Lord Russell of Liverpool
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(1 day, 7 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I speak to Amendment 222 in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong of Hill Top, which she has so ably explained. All the amendments in this group seem to be a good idea. I also acknowledge the help of the Children’s Commissioner and the children’s coalition.
This is a very simple amendment: there is a concern that the offence of child-criminal exploitation, as written in the Bill, gives the perpetrator a defence if he or she reasonably believes that the child is over 18. We understand that this is a common part of legislation around other forms of abuse and exploitation; we believe that it will hinder the prosecution of perpetrators. During the Jay review into child criminal exploitation, many witnesses pointed to the role of adultification and racism in the criminalisation of children. The Modern Slavery Act 2015 is clear that children cannot consent to their own exploitation. However, the Jay review found that perceptions of children’s complicity in their exploitation meant that some groups of children, and black boys in particular, were not receiving an adequate safeguarding response. We strongly recommend that this part of Clause 40 is removed. It is a small piece of text that would have a profound effect on young victims.
My Lords, I was happy to put my name to Amendments 218, 219 and 222. The Minister mentioned that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, has Amendment 222A. She apologises for not being here this evening, but said that she thought that the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong, were so much better than her own, that she would not move them anyway—so that deals with that.
I am a governor of Coram, and used to be a trustee there. Coram is very involved in some of the activities that we are talking about. The Jay review is like a gut punch to the stomach. I had heard of it; I had not actually read it, but did so last night, and did not have a particularly undisturbed night’s sleep. What it contains is pretty horrifying.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, and my noble friend Lady Armstrong of Hill Top for their amendments, and to the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for putting his name to them and for his supportive comments.
Before I lose the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, about a national register, I will just say that the Police National Computer and the child criminal exploitation prevention orders can impose notification requirements on persons subject to orders requiring them to inform the local police of their name and address. I had that on my phone before I peered at my notes, and I did not want to lose that point.
I will start by welcoming Clause 40. It is a positive, forward-looking clause that will help support the reduction of child exploitation. I am grateful for the amendments that have been tabled, and I am also grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for the amendments I have tabled.
Amendment 218, tabled by my noble friend Lady Armstrong of Hill Top and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, would require that, for the child criminal exploitation offence to have been committed, the perpetrator had used
“threats, physical force, intimidation, persuasion or any other means”
against the child. In doing so, my noble friend seeks to illustrate the ways in which children can be criminally exploited. However, I put it to her that, in specifying the required means by which an adult gets a child to commit criminal conduct, the way in which the amendment is phased risks narrowing the application of the offence, because the prosecution would have to additionally prove those means of exploitation took place. Currently, the child criminal exploitation offence does not require proof that the child was subjected to threats, physical force, intimidation or any other harmful ways in which the child’s compliance was obtained by their exploiter. This is because, as a Government, we are very clear that children cannot consent to their own exploitation, so the offence could be committed regardless of whether and how the child was compelled to engage in the intended criminal activity.
Although my noble friend’s amendment includes the words “any other means”, which mitigates against any narrowing of the scope of the offence, I do not consider it necessary to include an illustrative, non-exhaustive list in this way. It would cause courts potentially to wonder about its purpose as a legal test and may have the unintended consequence of limiting the circumstances in which the child exploitation offence may be made out. I want my noble friend to think about that. I suggest to her that the prosecution wants to get the best case, and, by accepting her amendment, we might end up narrowing the potential success of legislating against this offence.
My noble friend also tabled Amendment 219, which would more specifically capture adults who intend to cause a child
“to engage in actions that support or facilitate”
crime. My noble friend indicated in her speech that the purpose of this amendment is to ensure that the offence of child exploitation also includes causing a child to commit an action which, while not itself illegal, can lead to future criminal behaviour. We have looked at this amendment in some detail, but I consider the objective is already met by subsection (1)(a)(iii) of the clause, which captures where the adult does something to the child now to facilitate or make it easier to cause the child to commit a criminal act in the future—the noble Baroness can find this on page 59 of the Bill as currently drafted. I hope she will look at that and reflect on it as part of these discussions, before any further discussion takes place on Report.
Furthermore, actions that support or facilitate crime may already amount to an offence, such as the offence under the Serious Crime Act 2007. Where an adult intentionally causes a child to commit an offence, the child criminal exploitation offence may be committed.
I am grateful for the words of the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, in support of his Amendment 222. This amendment seeks to remove the requirement that, for the child criminal exploitation offence to be committed, it must be proved that the defendant does not reasonably believe that the victim is aged 18 or over. My noble friend Lady Armstrong mentioned the issue of migrants—we are currently examining facial recognition issues in relation to migrants, and we had a discussion about that in the other Bill that I am taking through the House at this moment on immigration very recently. But she makes a very important point. I sympathise with the noble Lord’s desire to ensure that all adults who target children to draw them into crime can be caught by this offence, but that is precisely why the reasonable belief test is important—to ensure that perpetrators who deliberately and intentionally target children to commit crime are correctly identified and prosecuted. If there was no requirement to prove a lack of reasonable belief that the alleged victim was a child, it would risk criminalising people as exploiters of children who genuinely did not intend or contemplate involving a minor in criminality.
We must remember that the child criminal exploitation offence requires no proof of harmful behaviours against the child, such as coercion, force or threats. This goes back to the first point that I mentioned in response to my noble friend’s first amendment. It is committed simply when an adult engages in any contact or conduct towards or in respect of a child intending to cause them to commit a crime. The exploitative nature of this offence is the imbalance of power, which is exercised by an adult in deliberately and purposely seeking to involve a child in crime. Where that is not a factor in a case, as demonstrated by what they believed about the child’s age, there are other more appropriate offences that might be charged. For example, where a person encourages or assists someone to commit an offence regardless of their age, there is already an offence under the Serious Crime Act 2007.
Again, I welcome the discussion that we have had this evening, I welcome the contribution of Action for Children, and I welcome the discussion that we have had from the Children’s Commissioner for England, who called for this amendment due to concerns that perpetrators will seek to take advantage of considerations around the reasonable belief of age to undermine the credibility of victims and potentially escape prosecution. I welcome those contributions to the debate. I want to give them, with my colleagues in the Home Office, serious consideration. However, I make the point to the noble Lord that at the moment we do not consider reasonable belief of age to be a loophole, as is suggested—and in support of that I make a number of points.
First, there is a test of reasonable belief that does not necessarily require that the defendants have specific knowledge about the victim’s age, which would be a higher burden. Secondly, a perpetrator’s claim as to their belief alone will not be enough to escape prosecution, as prosecutors can and, I hope, would establish either that they did not believe the victim was 18 or, even if they did, that that belief was not reasonable. Thirdly, it only applies to children aged 13 to 17, not the most vulnerable children aged under 13. Finally, it follows established precedent in other offences, where the core offending relates to an adult’s conduct towards a child—for example, to child sexual exploitation offences in the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for referring to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, on Amendment 222A—she is not here today. It is commendable that someone has looked at other amendments and decided not to move their own; it is a very un-egotistical way of approaching this business.
The noble Lord, Lord Russell, says “Cross-Bench”. I will take that as a bonus point for the Cross Benches. It is a noble approach to take towards the amendment. So I will not deliberate on those points as I would potentially have done, but I ask the noble Lord simply to pass on my thanks to the noble Baroness for her self-awareness on that issue, which is commendable.
I hope that, with those comments, my noble friend and other noble Lords will not press their amendments, will reflect on what I have said and, if need be, will consider this outside the Committee. I commend the amendments in my name to the Committee.