great joy that my noble friend Lady Smith, who is now a Minister not only in DfE but in DWP, because she is the Minister for Skills, is joining up the two departments.