Public Order Bill

Lord Skidelsky Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 30th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, in the temporary absence of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, from the Chamber, I speak to the amendments in his name, to which my name and that of the noble Lord the Minister have also been added.

The Constitution Committee, in its report published on 11 November 2022, considered the question of “reasonable excuse”—which is used, as has already been pointed out, in a number of contexts in this part of the Bill—and pointed out that it was not defined. It also said, at paragraph 14 of its report, that the offence does already

“require intent, which may render redundant the need for a ‘reasonable excuse’”.

The committee considered it unsatisfactory to leave to the court the task of determining what might be a “reasonable excuse” without Parliament indicating what it intends the defence to cover. Including a “reasonable excuse” defence invites arguments as to whether certain, but not other, political motivations might constitute an excuse. What the committee recommended was that that,

“unless a precise definition of ‘reasonable excuse’ is provided then the ‘reasonable excuse’ defence”

should be

“removed from Clauses 1, 3, 4 and 7”—

apart from anything else, in the interest of legal certainty.

This was a report from a committee looking at the constitutional aspects of the Bill. It included, as the House will know, Peers from all parties and none. I confess to some uncertainty as to what the Government can have intended by originally including a defence of “reasonable excuse”. If you cause serious disruption by attaching yourself to an object or land or otherwise locking on, as defined in the Bill, and you do so intentionally or recklessly, what could provide a “reasonable excuse” for doing so?

It seems to me that probably the only excuse that could be offered would be that your cause is a noble one: in particular, that you are concerned about the damage to the planet caused by climate change. I see the noble Lord, Lord Deben, taking a close interest in this debate, but I am not suggesting for a moment that he would be inclined to lock himself on—but that has been the stance taken by Extinction Rebellion and Just Stop Oil, as we know. It could be argued that any demonstration, however serious the disruption, is justifiable if it contributes in some way to putting extra pressure on the Government to take appropriate steps to, if not completely turn back climate change, at least substantially reduce its effect.

I suspect that “reasonable excuse” was put in the Bill in an attempt to ensure that the Bill then complied with the Human Rights Act: in particular, that it did not contain provisions that, in the light of the Supreme Court’s decision on Ziegler, might be said to be in breach of a demonstrator’s convention rights. The Ziegler decision has been controversial. Policy Exchange, in particular, in a number of publications has pointed out the flaws in the judgment, or at least the flaws in how the judgment has been interpreted.

Since the Supreme Court decision on Ziegler, there have been other cases which seemed significantly to water down its effect—the case of Cuciurean and the Colston statue case. However, the recent decision in the Northern Ireland abortion case, handed down in on 7 December 2022—after the Bill had progressed a long way in your Lordships’ House—has made it perfectly clear that Ziegler needs to be very substantially qualified. The ingredients of an offence can themselves ensure that it will be compatible with convention rights even if it does not include a defence of reasonable or lawful excuse.

It would be perfectly convention-compliant, in my view, to remove the defence of reasonable or lawful excuse altogether. I have to say that was my original preference, but I have been persuaded that it is better to retain the defence giving the possibility of a reasonable excuse that is restricted in the way the amendment allows. It would not be enough to say in relation to the offence that there is a worthwhile cause, such as combating climate change, and then to say that that is a reasonable excuse and have us ask a fact-finding tribunal, whether it be magistrates or even a jury, to give its views as to whether a reasonable excuse exists in the circumstances.

On the analysis of the relevant jurisprudence, the Supreme Court in the Northern Ireland case referred, among other cases, to the well-known animal defenders case decided in 2013. That case, and the European Court of Human Rights case law, shows that the state is granted a margin of appreciation in these areas. It would be a question of law rather than fact whether an offence sufficiently reflects the principle of proportionality. The prosecution will have to establish a serious disruption. It will also need to establish intention or, at least, recklessness. It seems entirely consistent with the Northern Ireland case that there is no need, as a matter of law, to provide for the free-ranging and imprecise defence of reasonable excuse.

The right to protest is extremely important. It is reflected in the ECHR, just as it was in the common law before the Human Rights Act was enacted, but this right should be balanced with the right of our citizens to go about their everyday life without interference. Inconvenience is something we should be prepared to put up with but where there is serious disruption involved, defined as the amendment which succeeded in the previous debate says, it should not be an answer for a defendant to say: my cause is so important that it trumps your right to go to hospital, to take your children to school or to go to work. This amendment is consistent with the law and with what the vast majority of the population would want.

[Lord Skidelsky (CB)]

My Lords, I support the amendments in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown. They would require the police to prove that a person charged with an offence lacked reasonable excuse, rather than the person charged to prove that they had a reasonable excuse. In other words, they restore the presumption of innocence rather than guilt.

The presumption of innocence is not just an archaic legal point. The intricate legal arguments are worthy of great respect but I do not think they get to the heart of the matter. Presumption of innocence is a cardinal principle of a liberal society—a cardinal political principle. Governments and law-enforcement agencies are always disposed to believe that their citizens are potential lawbreakers, I am afraid, so placing the burden of proof on the police is an essential safeguard for civil liberties. That seems to me the crucial point because unless that cardinal political principle is there, you are reducing the extent to which the police are answerable to the courts—and lawyers should be very interested in that point. You are reducing their accountability to the courts and that is why, in systems such as those in Russia and China, there is very rarely an acquittal because the presumption is that the person charged with an offence is guilty. The bias is then all in favour of the conviction rather than the acquittal. It is on the basis that this group of amendments embodies a fundamental political principle that I support it.

[Lord Deben (Con)]

I wonder whether I could suggest to the House that we have to think a little beyond the precise legal issues we have been concentrating on. First, I was drawn into this discussion by a previous speaker—the noble Lord, Lord Faulks—but I would remind him of my constant demand that we should take seriously the words of the Green vice-Chancellor of Germany, who made it absolutely clear that behaviour which meant that ambulances could not get to hospitals and suchlike was unacceptable as well as counterproductive. I do not think anybody would suggest that I have ever been a supporter of that kind of thing, and I do not think the noble Lord would have said that.

However, the Government have to face two very important questions. The first is on the point referring to the march of a million people, which of its nature is bound to discommode large numbers of other people. But as somebody who voted against a three-line Whip and against the Iraq war, it seems to me that unless you can accept that something so appallingly wrong can result in large numbers of people saying, “Not in my name”, you really cannot run a democracy. That is absolutely essential, so I need to know from the Government how they would explain that their particular way of looking at this would not have made illegal a march against the Iraq war. If that is not covered, then it seems that any of us who happen to believe in some fundamental issues will find it very difficult to support the Government.

