Domestic Abuse Bill
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill ExcerptsMonday 25th January 2021
(4 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Mendelsohn (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I shall speak in support of Amendments 3, 5, 168, 169 and 170. I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, for proposing these amendments and I applaud the compelling case that she made in her speech. I also thank all colleagues for their thoughtful comments and support for these measures which, as I say, I strongly support.
It is good to see the Minister in his place and ready to respond to the amendments. I am sure he is aware that it was his head of chambers, my noble friend Lord Grabiner, who introduced the Bill that became the Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act 2002 with the support of the then Government. These amendments come firmly from that tradition and the approach of successive Governments to these matters. The 2002 Act has been valuable, but, alas, the position of so many women who are caught in this situation continues to be a source of great anxiety. These measures would give real benefit and relief, not only to the women who are so chained but to the men who wish to marry them and, most importantly, to the health and well-being of any children caught up in this awful situation. I would like to pay tribute to Jewish Women’s Aid, GETTout and the many legal experts and professionals who have done so much for those too many who have been caught in this awful position.
These amendments do not seek to legislate on what I consider to be essentially matters of religious doctrine and custom. They do not seek to involve the civil courts in questions of Jewish religious law. In fact, these provisions would provide greater flexibility for the courts to apply matters so as to ensure a greater appreciation of religious law and those involved in it. Her Majesty’s judges have proved to be able to deal very effectively with these issues, and I am sure that the beth din of today will be able to do so too, as indeed it has since 1866 when the then Government told the Chief Rabbinate that it no longer had the sole or main right to determine marriage or divorce in the United Kingdom.
What these measures will do, most importantly, is support the person who in adverse circumstances is the most powerless, vulnerable and likely to be experiencing coercive or abusive behaviour. There has been a tendency in this debate to raise grounds for criticising rabbis for not getting a grip on the problem, but it is important to recognise that religious law is biblical in origin and therefore seen to be immutable. Changes in practice and interpretation are very hard to achieve, most notably in the orthodox and ultra-orthodox communities, especially in the absence of any central parliament and in the context of so many different traditions. In my opinion, their position must be understood.
Under our civil law, the process of divorce is straightforward and gender neutral. Neither party can control or manipulate the process, and once the conditions for divorce are satisfied, the divorce is granted. Jewish law is different, because it is gendered and allows the man to control the proceedings. There is a degree of mutuality, but, fundamentally, the process provides for the male to be able to make the final determination and empowers the religious courts with the ability to overrule women. Central to this is the place of the man to be judged as being able to make a decision under religiously defined obligations of “free will” or “free from coercion”. It is a definition absent of responsibilities, or even adherence to common accepted principles of right or wrong.
Unfortunately, these established rules of religious law sometimes bring out the worst in people. On these occasions, the giving of the get may be used as a tactical device or a weapon of blackmail in relation to the ancillary arrangements for the children of the marriage and the financial settlement made in connection with the civil divorce. Alternatively, a refusal to deliver a get may be motivated simply by malice or spite that is in turn driven by jealousy or some other, perhaps understandable but nevertheless objectively unreasonable, purpose. We have to place the needs of the victims at the centre and, as with this important Bill, rebalance our approach to deal with the needs of the victim.
Of course, the job of the beth din is not straightforward and should be recognised as being complex, and is, I am sure, as sensitive as it is agonising. We must avoid getting involved in its processes and matters that offend religious law and focus on helping the victims. In doing this—and this is why these amendments are so important—I will illustrate the predicament of victims through three real-life examples.
The first is of a woman who had been divorced in the civil court, but is still waiting for her get after five years. On finally securing an appointment with the religious court to receive her get, it was made conditional upon her signing to agree a financial settlement of £150,000 less than that awarded by the civil court, and being forced to sign a document relinquishing any ownership of the joint properties. She was encouraged by the beth din to accept the offer as a legitimate way to secure her get, but she did not choose to do so.
Another example is of a woman who has been waiting 20 years for her get, and whose estranged husband has left the religious community, so it has no hold over him. This, and the effect of years of emotional and violent abuse during the marriage, continues to blight her life.
A third woman’s husband was being prosecuted for the sexual abuse of children. In trying to secure her get, she was asked, including by presiding members of the religious court, to lie to the police and tell them that the accusations had been fabricated, so that she could be given her religious divorce. Additional financial sums were requested. The husband made further demands that were impossible for the wife to fulfil, such as clearing his name of all convictions and expunging references on the internet. The woman had non-molestation and restraining orders against her husband, but, nevertheless, she was subjected to a campaign of harassment at home, in the street and through the posting of offensive and abusive messages on social media. The perpetrators have not been easy to identify, nor has there been any co-operation in the investigations. While the beth din expressed sympathy with her plight, there was no movement on the securing of the get.
Not every matter can be resolved easily and not every situation will fall into neat boxes with regard to the roles that either the religious or civil courts can play. It is therefore essential that we take this opportunity to level the playing field and make sure that we give the support to victims that these amendments would provide. Their objective is to enshrine the right of Jewish women to secure their get where it is being withheld by a recalcitrant ex-husband in order to exert control over the woman. Having a specific inclusion for victims of this kind of coercive behaviour, psychological abuse and often economic extortion would be valuable to those women who may have secured a civil divorce but are not considered to be divorced within the Jewish religion. It is in line with the key objective of the Bill, which is to raise awareness and understanding of domestic abuse and its impact on victims. The provisions categorise domestic abuse as conduct whereby one party seeks to compel the other to remain in a marriage against their will and uses an existing religious structure to perpetuate abuse and exert control.
