Armed Forces: Pay
Lord Rosser Excerpts(11 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, service personnel will receive the increase from 1 May onwards. I understand that it is the general policy of all Governments not to backdate, to avoid adding complexity and risk to normal administrative operations. The noble and gallant Lord asked if the uplift in X-factor will be paid to mobilised reservists. X-factor is paid at the full level—currently 14%—to all ranks up to and including lieutenant-colonel or equivalent in the Regular Forces, full-time reserve service personnel on full commitment and mobilised reservists.
Lord Rosser
My Lords, the Government have made as nifty a U-turn as a London taxicab on implementing the X-factor supplement recommendation. Yet the contract for the chairman of the Armed Forces Pay Review Body, Alasdair Smith, is not being renewed. He said that, because of the late decision and the time needed to make another appointment, his successor will miss the first half of the year’s programme of work, including all the visits to members of the Armed Forces that are a hugely important part of the role. That statement indicates that this was a sudden decision by the Government, made following receipt of the pay review body’s recommendations at the end of January, since just over two weeks later Alasdair Smith was told that he would be finishing at the end of this month. In view of their hasty U-turn, will the Government now offer Professor Smith a further term as chairman? After all, he will have the confidence of members of the Armed Forces since he upheld the independence of the pay review body—or is that the problem?
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, there is no link between the Prime Minister’s decision not to reappoint Professor Smith and the increase in X-factor. The Prime Minister’s decision not to extend Professor Smith’s appointment represents broader government policy regarding no automatic right to reappointment to non-departmental public bodies such as the pay review body. The decision is in line with the Commissioner for Public Appointments’ Code of Practice for Ministerial Appointments to Public Bodies. An interim chair, John Steele, has been drawn from the remaining members of the AFPRB until a formal replacement can be appointed.
Defence: Procurement
Lord Rosser Excerpts(11 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Rosser
My Lords, I add my thanks to my noble friend Lady Dean of Thornton-le-Fylde for securing this debate on the important issue of defence procurement, on which there are areas of concern and uncertainty, a number of which my noble friend raised. The Government claim to have a balanced budget for defence, but it applies only to the equipment budget, which represents 40% of total Ministry of Defence annual expenditure. The recent National Audit Office report did not even cover that 40% as it did not look at equipment support costs, which make up just over half the total equipment plan cost. The report stated that,
“there is systemic over-optimism inherent in the Department’s assumptions around the costing of risk”,
and that,
“the cost of … procurement projects in the Equipment Procurement Plan has been understated by £12.5 billion”.
The National Audit Office also said:
“Achieving affordability is … contingent on savings being achieved elsewhere in the budget”,
which can only mean the non-equipment budget comprising welfare, housing and manpower.
One of the major outstanding procurement matters, as has already been said, is a decision on the future of Defence Equipment and Support, on which there appears to be some delay. The Government favour moving to a government-owned, contractor-operated organisation, but have not answered many of the points of concern that have been raised, including those raised by the Defence Select Committee in the other place. The opposition position is that private expertise should be integrated in policy-making, since a partnership delivers positive policy outcomes. We have, however, practical reservations about the GOCO model for reform of Defence Equipment and Support. Accountability to Parliament must be retained, and the reasons for outsourcing a £160 billion equipment programme must be much more explicit than is the case at present.
It is not clear with a GOCO what risk is being transferred from the public sector to the private sector. The risk lies with the body or organisation that pays the cost in either financial or reputational terms if equipment is not delivered to specification, to time and within budget. Where that risk currently lies with the Ministry of Defence in the public sector it is not going to be transferred to the contractor-operated but government-owned organisation, not least because no contractor would be prepared to take on such a risk. It is difficult to see what risk at all would be taken on by the contractor. Should the full burden of risk continue to be with the Ministry of Defence, the benefits of the GOCO model and the outsourcing of procurement decision-making become harder to see.
In order to gain or retain an advantage over potential aggressors and enemies, new defence equipment, by definition, will be at the leading edge of technology. That can increase the likelihood of overruns, since new ground is being broken, and, with it, the uncertainties that have to be addressed and the unexpected that may well occur. In that situation the risk has to be borne by the public sector since no company would be prepared to take on such a risk that could well jeopardise their very existence if it materialised.
A private contractor operating a GOCO is presumably going to achieve its return through equipment that is procured rather than through equipment that is not, even though in some cases dropping, or making significant changes to, a project would appear the better option than continuing with it. Under the GOCO proposal with the private contractor, how would the contract incentivise or reward a project manager to meet the time and cost targets of a project if it had become clear either that the costs would be well in excess of what had been estimated or, alternatively, that the specification could no longer be met within the timescale—or, indeed, adequately met at all? We need a broader new culture, with the Government being prepared to return a project to the main gate stage when forecast cost or timescales exceed set targets. Changing specifications and an acceptance of missed targets should not be the norm.