The second thing the Government have to explain is how they see the position in which this puts the police. I have to say this carefully, but the truth is that the police’s reputation is practically at its lowest ever. We have to ask whether this is the right moment, in any way, to put them in the small “p” political position of making these kinds of decisions. That is why I voted against that ludicrous thing we introduced, which was that you could be prevented from making a noise. The concept was that, somehow or other, the police were going to say that if your protest was too noisy, they could stop it before it was started. I have never been on a protest that was not noisy and meant to be so; its noisiness was essential. But we passed that provision, which was and is nonsense. It will never be imposed but the Government argued for it, so they are in a slight difficulty here. The argument I used against that was not only that it was barmy, which was obvious, but that it would put the police in an embarrassing position at a time when the police are themselves—

Public Order Bill

Lord Skidelsky Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 128 is in my name, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans. I will also speak to Amendments 129, 130, 133 to 136, and 139 to 142 in my name and to the other amendments in the group; and I will oppose Clauses 19 and 20 standing part of the Bill.

Serious disruption prevention orders are modelled on the orders given to terrorists and knife carriers, with similar draconian provisions, yet these are to be imposed on peaceful protestors, some of whom will never have been convicted of a criminal offence and some of whom will have never even attended a protest. These orders will effectively prohibit British citizens from exercising their human rights of free expression and assembly. They include the possibility of electronic tagging and restricting people’s use of the internet.

Liberty gives an example, which, in my own words is of someone who could be subjected to an SDPO, who has never been convicted of an offence, who attended two protests in the last five years and who, at those protests, based on inadmissible hearsay and on the balance of probabilities, contributed towards someone else doing something that was likely to result in serious disruption. The purpose of the order would be to prevent the person subject to the SDPO from contributing towards another person doing something that was likely to result in serious disruption at some point in the future.

HMICFRS says of serious disruption prevention orders:

“Such orders would neither be compatible with human rights legislation nor create an effective deterrent. All things considered, legislation creating protest banning orders would be legally very problematic because, however many safeguards might be put in place, a banning order would completely remove an individual’s right to attend a protest. It is difficult to envisage a case where less intrusive measures could not be taken to address the risk that an individual poses, and where a court would therefore accept that it was proportionate to impose a banning order”.


In the same report, senior police officers are quoted as saying that SDPOs would

“unnecessarily curtail people’s democratic right to protest”;

that such orders would be a “massive civil liberty infringement”; and that,

“the proposal is a severe restriction on a person’s rights to protest and in reality, is unworkable.”

That is the police’s view. They added that it appeared unlikely that the measure would work as hoped, because a court was unlikely to impose a high penalty on someone who breached such an order if the person was peacefully protesting, to which HMICFRS said:

“We agree with this view and that shared by many senior police officers.”


It is what we would expect in Russia or Iran, not in the United Kingdom.

These orders can also be imposed on those convicted of public order offences, and although we impose their imposition on anyone, it cannot be right that a person can be convicted of a criminal offence of breaching a serious disruption prevention order and sentenced potentially to a term of imprisonment, on the basis of an order imposed on the balance of probabilities, potentially based on evidence such as hearsay that would not be admissible in a criminal trial. I have rehearsed these arguments time and again in relation to similar orders in the past.

The origins of this type of order are to be found in anti-social behaviour orders—ASBOs—another order imposed on the balance of probabilities but with criminal sanctions for a breach, which Parliament decided was unfair and unreasonable, and so replaced with an entirely civil-based, non-criminal approach. In the case of knife crime prevention orders, the Government used the argument that the police had advised them that knife carriers would not take the orders seriously if no criminal sanctions were attached to them. Even if noble Lords had some sympathy with that approach in relation to the potentially fatal consequences of knife crime, surely serious disruption prevention orders are far closer to ASBOs than to knife crime.

The noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans have added their names to my Amendments 128, 129 and 130; and the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, has also added his name to my Amendment 128. The amendments require a court to be satisfied “beyond reasonable doubt” —the criminal standard of proof—before imposing a serious disruption prevention order, rather than depending on the civil standard of “on the balance of probabilities”.

We support Amendment 131 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, which states that participation in a lawful trade dispute should not result in the imposition of a SDPO. I can see what the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, is doing with her Amendment 132, and, if she were here, I would have looked forward to her explanation of it to the Committee.

Although electronic tagging is limited to 12 months, serious disruption prevention orders can be imposed for up to two years—but they can also be renewed indefinitely. That means that someone who has never been convicted of an offence can be prohibited from being in or entering a particular area indefinitely, prohibited from being with particular people indefinitely, prohibited from engaging in particular activities indefinitely, and prohibited from using the internet for particular purposes indefinitely. Can the Minister explain how that provision would be enforced, if they could use the internet for some purposes and not others? My Amendments 133, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141 and 142 would prevent serious disruption prevention orders being renewed, effectively placing a maximum limit of two years on their imposition.

Someone who breaches a serious disruption prevention order can be sentenced to a maximum of 51 weeks in prison and an unlimited fine. My Amendment 134 questions whether an unlimited fine is appropriate for such an offence, for the reasons I have argued in previous groups.

Most of those amendments should be redundant, because I urge all noble Lords on all sides of the House to join me and the noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede and Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, in opposing the proposition that Clauses 19 and 20 stand part of the Bill. I beg to move Amendment 128.

[Lord Skidelsky (CB)]

My Lords, I enthusiastically support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, that we are not living in a totalitarian state, but George Orwell also warned of the slide from democracy to despotism: it becomes invisible so that, in the end, you cross a border without really knowing that your freedom has been taken away because you do not want to do anything that might lead to anyone wanting to take it away. We have not got there yet. Nevertheless, it seems that we are discussing areas of legislation in which we find, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, blocks of words being transferred mindlessly from one set of offences to another set of offences, rather like prefabricated hen houses. One has to guard against that, because the offences are of very different gravity and one must not use the same language when talking of one rather than the other.

Part 2 introduces the serious disruption prevention order, described by Liberty as a protest banning order, which gives police the power to ban a person who has not been convicted of any offence for up to two years from attending any protest, together with extraordinary powers of surveillance, including electronic surveillance. Now I am against prevention orders on the whole, because they tread the path of stopping the liberties of people who have not been convicted of any offence. That is the road down which they lead, so I am suspicious of that in principle.