There is a provision in law for the withholding of a civil divorce if a husband does not give a get, but in abusive cases, husbands are often in no rush to obtain a civil divorce, and with the bulk of the matrimonial assets and resources often being in their sole name, they are content to remain married without the final separation under way in the civil court.
While the Jewish religious courts have introduced communal and social sanctions with some degree of effectiveness, they are severely limited by having weak enforcement capabilities. This is why the law needs to go further to protect victims of this kind of coercive control and mental cruelty.
Women in this position must be entitled to the support afforded to other victims of domestic abuse under the Bill, whereby unreasonably refusing to grant a religious divorce means an act or pattern of acts designed to make a person subordinate and/or dependent by isolating them from sources of support, exploiting their resources and capacities for personal gain, depriving them of the means needed for independence, resistance and escape, and regulating their everyday behaviour. That is the absolute definition of coercive control.
It is important to bear in mind that for women who experience get refusal, it is highly likely that that is just one of many abusive behaviours perpetrated against them, often escalating over the course of several years. Sustained domestic abuse serves to humiliate, degrade and slowly remove a woman’s sense of self, severely limiting her wherewithal to advocate for herself. Many women in this position have explained the trauma and absolute desperation it creates, and the fact that they have no way of legitimising their concerns. In some cases a man uses the imbalance of power in his favour simply out of spite—perhaps out of dissatisfaction with the way the civil marriage ended, or with the financial settlement afforded him by the courts.
In other cases, a man may have mental health issues—commonly a personality disorder. In one example, a young woman, A, converted to Judaism and at 19 married a man, B, who quickly became physically and sexually abusive, as he suffered from bipolar disorder, of which she had been unaware during their short courtship. She left him after less than a year, but six years later remained in limbo, unable to marry within the religion she had chosen.
These amendments would provide the opportunity to ensure that the provisions and protections were available to all, and specifically to recognise the plight of these women, removing the shadow of abuse and control. The law cannot restore their right to exercise their faith through their ability to remarry and have children within their faith, but these measures, in this Bill, can provide women with protection through the courts, and give them access to a domestic abuse protection order on the grounds of get prevention.
As noble friends have said, beth din-approved gets have been achieved by using the law, and these particular measures, more creatively and assertively, and in tandem with other steps. Nothing in the amendments makes a case for using them in the first instance, or even making them a normal feature of proceedings in Jewish law governing divorces, the overwhelming majority of which, as colleagues have said, pass easily. I am sure that such a prospect, of being urged to be in compliance, would be unnecessary and would raise deep concerns. But these measures need to be more readily available to support victims, so I hope that the Government are willing to support the amendments, as they are in the tradition of their own approach and of the important progress that the Bill offers.
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD) [V]
My Lords, I first declare my interests as noted on the register; I think the relevant ones would be as a vice-president of the Jewish Leadership Council and as a long-standing member of the United Synagogue. I have signed all the amendments in this group, and I shall not refer to them individually. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, for leading on them. She said that she was speaking as a religious Jewish woman, so I thought it might be appropriate for me to speak as a religious Jewish man. These problems, which mainly affect women, are well known in the Jewish community.
Noble Lords will notice that the amendments in this group have been signed by Peers from the Cross Benches, the Conservative and Labour Benches, and by myself on the Liberal Democrat Benches. When I speak in debates, it is not often that I agree with all four of the speakers immediately before me—maybe this is due to my bad nature—but tonight I do, and I pay tribute to the details that they have added to the debate.
The questions we are asking are: what is abusive behaviour, and what is coercive behaviour? We are saying that spouses should not unreasonably prevent the dissolution of a Jewish religious marriage. Other noble Lords have mentioned the effects on the children of such marriages, and I shall expand a little on that. Previous amendments have said a lot about parental problems and responsibilities, but if no religious divorce—no get—is given, the children of that marriage cannot live separately with the divorced parent. Worse than that, the children of a marriage that is recognised in the civil courts but not in the Jewish religious courts are treated as illegitimate in the Jewish religion. What we need to do, if we can, is to use UK legislation to help those chained women.
Previous speakers have commented on recalcitrant husbands who demand to be paid off in order to give a get. We should do everything we can in UK legislation to give power to the women who have such problems. I would have given some examples, but the noble Lord, Lord Mendelsohn, has already given some graphic ones, which I am sure will be well known to the Minister.
Modern Slavery Bill
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts(10 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)
My Lords, having listened to all the various learned speeches on the matter, I should like to tackle the matter from a slightly different angle. Although it is very hard to find a different angle at this stage of this short debate. What harm would be done if the new clause were included in the Bill? The Government have already moved forward with Amendment 4 but, as other noble Lords have asked: is that enough? The telling point has been made that it would clash with and be repetitive of other legislation. Are we saying that there is no legislation in this land which does not clash and is not repetitive? We have that all the time; perhaps we should not.
However, the question we must ask here is, I hope, this. If the amendment under consideration, as proposed by my noble friend Lady Doocey and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and others, was passed by this House or taken into account by the Minister after this debate, would there be a possibility of even one child not being exploited where previously that child or children may have been? I think that the numbers will be great but even if it was one child not being exploited, surely it would be worth while having this specific provision in the Bill. It would mean that it would be clarified and made more important for those who enforce the law. I hope that when my noble friend the Minister replies, he will say that the Government—
Baroness Butler-Sloss
Perhaps I might ask the noble Lord about the other point that I made on confusion. What does he have to say about confusion?