Presumably, under the GOCO, many of the same people as now would continue to be involved in defence procurement, as the TUPE arrangements would apply, with those currently involved being transferred over to the new organisation. If the argument is that a private contractor will somehow be better able to buy in and bring in talented people, then why can the Ministry of Defence not do this? We have a model of private sector management operating an activity in the defence field at Aldermaston. What exactly does the Ministry of Defence feel has been achieved from this that has been beneficial in terms of cost and performance? What experience do other countries have of outsourcing responsibility for defence acquisition? Under the government-owned, contractor-operated scheme, how would the Ministry of Defence retain overall responsibility for UK defence acquisition? Would such a development in this highly sensitive security field have an adverse impact on levels of co-operation with allies?
The greater the extent to which responsibility for UK defence acquisition is outsourced to the private sector then the less knowledge on this vital and security-sensitive area of activity is retained within the military and the Ministry of Defence. There must surely be an argument for nurturing and developing these skills within the Ministry of Defence and providing opportunities for worthwhile and satisfying careers within defence acquisition, rather than seeing defence acquisition as a step on the ladder to another career within the military field. This would help to ensure that the expertise and knowledge are acquired to work with maximum effectiveness with both manufacturers and suppliers, as well as within the Ministry of Defence and the military. We need to be able to offer a permanent professional career choice in procurement, ending two-year stints.
This is surely an area of activity where the Ministry of Defence must retain real knowledge and expertise, bearing in mind the sensitive security nature of defence acquisition, the sums of money involved and the need for a defence industrial strategy which supports appropriate national sovereignty. The House of Commons Defence Select Committee stated in its recent report that,
“the absence of a defence industrial strategy which supports appropriate national sovereignty puts the UK at a disadvantage against competitor countries”.
Procurement power should be used to provide certainty, support supply chains, increase transparency and establish an active industrial strategy in partnership with business. Since the Government seem to regard buying off the shelf as their default position, it is increasingly important to give industry greater certainty—and that means being explicit in the capabilities the Government intend to purchase off the shelf and those they regard as sovereign.
When an effective market exists, competition is the best procurement policy. The reality, though, is that there is seldom a viable market for major defence projects. There must be a case for considering how certain value-for-money tests might be taken into account, including wider employment, industrial or economic factors. Given the social and economic impact of defence procurement, it should be looked at on a cross-departmental basis. Defence decision-making could be made more transparent through the MoD publishing the cost-benefit analysis that provided the basis for awarding contracts, while respecting commercial sensitivities and any classified security issues. This would also add greater accountability, something that was exposed as necessary during the Department for Transport’s west coast main line franchising debacle.
I hope that the Minister will be in a position to provide more information on the Government’s intentions and reasoning on future defence procurement. Defence procurement is technical, and reform to Ministry of Defence internal structures is necessary, but we should surely always remember that the goal and objective for procurement is about delivering equipment when and where it is needed on the front line in order that battles can be won, lives can be saved and operations brought to a successful conclusion.
Armed Forces: Reserve Forces
Lord Rosser Excerpts(11 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Rosser
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what progress is being made towards achieving the projected increase in the size of the United Kingdom’s reserve forces.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Astor of Hever)
My Lords, the first year of the Future Reserves 2020 programme has been about stabilisation and understanding. The number of inquiries about reserve service has increased, and early indications are that strength is stabilising. We recently conducted a public consultation to ensure that the right relationships were established between reservists and their families, their employers and the Armed Forces. We intend to publish a White Paper in the spring that will set the conditions to deliver the reserve force strength we require.
Lord Rosser
My Lords, the future strength and capability of our Armed Forces is dependent on increasing our Reserve Forces to 30,000 by 2018, yet the Territorial Army has declined by 1,000 over each of the last three years. In the year up to this March, it looks as though the number of recruits will be well below target. A Federation of Small Businesses survey showed that even among members who are open to employing reservists, two out of every five believe that the Government’s future requirement that reservists serve and are away from their civilian jobs for one year out of every five would negatively impact their business. What action do the Government intend to take to accelerate recruitment to our reserves; what incentives will be given to employers to hire reservists; and what protection will be given to reservists to prevent them being discriminated against in respect of both hiring and promotion?
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, we acknowledge that this is the start of a challenging programme to reshape our Armed Forces. We inherited Reserve Forces that were in decline and not being used in the most cost-effective way. What we are setting out to do is sensible and achievable, and the planned strengths are well within historic levels. However, we are not complacent, and we are already running a major recruiting campaign for the TA. This has already resulted in over 6,650 inquiries since it started on 17 January. The Government are fully committed to delivering Reserve Forces that are integral to and integrated with the Regular Forces, and we are investing an additional £1.8 billion over the next 10 years.
Somalia: Piracy (EUC Report)
Lord Rosser Excerpts(11 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Rosser
My Lords, I add my thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, and the European Union Committee for the report that we are considering today, which is a follow-up to the 2010 report on the European Union’s naval operation Atalanta. The noble Lord, Lord Teverson, gave us a comprehensive introduction on the present state of play, the key issues involved and progress made since the previous report. I do not, therefore, intend to refer to all the issues which he so ably addressed and which are referred to in the report.
The report indicates an improving situation as far as the levels of Somali piracy are concerned, with a significant reduction in the number of pirated vessels and hostages in June 2012 compared to June 2011, as well as much greater practical co-operation between organisations and nations. However, the report certainly does not suggest that the problem has been solved. The committee welcomed the EU Atalanta attack on the pirate land base and, in their response, the Government agreed with that. The committee also reported that it had changed its view on having armed guards on ships, in light of the fact that no ship carrying armed guards has been successfully pirated and violence has not apparently escalated.
