Limited Liability Partnerships (Application and Modification of Company Law) Regulations 2025

Debate between Lord Sikka and Lord Vaux of Harrowden

Wednesday 10th September 2025 Grand Committee

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, I congratulate the Minister on retaining his position after the recent reshuffle of the Cabinet.

Despite recent reforms of Companies House, several issues remain unaddressed and the legislation in front of us does not really deal with them. I will illustrate my concerns with three pieces of empirical evidence. I can do more, but I do not have time.

The first concern is exemplified by a company called Herran Finance plc, which is company number 12370122 at Companies House. It was incorporated on 18 December 2019, with issued share capital, so its accounts claim, of £59,892,205. Its purpose is to provide financial services. This is a dormant company. It has never traded. The rudimentary accounts filed at Companies House show that it had cash in hand and at bank on 31 December of—guess what—£59,892,205. Amazingly, exactly the same amount was held a year later when the accounts for the following year were filed on 12 August 2022.

The company is engaged in banking, though it does not have the word “bank” in its name, which, as we know, is reserved for certain types of organisations. Its name does not appear on the FCA list of authorised firms. None of its directors is on the FCA list of authorised individuals. No person of significant control statement could be found at Companies House. The company’s page at Companies House noted on 10 October 2023:

“Compulsory strike-off action has been suspended”.


There has been no update since then. That is, nearly two years have elapsed.

This is a fake company that may have duped people. It actually has a website and its address is herran.co.uk, which has all the hallmarks of a scam. It describes itself as

“the 10th oldest bank in the country”

and says that deposits with it are safe because they are insured with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation —yes, a UK-based bank covered by US depositor protection. If anyone needed a sign of fraud, there it is. The website is an exact clone of a genuine bank.

Some five years after the incorporation of this organisation, no attempt has been made by Companies House to see that the accounts are genuine or that the company is licensed to carry out the described activities. Can the Minister explain who checks whether a fake bank has been incorporated at Companies House and how often these checks are made? Who are they reported to?

Directors of Herran provide a UK address but do not appear to live there. Companies House does not require proof of address when you first create a company. Anybody’s address can be used and, paradoxically, the injured party must provide evidence of the proof of address to correct data held at Companies House—but crooks do not have to. Can the Minister explain why no authentic proof of address is needed to register a company at Companies House?

Does the Minister agree that the filing of false information at Companies House should be a criminal offence? Why is that not already the case? What is the Government’s plan to deal with this? We have a lot of debates around immigration, but fake companies can be used to secure work visas. Can the Minister tell the House how many work visas have been secured by false companies? How do the Government know how many have been issued? Is there any check at any time? That is my first piece of evidence.

My second piece of evidence is that numerous fake banks are routinely registered at Companies House. Examples include “CITIC Limited”, “The Toronto Dominion Ltd”, “JPMorgan Chase Ltd” and “Goldman Sachs Finance Ltd”, and all these had a common director: a person named Barbarat Giuseppee, who claims to be an Italian living in France. The address given is probably non-existent, and the person probably does not exist either. The same Giuseppee currently holds seven company directorships according to Companies House. Yet nobody has bothered or cross-checked; nobody seems to be doing any job in tackling the crooks.

No amount of identity verification can confirm that a foreign national forming a UK company is genuine, as the UK does not have access to the passport or birth certificate databases of other countries. Even if a genuine foreign national is caught in illicit practices, UK law cannot be enforced on any person living in another country. Around 900,000 UK-registered companies do not have a UK director. Evidence shows that a company with only foreign directors is 17 times more likely to show signs of fraud, yet nobody has bothered to deal with this particular problem.

Genuine companies are not informed by Companies House or anybody else of the existence of fake companies abusing their name. As and when they discover this, they are left to incur legal costs out of their own pocket to fight fraudsters. Can the Minister explain why Companies House registers blatantly fake companies? Does he agree that we need a law requiring all UK-registered companies to have at least one UK citizen as a director? That way, at least we would know whom exactly to hold to account.

My third piece of evidence relates to a law firm that was shut down in October 2023. The name of the firm is Axiom Ince Ltd and it was closed by the Solicitors Regulation Authority. Some £64 million of clients’ money was missing. Unaudited accounts for the year to 31 March 2022 were filed at Companies House on 7 February 2023. They were not audited because directors claimed that the company was a small company. It was not, because it did not satisfy the requirements of the Companies Act definition.

