Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Strasburger Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th January 2026 Lords Chamber

Whatever my misgivings on the accountability of the Parades Commission, those principles could be applied by a senior police officer or, indeed, the Secretary of State. If we are looking at principles to think about between Committee and Report, we might think about this. I think the impact on communities is already operating in Northern Ireland. As I say, I make no mention of my support for the Parades Commission, but I think it is important to look at the legislation that set it up and the principles that are there, because I think the Government amendment and Amendment 380 continue the piece of work that has happened in Northern Ireland, which is instructive about how this can work. I hope that is helpful in terms of the amendments that have been put forward. I very much support the Government’s amendment and Amendment 380 in my name.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

I shall speak to Amendments 372 and 380 and various other amendments in this group. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, for his kind remarks at the end of the previous group, but I fear that, after this speech, normal service might be resumed. There are many issues to cover in this group, and I will try to be as brief as possible.

Government Amendment 372 amends the Public Order Act 1986 to impose a duty on the police to consider so-called “cumulative disruption” caused by repeated protests in a given area. The amendment gives the police unprecedented powers to restrict or prohibit protests that are expected to be too disruptive. This amendment represents a grievous attack on the right to protest, which is vital to our democracy, and has many unintended consequences, as I shall outline. The overly broad framework would empower the police routinely to curb freedom of expression and assembly as exercised through peaceful protest. It would significantly expand the definition of serious disruption to include so-called cumulative disruption caused by repeated protests in an area. This would allow the police pre-emptively to prohibit peaceful demonstrations if, in their opinion, an area has been the site of too many protests, which is an extremely broad discretion.

Until this debate started, I had no idea that this provision is aimed at frequent protests outside synagogues. The amendment says nothing to that effect, and it has very broad application to all protests, so I shall carry on on that basis.

Presumably it would apply if the protests in question were organised by different groups who advocate for different causes. This could create a first-come, first-served version of free speech, where areas are given what could be described as a protest allowance at the whim of the local constabulary. The police would be within their rights to prohibit peaceful assemblies once that allowance had been used up. This opens up the concerning opportunity for groups of citizens to censor their political opponents by using up an area’s protest allowance before their opponents have had a chance to protest themselves.

Furthermore, as has already been said this evening, the amendment is silent on what constitutes an area. We do not know whether this power would permit the police to move a demonstration to a different part of a square, to another part of town or even to a difficult-to-reach rural area, resulting in decreased attendance and visibility. Perhaps the Minister could enlighten the Committee on that.

Similarly, Amendment 372 does not specify within what timeframe disruption would have to be repeated to be considered cumulative. This is another question for the Minister. The suggestion that so-called cumulative disruption should be taken into account in considering conditions for restrictions or prohibitions of protests is also disproportionate. Will the Minister please explain why one person’s right to protest should be extinguished simply because somebody else has already protested in the same location about the same cause, or about a different cause?

What about causes that evolve or develop over time, legitimately calling for further protests to coincide with the next stage of public debate? The courts have also repeatedly concluded that a relevant consideration regarding the proportionality of Article 10 and Article 11 rights is whether the views giving rise to the protest relate to “very important issues”. That would de facto be more likely to apply to causes that have led to repeated protests than it would to causes that have given rise to a single protest. This provision, if enacted, would give the police an additional power to ban or curtail protests on the most important causes: the ones most worthy of protest and the ones most protected by the courts. Will the Minister please explain if that is the intention?

Amendment 372 is poorly drafted. It is far too broad to prevent the problems that I have described, and it gives the police far too much power to curtail or prevent peaceful protest on the most important matters. Government Amendments 372 and 380 should both be withdrawn or, if necessary, voted down.

Government Amendment 381 would create a new offence about protesting outside the homes of public officeholders. This may be sensible but should it not have a reasonable conduct defence, as appears in other harassment-type offences, to cover, for example, situations where a neighbour speaks amicably to a politician about a local issue as they are leaving home? Would it be proportionate to criminalise that perfectly normal interaction? That is another question for the Minister.

On Clause 124, which caused so much heat rather than light earlier, it goes without saying that worshipers must be free to access their places of worship, be they synagogues, mosques, churches, or whatever, and worshippers must be able to do so without intimidation or threats or fear of the same. But those rights are already fully protected by the Public Order Act 1986. Under the Act, conditions may be imposed on protests by senior police officers if they believe that the procession may result in serious public disorder or where the purpose of the organisers is the intimidation of others. Section 12(2)(a) of the Act specifically includes places of worship, so Clause 124 may be completely unnecessary.

The amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, and the noble Lord, Lord Hain, seek to clarify what is meant by “in the vicinity”. They are all well and good, but just about every place where people demonstrate is close to a church or another place of worship. For example, Parliament Square and Trafalgar Square would fail the test. Clause 124 could enable the police to ban or restrict just about any protest on that basis. That is probably not the intention, but it would be the result.

Amendment 378A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, would allow restrictions to be placed on protest or assembly if they take place in the vicinity of places used for “democratic decision-making”. Given the high standing of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, in this House, I find this idea rather strange. It would restrict protest close to Parliament, which is where the people who make the decisions, the people the protesters most want to influence, are to be found. The whole point of protest is to engage in a democratic process and seek to persuade decision-makers to a particular point of view. If anything, protest is more proportionate where it takes place in the vicinity of decision-makers. There is no sensible argument for Amendment 378A; it should be rejected.