Evidence was given to the committee, though, that those involved in piracy were increasing their activity on land, including kidnapping on shore, and that the smaller number of successful attacks had led to an increase in the level of ransom demands and greater violence. Indeed, the view appears to be that piracy will never be eliminated except, hopefully, in the longer term and that the realistic objective must be to make sure that it is contained. As a key part of that objective of containment, Operation Atalanta’s mandate was renewed in 2012 until the end of 2014.
I should like to raise a few points of relative detail about the report and the Government’s response. I note that, when the previous report was discussed in this House in November 2010, the response was given by the Foreign Office Minister. Today, the response to the European Union Committee’s follow-up report is being given by the Defence Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Astor of Hever. I am not sure whether the change in department responding to the debate represents any change in the Government’s priorities and approach to the issue of Somali piracy, Somalia and the EU’s Operation Atalanta, or whether it is simply an issue of the availability—or flexibility—of government Ministers. It would be helpful to have that small point clarified.
Paragraph 26 of the report states:
“We were, however, surprised to hear from the Minister that only one Royal Navy ship was allocated to Operation Atalanta for three months in a two year period”.
While the committee was surprised to hear this, it was not concerned, unlike the Chamber of Shipping, as the committee felt that there were financial constraints and considered that our command role from Northwood Headquarters was compensation for our limited contribution of vessels.
As the noble Lord, Lord Jopling, said, the committee’s report was completed last summer—over six months ago—and the government response was written last September, so could the Minister tell me whether our allocation of Royal Navy ships to Operation Atalanta remains as indicated in the report and the government response? I ask that also in the light of a recent article in the House magazine about HMS “Westminster” and her crew, which referred, among the other roles that they have, to the proud contribution made,
“to the international naval effort which has seen piracy attacks off the Horn of Africa reduce by 75% in the last 12 months”.
It may be that HMS “Westminster” has been involved in one of the other operations in the area, rather than in Operation Atalanta.
In its report, the committee expressed the view that any reduction in effort would quickly result in a renewed upsurge of pirate activity and that the mandate of Operation Atalanta should be extended beyond December 2014 to send a clear signal that the EU would not walk away from confronting piracy in the Indian Ocean. Rightly or wrongly, I rather took it from that that the committee may not wholeheartedly share the view that a decision on the renewal of the operation’s mandate should wait until the middle of next year, as appears to be the intention. The Government’s response to the report did not specifically address the issue of whether and when the mandate should be renewed, so it would be helpful if the Minister could say whether, on the basis of the situation on piracy as it is at the moment, the Government would or would not support renewal of Operation Atalanta’s mandate.
When the committee’s earlier report was discussed in 2010, there was general agreement that the long-term elimination of piracy would be secured only through addressing the underlying causes of instability affecting Somalia. That clearly remains the view. The committee’s report and the Government’s response set out the developments that have occurred and the steps that have been taken since the earlier report by the EU, the UN and the international community to help to improve the prospects of stability in Somalia. As the Government’s response says, fundamental to the EU’s efforts is the principle of encouraging greater African ownership, including by the African Union.
The committee is to be congratulated on the thoroughness of its work, including the follow-up report, which has highlighted the considerable progress that has been made and the reasons for it. Let us hope that that progress proves to be soundly based and that, despite some of the information that we have been given in the debate today about the release of those involved in piracy, it will ultimately lead not only to the eventual end of piracy but to a safer, more secure and more prosperous future for Somalia and its people in particular and for the region in general.
Armed Forces: Army Basing Plan
Lord Rosser Excerpts(11 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Rosser
My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement made earlier in the other place by the Secretary of State on the next, but hardly controversial, stage of one half of the coalition Government’s withdrawal of troops from Europe. We welcome a steady, costed withdrawal of UK troops from Germany. Today’s announcement will impact on Army deployability, our ability to meet planning assumptions, service families’ livelihoods, and the integration of service personnel with local communities.
Before asking some detailed questions on how to make these measures successful, I will refer to previous Statements on the basing plan. The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review referred to the redeployment back to the United Kingdom of British Forces personnel currently based in Germany. It also referred to reconfiguring the Army into five multirole brigades. Approximately half of the then 20,000 personnel serving in Germany were expected to be relocated back to the United Kingdom by 2015, and the remainder by 2020.
Following the SDSR, the Ministry of Defence undertook a basing review, the conclusions of which were announced by the Secretary of State in July 2011. Under the plans announced then, RAF Kinloss would be transferred to the Army, with some of the personnel returning from Germany being based at Kinloss from 2014-15. RAF Leuchars was also to be transferred to the Army, with two major units and a formation HQ being redeployed to that site from Germany. The HQ was expected to move to Leuchars before 2015, followed by the two units between 2015 and 2017. RAF Cottesmore was to be vacated by the RAF, with the Army expected to start moving in in 2013.