An accountancy firm named Adrian C Mansbridge & Co. issued an accountants’ report and went along with the directors’ fiction—for a fee, of course. Subsequently, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales fined the firm the puny sum of £2,100 and recovered the disciplinary costs of £2,200. The ICAEW keeps the fines to swell its coffers. The whole thing is a racket. Accountancy trade associations make money by licensing accountants and auditors and then profit again from their misdemeanours.

Companies House never checks accounts to see whether any of the audit exemptions claimed are appropriate. Can the Minister explain who checks to ensure that the accounting and auditing exemption requirements are not abused? He cannot say that it is up to the directors, because they are party to the wrongdoing, and he cannot say it is up to the auditors and accountants, because they are party to the wrongdoing as well.

So, currently, there is no central enforcer of company law, and the deregulatory zeal in political circles at the moment is unlikely to deliver the required transparency or freedom regarding economic crime, which is what the Minister said the legislation in front of us will deliver. I look forward to his response.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing these regulations. It is good to hear from him on the progress Companies House is making in cleaning up the register and the process of verification, although, as the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, has just demonstrated so clearly, it is a work in progress.

The Register of People with Significant Control (Amendment) Regulations 2025 are fine so far as they go, but they still leave it far too easy for persons with significant control to disguise themselves and, therefore, not be disclosed on the register as they should be. We discussed this loophole at some length during the passing of what the noble Lord called the 2023 Act. It relates to the use of undisclosed nominee share- holders.

During the process of passing the Act, this House passed an amendment on Report that would have required shareholders holding 5% or more to declare whether they are holding those shares on behalf of another person. That amendment was ultimately dropped during ping-pong after a compromise was reached with the then Government that inserted into the Bill a power for the Secretary of State to regulate to strengthen the rules around nominees’ shareholdings.

A PSC has an obligation to state that they are a PSC, but a dishonest actor would not do so. The problem we have is that the onus on reporting PSCs falls to the company, and the obligations on the company under the statutory guidance are quite weak. The statutory guidance says that the company should simply scan its share register and identify any shareholders who hold 25% or more. It is easy therefore for a PSC who wishes to hide their identity to structure their holdings via a number of shareholdings below that 25% threshold. For example, five holdings at 20% would give 100% control.

All the dishonest actor has to do to hide that control is find five willing people who are prepared to have their name on the shareholder register and hold shares on behalf of the dishonest actor as nominees. There is no comeback for those nominees. They have no obligation to disclose the nominee arrangement unless the company actively asks them to, which it does not have to do if the shareholding is below 25%. So the company could quite legitimately say that it had followed the guidelines and state that it does not have a PSC because it could not see any shareholders above the 25% threshold.

A whole industry of nominee companies has grown up, as you can see if you google “nominee shareholders”. If the Minister has not done that, I urge him to take a look. Although there are perfectly reasonable uses for nominee shareholdings, it is fair to say that most of the nominee companies make it pretty clear on their websites that the primary purpose is simply to hide the beneficial ownership of the shareholding, which they will do for just £200 a year. Very few of them point out the PSC rules. Forcing those nominees to lie on the record to hide the identity of the beneficial owner would, at the very least, concentrate their minds and make it much harder for a dishonest PSC to find nominees prepared to hide their identity.

My questions for the Minister are as follows. What analysis have the Government done on this since the Act was passed? Does he recognise the issue? Is there any plan to use the powers that were inserted into the Act during ping-pong to deal with it?

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Debate between Lord Sikka and Lord Vaux of Harrowden

Committee stage
Monday 16th June 2025 Grand Committee

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, there are three amendments in this group. Amendments 91A and 91B are tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. All three seek to strengthen the review into the impact of eligibility verification on vulnerable persons. I will just speak to my Amendment 90.

Amendment 90 seeks to clarify whether the Government will take account of the views of recipients of the benefits in question in any independent review and suggests that this would be best achieved by ensuring that at least 50% of the review body is elected by benefit claimants. The proposed review under the Bill is welcome, even though it creates another quango. One difficulty is that regulators and reviewers are all too often appointed to advance political aims and objectives rather than serve the people. One needs to look no further than regulators of water and energy—the Independent Water Commission is currently reviewing the water industry, but its terms of reference exclude consideration of public ownership of water, even though that is favoured by many, including those who are experiencing high customer bills and sewage floating in rivers at the bottom of their gardens. I am seeking the representation of the people directly affected.

