Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Debate between Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede and Lord Hannay of Chiswick

Committee stage
Monday 7th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

I echo, from a non-legal point of view, the points made by the previous two speakers but, when looking at the European Court of Justice and its role under the protocol, I imagine that even the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, would not contradict the point that I am about to make, which is that the properly constituted British Government, supported by the properly constituted British Parliament, entered into a treaty that gave a role to the European Court of Justice. That is a simple fact. It is there, written. It is another simple fact that there is no provision in the protocol to remove that role of the European Court of Justice—none.

What we are talking about is a breach of our international commitments. I am sure one of the noble Lords on the Front Bench will again hotly deny that this is the case because, like the Red Queen in Alice, their only argument is, “It is so because I say it is so”. Fortunately, that is not a terribly convincing argument in this place, where occasionally—not all the time—reason has a way of prevailing. I should like to suggest that we recognise this reality, which is that the Government’s attempt to remove the European Court of Justice unilaterally from two international treaties, which they entered with the consent, support and approval of Parliament, is a breach of our international commitments.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, we had a brief debate on matters relating to the European court last week, which largely focused on the earlier parts of the Bill. It is helpful to have this opportunity to deal with some of these issues in more detail.

The agreement reached with the EU on the status and role of the CJEU in relation to the protocol and other parts of the withdrawal agreement was carefully crafted and informed part of the oven-ready deal the Conservative Party was proud to call its own. There is some logic in what Clause 20 seeks to achieve. If the protocol no longer functions as intended, the legal processes cannot either, but that is only if one accepts that it is acceptable to tear up a binding international agreement in the first place.

The power for Ministers to introduce some form of referral process is interesting and a little surprising. It seems to contradict the earlier power in subsection (2). From a practical point of view, would not any referral scheme work only if the EU and European court agreed to engage in the process? Would this point not need to be negotiated?

There has been a wide-ranging debate on these issues, but it seems that there are some very practical consequences of trying to put into place a new referral process while at the same time needing to negotiate with the organisation one has just torn up a formal agreement with. How would that work in practice?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 56 deals with the

“Duty to seek an agreement on outstanding issues with the Northern Ireland Protocol”.


This amendment would make it a statutory requirement for the Government to seek a negotiated outcome with the EU and to exhaust legal routes under the EU withdrawal agreement before availing themselves of the powers in this Bill. The amendment would also require Ministers to provide regular updates to Parliament regarding the ongoing UK-EU negotiations.

In this amendment, we seek to bring together two issues in a single text: the negotiated settlement and the regular updates. This would ensure that the extraordinary measures in this Bill could not be used until all legal routes are exhausted. We know that the Government will say this amendment is unnecessary, yet the very existence of this Bill highlights the lack of good faith displayed by Ministers. We have been asked to trust in the new negotiations, but we have not yet had an update from the Foreign Secretary—although we are told we may get one later this week, and I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm that. Colleagues such as the noble Lords, Lord Hannay and Lord Kerr, often remind us of the Commission’s duties to the European Parliament, so why, after all this time, does the Conservative Party continue to sideline what they call the mother of Parliaments—this House? If the Government really are acting in good faith, they should take no issue with this amendment. It is a restatement of their own policy, coupled with a request for further information. I beg to move Amendment 56.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, I support this amendment. I have spoken on a number of previous occasions about the fact that we are fumbling around in the dark. The noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, made a noble attempt at an earlier stage in today’s debate to say something about what was going on but I am sorry to say that, if I was being impolite, I would say that what he said was the square root of nothing. Are we going to get something more than that? We ought to. That has been the practice of previous British Governments in negotiation as a third party when we were outside the European Union and in many other negotiations. I think it is pretty shocking that we are not getting that.

It also underlines a point which all our debates illustrate: that the Government have put the cart before the horse. Surely the right sequence would have been for the Government to enter into a serious process of negotiation from last February onwards; but they did nothing—absolutely nothing. We now know that nothing happened after February. As that process went along, they should have reported it to Parliament. At some stage or another, it would have been perfectly reasonable for the Government to say that we cannot go on like this for ever and, if we cannot get a negotiated agreement to sort out the implementation of the protocol in order to cure it of some of the imperfections which none of us contests, then we may have to go down a unilateral course.

If the Government had done that, I suspect that we would have had an agreement by now—but the lady who was Foreign Secretary at the time and who had her eye on higher things, which, alas, turned out to be a flash in the pan, went down another course, which was to put the cart before the horses. And that is where we are: with the cart firmly before the horses. Here we are, spending hours and hours discussing what we are going to do if this process of negotiation, which the Government say is their preference, fails. Well, the time to do that is when it has failed, when the Government have made a full and detailed report of why it had failed, and when we can see what the other side in the negotiation says about whether those reasons for failure are justified. Then Parliament can take a view on what to do next.

Instead of which, we are being asked to do all this now in the, alas, totally futile belief that this will somehow put the frighteners on Brussels. Well, it does not look to me as if Brussels is terribly frightened; nor has it been for many months. So I wish we could just get away from this and leave the process of deciding what we do if the Government’s preferred option fails, and then we will deal with that when we get to it. We will cross that bridge when we get to it.

Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Debate between Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede and Lord Hannay of Chiswick

Committee stage
Wednesday 2nd November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, I will briefly follow the noble Lord, Lord Bew, because he raised a point of great importance: we are breaking our teeth on a problem with three parts. At the moment, the Government are giving us absolutely nothing in terms of reporting on what is going on in Brussels. It is simply described as a “running commentary”, as if that were answer to the problem—well, it is not.

I lived through the last time the United Kingdom negotiated with the European Union as a third country, known as our accession negotiations. The process of the negotiations was reported on regularly to both Houses of Parliament by the Heath Government. No one said that was a running commentary or the wrong thing to do. We cannot go on like this, without the slightest idea of what is going on in Brussels, because it very much affects what we are discussing here. As the noble Lord, Lord Bew, rightly said, there is not the slightest sign to show whether our discussion here, and the Government pushing this absurd legislation through in an untimely manner, are either helping or hindering what is going on in Brussels.

I plead with the Minister to programme a moment at which the Government will give both Houses a progress report—not of everything going on in Brussels, but so that we have some idea of how that piece fits in with the others.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, Clause 15 contains what the DPRRC called the “most arresting” powers in the Bill, allowing Ministers to rip up and rewrite an Act of Parliament by granting the power to classify parts of the protocol as excluded provision or to tweak the precise nature of that classification, with virtually no parliamentary oversight.

The Minister will argue that the Government have constrained themselves by listing nine permitted purposes for which changes can be made to the application of the protocol, but that list changes very little. The DPRRC describes it as

“a very broad set of circumstances”.

Unlike SIs made under the EU withdrawal Act 2018, which must be accompanied by a declaration of the good reasons for them, the DPRRC says that there is no obligation for a Minister to include a statement setting out why the regulations are being made.

The DPRRC report does not take issue with Clause 16, although this also confers very broad powers on Ministers: they can make any additional provision that they like in relation to additional excluded provision. Once again, we need the Government to publish indicative regulations: we currently have no idea how the use of these powers would look or how often they would be used. We are told that the tearing up of the protocol is to bring stability and predictability to trade across the Irish Sea, yet these powers theoretically allow Ministers fundamentally to alter trading arrangements at short notice, with no reasoning, consultation or formal scrutiny. As with Clause 14, the provisions appear unworkable, and granting such discretion to Ministers is likely to increase uncertainty and instability.