The five multirole brigades envisaged under the strategic defence and security review were to be located in and around Catterick and Salisbury, in eastern England largely at the former RAF base at Cottesmore, and in Scotland, largely in Kirknewton, south-west of Edinburgh. The multirole brigades in eastern England and Scotland were to be largely formed from units returning from Germany. According to the July 2011 Statement, it was expected that approximately 6,500 to 7,000 Army personnel currently in Germany would be based in Scotland. It was also expected that units returning from Germany would move into bases in Aldergrove in 2015, and that further units returning from Germany would relocate to Pirbright barracks during the course of this year.
In November 2011, the Ministry of Defence announced the first tranche of moves that would take place in 2012 and the first half of 2013 as part of the defence rebasing programme, with the first tranche including 1,800 personnel returning from Germany. I mention all that because I want the Minister to clarify the extent to which the proposed moves and timescales announced today are in line with previous announcements and Statements on the basing review and on the redeployment back to the United Kingdom of British forces personnel currently based in Germany. Where there have been any changes, will he explain what those changes are, including changes in timing, and the reasons for them, as that is not entirely clear from the Statement made in the other place by the Secretary of State for Defence?
The Secretary of State in the other place also said, and, indeed, repeated in the Statement, that the total cost of returning troops from Germany is £1.8 billion. Will the Minister spell out specifically where this money has been found and say whether any cuts to the Ministry of Defence non-equipment budget are being made as a result of having to find this money? All those in the military who have recently lost their jobs will want to know that today’s announcement has not been funded at their expense. Likewise, will the Minister say how much is allocated for each RAF base being converted to make them fit for the Army, and in each case when the conversion will be completed?
I would like to refer to the Armed Forces Covenant Annual Report 2012 because it contained the following observations by external members of the covenant reference group. It stated:
“Notwithstanding the fact that work on the New Employment Model (which will include accommodation) is on-going, we urge the Government to produce a transparent assessment of the impact of the freeze both on the condition of accommodation and on how the needs of Armed Forces personnel and their families are being met, particularly given the imminent relocation of our Forces from Germany”.
It is also worth reminding ourselves of the comments by the Armed Forces Pay Review Body in its 2012 report. It stated:
“Against the background of wider changes and uncertainty, accommodation remains high on the list of concerns for Service personnel and their families. We hear repeated concerns during our visits and from the Service Families’ Federations, ranging from practical issues about the lack of choice in allocations and variable maintenance performance in different locations to policy issues on the definition of the family. … On our visits Service personnel and their families often commented on the allocations process for Service Family Accommodation (SFA). Lack of information and choice ahead of moving to a new unit were often mentioned as issues of concern”.
The pay review body went on to express concern at receiving,
“poorly evidenced proposals from MOD to address its perception that the ‘subsidy’ to Service families has become too high”.
The pay review body went on to comment:
“The evidence we received from MOD was driven by the perceived need to reduce the difference between MOD’s spending on Service accommodation and its rental receipts. It did not give sufficient consideration to the human aspect of housing or the role of accommodation in the overall package for personnel”.
In the light of those comments from the pay review body and the Armed Forces Covenant Annual Report, including observations by the external members of the Covenant Reference Group, in relation to accommodation, rents and the apparent gap between income and expenditure, can the Minister say whether Armed Forces personnel and their families returning from Germany will be faced with attempts by the Ministry of Defence to secure significant increases in rents for accommodation provided for them in this country? What steps are being taken to address the other concerns on accommodation, to which I have referred and have been highlighted by the pay review body, in the light of the moves back from Germany? Clearly, accommodation is a significant issue for Armed Forces personnel. The quotes that I have mentioned are not mine but are contained in the Armed Forces Covenant Annual Report 2012 and the pay review body report for 2012. It would be helpful to have the Government’s response, bearing in mind that a significant part of the success of the moves back from Germany will be dependent on the quality, extent, variety and cost of accommodation provided for our Armed Forces personnel who are moving back.
What efforts will the Ministry of Defence be making to give personnel returning from Germany the opportunity to purchase their own homes, which I know is an objective of the MoD? It would be helpful if the Minister could say a little more on that score. Can we also be assured that the accommodation provided in the UK will be of comparable size to the accommodation in Germany? I know that this might sound like a detail but, to the families, that would not be the case if it went wrong. If the accommodation is not of comparable size, there could be logistical issues such as existing furniture not being able to fit into the new accommodation. I am sure that some warm words—I hope more than warm words—of clarification on that point would be extremely helpful.
Most of my comments are directed towards the moves back from Germany. Can the Minister give a guarantee that no one returning will be forced to take expensive private rented accommodation? What are the anticipated costs of education and healthcare provision for Armed Forces personnel and their families returning to this country, bearing in mind that they are likely to be concentrated, as I understand from the Statement, in a relatively small number of locations? Will the cost of education and healthcare fall on the defence budget or education and health departmental budgets, and those of the devolved Administrations? I ask that particularly in relation to the reductions in the amount of money that local authorities have. Bearing in mind that those returning are moving back to a relatively small number of locations, what will be the impact on existing schools? If new schools are required, will they be local authority schools, academies or free schools, and who will make such decisions?