All too often, Governments claim that regulatory and review functions are best carried out by individuals with some experience of the field. None has more experience of the field than benefit claimants—after all, they are directly impacted. They will know the frustrations of answering 243 questions to apply for pension credit; they will also be subjected to financial surveillance and may be concerned about that. They are also affected by the DWP’s errors, including erroneous prosecutions, as we heard earlier. They have direct experience of that, and are therefore eminently qualified to directly participate in the review process.

This Bill refers to an independent review by a reviewer, but that reviewer will essentially be a political appointee. The review team is unlikely to include benefit claimants or someone experiencing hardship due to benefit cuts, confusing DWP forms or inconsistent application of DWP rules. Such a person and his or her team are unlikely to be able to bring the daily experiences of benefit claimants into the review. It is vital that the experience of the people on the receiving end of this legislation is brought directly into the review—their words and their worldview, not filtered through what was heard by somebody on some regulatory body or review commission. Quite often, there are cosmetic consultations or token discussions with the affected people. That is not really appropriate here.

Amendment 90 would empower benefit claimants and enable them to elect individuals to carry their worldviews into any review. The person so elected would be accountable to the claimants, whereas the proposed reviewer would not be accountable to any benefit claimant. There is absolutely nothing that they can do about it—they cannot force that person to consider their worldviews deeply. I fully appreciate that extending democracy may well be a contentious issue, even in Parliament, and that empowering people may well be contrary to some government department’s policies. Nevertheless, I would like to see greater representation of benefit claimants in any review that is carried out under the Bill. I beg to move.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 91A and 91B in my name in the group, and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, for her support in this.

As the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, just said, these two amendments are designed to expand the scope of the independent review and the powers of the independent reviewer. I was very pleased to see the introduction of an independent review around the EVN powers; it adds an important safeguard. But as drafted, the scope of the review is quite limited, covering only whether the exercise of the powers has complied with Schedule 3B and with the code of practice, and whether it has been effective in identifying or assisting in identifying incorrect payments. It does not cover any of the other impacts that the exercise of the powers might have beyond that; we talked in the previous group about the costs, for example.

We have previously discussed and raised concerns about the effects that the Bill could have on vulnerable people, so I will not repeat those again—we have had quite a lot of debates around it. However, the possibility of those impacts on vulnerable people is both real and important, so it should be considered once those powers are in force, and, frankly, the obvious place for that is the independent review. So Amendment 91A would simply add an assessment of the impact on vulnerable persons to the scope of the independent review.

Amendment 91B is about the powers of the independent reviewer to obtain information. As it stands at the moment, they have no information-gathering powers. All the Bill says is that the Secretary of State “may” disclose information to the independent reviewer, and that is not good enough. For the independent review to be meaningful, the reviewer must have the legal ability to obtain all the information that he or she considers necessary to carry out the review. That is what Amendment 91 attempts to achieve: to allow the independent reviewer to request whatever they feel necessary to carry out the review, and to put a requirement for the Secretary of State to disclose what is requested. I rather hope that neither of those is particularly controversial as amendments go.

Just generally, I should say that these are the last amendments that I have tabled, which may relieve the Minister, so I just wanted to say that I hope that she accepts the spirit in which all of them have been put forward. I accept that the Bill is much less concerning than its predecessor was, and I hope that she sees the amendments as generally constructive, aimed primarily at ensuring that the safeguards against misuse of these powers are both robust and, importantly, permanent. I will be very happy to meet with her between now and Report to see whether we can find common ground on some of them.

Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Sikka and Lord Vaux of Harrowden

Committee stage
Thursday 5th September 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 9 deals with moral hazards, which, if anything, are multiplying. The amendment seeks to restrain excessive risk-taking by imposing possible personal penalties on bank directors.

The recent legal developments have actually multiplied financial moral hazards and the related risks. For example, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 reintroduced the secondary regulatory objective to promote the growth and international competitiveness of the finance industry. In effect, it dilutes the regulator’s remit to protect customers. On 12 August, the Chancellor said that she and the Economic Secretary to the Treasury were constantly asking regulators, “What are you doing in practice to meet that secondary objective?” The meeting of that secondary objective will necessarily increase moral hazards.

Secondly, further deregulation is coming in—reforms of Solvency II, for example—with the claim that this will somehow conjure up an additional £100 billion of investment by reducing capital requirements. There is no pot of gold sitting in a corner in any bank boardroom that people can simply empty and get £100 billion out of. All of that is underpinning bank resilience and insurance company resilience. All of that is invested in some safety buffers. All of that will have to be liquidated. Yet the consequences for how the directors might behave have not really been outlined.