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill
I thank the noble and learned Baroness very much. We are talking about semantics and about circumstances, confusion and all the other words in the English dictionary. I would in fact be cheerful if there were some confusion, if it saved one child from being exploited. At the moment, I can see that there may be some modest confusion but I do not see that that weighs in any way with having specific legislation to protect the child. Are we saying that for fear of being confused, or of clashing or being repetitive, we desire to be in the middle, which I call sitting on the fence with the nails sticking in you where they should not? That is not enough; what we want is the best protection for the child.
I have not heard any Member of your Lordships’ House, on any side on this debate, say that they are not against the exploitation of children. I think we are all of a mind on that but what is not in agreement is whether this amendment is needed. I am not a lawyer and I shall not nitpick about confusion or circumstance, or any other such word in the dictionary. But having listened to the debate, to my mind we need a strengthening of Clause 4. I believe that this amendment would do that and that it is worth any confusion—any sitting on the fence, any clash or repetition—if it saves the exploitation of even one child.
Lord James of Blackheath (Con)
My Lords, my Amendment 6 is in the same group. I suspect that the followers of Amendment 5 are now well past number 11 and following on in the second innings, so I wonder if I could be forgiven for taking over to speak to my Amendment 6. It is the consequence of a long-running dialogue between the Minister and I, where we have failed to agree having had a long time together on the subject, so I have brought this amendment back from its first appearance in the early stages.
Your Lordships will recall that I first raised this subject when I was reminded of my experience in working for the Australian Civil Service in London. I recounted in Committee that I was deeply suspicious of the circumstances in which I was being required to herd small children on to boats at Tilbury for transportation to Australia. They did not have names; they did not know who their parents were, or where they came from, and they were completely terrified. I was suspicious that these children were improper migrants—that they did not have the proper authority to go—and it was a very strange position. Since then, I have done a lot more research and a lot of very interesting things have come to me in the post, including a little hate mail, which was actually very useful. Because of the fact that I had admitted overseeing the transportation of some 2,500 children, I was accused of being worse than Jimmy Savile. I think that Jimmy Savile might have been quite offended at that because he is being accused in relation to 300 children, whereas I have about 2,500 on my slate.
However, in the circumstances that was interesting because it raises two questions. First, was it illegal at the time that these children were being transported and, secondly, is it something which could occur again? My own belief is now, emphatically, that it was illegal and that there was no proper authority for the transportation of those children. It involved many tens of thousands of children over 15 years; we should be deeply ashamed of it, and make sure that the Bill cannot talk about controlling slavery without making it absolutely certain that we can never again repeat this dirty little secret of our history.
I need to give a bit more detail. I am going to quote the reference for a committee report that was brought to my attention by the Child Migrants Trust, and which I was initially told by the Library no longer existed. However, I am happy to say that our wonderful Library found the only copy that it thinks officially exists today. I will read its number into the record for the House: HC 755 I and II in volume XCVI, 1997-98. That report has now been found and is on the shelf behind the inquiry desk in the Library for any noble Lords who want to verify it. I have mentioned this at the start of what I am going to say because everything I will say is verifiable somewhere in that huge book. The committee in question was a Department of Health committee from 1997 to 1998. It was a rare committee because it was funded to travel to Australia to carry out its investigations on the ground for nine days. I am afraid we do not have committees like that any longer.
The story starts at Christmas 1944, when the Prime Minister of Australia contacted the coalition Government in England and said, “You’re getting towards the end of a war and you’re going to be overrun with orphans. We want to help you. We’d like to take 17,500 orphans from you every year for the next 15 years. We want at least 150,000”. The British Government thought about this for a while and said, “We’ll talk about it”. Then they brought in the orphanages and social services. Of course these were coalition times, so Herbert Morrison was in charge. By a quaint quirk of fate, I knew Herbert Morrison very well later on because he was president of a cricket club where I was the secretary, and I could not have asked for a man of greater integrity, personal charm or dedication. He was a very human being indeed, and I cannot believe that he would ever have done anything disreputable whatever. However, what happened under his hands was appalling.
They set about getting together a policy to find 17,500 children a year who could be given to the Australians. They brought in the heads of the orphanages and got Dr Barnardo’s to head the exercise. They got the local councils to get their heads of their child agencies, which I suspect was then an industry somewhat in its infancy compared with what it is now, and started to put the process together. Then came an election. The Labour Party won it with the very high promise of Beveridge’s social reforms, including the National Health Service. I do not remember anyone telling the electorate at that time that if they wanted a health service they would have to accept that we were going to dispose of 195,000 of our children to a foreign country without trace or record being kept, but that is in fact what happened. As the head of Barnardo’s says in a clear and precise statement at the opening of the committee, “It was an economic necessity. We couldn’t afford to look after the children we had. There were too many of them. We hadn’t got enough beds and couldn’t feed them. We had to do it. It was a Government-led initiative which we had to do”. That is an interesting comment and someone might want to look it up on the record one day.