Will the decisions on where to base personnel—the biggest group that we are talking about is coming back from Germany—lead to an even greater concentration of our Armed Forces in a limited number of locations, largely in the south of England? Given that that appears to be the case, subject to what the Minister says in reply, will that have any adverse impact on recruitment into our Armed Forces from other parts of the country, particularly when the economy picks up and those seeking employment have a wider choice of job opportunities?
Will it also be the case that, with the withdrawal of our Armed Forces from Germany, the expenditure on the costs of such a move will have to be financed well in advance of any savings or other financial benefits being realised? The noble Lord referred to costs and he also referred to savings, but he did not refer to timescales. If it is the case that the costs have to be borne well before the savings are achieved, what would be the cash-flow implications for the Ministry of Defence budget? May I also ask that, in withdrawing from Germany—
Noble Lords
Lord Rosser
Are we faced with any penalty or other payments as a result or are we able to withdraw from the accommodation sites we currently occupy in Germany at any time we choose without incurring any penalty or other charges?
I am sure from the comments that have just been made that your Lordships will appreciate the fact that I am about to conclude. UK troops have been stationed in Germany for almost 70 years. We support their return home, but this will be matched, on our part, by detailed scrutiny. I hope the Minister will be able further to outline the implications of today’s announcement for personnel and their families as well as for local communities which, I am sure, will give our returning troops a warm and patriotic welcome.
Armed Forces: Redundancies
Lord Rosser Excerpts(11 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Rosser
My Lords, I express our sincere condolences to the families and friends of the two brave members of our Armed Forces who have lost their lives as a result of action in Afghanistan in the service of our country.
I thank the Minister for repeating as a Statement the Answer given in response to the Urgent Question asked in the other place on Armed Forces redundancies. With these further redundancies, how will the Government ensure that the specialist skills that will be required more than ever in future in, for example, North Africa, in intelligence capability and foreign languages, as well as in our Special Forces, are retained, not lost in the continuing reduction in the size of our Armed Forces?
Secondly, the reduction in the size of our Regular Army also assumes an increase in the size of our Reserve Forces. That will require incentives for employers to employ and retain reservists and cast-iron guarantees for reservists that they will not be discriminated against in their employment. What assurances can the Minister give on these two points, without which achieving the required strength of our Reserve Forces is likely to prove very difficult?
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for his comments at the beginning of his speech. He asked how we ensure that we retain the skills that we need. There are certain pinch-point skills that will be excluded from the redundancies. Off the top of my head, they are the intelligence corps, a certain number of Royal Engineers, particularly IEDs, language skills, which the noble Lord mentioned, and, of course, the Special Forces, which we do not talk about. They will be excluded.
Turning to reservists, as the noble Lord knows—we had a debate on this subject the other day—we expect to have a White Paper on this issue in the spring. We spent a lot of time debating this issue. This is a subject in which I personally take a great deal of interest. I have been involved with the reserves for a number of years, and I am confident that we can do everything possible to get up to the number we want, which is 20,000 by 2018.
Armed Forces: Future Size
Lord Rosser Excerpts(11 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Rosser
My Lords, it is late. Perhaps because of that, the interest shown in this debate in terms of the number of speakers is limited. Nevertheless, the issue raised is one of real interest and importance. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Empey, for giving us the opportunity to have this debate.
Relationships between countries and continents, strengths of countries and continents and their levels of influence change over time. For example, it will not be long before the size of the Chinese economy will exceed that of the United States. China’s military capability is also expanding fast and, with it, the confidence in wielding influence and greater political dominance that that brings. The United States, for its part, has made clear that it will be devoting more of its attention and resources, not least military ones, to the Far East and China, which will become its new strategic priority, and fewer to Europe. The United States ambassador to NATO has recently been quoted as saying that the NATO allies need to find the money to spend on military equipment to maintain the organisation’s strength. The US itself accounts for 75% of NATO’s budget and spends 4% of its GDP on defence. The ambassador asserted that the campaign in Libya had exposed what he described as “worrisome trends” in Europe’s ability to act without US help, that some European stockpiles had run out and had to be replenished by the United States, and that there were a,
“number of other critical capabilities that the US provided in spades”.
The future direction for the Middle East, in which we have considerable interests, is far from clear. Significant change, which was not predicted, has taken place in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. We have seen the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood as an international phenomenon and the Gulf States, including Qatar and Saudi Arabia, becoming more active players in events. The Sunni/Shia sectarian animosity in the Middle East continues to be a telling factor. Syria is in a state of turmoil and that is having repercussions in the Lebanon and Jordan. It remains to be seen in which direction Syria goes once President Assad has left the scene, and in particular the impact that this has on the Iranian Government and stability in the region, since the Iranians back the current Syrian regime.
Presidential elections are due in Iran in June and the current president will have to step down after two consecutive terms in office. Iran continues to face pressure over its nuclear intentions and its economy is in trouble. Israel also has elections later this month, though a significant change in government direction does not appear to be likely. The peace process between Israel and Palestine appears at present to be going nowhere, and there continues to be speculation on whether the Israeli military will strike against Iranian nuclear facilities.