The cap on bankers’ bonuses has been lifted, so there are now economic incentives for bank directors to be reckless and take excessive risks, as that would maximise executive pay and bonuses—all done in the full knowledge that the bank would be rescued, restructured, recapitalised or bailed out, be it through the mechanism of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme or, eventually, some reconstruction. There are no great pressure points on bank directors to be risk-averse and prudent or to act in a responsible manner.

The risk-boosting effects of moral hazards are ignored by this Bill, yet they are highly relevant to any form of stability. We have a whole history showing how this happens. In the 2007-08 banking crash, attention was drawn to moral hazards or conflicts of interest between the interests of shareholders and managers, debt holders and the public purse. Bank directors took on excessive leverage because the state incentivised them to do so. It continues to incentivise them to do so, for example by giving tax relief on interest payments, which reduces both the cost of debt and the weighted average cost of capital while increasing shareholder returns, providing a justification for greater executive bonuses and remuneration.

Numerous studies have shown that shareholders were, and remain, focused on short-term returns. In any case, they still do not get good-enough information to invigilate directors; perhaps at some point, when we are discussing the world of accounting, I will point out how almost useless company accounts are in enabling shareholders or anybody else to invigilate directors. Back at the time of the last crash, directors accepted excessive risks from not only financing the organisation but risky investments. For example, numerous varieties of derivatives and complex financial bets were made because of explicit guarantees about depositor protection, central banks providing liquidity and support, and, ultimately, publicly funded bailouts.

If the bets made with other people’s money paid off, directors got mega payoffs; if they did not, somebody else picked up the loss, leading ultimately to rescue bailouts—now we are using the term “recapitalisation”. This Bill adds another string to publicly funded bailouts—though it likes to use different language. Yes, the cost of the FSCS levies is borne ultimately by the people, as has already been pointed out, and not necessarily by other banks.

If the Government succeed in persuading the banks to lend more to facilitate additional investment, as they are trying to do, that will add to the risks and strain the capital adequacy requirements of those banks. In boom times, banks tend to lend more freely, because they do not want to miss out on the opportunity to make more profits, and they relax credit standards, but there are inevitably consequences, as we saw with the last crash. Directors are rarely held personally liable, and that remains the position today.

Amendment 9 would address this gap by requiring the Bank of England and the scheme managers to consider a clawback of directors’ pay and bonuses paid during the previous 12 months. In case the Minister might refer to other clawback arrangements, let me pre-empt those. Paragraph 37 of the UK Corporate Governance Code states:

“Remuneration schemes … should include … provisions that would enable the company to recover and/or withhold sums or share awards and specify the circumstances in which it would be appropriate to do so”.


That is of no help whatever, because such codes do not apply to large private companies, of which Wyelands Bank, which came to an end recently, is a good example. The codes are also voluntary and cannot be enforced in the courts. They do not empower stakeholders in any way; they do not require the clawed-back amounts to be handed to regulators or to be used for recapitalisation of banks.

The FCA handbook also has a section on possible clawback, but it applies to what it calls “variable remuneration”, which is generally taken to mean bonuses. It states that in certain circumstances the clawed-back funds need to be handed back to the institution. This does not cover entire remuneration; it does not require that the clawed-back amounts be used for the recapitalisation and reconstitution of banks. So, in the interests of clarity and certainty, a statutory approach to clawbacks is needed, not a mishmash of voluntary arrangements. I beg to move.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 16, which would do a certain amount of what the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, would do, but in a slightly different way. It is intended as a probing amendment to obtain clarification on what ability there would be to recover all or some of the costs of failure from either management or shareholders of the failed entity when it is recapitalised rather than being put into insolvency—there seem to be two different things there.

It is possible to imagine a situation where members of the management team responsible for the failure are paid large bonuses or dividends prior to that failure. As the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, pointed out, that is more possible now that the cap on bonuses has—rightly, in my view—been lifted. Can the Minister clarify in what circumstances it would be possible to recoup those bonuses or dividends to offset the recapitalisation costs? In an insolvency situation, where there is fault—for example, in cases of wrongful trading—it may be possible to recoup those payments, but I cannot see how that would work if the bank was recapitalised. To me, it must make sense that management should not see the risk of having to repay bonuses or dividends as being lower than it would have been if the bank had been put into insolvency just because the bank has been recapitalised.