Here, we have a penalty which can be imposed on a civil standard of proof, meaning that the conditions needed for being given an SDPO need to be proved only on a balance of probability. That compounds the offence. The Government are not only taking powers to inflict extraordinary penalties on someone who has not been convicted of anything, they are also claiming the power to do that on a balance of probabilities, rather than on having reasonable suspicion. That is what this amendment wants to remove and there are subsequent amendments to which the same logic applies. We need to put in a requirement of reasonable doubt into the whole series of these preventive disruption orders.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I gladly put my name to the stand part amendments on Clauses 19 and 20, which of course stand for Part 2 as a whole, not because I am temperamentally inclined against compromise but because these clauses are so breath- takingly broad that I am not sure I would know where to begin the process of amendment.

Seeking perspective, I turned to the civil orders with which I am most familiar, terrorism prevention and investigation measures, or TPIMs, the replacement for control orders, mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, which are currently being copied, I think reasonably, for hostile state actors in the National Security Bill. These are the most extreme forms of restriction known to our law, short of imprisonment. In a rational world, were measures such as these considered necessary in the completely different context of public order, they would be considerably lighter—but, in no less than six respects, the reverse is true. I shall briefly explain how.

The first respect is the trigger. TPIMs can be imposed only when it is reasonably believed that the subject is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity and that the TPIM is necessary to protect the public. An SDPO can be imposed under Clause 19 on someone who twice in the past five years has been convicted of something as minor as obstructing the highway, if an order is thought necessary to prevent them doing so again. Under Clause 20, the person need never have been convicted of anything, though of course if they breach any provision of their SDPO then, just like the suspected terrorist, they can be convicted and sent to prison.

The second respect is content. The range of TPIMs is limited to the specific measures specified in the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011. The Bill, by contrast, makes a virtue of the fact that the range of SDPOs is completely unlimited—a point emphasised in Clause 19(6), Clause 20(5) and again in Clause 21(7). Notification requirements seem to be envisaged as routine—as, remarkably enough, is electronic tagging—but these orders can require the subject to do, or prohibit the subject from doing, anything described in them. The extensive list of prohibitions in Clause 21(4) is for some reason not considered sufficient. The right to peaceful protest is not even referred to in the Bill as a consideration to which those imposing the orders must have regard, despite the obvious potential for these orders to inhibit the exercise of that right.

Public Order Bill

Lord Skidelsky Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 16th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Skidelsky (CB)]

My Lords, I am happy to add my name to the group of amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, in perhaps a more crusading spirit than the noble Lord, Lord Anderson.

If asked, most people would say that the most important principle in our legal system is that a person is presumed innocent until proven guilty. They would be surprised, and should be alarmed, by the extent to which this principle has been steadily eroded in our legal practice, of which this clause is a good example. As the clause stands, a defendant would have to prove in court that they had a reasonable excuse for committing the offence specified in Clause 1(1)(a).

Our amendment is designed to ensure that the police must prove in court that the defendant had no reasonable excuse for committing the offence. In other words, the police would need to prove that A and B, charged with walking down a street linking arms, had no reasonable excuse for doing so. As the burden of proof will fall on the police, they are less likely to arrest and charge people indiscriminately without a reasonable cause for doing so.

It is a very important point. The effect of this amendment will be to diminish the number of people detained and arrested for no offence. If we can achieve that, it will be an important thing to have done.

[Baroness Blower (Lab)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Hendy has added his name to Amendment 60. In his unavoidable absence, I will speak to that amendment in words which are largely his, although I support and endorse all the amendments in this group.

The purpose of Amendment 60 is simple: to make more effective the protection the Government intend to provide for those with a reasonable excuse or those engaged in a trade dispute in the current version of Clause 7. I will focus specifically on trade disputes, with which I have some affinity.

By way of preliminary, it should be noted that the phrase

“in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute”

originated in the Trade Disputes Act 1906. It is now found in the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, where is also found the definition of a trade dispute. For the purposes of today’s debate, it is sufficient to say that trade disputes encompass disputes over terms and conditions of employment and certain other industrial relations matters.

As drafted, Clause 6 recognises that obstruction or interference, which constitute the offence in subsection (1), may well be applicable to those picketing in the course of a trade dispute. Clause 6(2) seeks to exclude pickets from being found guilty of the subsection (1) offence. However, the way the subsection is drafted means that a person in such a situation, as we have heard, may be arrested, charged and brought before the court. It is only when presenting their defence that the trade dispute defence will achieve the protection afforded by the Bill.

Those who have signed this amendment and the rest of us who support it hope that, if someone is acting in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, they will not be liable, as we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to be arrested, charged or brought to court for a subsection (1) offence. The defence should kick in before that point.

It is important to bear in mind three points. First, the right to picket in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute is a statutory right, now set out in Section 220 of the consolidation Act of 1992 but with its origins in the Conspiracy, and Protection of Property Act 1875. The price of the right to picket was that no protection was given for the offences created by the 1875 Act, such as “watching and besetting”, fascinatingly; nor has it been given for the array of other potential offences such as obstructing a public highway or an officer in the exercise of his duty, or more serious offences.

Since 1875, the right to picket has been regulated and restricted by many amendments to the relevant law, the latest being several requirements imposed by the Trade Union Act 2016, now found in Section 220A of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. This leads to the second point: the amendment seeks only to strengthen the protection against this specific offence; all other potential offences which might occur in the course of a trade dispute remain open to charge. The amendment does not seek to enlarge the right to picket.

The final point is this: a picket in the course of a dispute is not a secret activity; it is not one of which local police will be unaware. The very purpose of a picket—and I can attest to this from having stood on many of them myself—in the words of Section 220 of the 1992 Act is that of

“peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or peacefully persuading any person to work or abstain from working.”

To this end, pickets draw attention to themselves, to their union, and to the dispute they seek to further in the hope of persuading others not to cross the picket line. Your Lordships will be familiar with images of picket lines, and over the last few months, perhaps even familiar with actual pickets. The police will have no difficulty in recognising those acting in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute long before they, no doubt vociferously, proclaim it.

More than that, under Section 220A, a picket supervisor must be appointed by the union. She or he must be familiar with the very extensive Code of Practice on Picketing, and, most importantly for our purposes, she or he must take reasonable steps to tell the police his or her name, where the picketing will take place, and how he or she may be contacted. The section also requires that the picket supervisor must be in attendance on the picket or able to attend at short notice. She or he must be in possession of a letter of authority from the union which must be produced on demand; significantly hedged about, therefore.

It is right that in the creation of this new offence the Government have not sought to encroach on the protection of the right to picket in industrial disputes, a right which is also protected by Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and hence the Human Rights Act 1998. This amendment is exceedingly modest: it asks that the protection be made effective by preventing a picket from being charged with a new offence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Well, we are about to go into a good deal of discussion about things such as serious disruption, key national infrastructure and so on, which form essential parts of this Bill. I am not a policeman, but I imagine that the police are perfectly capable of utilising those aspects of the Bill.