On top of this the growing strength of al-Qaeda in parts of Africa, the rise of new powers in Asia Pacific, weak states outnumbering stable states by two to one, and new threats in cyberspace, which have been the reality in the Middle East in recent months, are all matters to be taken into account in assessing future developments and priorities. Even though we may not have predicted at least some significant events that have taken place, forecasting what is going to happen in the future is likely to become more, not less, difficult. Today, energy security, climate change, demographic shifts, and the spread of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials are threats, alongside state-on-state warfare, or contorted religiously inspired terrorism.
The global economic downturn that we face means that we and the majority of our allies are making spending cuts, with unavoidable consequences for capability and global reach. In the UK the situation has not been helped by the fact that decisions taken by the Government have not yet stimulated domestic growth and austerity is set to be extended. Budgetary restraint is unavoidable, however undesirable. If we are to realise our intentions and ambitions for our forces they will have to be affordable, and the profile of the defence budget will be an expression of our priorities.
Carrier strike and improved ISTAR are vital. Strategic warning capabilities and intelligence will be crucial in providing early indicators of threats and potential crises. Two state-of-the-art fighter fleets, advanced unmanned vehicles supporting all three services and strategic air lift are also key components. That our Armed Forces personnel will continue to be our most important asset and skills must also be a strategic capability. We need highly trained service personnel able to use higher technology platforms and exploiting to the full the opportunities new technology presents, reservists using niche civilian skills in military contexts, not least in the field of cyberspace and cyber security, and a high-skilled, broad-based defence industry. Remote surveillance, manoeuvrability in cyberspace, better communications and acting at distance with accuracy are all necessary features for our future forces.
Alongside this must also be a greater focus on international alliance-building. Shared threats and financial challenges demand that we pool resources and expertise. The UK/France accord may lay the ground for multiple discrete bilateral or regional arrangements between nations. NATO, though, is the primary military grouping through which action will be taken, and Europe’s focus should be on greater deployability and burden-sharing within the alliance.
It is vital that European nations work together towards meeting military objectives. European NATO nations are making deep cuts to defence budgets in isolation of each other and the consequence could be cross-alliance shortfalls or duplication, which would certainly not be the best use of available resources overall.
We also need to consider the opinion of the British people when considering our defence posture in protecting and furthering British interests and ideas. The public are wary of interventionism, following recent conflicts and the financial crisis. We have to make the case for strong, proactive defence postures, with our goal being prevention before intervention, and early intervention before conflict.
Diplomacy can be more effective than the painful cure of military action, albeit that a key function of our Armed Forces is to deter and be a credible threat to those who wish us and our allies harm. Whether in tackling climate change, investing in civil society and governance or diplomatic engagement, the spectrum of soft-power capabilities at the UK’s disposal to defend our interests and promote our ideas in the world should be capitalised on.
Defence is becoming more intricate and complex while the world is becoming more interdependent, and we need a policy response as broad as the threats that we face. We must aim to have flexible forces with whole-spectrum capabilities, able to respond rapidly whether through preventive measures, reactive disaster relief or multilateral interventions, and we must ensure that our intentions and ambitions for our forces are affordable and can be financed, with the needs of the front line being matched to those of the bottom line.
Afghanistan
Lord Rosser Excerpts(11 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Rosser
My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement made earlier today in the other place by the Secretary of State. These updates on the situation in Afghanistan provide us with a welcome opportunity to express again our continuing appreciation of the bravery and commitment shown by our Armed Forces. It is also a sombre opportunity, particularly as we approach Christmas and prepare to celebrate it with our families, to remember and reflect on the sacrifices made by members of our Armed Forces who have lost their lives or suffered life-changing injuries, whether physical or mental, in the service of our country.
The commitment to success in Afghanistan runs deep on all sides of the House, and while we on these Benches will scrutinise government decisions we will support the intentions with which they are made. Afghanistan has seen significant but not irreversible progress. Al-Qaeda has been dispersed, we have overseen elections, the army and police forces are being trained and the rule of law is evolving. None of these tasks, however, can be said to be complete. There are immense challenges to overcome. Facilitating free and fair presidential elections, tackling green-on-blue attacks, improving the representativeness of the police and the army, developing an education system and, above all, helping to deliver political reconciliation are all issues which necessitate our commitment up to and beyond 2014.
We all want to see our troops home as soon as possible and we welcome today’s announcement. When will the Minister be able to tell us which units will leave and from which part of Helmand? We are all concerned about the continuing risk to UK personnel who will remain, so can he say whether any force protection capabilities will be drawn down as a consequence of today’s announcement? Can he give an assurance that the full current range of facilities and amenities available to our forces in Afghanistan, including medical facilities, will continue to be provided for our remaining Armed Forces once the reduction in the overall size of our forces in Afghanistan commences?
The Minister spoke in general terms; however, can he be more specific about how the capacity of those departing can be sufficiently replaced by Afghan forces? Can he give the House more detail on the capability of the Afghan forces, specifically on what capacity they have in providing an air bridge, aerial surveillance and intelligence? He told us, in repeating the Statement, that 3,800 of our forces will leave by the end of next year. Does he currently envisage most remaining until the end of the fighting season and does he now expect the remaining UK forces, post-2013, to be withdrawn throughout 2014 or to remain until the end of combat operations?