So they did it. On the face of it, things were going to be fine because the Australian Government were falling over backwards to be helpful. They said, “You send the children to us. We will have prearranged adoption homes and domestic places for each of the children and we will ship them off directly as soon as they land, after giving them a medical check, and we will then give a maintenance cash allowance to every home that takes one to look after these children. Then we’ll get the adoption process carried through the courts”. So the British Government said, “Sounds fine to us”. However, Morrison said, “We will insist upon the British Home Office maintaining an oversight responsibility for their welfare afterwards”. We need to remember that because there is no evidence that it was ever done, and we need to see what happened to that.
A change of Government having taken place, Morrison steps aside and Chuter Ede becomes Home Secretary. There was nothing wrong with Chuter Ede but there might have been something wrong with a few of his servants. The process goes like this: the Labour Government take office on 26 July 1945, and on 16 September that year the first ship sails full of children, 2,000 of them. The 2,000 children set off into the blue and are the first of 155,000 who are sent between that date and the end of 1960. After 1960, another 120,000 are sent, bringing about a total in aggregate of 295,000 children, all from orphanages and local council overspills, which could not cope with them.
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Armed Forces) (Amendment) Order 2012
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts(12 years, 6 months ago)
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Lord Goodlad
My Lords, very briefly, I share the concerns of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott, about the order, which was commented on by the Select Committee on secondary legislation. This area of the law was thoroughly looked into some years ago by your Lordships’ Constitution Committee. The recommendations of the committee, contained in the second report of the 2008-09 Session entitled Surveillance: Citizens and the State, were broadly welcomed. Since that report Parliament has passed the Crime and Security Act 2010 and the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. The provisions of the latter, dealing with the retention of DNA, have not yet been brought into effect, as the noble and learned Lord pointed out. However, the intentions of the Government and of Parliament have been made clear beyond peradventure.
It seems strange, therefore, that the Government have brought forward an order which has the effect of lengthening the period during which DNA may be retained by the police service, in circumstances which will no longer be lawful when orders under Part 1 of the Protection of Freedoms Act have been passed by Parliament. I hope, therefore, that the Minister will be able to give the House the assurances so precisely defined and advocated by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott.
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill
My Lords, I welcome the thrust of the Motion of Regret from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott. It comes from someone who contributed five times during what became the Protection of Freedoms Act, so it is not a flash in the pan. I also look forward to the Minister’s detailed reply for the Government. I should like to make a point that to some extent has already been made: the point of substance in the noble and learned Lord’s Motion is to respect the rights of the citizen when considering DNA or fingerprint records, and I emphasise that.
Prior to the Minister’s comment, which the noble and learned Lord apparently welcomes, I would like to say that the Government have taken a big step forward in enacting the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, which sets in place a system of deletion and destruction consistent with the Marper judgment, which has been referred to, and human rights obligations. It is clear to anyone who looks at how DNA records are apparently kept, though, that absolute care must be taken when dealing with the material. It is both highly personal to the individual from whom it is taken and an important tool in the detection of crime.
Time is needed, of course, to put in place the policies and procedures to give accurate effect to the legislation passed by Parliament. The DNA evidence from those who have been responsible for crimes and those who have not needs to be sorted, and I gather that that evidence is voluminous and there is a time element. I am happy, and I hope that the noble and learned Lord will be too, that the Government will, we hope, indicate that they will have the long-term position resolved by mid-2013, as I understand it—perhaps even sooner; that the updated Armed Forces policing regulations will follow; and that both will be delivered according to the timetable. I welcome the clarification that this Motion will, I hope, produce.
Lord Rosser
My Lords, unlike the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott of Foscote, I do not have the advantage of knowing what the Minister is going to say in reply. Indeed, I did not even expect that the noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Holbeach, would be the Minister replying; I was under the impression that this was a defence issue.
The order that we are covering came into force on 30 October this year, just one month ago. It amends the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Armed Forces) Order 2009 by providing that biometric data taken from someone being investigated for a service offence by service police can be retained for up to four years but no longer, unless within that period the person is convicted of the service offence. The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 amended the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and introduced different rules and requirements for the retention of biometric data taken from arrested people. However, the Armed Forces are not covered by the Protection of Freedoms Act.
PACE also only applied to criminal investigations being conducted by the civilian police. However, under Section 113 of the 1984 Act the Secretary of State can by order apply certain provisions of the 1984 Act to investigations conducted by the service police. This was done in relation to the taking and retention of biometric data by way of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Armed Forces) Order 2009, which has since been amended by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Armed Forces) (Amendment) Order 2011, and again by the 2012 order, which we are discussing now.
The 2011 order amended the 2009 order by increasing from two years to three the time limits that apply under that order to the retention of fingerprints, samples and impressions of footwear, and the 2012 order amends the 2009 order to allow material taken on or after 31 October 2009 to be retained for up to four years from the date on which it was taken, unless during that period the person is convicted. For material taken before 31 October 2009, the four-year period runs from that date.
It seems that the Government regard this 2012 order as a holding measure, as the intention apparently is to introduce a new order once the relevant provisions of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 have been brought into effect, and that that new order will broadly replicate for service personnel the 2012 Act’s provisions on retention of biometric data for civilians.
As the report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee sets out, the changes that have been made and are still to be made to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 arose from a ruling in 2008 by the European Court of Human Rights that the relevant provisions in Part 5 of PACE were in breach of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Those provisions in Part 5 allowed for the indefinite retention of fingerprints and DNA samples when there had been no conviction. As a result, Part 5 of the 1984 Act was amended by the provisions in Chapter 1 of Part 1 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. However, those provisions in the 2012 Act are not expected to be commenced before mid-2013.