I come to the hypothetical example of the landowner that the noble Lord raised earlier. It is worth pointing out, in relation to the entire Bill, that the threshold is “serious disruption”. In the case that the noble Lord outlined, that is clearly not the case, so there would be no case.

I move on to the measures in Clauses 1 to 8. As well as the measures we will discuss next week, the police will have the proactive powers necessary to respond quickly to these dangerous and disruptive tactics.

I turn to the specific amendments in the group. Amendments 1, 7, 8, 24, 28, 29, 35, 39, 40, 55 and 59, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Paddick, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, Lord Skidelsky and Lord Coaker, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, seek to move the burden of proof for a reasonable excuse from the defendant to the prosecution, making it a key element of the offence. We will debate the subjects that the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, raised with regard to trade disputes in the fourth group today, so I will defer specific answers to those questions until the debate on that group.

Whether or not someone has a reasonable excuse for their actions is very specific to each particular incident, so we see it as entirely appropriate that the defendant, who has committed the offence in the first place and has personal knowledge of these facts, is required to prove them. It is also the case that the burden of proof resting on the individual is not a novel concept. There are multiple offences where this is the case, including—as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, pointed out—the defence of good reason for possessing a bladed article in a public place under Section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.

The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, raised the example of linking arms. Of course linking arms itself is not an offence; it is an offence and applicable only if the act

“causes, or is capable of causing, serious disruption to … two or more individuals, or … an organisation”.

Groups of protesters linking arms and obstructing roads or buildings can cause just as much disruption as those who use other equipment to lock on. For example, it is not right that groups of people who glue themselves to roads may fall under this offence but those who link arms and cause just as much disruption do not.

On the question from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, on why the burden of proof being on the defendant is in the public interest, we have seen people cause so much serious disruption and then continue to burden the prosecution with more and more requirements to prove things. Surely it is right that, where people have caused this kind of disruption, they should demonstrate that they had a reasonable excuse.

With these offences, the prosecution will still need to prove all the elements of the offence to the criminal standard of proof, including that the act

“causes, or is capable of causing, serious disruption”,

as I just explained, and that the defendant intended or was reckless as to serious harm disruption. For those reasons, I respectfully disagree with the amendments.

[Lord Skidelsky (CB)]

Does the Bill define serious disruption?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Again, we will come back to that in some detail in the debate on a later group. The amendments have been grouped thematically today so there will be a bit of overlap, for which I apologise. For now, I respectfully disagree with these amendments and ask that they not be pressed.

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[The Lord Bishop of Southwell and Nottingham]

My Lords, in the absence of my right reverend friend the Bishop of St Albans, who is a signatory to Amendment 17 but unable to be present in the Chamber this afternoon, I am pleased to speak in its support, as it provides much- needed clarity to the law. I am also very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for explaining the amendments with such clarity at the beginning of this group.

I will make two main points. First, the Bill, in its present form, fails to provide a definition of what constitutes “serious disruption” to the “community”. I strongly support providing a strict statutory definition of this; it will give clearer guidelines to the police as to what is acceptable, as well as to those wishing to engage in lawful protest, and will provide much-needed democratic oversight to the Bill. Under the current law and the Bill as drafted, there is no clear definition of what disruption to the community means, and it would be subject to the discretion of the police themselves. A lack of clarity is not helpful to either the police or the community. As reported in evidence to the Bill Committee in the other place, many police officers have expressed a desire for clearer statutory guidance, and many are concerned that they will be asked to make decisions on matters which they do not have the confidence to make. If we are to reflect on the consequences of the amendment, we can see that it would mean that protesters would rightly be prevented from disruption to essential services—schools, hospitals or places of worship—but the right to reasonable democratic protest would still be protected.

Secondly, it is important that proposed new paragraph (c) in the amendment upholds the access to “a place of worship” as an essential service. I am very pleased that this amendment would enshrine freedom of religion or belief as a central part of the Bill. As we have been reminded over the pandemic, churches and other religious buildings offer essential services for their local community. Access to these buildings and the pastoral work of the clergy and other faith leaders should not be unreasonably hindered.

Churches are not unfamiliar with protests. Indeed, they have sometimes been a catalyst for good and even forthright protest inspired by principles of faith in the interest of the common good. The example of Jesus is a challenge and, I believe, an inspiration in this regard. Sadly, there have also been times when churches have been the focus of reasonable protest, challenging the Church when it and society have failed to exemplify the values that underpin faith. Either way, many protests over the centuries have happened inside or within the vicinity of our buildings. Churches are public buildings, places of sanctuary and refuge, there to serve all in their community. They are therefore to be considered essential places for people to meet, to worship and to nourish their faith, and for all who are seeking spiritual comfort or hope, often in difficult times. The right to attend a place of worship is therefore a vital human right enshrined in law in our country, and it is important that this law makes that clear. I once again express my wholehearted support for this amendment.

[Lord Skidelsky (CB)]

My Lords, I speak in support of Amendments 2 and 4 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to which I have added my name.

Amendment 2 is designed to raise the threshold required for the committing of the offence of causing a disruption. The clause leaves what is capable of causing disruption to purely subjective judgment, which is not satisfactory. I do not think that I have ever made a speech that insults members of the audience; I hope I never have. But such a speech may be reasonably deemed to be capable of causing a serious disruption—at least maybe in the other place, if not here. In other words, an event has to happen that is provocative in order to make it reasonable for the police to come to that conclusion. Whether it is provocative is the test of whether it is capable of causing disruption. Perhaps I can make a constructive suggestion here: every time the words “capable of causing disruption” appear, why do not the Government put in front of them “It is reasonable to believe that it is”?

On Amendment 4, the purpose is to make the intention to cause serious disruption the test of an offence. I strongly support that. I have become increasingly suspicious of the growing tendency to treat reckless speech—and suspicious, in fact, of the word “reckless” —or action as a criminal offence in itself, regardless of the intention of the speaker or actor. Of course I should consider the consequences of my words and actions—everyone should—but the line between reckless speech and free speech is a delicate one, and I would prefer to err on the side of free speech and peaceful protest.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

My Lords, I support most, if not all, of the amendments in this group seeking to circumscribe the new powers over “serious disruption”, especially Amendment 23. I do so not to offer the kind of forensic advice and analysis that many much more eminent noble Lords have already given today, but to offer a general and a more personal view, because I think the Bill takes the state’s power to restrict the right to protest to unprecedented levels. Many of the clauses in the legislation bear a striking resemblance to anti-terror laws. Surely, this is no way to treat those exercising their fundamental rights to dissent in the liberal democracy that the Government claim the UK to be. It is more like a police state Bill, in my view, than a liberal democracy one; more something that Beijing’s autocracy would favour, as opposed to London’s democracy.