Can the Minister say whether he envisages any circumstances that might lead to the decision announced today being changed or reversed? The co-ordination of the military coalition is essential, so is this part of a synchronised set of announcements? Once the reduction in our Armed Forces in Afghanistan begins, will our remaining forces continue to undertake their current roles and responsibilities—albeit on a scaled-down basis—or will the roles and responsibilities of our Armed Forces change from what they are at present?
There are currently some members of our Reserve Forces in Afghanistan. Will it be the intention to continue to deploy Reserve Forces as our Armed Forces in Afghanistan are reduced, or will members of our Reserve Forces no longer be deployed once the reductions start? Can the Minister also say whether all those who will be returning from Afghanistan, whether in 2013 or 2014, will be exempt from any future tranche of compulsory Armed Forces redundancies?
While the focus is rightly on withdrawal, it is also necessary to consider the post-2014 military settlement, which was referred to in the Statement. The Chief of the General Staff is right when he says that our commitment to Afghan institutions must be long-term, but we need more clarity on the nature of that commitment. Can the Minister therefore be more specific about the role of non-combat personnel? Is it current thinking that our trainers will be embedded with the ANSF and, if so, who will have responsibility for force protection?
It is still unclear how many UK forces will remain post-2014 or from which services they will be drawn. When will the Minister be in a position to give us greater detail on this, as well as on the UK’s equipment legacy to Afghanistan? I appreciate that firm decisions may almost certainly not have been made on these aspects, but if he is able to provide some more detail it would be extremely helpful. I accept that if he is able to do so, it may well be in writing subsequently.
We all know that a long-term settlement for Afghanistan will be achieved through politics rather than just military might. There have been recent reports of a “road map to peace” from Afghanistan’s High Peace Council, outlining plans for talks between the Afghan Government and the Taliban early next year. What confidence does the Minister have that such talks may indeed take place, and can he say whether he believes talks between the Taliban and US officials will recommence in Qatar in the new year? Can he also comment on the significance of Pakistan releasing a number of Afghan prisoners, and whether he sees that as marking a potentially significant shift in the Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship?
One of the main measures by which we will judge progress in Afghanistan will be the progress of women, to which the Minister referred in repeating the Statement. Sadly, a detailed recent UN report showed that Afghan women remain frequent victims of abuse. What efforts are the UK Government making, beyond those that the Minister referred to, to ensure that women’s safety does not deteriorate once ISAF forces have left? In particular, what are the Government doing to bring more women into the political process, the police and the judiciary?
Finally, as we enter what I believe to be the 12th and penultimate year of UK combat operations in this bloody but unavoidable conflict, there will rightly be lessons and consequences from Afghanistan. The time will also come for us to reflect as a nation on how we mark in a lasting way our commemoration of the fallen and injured. I look forward to the Minister’s replies about how NATO achieves withdrawal while maintaining the stability that so many have fought for. We need to get this right, since none of us has any intention of there ever being another conflict in Afghanistan.
Armed Forces: Medical Services
Lord Rosser Excerpts(11 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Rosser
My Lords, we, too, offer our sincere condolences to the family and friends of Captain Walter Barrie. His death is another all-too-frequent reminder of the enormous sacrifices still being made by members of our Armed Forces in the service of our country.
The report of the public inquiry into the death of Iraqi civilian Baha Mousa found that military guidance on key ethical questions was not provided to regimental medical officers at the time. Is the Minister now satisfied that if there were to be an increase in the proportion of medical personnel who were reservists, appropriate guidance would always be given to them prior to deployment, and that they would be as able as regular medical officers to resist any pressures to prioritise their obligations or loyalties to the military over their ethical duties to patients? Further, will the medical services available to members of the Reserve Forces post-deployment be the same as the medical services available to members of the Regular Forces post-deployment?
Lord Astor of Hever
My Lords, in answer to the noble Lord’s first question, I am pretty certain that I can give him that assurance. Like a number of noble Lords, I have been to Afghanistan and seen the hospital at Camp Bastion. I talked to a number of reservists. They work to an incredibly high standard. The NHS is very grateful for what its personnel pick up there and are able to take back to their respective trusts.
Future Reserves 2020
Lord Rosser Excerpts(11 years, 6 months ago)
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Lord Rosser
My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement made today in the other place by the Secretary of State. We support an enhanced role for our Reserve Forces and we pay tribute to the significant contribution made by our reservists and to their courage, not least in operations in the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan and, most recently, Libya. Nearly 30 have lost their lives on operations over the past 10 years and many more have sustained major injuries in the service of our country.
The Statement indicated that, for the first time in many years, our Reserve Forces numbers will be on an upward trend. That is obviously the intention, but let us be clear that that is because our Regular Forces numbers are on a significant downward trend, which is now much greater than that indicated in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review.
The Statement has confirmed the Government's earlier decision to invest an additional £1.8 billion in our reserves over the next 10 years in order to increase their size to a trained strength of approximately 35,000. Could the Minister say how this figure of £1.8 billion was determined? What exactly does it pay for in terms of training, equipment, buildings and payments and incentives, both to individuals to join the reserves and to employers to agree to them having the necessary time off to undertake the future enhanced commitment that will be expected? We need to have this breakdown to form a view on the adequacy or otherwise of the £1.8 billion in the light of the Government's intentions on the future size and role of our Reserve Forces.