The purpose of the 2009 order, and subsequent amending orders in 2011 and now 2012, was, we are told by the Ministry of Defence, to make interim provision that would be compliant with the European Court of Human Rights ruling and allow the service police to retain material until Part 5 of PACE was amended. The Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee has commented that the practical effect of continuing to bring forward these orders, extending the period for which data can be held, is potentially to enable the material to be retained indefinitely. The order that we are now discussing means that the interim provisions will be in place for at least five years after the European court gave its judgment, and even longer if there is further delay in commencing the relevant provisions of the 2012 Act. The committee has also questioned whether successive statutory instruments with the practical effect of potentially allowing the indefinite retention of material taken by service police can be considered compliant with the European court’s judgment.
These are all points which deserve a considered response from the Minister. When he replies, perhaps he could also say why the relevant provisions of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 are not coming into force until at least the middle of next year. In Committee on the Protection of Freedoms Bill, the then Home Office Minister rejected our amendments providing for the retention of DNA and fingerprint profiles for six years, a longer period than that proposed by the Government and now incorporated in the terms of the Protection of Freedoms Act. We were told that there was a need for balance between public protection and individual freedoms, and that the Government considered that they had got the balance right and we had got it wrong. One would have thought that after that the Government would have made every effort to bring into effect the relevant provisions of the Protection of Freedoms Act as soon as possible, not to find themselves in a position where they are putting forward an order that specifically provides for the retention of biometric data for a longer time than the Government said struck the appropriate balance and rather nearer the time in years that we were arguing was appropriate.
Why was it not felt right to make provision within the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 for matters relating to the investigation of service offences, at least in relation to the taking and retention of biometric data if not to other areas, to be brought within the terms of Part 5 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984? Presumably, the situation at the moment is that if a member of the Armed Forces is being investigated by the civilian police, the provisions of the 1984 Act apply to the investigation directly, but that if that same member of the Armed Forces is being investigated by the service police then the 2009 order—as amended by the 2011 and 2012 orders—applies. Is there any reason why it is essential that this distinction continues to apply in all instances?
We understand the reasons why the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott of Foscote, has drawn this order to the attention of the House. Whether or not one believes that the Government’s decision on what specific action to take to meet the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights was appropriately balanced, it is still relevant to ask why it will be at least just over three years after taking office, and five years after the ruling, before the Government implement their decision on how to comply with a judgment with which they are not in disagreement.
Universities: Anti-Semitism
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts(13 years, 3 months ago)
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The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Lord Strathclyde)
My Lords, we really cannot all stand up at the same time. I think that it is the turn of the Labour Party, and I rather wish that one of the two noble Lords would give way to the other.
Baroness Verma
My Lords, I do not want to enter into another debate, and that is a separate debate although it is one that we must not shy away from. At the same time, we do not want to lose the greatness of our universities, which allow students to hear contributions that are often very vile but then also allow them to make a judgment as to their response.
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill
My Lords, my noble friend the Minister drew attention to the statistics up to 2010. Based on the October 2011 report from the National Jewish Student Survey, 21 per cent of Jewish students felt very worried about anti-Semitism at university; 38 per cent of Jewish students felt worried about anti-Israel sentiment at university; and, more worryingly, 42 per cent of Jewish students had witnessed or been subjected to anti-Semitism in the seven months up to the survey. Will my noble friend the Minister confirm that Her Majesty’s Government consider these figures to be a real cause for concern, and indicate what steps they will take to address this issue? Can the Minister outline the approach that the Government are taking to work with universities, the academic community and the Jewish community to solve what is a real problem, despite what other Members of this noble House have said?
Baroness Verma
My Lords, I am sure that my colleagues in the Box have taken note of my noble friend’s concerns and the figures that he has raised today. The Government take all these issues very seriously and I reassure the House that wherever we find that we can intervene, we surely do.
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts(13 years, 8 months ago)
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Lord Palmer of Childs Hill
My Lords, I, too, welcome the noble Lord, Lord Henley, to his post. Someone who makes marmalade must have a lot going for him.
Clause 4(1)(c) includes the words,
“conduct which gives encouragement to the commission, preparation or instigation of such acts, or which is intended to do so”.
in the definition of involvement in terrorism-related activity. How does this relate to the existing provisions against the glorification of terrorism? Is it a lower evidential burden? Would it capture some of the more inflammatory speeches that we hear on demonstrations supporting jihad and resistance and so on?
The Bill before us is called the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill, and I look for ways of heading off disharmony often, but not always, between different ethnic groups. For many years I sat on a police gold strategy group in north-west London. The aim was to bring together the police, headed by the then borough commander, with representatives of the Jewish community, the Muslim community, Hindus and others. The idea was to deal with problems before they occurred and to seek to engender a feeling of trust between community groups and the police. I sat on it for years and I was never sure why I was invited to be on it other than, perhaps, the fact that I was known to the police.