Noble Lords need not take my word for it. Please read the recent Financial Times article by the noble Baroness, Lady Cavendish of Little Venice, who elegantly but devastatingly demolishes the case for the Bill and its many clauses, including those we are discussing right now. The noble Baroness is no leftie: she was a policy adviser to Prime Minister David Cameron. Under this Government, the trajectory of public order legislation has slowly chipped away at people’s fundamental rights, weighting the balance of power heavily towards the state and its agencies. These amendments are trying to redress that a bit, but the legislation advances that trajectory, despite the ink barely being dry on the recently passed Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act. It is a constant ratcheting up of restrictions at the expense of our freedoms and the health of our democracy.

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[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I put my name to a number of amendments, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, read out. He has largely explained my reservations and why I put my name to, in this instance, Amendments 19 to 21. This is the focus on what equipment is “intended” to be used for.

I think it extraordinary that the Bill would criminalise somebody holding equipment that “may be used” for something. Completely innocent objects can be interpreted in the most malign way, and it seems far too speculative. Everyone should remember that, while we have in our minds locking on and Just Stop Oil, this piece of legislation does not mention Just Stop Oil. Therefore, anything that speculates about what people might be about to do with an object could be used to criminalise any range of behaviours. That is one of my concerns. It feels as though, rather than being proactive policing, as the Minister discussed earlier, it allows people to be scooped up just in case they use any object in a particular way.

Amendments 48 and 49 focus on the offence of “being equipped for tunnelling” and the requirement for the object to be used not specifically by the person with the item but by “any person”. My concern is that this puts into law a kind of guilt by association. Somebody has not committed a crime and there is no indication that they have, but somebody else has used an item that they had and then committed a crime. It reminds me of the worst of the joint enterprise laws that led to so many injustices for all involved. I would really like to see that go. In fact, I would like the whole thing to go—but if we are going to have it, et cetera.

Finally on Amendment 65, which focuses on key national infrastructure, this is one of the things that the public most worry about—that key national infrastructure will be targeted by these kinds of stunt protesters. Somebody described it as guerrilla warfare, and it sometimes feels like that. We all know how important key national infrastructure projects are to any country. That is why Russia targets them in Ukraine. You know that the maximum number of people will suffer if you attack the things that keep any country going at any given time. So I am very keen that we protect them, but it is about the wording on the extent to which they are attacked and the illustrations that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, gave. Again, it is not only Just Stop Oil. We have to keep getting that out of our minds, because this affects anyone who does anything to possibly disrupt a key infrastructure project.

Perhaps I might echo, in a glib way, the comments made earlier by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, in relation to the NHS. I thought she had a point there. In this instance, when I read about “key national infrastructure”—

“road transport infrastructure … rail infrastructure … air transport infrastructure … oil infrastructure … gas infrastructure”,

et cetera—I thought, “Who needs Just Stop Oil?”. Most of that infrastructure does not work. I spend most of my time not being able to get trains, and the energy system is in total crisis. If noble Lords want to know what is likely to create the greatest threat to most of the national infrastructure projects in the forthcoming months, I can tell them: it is not Just Stop Oil but austerity cuts coming from the Government. Although that is a slightly glib point, it indicates why using these things in the law, if you are not precise about exactly what you describe as “disruption”, can get you into hot water.

[Lord Skidelsky (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly in support of Amendment 21 from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to which I put my name. The principle it seeks to uphold is that the offending person must be the one committing the offence or intending to commit the offence, rather than somebody else connected with that person. That is a very important point, because “in connection with” is another of these vague phrases that have crept into this kind of legislation. It is also there in counterterrorist legislation. How connected? Friend, lover, colleague, co-religionist? What is the nature of the connection? All these things are undefined. What counts as a malicious connection? That is why we want this amendment.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank those who have supported the various amendments in my name. I very much supported the comments that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, made when she opened the group. Similarly, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for his support and the arguments he put forward on the various amendments. I also thank the noble Lords, Lord Beith and Lord Skidelsky, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. She made some very good comments about “serious disruption” and “key national infrastructure”.

This is the first contribution I have made. The Minister said that the Government had listened to the House of Lords by withdrawing amendments when they came up in the Bill at the beginning of the year, putting them through the Commons and then bringing them to the Lords, that constitutionally that was the right way of doing things, and therefore that the Government had correctly brought the Bill forward to the Lords. I say to him that we as the Lords have a constitutional right to review legislation that comes from the Commons, to say where we think it is wrong, to put forward amendments and to seek clarity where there is none.

That has been the purpose of all the amendments put forward here this afternoon as we go into the evening. Each amendment put forward has sought that clarity of definition—what the Government actually intend and mean—so that as this law goes through and the Bill passes, as it will, it will be a better Bill that delivers what the Government want. That is what we seek to do with all the various amendments.

The key question that will keep coming back to the Government is: why is the Bill necessary? There is no dispute in this Chamber—we all totally and utterly feel that the Just Stop Oil protesters went too far, and that was serious disruption that was unacceptable. It is an Aunt Sally, or whatever the politically correct term is, to say, as the Government sometimes do, that they are in favour of the great British public who object to having their lives disrupted while there is a group of others, in this Chamber or elsewhere, who seek to be on the side of the protesters instead. We are all on the side of the public. We all agree that there is a right to protest but that there should be limits to it, and there will be a debate about where that should come.

The third group deals with the scope of the offences. Again, there is a series of questions for the Government in this group about where we are with the drafting and the scope of the offences. As I say, we keep coming back to the need to draft good law and the need for clarity, not offences so broad that they impinge unreasonably on the British public’s rights and are unenforceable. Other key issues include focusing police resources on where they actually matter, not criminalising lawful behaviour or peaceful protest by members of the British public who are causing minor disruption. Our various amendments seek to probe the Government so that we can consider what to bring forward on Report.

Amendments 18 and 20 deal with being equipped to lock on. Currently, Clause 2 provides that an offence of being equipped for locking on takes place where a person is carrying an item that “may” be used “by any person” in the course of a locking-on offence or “in connection with” such an offence, or which may be used “by any person” in the course of or in connection with a locking-on offence. The amendments that I have tabled and others in the group would narrow that scope so that an offence was committed only where a person was carrying an item with the intention that it “will” be used to commit an offence by the person carrying it. As I say, those amendments are to probe the scope of the offence. Why is the word “may” there, not “will”? Why is the phrase “in connection with” used?