The Statement refers to the commitment that will be expected from members of our Reserve Forces in the future: a deployment of no more than six months in a five-year period for the Army Reserve, with total mobilisation being up to a year to cover operation-specific, pre-deployment training and post-operation recuperation. Can the Minister confirm that, in addition to this, there will be a requirement for some 40 days’ training each year, or nearly six weeks? Will that 40 days’ training—if that is the correct figure—take place during the week, requiring further time off from employment, or will some of it be undertaken at weekends or during the evenings, or will weekend and evening training be in addition to the 40 days? If part of the training is at weekends or during the evenings, presumably that means that people who have to work shifts or work at weekends, of whom there are increasing numbers, would also require time off work for this training commitment.
Perhaps the Minister could clarify these points, as they relate directly to the amount of time that individuals would require to commit themselves to be away from their employment, and the level of leave of absence to which the employer would be asked to agree. Could the Minister also say how many reserves will be expected to be on extended readiness at any one time?
Could the Minister also confirm that if, as a nation, we felt it necessary in our national interest to become involved in a future operation requiring the level of resources that we have had to commit to Afghanistan and over the same lengthy period of time for which we have had to do that, we would be able to undertake such an operation with the number of Regular Forces and Reserve Forces projected for the future, and within the Reserve Forces commitment referred to in the Statement of a deployment of no more than six months in a five-year period for the Army Reserve, with total mobilisation being up to one year?
The present trained strength of our Army reserves is, I believe, around 17,000 and there is a need to increase that figure by some 13,000 to 30,000 over the next six years or so in order to deliver the Government's objective on the future role and strength of our Armed Forces. We hope the Government achieve that objective as we have made clear our support for an expanded and enhanced role for our Reserve Forces. We also support the proposal to look at the idea of a kitemark-style national recognition scheme for reserve-friendly employers, and we support, too, the intention to look at the renaming of our Reserve Forces.
However, what is not clear from the Statement is whether the implementation of the staged decrease in the size of our regular Armed Forces will be related to actual delivery of the required staged increase in the size of our trained Reserve Forces, or whether the implementation of the staged run-down in the size of our regular Armed Forces is simply related to the intended, but not actual, required staged increase in the size of our trained Reserve Forces. Could the Minister give some assurances on that point, as reducing the size of our regular Armed Forces without the required additional trained reservists being in place at each stage of the reduction will surely represent a potential threat to our national security and our ability to protect our vital national interests?
We have previously expressed our concerns over the ability to deliver the additional trained members of our Reserve Forces, and no doubt one area where the Government will be looking for future members of our Reserve Forces will be former members of our regular forces. Would the Minister consider fast-tracking service leavers’ applications to join the reserves for up to two years after having left the Regular Forces, instead of the one year as I believe it is at present?
The Secretary of State has said that he will be publishing a White Paper next spring, which will set out the Government's proposals for the way ahead in respect of our Reserve Forces, including any requirement for legislation. Employers are going to have to be willing to agree to the necessary time off to enable employees to give the required greater commitment as reservists that will be called for in the future, a greater commitment that frankly makes statements that it should not be a problem, because the size of our Territorial Army has been larger in the past than that now projected for our reserves, somewhat irrelevant and meaningless.
There is an argument that an employee who has had service in the reserves will have learnt and developed skills that will be of real value to the employer. I am sure that will be the case. My only comment would be that in another field, where the same argument applies—namely, over employees who wish to serve as lay magistrates—it is sometimes very difficult for an employee working for a private sector company to get the prior agreement to the time off which really is needed before they apply to become a magistrate. Even if time off can be secured, an employee who was looking to progress up through their company or organisation would need to be satisfied that their prospects of promotion or advancement would not be jeopardised by the fact that, for quite significant periods of time, they would be away and not undertaking the duties and responsibilities of the civilian post that they held. These are real issues, which the Government will have to address if they are to succeed in their objectives for our Reserve Forces, and these issues will be even more acute with small private sector employers for which the Government will need to draw up a specific strategy.
I know it will probably go against the grain for them, but the Government might care to consider whether the trade unions, who represent staff in many of our larger companies, might also have a role that they could be invited to play in drawing the attention of those staff to the opportunity of joining the reserves, and in encouraging employers to agree to the necessary time off along with some cast-iron written guarantees that people will not lose out on issues such as promotion, levels of salary enhancement or bonuses, where it might be very difficult to prove discrimination as opposed to suspecting discrimination.
My final point concerns the impact of the new enhanced role on reservists at a time when medical analysis shows that they are more susceptible than regulars to post-deployment mental health problems and post-traumatic stress disorder. Reservists return to civilian life without decompression with those with shared experiences and do not have access to military medical services. Could the Minister say what improvements are being made to post-deployment care as, in future, we will ask even more of our reserves? We should surely give more back in order to prevent the spread of this kind of invisible injury.
I conclude by reiterating our support for the Government's intention to increase the role and responsibilities of our Reserve Forces. Our concerns are over the logistics and feasibility of delivering the objective without firm, clear and decisive action. Our concerns are not over the principle of what the Government are seeking to achieve.