Noble Lords have spoken about terrorism. In the midst of all the legal arguments it is worth emphasising that it is equally important that we build up and maintain an environment where local UK communities do not give support and substance to those aiming to commit and encourage or inflame actions that undermine our British harmony. The noble Lord, Lord Howard, gave an analogy of the United States of America, which made me look at my papers. I have a quote by Joseph Singer who is a lawyer with the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review. He says in this publication:
“Minimum standards regulations do not deprive us of freedom; rather, law promotes both freedom and democracy by outlawing social and economic relationships that are ‘subprime’ because they fall below the minimum standards acceptable for human relationships in a free and democratic society. It is time we acknowledged the regulations we too often take for granted. If we do that, we can debate what those laws should be, rather than focusing on a false debate about whether they should exist at all”.
I relate that to our debate because my noble friend Lord Macdonald spoke about rebalancing freedom and security. That is what we are talking about. How do we balance the civil rights about which some noble Lords have spoken with the security about which other noble Lords have spoken? The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, spoke about the role of the Minister versus the role of the judiciary. That is a very important factor. There is a role for both and they are not mutually exclusive. In the short term, the role of Ministers in taking Executive decisions of this nature may well be necessary. All Home Secretaries seem to have been convinced by the arguments in the past. It should be part of the procedure that control orders, as they were, or TPIMs as they will be, should last for as short a period of time as possible before a case comes before a judge or the courts.
I take issue with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. There is a role for the Minister in this case. It is also necessary to keep that action as short as possible within the terms implied. Noble Lords have spoken about the possibility of having this reviewed within 15 months, two years or five years. Because the lapse of time became outdated and we thought that we could improve control orders—which is the way in which TPIMs are being talked about—I prophesy that in a period of years or even months we may be considering another change based on the experiences of that time.
We have been hearing about the use of electronic surveillance equipment. Some of that was not available even a few years ago. It has been improved and is continuing to improve. We may get to a time when it becomes “Beam me up, Scotty”, as they said in “Star Trek”. There are so many changes that will happen, and the legislation and its implementation will change as well.
I support the Bill. During its passage through this House, I hope that there will be some amendments made to it. Being 20th in the list, I will not talk about those possible amendments, but the basis of the Bill is right. There is a duty not only to civil liberties but to protect the people of this country, in as harmonious a way as possible.
Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts(13 years, 11 months ago)
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Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville
My Lords, it is a privilege to follow the noble Lord, Lord Imbert, who is a great deal more experienced in these matters than I am. I am also at one remove in following my namesake, who spoke earlier, and who alluded to the presentation which a number of us received on Monday morning. Reference has been made to the experience of the American professor from Stanford who gave a presentation to us about his White House experience. I would add the footnote that he also holds an honorary degree from King’s College London, so he is not without form on this side of the Atlantic.
Brevity is at a premium, so I shall not cover the ground that other speakers have covered. When the Minister spoke on the previous occasion in Committee, she indicated familiarity with the South Dakota experiment. I have a brief addition to make to that. Monday’s presentation emphasised the experience of the three states where the problem was most severe—North Dakota, South Dakota and Montana—and did so graphically with a parallel line high on the page representing North Dakota. A line at the bottom of the page indicated the average experience in the individual states in the US. A diagonal line from the top of the left-hand corner to the bottom right showed the way that South Dakota’s experience had so dramatically improved.
At the end of the presentation, I asked the professor what had been happening in the states that lay between the average figure at the bottom of the page and the experience in the Dakotas and Montana. He said that a series of them which fell in their own performance between the top and bottom lines had already also adopted the South Dakota experience, North Dakota and Montana having already done so. The most notable example of a state that had, as a result of the South Dakota experience, advanced to putting it on the statute book was California.
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill
My name is attached to the amendment and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, for tabling it. I, too, attended Monday’s seminar. Also present was the Deputy Mayor of London, who was most appreciative of the scheme in that it would add to the ammunition which the authorities have in dealing with drunkenness.
I do not think that any other speaker has yet said that the issue is not about anti-drinking but is about anti-drunkenness. That is what sobriety means in this instance. I am still a councillor in the London Borough of Barnet where there is a lot of drunkenness on the streets. Not all of it is youth drunkenness, but it is drunkenness. We have tried various ways of stopping it. For instance, in the ward of Cricklewood that I represent, there is an anti-street-drinking order. That helps the police to enforce measures against drunkenness. We tried to apply the order in another area of my ward. The local authority has not supported that but the police have done so.
Although that is not specifically to do with the amendment in front of us, I mention it because I believe that those who enforce the law, whether magistrates or the police, must have as many armaments as possible to use with caution to ensure that our streets are safe and pleasant for society to live in. Too often, in the urban environment in which I live many people—not all of them young—are drunk on the streets and throw down their beer cans and bottles. Perhaps with this amendment we can help in some way. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, has done us a great service because whether or not the amendment is adopted, the Government have highlighted the fact that they are aware of the problem and have said that tests will be carried out. I thank the noble Baroness for bringing the matter before us.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town
My Lords, I add a few words in welcoming the amendment and urging the Government to respond positively to it. When I was a magistrate, I would have loved the possibility of this rehabilitation order to monitor ongoing alcohol consumption. As the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, suggested, it is one of a range of possibilities, but to have had this in one’s toolbox, as I gather the phrase is, would have been an enormous advantage.
As has been made clear, the amendment allows the magistrate this power only if alcohol caused or contributed to the offence—in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Imbert, I say that it is the magistrate who will take that decision—and if the offender has a propensity to misuse alcohol and is willing to comply with the requirement. As I argued in Committee, help with alcohol misuse should also be available but, as the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, has said, we must consider the victims in assessing this possibility.