What does “by any person” mean? Any person in the group? Any person standing next to them? Any person who happens to be standing nearby? We heard from my noble friend Lady Armstrong about the difficulties one has where you just imply that someone in the group may be associated with a particular person, and the problems that causes. As my noble friend Lord Ponsonby said to me, there is already a well-used piece of legislation containing the offence of being equipped. He would know, as a magistrate. Why does that legislation not work here? Time and again, the Minister has been asked to say why the current legislation is inadequate to deal with such situations.

Last Friday when Just Stop Oil called off its protest, I heard one of the protesters say on Radio 4—it was the “Today” programme, and the Minister can go back and listen to it—that among the reasons why they did so were the number of people who had been arrested and the number who were in jail or on remand. They said that was having an impact on the ability to carry out protests. Is that not part of the existing legislation dealing with these problems? Maybe it should have been used or enforced quicker but that is a process issue and a policing issue, not a legislative one.

Under current drafting, if an item is not used and absolutely no disruption is caused to anyone, has the person committed a criminal offence because something in their possession may have been used by someone else—not even themselves—to lock on? Is that a criminal offence or not? What does “in connection with” a locking-on offence mean? What activity does that cover?

The classic example that we have all used is a bike lock. We keep coming back to that because it has not been properly addressed. If a person walks through Parliament Square with a bike lock, they could be caught by that clause—is that not the case? Will it be up to that member of the public to prove to a police officer that they have no intent even though it might be used by someone else, not even to commit locking on but for an action that is somehow connected to it? Again, clarity is needed in the law because that police officer will be required to enforce it.

It is worth noting that the clause does not include a reasonable excuse defence. In practice, that is what happens when someone has a reasonable excuse, such as they work close by and own a bike. How is that going to work if there is no reasonable excuse defence available in the clause. Or have I misread it? Asking these questions is, after all, the purpose of Committee.

Amendment 52 concerns the obstruction of major transport works. Clause 6 makes it an offence to obstruct any actions that are

“reasonably necessary … in connection with”

constructing or maintaining transport works. The amendment would remove “in connection with”. Again, this is to probe what actions that may cover. Clause 6 currently provides that it is an offence to obstruct a person

“taking any steps that are reasonably necessary for the purposes of facilitating, or in connection with, the construction or maintenance of any major transport works”.

What does “in connection with” mean? Imagine the list of activities that could be considered as any step that was reasonably necessary in connection with maintaining a transport work. If a local protest prevents a person from painting a railway generator for a few hours, is that now a criminal offence? As the JCHR said:

“For example, the offence would be committed by moving any apparatus that ‘relates to’ construction or maintenance of major transport works (such as a shovel, a broom or a traffic cone) or, indeed, moving any apparatus (even if unrelated to the works) that belongs to a person acting under the authority of the person in charge of the works.”


Is the JCHR wrong to have used those examples? As I say, poor, open-ended drafting will make these offences unusable, casting the net so wide that it means that in no way is the Bill focused on the small number of highly disruptive protesters who are purposefully breaking the law.

Public Order Bill

Lord Skidelsky Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 1st November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Skidelsky (CB)]

My Lords, it is very cold in this House; I wonder what has happened to the heating. It certainly has a chilling effect on debate.

I am not a lawyer like the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, nor a policeman like the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. I am driven to take part in the debate because I have become increasingly concerned at the wide powers of surveillance and control being claimed by Governments in the name of public order and national security—powers that, in their structure though not yet in the scale of their implementation, resemble those in countries such as Russia and China.

I recall that George Orwell wrote in 1939 about

“whether the ordinary people in countries like England grasp the difference between democracy and despotism well enough to want to defend their liberties. One can’t tell until they see themselves menaced in some quite unmistakeable manner.”

People feel menaced in different ways; I myself have been woken up by one such menacing experience. I hope also to bring some historical perspective to the topic we are discussing.

The traditional aim of public order Acts, starting in 1936, was to prevent violent clashes on the streets. A famous common-law precedent was Wise v Dunning in 1902. Wise, a rabid anti-Papist, whose habit of speaking and dressing in a manner offensive to Catholics in Liverpool had led to fights at previous meetings, was bound over to keep the peace. The principle was clear enough: freedom of speech, procession and assembly must not be carried to the point where it caused violence on the streets.

As most noble Lords have pointed out, we already have plenty of Acts designed to prevent disruptive behaviour. Why do we need more? As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, it is not because many of these measures have been demanded by the police. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, suggested an answer that I find extremely convincing. This Bill brings peaceful, if inconvenient, protest and incitement to violence and terrorism into the same legal framework, implying in principle that the first is as culpable as the second. This argument is used to extend the powers of the state in dangerous ways, which have been charted only in despotic systems. That is why I talk about an Orwellian creep and cited George Orwell at the beginning.

I take up just two matters from Parts 2 and 3 of the Bill, consequential on this false identification between peaceful protest and violence and terrorism. The first, which other noble Lords have alluded to, is the extension of the police’s stop and search powers. In the past, stop and search powers have been used to prevent only the most serious offending, such as serious violence or reasonable suspicion of terrorism—for example, if people were suspected of carrying knives, guns or explosives. This was seriously open to racial discrimination and was highly controversial, but I can see a justification for the power itself. However, the Bill would extend the same powers of stop and search to the protest context. Someone can be stopped and searched for being suspected of being linked, however peripherally, to non-violent purposes or conduct. To stop and search someone suspected of carrying a bomb is one thing; to stop and search someone suspected of carrying a bicycle lock seems to me, to put it mildly, disproportionate—and, in fact, mad.

This leads me to my second point, to which I can hardly do justice in a short speech, namely the extremely worrying spread of arrest and detention where there is no reasonable suspicion that the person may be involved in proscribed behaviour, or where there is merely a balance of probabilities—I want to come back to that term—that they might be.

Clause 11 creates a new suspicion-less stop and search power, whereby the police will have the power to specify that, in a particular locality and for a particular period of time, they do not need to have reasonable suspicion—in other words, an objective basis for suspicion based on evidence—that a protest-related offence will be committed, before stopping and searching people for a prohibited object. This is similar to powers contained in anti-terrorist legislation. Let me quote from the public information leaflet issued to explain Schedule 3 of the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019:

“Unlike most police powers, the power to stop, question, search and, if necessary detain persons does not require any suspicion … The purpose is to determine whether a person appears to be, or to have been, engaged in Hostile … activity.”