Most of what we now call domestic abuse, but when I was growing up we used to call wife-battering, is alcohol-fuelled. Violence on the streets, whether against property or against people, would undoubtedly be less without the addition of drunkenness. When are we going to do what the ordinary decent people who walk around our streets want us to do, which is to reduce alcohol-related disruption that affects their lives? That is the question that we have to answer.
As the previous speaker said, this is not anti-alcohol. Indeed, I should declare an interest that last night I was at the parliamentary beer dinner. I was very grateful that we had not reached this amendment by then. I am not against the consumption of alcohol but I am very much against the consumption of excessive amounts of it that then damages the people concerned or, in the light of this amendment, damages the life and well-being of others.
This is an enabling measure and does not require the courts to impose it. It is an opportunity for someone with the propensity to misuse alcohol in a way that damages others to have a period of sobriety—with help available, I hope—thus improving their own family lives as well as the well-being of others. I urge support for this.
Baroness Scotland of Asthal
My Lords, I say for the sake of completeness that I concur with the submissions just made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and particularly endorse his sentiments about the importance that where offences of this nature are identified, they should be prosecuted with vigour and rigour and that those who have committed such heinous offences should most certainly be brought to book.
I was somewhat perplexed by the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, and supported by the noble Lord and the noble Baroness for this reason. I agree with the legal analysis of the flaws identified so cogently by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I was surprised to find those flaws in an amendment drafted by lawyers of the eminence of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald and the noble Lord. The errant drafting of the amendment has given us a cogent reason why the matter should be left to the current Attorney-General and Director of Public Prosecutions.
For completeness, I have confidence in the current Director of Public Prosecutions, Keir Starmer QC, to discharge his duty with commendable precision. I have equal confidence in the current Attorney-General and Solicitor-General that they, like their predecessors before me, will discharge their duty with distinction and propriety. I have every confidence that each of them, irrespective of political complexion, can be safely entrusted to discharge the heavy burden of exercising their discretion in those cases and that no further amendments should be made to inhibit them from doing that which must be right in cases of this severity. I am glad that the consensus now appears to be that the gap which was so carefully identified by the Director of Public Prosecutions in his evidence should be closed.
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill
My Lords, I rise rather hesitantly, because I feel intimidated in talking in this debate, which seems to be populated by QCs. I am neither a QC nor a lawyer. I rise to give a more layman's viewpoint on behalf of those, like me, who are not adept in the intricacies of the law.
No one on any side of this debate is trying to stop universal jurisdiction for the prosecution of suspected war criminals. That must be stated clearly. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, the amendment is unnecessary and, I would say, even unhelpful. As many noble Lords will know, the usual course at the moment is that the police investigate and pass a file to the Crown Prosecution Service if they believe that such an offence has occurred, if there is a realistic chance of conviction and, as noble Lords have said, if it is in the public interest.
I read Hansard carefully after the previous debate—that is why I was inhibited by the cabal of QCs who were speaking—and I particularly noted the comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, whom I know cannot be here today but who has intimated that he is against the amendment left on the Marshalled List. He said in Committee that,
“there are two elements in the code for Crown prosecutors. One is the test as to the adequacy of the evidence and the second is the public interest. Both have to be satisfied before a prosecution takes place”.—[Official Report, 16/6/11; cols. 1008-9.]
For non-lawyers, it is perhaps useful to say so.
Comment has been made about the current Director of Public Prosecutions, who is universally admired. Those who have inquired of Mr Starmer have been given reassurance that, if extra resources are needed to pursue prosecutions, they will be there. If people who are at the moment going to the magistrates’ court to seek a private prosecution, in advance of the alleged criminal coming to this country, were to give that evidence to the Crown Prosecution Service, the CPS would investigate the case before that person then comes to this country. That seems to me pretty good.
I particularly disagree with the amendment—and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, touched on this—because the DPP does not need to be told, as it says in the amendment, that he “shall give consent”. I hope noble Lords have confidence, as I have, in the Directors of Public Prosecutions, both past and present, so to do. I am slightly dismayed that the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, was unable to be with us in Committee and, for obvious reasons, cannot be here today. He was also a Director of Public Prosecutions and it is very important to know what he would say.
It is worth mentioning the difference with a private prosecution, via an arrest warrant in a magistrates’ court, where a much lower prima facie case needs to be made. The magistrate is shown the alleged evidence but that court does not have the facilities to investigate that case in more than a superficial manner. The arrest warrant could then be issued if the paperwork looks good—it is only paperwork. The alleged criminal is not informed. No basic defence can be submitted and, if that person comes to this country, under that arrest warrant he could be put in jail for a couple of nights while the DPP decides whether to prosecute. Many people believe that in the many cases that come forward, for one reason or another, they would not have involved a prosecution. The tests used by the magistrate amount to,
“little more than asking whether the papers disclose an arguable case”—
I take that comment from legal advice given in an article that has just recently been written.
This has not been mentioned by other speakers but I would go on to the practicalities. Can it be right that people who have served in their countries—whichever country—as, say, a Defence Minister, Foreign Minister or a member of the armed forces and who are no longer such, and who come to this country, should be liable for arrest at the magistrates’ court rather than be under the consideration of the DPP?
Lord Wallace of Saltaire
I hesitate to interrupt the noble Lord but I remind him that we are on Report and this is becoming rather more of a Second Reading speech than a speech on Report, which should be narrowly connected to the amendment under discussion.
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill
Thank you. I am happy to bring it back to the amendment. The amendment supposes that it is right to instruct the Director of Public Prosecutions what he or she should do. I believe that DPPs past and present are able so to do without the amendment.
Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill Excerpts(14 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Palmer of Childs Hill
My Lords, I am part of the coalition, which I hope will last. I want to address my remarks both to universal jurisdiction, in Section 154, and to licensing—to the universal and the local, if I can put it that way. No one is trying to stop universal jurisdiction for the prosecution of suspected war criminals. That case was made very clearly by the noble Baroness, Lady Ramsay, by my noble friend Lord Carlile and by the Minister when she spoke at the beginning of the debate, so I thought that I would just stand up and say that I agreed. Luckily for me, the noble Baroness, Lady D'Souza, added some comments that I can elaborate on.
The noble Baroness pointed out that we do not want a two-tier system. I am sorry that she is not in her place, but we already have a two-tier system. If I talk about private prosecutions, the next stage is the Attorney-General. The two-tier is already there, so she is not correct in that assumption.
The usual course at the moment is that when someone is accused, the police investigate and pass the file to the Crown Prosecution Service. If the Crown Prosecution Service feels that there is a realistic chance of conviction and a prosecution is in the public interest, it will charge the accused with the crime. It has powers of arrest while it investigates. That is the case now and that will be the case after and if the Bill is passed.
In answer to the question raised by the noble Baroness, Lady D'Souza, although she is not here to hear the answer, if she had followed the case in the House of Commons she would know that, in answer to one of my Liberal Democrat colleagues, the Minister gave extra reassurance that the Crown Prosecution Service would be given sufficient resources to give exactly what the noble Baroness is complaining about, which is not happening now.
The difference in a private prosecution is that the test is much lower—a prima facie case—and the magistrate is shown only the alleged evidence for the prosecution and nothing at all from the defence. There has never been a private prosecution for universal jurisdiction ending with a conviction. There has never been a trial. Comments were made that there were only 10 cases, of which only two had arrest warrants, but they never went to trial.
So, at present, an arrest warrant is issued and the person concerned is not informed, nor can he or she defend themselves. The person foolish enough to come to our democracy is arrested, and then, currently, the Attorney-General—the second tier, which the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, did not notice—will decide whether there is a realistic case to answer.
The change effected by the Bill would be that someone can still be accused before an arrest warrant is issued but the Director of Public Prosecutions would have to agree that a prosecution should go forward. The change, which is very good for a democracy, is that you are taking out the politician—the Attorney-General—and replacing them with the DPP, who is not a politician and who has given lots of assurances in the other place. When we spoke about this outside this Chamber, people asked me what the difference is and why someone should not be arrested by the magistrates’ court. The bottom line is that, under the current system, that person could spend two nights in jail before the Attorney-General said that there was no case and they were released. However, if there was a case—whether it is a Crown Prosecution Service arrest or one that arose out of a private prosecution, supported by the DPP—universal jurisdiction and all the things that follow would be there. The noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, also said that there should be no politicisation of the process. I assure her that the DPP is not a politician—however, the Attorney-General is, and that aspect of the current system is being changed.
I now turn to the localism of the licensing section. Until the last two or three speakers spoke—the noble Lords, Lord Brooke and Lord Clement-Jones—I thought that this would break new ground and offer a little light relief from police commissioners. Part 2, which covers this issue, is pretty good apart from one point, which I think is wrong—the Minister used the word “vicinity” when she talked about widening the places from where people can make objections. At first glance, that is correct, because anyone within the local authority area can object now, which is an improvement. However, local authority areas have boundaries. In my own area of London, there is a boundary for instance between the borough of Barnet and the borough of Brent, called the Edgware Road. There is a pub I can think of on the Brent side of the road that causes great trouble, which, indeed, is subject to a licensing appeal and hearings. However, the people on the other side of the road, in Barnet, under the current draft of the Bill, would not be able to object, because although they live in the vicinity, they live in a neighbouring licensing authority area. I hope to bring forward a minor amendment to include that in Committee.
The Bill itself, as far as licensing is concerned, is dealing very much with dotting the “i”s and crossing the “t”s. However, the trouble is that we have moved in this country towards the free availability of alcohol under the licensing legislation, which did not exist before. Licensed establishments tended to close at 11.30 pm, perhaps with a half-hour drinking-up time. We were told that in order to stop the inebriated persons—let us call them drunks—coming out of the pubs at 11.30 pm in one horde, we would lessen the load by spreading it from 11.30 pm to 12.30 am, 1 am, 3 am and so on, and then it would be easier. Our neighbours across the channel sit quietly at the tables and drink their wine in a civilised fashion, or so we are told.
The halcyon days of the pubs closing at 11.30 pm have now moved on to the pubs emptying out over a period of hours. During that period, those inebriated people may be kept under control within the licensed establishment, but once they are outside, it is the responsibility of the police. Local communities are being treated very, very badly by the freeing up of licensing laws. One noble Lord talked about licensed retailers selling alcohol. So many retailers—someone mentioned a fish and chip shop and someone mentioned a post office—are extending their licensing hours and applying to sell alcohol that it is free for drinking not only within the pubs but in our streets. I believe that that aspect of the Bill needs to be looked at again.