Leave to one side the draconian powers being asserted here; it is surely fantastic to apply the same reasoning and powers to someone who might or might not be carrying a paintbrush.

Almost as bad as suspicion-less stop and search is Clause 20, which authorises serious disruption prevention orders. Many noble Lords have talked about these. They allow a court to ban a person from attending demonstrations and protests for up to two years, not on conviction of any offence but on a balance of probabilities that, on at least two occasions in the previous five years, they have carried out activities related to a protest or caused or contributed to someone else carrying out a protest. Failure to comply with SDPO conditions is a criminal offence, subject to 51 weeks’ imprisonment.

The balance of probabilities means that the court must think that it is 51% likely that the person concerned has carried out such activities. If it thinks that it is only 49% likely, they get off free. What sort of evidence is needed to make that kind of calculation? I would be grateful if that could be explained. The essential point is that Clause 20 allows standards of proof appropriate in civil cases to be used for imposing criminal sanctions, such as electronic tagging, on individuals convicted of no criminal offence.

Any serious analyst of these measures would need to trace not only the growth of novel forms of protest, which is acknowledged, but the way that concepts such as dangerousness and mens rea—guilty mind—have penetrated into the heart of our criminal justice system, creating a large and growing area of law in which you do not have to have done anything criminal to have been deprived of large chunks of your liberty.

It would be very difficult to amend the Bill to make it compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights. I therefore agree with those noble Lords who want to reject Parts 2 and 3 and seriously amend Part 1.

Ukraine: Refugees

Lord Skidelsky Excerpts

Tuesday 8th March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

Is it not clear from listening to interventions from all around the Chamber that—

[Lord Skidelsky (CB)]

My Lords, in addition to the help that the Government are giving to Ukrainians to come to this country, will they consider offering humanitarian visas to those brave Russians—members of the clergy, members of civil society, academics, journalists and ordinary citizens—who face long prison sentences for exercising their democratic right to oppose this war?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I am very glad that the noble Lord asked that question because, at this point, we all need to stop and remember all of those Russian people who are so against, or do not even know, what is happening in Ukraine. I do not have many details of that, but it is certainly heartbreaking when you see Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine who appear not to know what they are doing and why they are doing it.

Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Lord Skidelsky Excerpts

Monday 25th March 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Soley]

My Lords, I shall address this matter fairly briefly. I congratulate the Government on having moved as they have, and the noble Lord on his opening comments.

I want to make two points, but they are quite important ones. What is welcome and what we need to remember when we discuss these issues is that there is a world of difference between an individual who might say something factually incorrect and even insulting as an individual and a very large-scale international organisation such as News International doing the same thing. That is really where this problem has come from. People reacted to Leveson from the press side by saying that it was an attack on 300 years of press freedom, but that is nonsense. Press freedom was about small individuals and small groups fighting for the right to publish their views, and that remained the case until quite late in the 19th century, when the press barons emerged and these large-scale and powerful organisations developed. That is when it became difficult, because you could no longer feel the same about an attack by an organisation such as News International that was factually incorrect and severely intrusive, and that of an individual. That sort of balance needs to be kept in mind.

When I listened to the Minister’s opening comments, I felt that the Government were aware of the difference between the large and small organisation. But it is a problem for the small organisation. I started a blog in, I think, 2003, then came here and converted it to “Lord of the Blog”, and then it became “Lords of the Blog”, which is still operating, and is run by the Hansard Society on behalf of the House. I think that it is relevant—and this refers in a way to some of the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas—and we need to be aware of the impact on charitable organisations and the smaller groups.

My second main point is that we need to review the legislation over a period of time. Part of the reason why we need to do that is the rapidly changing technology; it is so fast and so dramatic that it is difficult to keep up with it. I do not believe that all the press will suddenly go out of business because of the internet, but they are under more severe financial pressure because of it. Frankly, good newspapers are likely to survive—and likely to survive also because of their online material. We have to break away from the old culture whereby, if you felt that you could not publish a story, you got someone to put it on the internet and then, lo and behold, it suddenly appeared in News International newspapers, or wherever—and anyone could have put it on. It was easy to get round the rules.

As someone who set up those blogs, I would have welcomed at that time some sort of code that was external to what I was inventing myself. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, said that you may be threatened by that. He may be right. I do not want to disagree with a great deal of what he said as I have a lot of sympathy with it, but I think he may be overafraid of this. When I started the blog in 2003, I was not concerned about individual attacks on me—any MP gets used to that fairly quickly and takes the rough with the smooth—but I was concerned about attacks on third parties or statements about third parties. We saw a dreadful example of that recently with the challenge to Lord McAlpine. In my view, none of this regulation threatens good investigative journalism. Indeed, I gather that the BBC programme tonight on Boris Johnson will be pretty critical and that is a regulated media outlet, so we should not be too concerned about this issue. However, vast changes are taking place.

To give another example, after the Iraq war, at the request of some Arabs in my then constituency, I set up the Arab-Jewish Forum, which was essentially a conference organising group, but I have recently converted it into a blog organisation for Arabs and Jews in this country, although, inevitably, it will go worldwide. In doing that, I am worried about regulations. A group of Arabs and Jews will regulate it. I will also keep a close eye on it although, as someone of neither Jewish nor Arab heritage, I will be less good at that than the moderating group. It would be good to have guidelines on what to do if something is factually incorrect. Although what we are discussing is not directly relevant to that issue, it underpins it and may indicate a way forward in dealing with the emerging internet communications, which will replace newspapers to a large extent, although not completely, in my view. We will then need constantly to review the legislation.

I carefully followed the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, in which he raised important issues, with which I have sympathy, and to which I wish to add two comments. First, an organisation may value being a member of a regulatory body as that gives you some guidance, even if it is not a complete code, and a structure within which to work. I ask the Minister to address my next point when he winds up. Secondly, it is very important that we develop a way to review this legislation over time given not just the complexity of setting up a regulatory body for the press for the first time but the fact that the technology is changing so fast it is very difficult to keep up with it.

[Lord Skidelsky]

My Lords, I would like to speak to Amendment 11B and a group of consequential and related amendments, and I am sorry not to have got to my feet quicker. These amendments seek to implement the Leveson report as Lord Justice Leveson provided for—no more and no less. I broadly welcome the Government’s Amendment 11 and the Minister’s explanation of it but would welcome assurance on a number of specific points.

There are three amendments on exemplary damages: Amendments 11C, which provides that the existing common law test does not apply in this case; Amendment 11D, which provides that vicarious liability should apply in this form of exemplary damages; and Amendment 13A, which provides that the court will have regard to the means of a defendant when making any award. It is very important that the law is clear that for exemplary damages to apply, the conduct does not have to be carried out with a view to a profit and with a deliberate disregard of an outrageous nature of the claimant’s rights; in other words, there are two alternative tests and not one. The Government’s amendment is unclear on that matter and I should like clarification on it.

Amendment 17E makes clear that to benefit from costs protection the publisher would have to participate in the self-regulator’s arbitration scheme. Amendment 17J provides that the current hold on the commencement of Sections 44 and 46 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act in respect of publication proceedings will remain until a way forward is found. In relation to this, there will be cross-party talks in which Liberal Democrats and Conservatives will be able to take different positions. The reason for that is that Sections 44 and 46 of LASPO abolish the recoverability of success fees for the loser and would have disastrous effects on media claimants such as the Dowlers and the McCanns. I look forward to hearing from the Minister what the Government propose to do about the effective elimination of a success fee.

Two further amendments where assurances are sought are Amendments 19C and its consequential Amendment 19D, which concern the inclusion of data protection actions within the definition of publication proceedings. Amendment 19E provides that the Information Commissioner will take into account membership of an approved regulator when considering the exercise of his powers. In both these cases, we understand that the Minister will be bringing these back as part of the post-Leveson data protection consultation. We seek the assurance that decisions on this matter will be subject to cross-party talks in which Conservatives and Liberal Democrats will be able to take different positions.

Amendment 19B would require that the recognition panel which approves the self-regulator is subject to the Freedom of Information Act. No one would expect this body to act in secret. I seek an assurance from the Minister that the relevant special interests would be promulgated in good time for the start of its work.

Amendment 131A concerns relevant publishers which hold broadcasting licences. We seek assurance that this is not intended to cover the whole publishing activity of such licence holders but only their broadcasting activity. As regards Amendment 11B, which deals with the exemption from immunity of self-regulated newspapers to exemplary damages, I understand that a further amendment is to be agreed to this clause. Therefore, I need say nothing further about it and it can be considered in another place.

Amendments 17A, 17B and 17F would enable bloggers and small publishers who decide to join a self-regulator to obtain the costs protection that they deserve on the basis of it providing a low-cost arbitration service. I understand that this is the subject of continuing cross-party discussion and will also be dealt with in another place. Other noble Lords will have something to say on the position of bloggers and the need for small publishers to be excluded from the definition of relevant publishers. That has already been alluded to. I merely commend my two Amendments 18A and 18B as a contribution to the debate.

[Baroness Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury]

My Lords, I speak in favour of Amendment 11. We need it because we need the Leveson cross-party agreement on press regulation and because we need a raucous, unfettered press, but one that does not prey on the vulnerable and the innocent. I believe that we have achieved this balance through the proposed royal charter, and we have achieved it with all-party consensus, thanks in part to the persistence of my right honourable friend the Deputy Prime Minister. As part of that, the three parties agreed proposals on exemplary damages and costs designed to provide incentives for publishers to join the independent press regulator, as set out in these amendments.

I have been disappointed, if not surprised, by the response from some sections of the press to the cross-party agreement. In our debate on Monday, my noble friend Lord Fowler referred to that great practitioner of investigative journalism, Sir Harry Evans, and to a speech he made recently in which he abhorred the negative response to the Leveson report, in particular the suggestions that it was an attack on the freedom of the press. The freedom of the press is, as he said,

“too great a cause, too universal a value to a civilised society, to be cheapened as it is in the current debates. Every year upwards of a hundred journalists, broadcasters and photographers die in the name of freedom of the press”.

My great friend, Marie Colvin, was one of them. She died because she so passionately believed in making public the stories of the forgotten. In the case of her last despatch, it was the people of Homs. She knew about state control of the press and experienced it in East Timor, in Chechnya, in Sri Lanka and, finally, in Syria where the state targeted the media centre she was working from and killed her.

The royal charter and its independent press regulator, properly underpinned—to use that very unhappy term—will mean the end of unethical work practices and achieve a proper environment for journalists to ply their important trade. It protects both the freedom of the press and the rights of the individual.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord McNally]

I appreciate my noble friend’s intervention. At one stage during my speech I began to have sympathy with Chancellors of the Exchequer. In many ways, of course, this is not an ideal situation. On the other hand, if you take into account Baldwin’s cri de coeur against the press—was it in 1932 or 1933?

[Lord Skidelsky]

1930.

[Lord McNally]

God bless you, sir. This is the great value of this House; you ask a question and you get an authoritative answer. Baldwin’s cri de coeur was 80 years ago. I was thinking while the noble Lord, Lord Black, was speaking that it is 20 years since David Mellor warned the press about the last chance saloon, and it is 10 years since I was told from this Dispatch Box that a very minor amendment was the slippery slope to a state-controlled press, so we have not been discussing entirely new and fresh issues.

We have done what we have quite miraculously, I think, because it has needed a leap of faith and a generosity of spirit from all three parties. The Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition have come together and given national leadership on an issue that probably would never have got through in any other way. This has its flaws but is still a way forward that has eluded Parliament, as I say, for 80 years.

[Lord Skidelsky]

Before the Minister sits down, may I have his assurance that, in the cross-party talks that will take place on a number of outstanding issues, Conservative and Liberal Democrat participants will be able to take different, independent positions?

[Lord McNally]

As one who has had the good fortune to watch the traffic of the cross-party talks, and who has a strong view that my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness is in line not for a knighthood but for a sainthood for his patience in those talks, I assure the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, that all three parties have shown a robust individualism in the talks but, thank goodness, have also shown the generosity of spirit that has made agreement possible. If we can get the balance right between clear, vigorous discussions and generosity of spirit, we will get this done. I do not know whether we are getting a fish in the boat or a ship to port but, whatever it is, I recommend it to the House.

UK Border Agency

Lord Skidelsky Excerpts

Monday 7th November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, it is early days for saying much about the pilot other than that it looks as though it achieved rather good results by focusing on the more high-risk people rather than on the lesser ones. However, no doubt we will be able to tell the noble and gallant Lord more in due course once the pilot has been fully assessed.

[Lord Skidelsky]

My Lords, I am sure the Minister is aware of Adam Smith’s famous remark that defence is more important than opulence. Does he agree that defence is also more important than austerity, and that the security of the realm should not be sacrificed to the cuts?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, we have not sacrificed the security of the realm to cuts either in this area or in other areas. However, I thank the noble Lord, as always, for bringing to my attention another bit of Adam Smith that I was unaware of, but then I was never quite as well educated as I ought to have been, if I had had the chance of sitting at the feet of the noble Lord at an earlier stage in my career.