Turning briefly to Amendment 370A, I understand that the idea of designating as an “extreme criminal protest group” is something that the noble Lord, Lord Walney, has been advocating for a long time. I oppose it because it is an oppressive and draconian restriction on the right to protest, in essence banning specific protest organisations. It is, of course, right that the law steps in to criminalise unlawful protest activity, but this is already done frequently on an individual basis. Criminalising association with others who share the same cause is wholly disproportionate; not everyone associated with a group shares any criminal intent. Designation or restriction of ECPGs will serve only to criminalise other law-abiding citizens because of their shared, but reasonably held, political views about a particular cause.

Taken as a whole, this group of amendments extends the regressive and anti-democratic tendencies of the previous Government—and now this one—to suppress or ban legitimate and peaceful protests in whatever way they can. Substantial pruning is required to get the Bill into a state where it no longer threatens our cherished democratic processes. Peaceful protest educates the public. It sparks debate. It creates the pressure needed for reform. In a healthy democracy, disagreement is not a threat but a sign that citizens care deeply about their society.

[Baroness O’Grady of Upper Holloway (Lab)]

My Lords, I support what I understand to be probing amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, but first I want to seek clarification from my noble friend the Minister on government Amendment 372. I do so from the perspective of someone who had direct responsibility for organising mass demonstrations when I was at the TUC, which now could be caught in this net.

First, can the Minister clarify the definition of disruption and whether that applies to conduct or location, and the safeguards that will be applied under “cumulative impact” to ensure that any restrictions and conditions imposed by the police are proportionate? As cumulative impact, as we have heard, will be applied collectively to demonstration organisers, this could lead to a rationing of protests in a particular area, presumably even when they are entirely peaceful. In practical terms, can the Minister explain how such a ration would be distributed between, as we have heard, potentially very different organisations with very different aims? Who will decide and on what basis or are organisations supposed to figure it out for themselves?

In central London, there are really only one or two routes, which have viable assembly points at the start and finish, available for very large demonstrations. How realistic is it for the Home Office to suggest, as it did in a press release, that the police could instruct organisers of national demonstrations to divert their demonstrations to alternative routes when in central London there may be none? Crucially, can the Minister tell us whether consideration of the cumulative impact of demonstrations will be weighed against the public’s right to protest in response to the cumulative impact of real-world events? For example, hundreds of thousands of people turned out for successive TUC marches through the 2010s—I recognise that not everybody here may have joined them, but plenty did—in response to the mounting harm that austerity and public service cuts were inflicting on workers, families and communities.

More recently, hundreds of thousands have joined demonstrations in solidarity with the Palestinian people. Again, the frequency of these very large protests is not happening in a vacuum, nor is it divorced from the strength of public feeling. While the International Court of Justice may not reach its verdict on genocide in Gaza for some years, much of the UK population, according to a YouGov poll published in June last year, has already made its mind up. Have the Government really considered the societal impact of making expression through peaceful protest much more difficult?

--- Later in debate ---

In this area the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, asked about safeguards around this power. It is a defence for a person charged under these powers to show that they were not aware that the premises were used by a public officeholder as a dwelling. If sufficient evidence is raised, the prosecution must prove otherwise beyond reasonable doubt. We consider this a necessary safeguard to prevent instances where individuals might unknowingly find themselves in breach of the law, for instance where someone is protesting about an issue unrelated to the public officeholder outside an apartment block where that officeholder lives. The noble Lord talked about reasonable behaviour, but I would say that reasonable behaviour is protesting outside a constituency office or a town hall, not outside somebody’s private home.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

I thank the noble Lord for taking the intervention, but my question was not about protest. It was more that, if an officeholder and a constituent met outside and had a conversation, I did not want that sort of interaction to be criminalised—not a protest, just a conversation.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

That is a helpful clarification. Ultimately, there are still the basic safeguard backstops of the CPS decisions to prosecute and police decisions to make arrests. There will always be discretion and flexibility, and one might posit that the CPS would not risk a prosecution where it was clear that there was not necessarily any offence caused. If the officeholder is engaged in mutual conversation, there would be no wish to see a charge brought, so I hope that addresses the concern the noble Lord raises.

Amendment 382 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, would seek to strike out the new offence from the government amendment. The new offence gives the police clearer and broader powers to act swiftly to deal with protests outside the homes of public officeholders. It is right that we protect them and their families from the harassment, alarm and distress that such protests inevitably give rise to. We have purposefully limited the offence to the homes of public officeholders; as such, it would remain open to anyone to protest outside an MP’s constituency office, a council chamber, a town hall or indeed the Houses of Parliament.

I hope that I have been able to persuade the noble Lord, Lord Davies, of the need for the new offence in subsection (4) of the proposed new clause in Amendment 381. The new offence is targeted and proportionate in defending those dedicated public servants, in this House and elsewhere, who put themselves forward to take part in our democratic institutions. They should be able to do this without a fear of being harassed in their own home. If, however, the noble Lord continues to have concerns about Amendment 381 then we will not move it in Committee, but he should be clear that we will bring the amendment back on Report.

Let me now respond to the other non-government amendments in this group. Clause 124 strengthens police powers to impose conditions on protests in the vicinity of places of worship. I put it to noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, that we have seen a clear need for this measure as a result of the protests we have seen following the conflict in Gaza, and indeed thugs targeting mosques as part of the disorder in the summer of 2024.

Frequent large-scale protests since 7 October 2023 across the UK have significantly impacted the Jewish community, particularly in London and in Manchester, Leeds and other cities. We have heard reports of fear and disrupted access to places of worship. To reassure the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, it is absolutely clear that this is related to the impact that we have seen in the wake of the protests arising from the conflict in Gaza, in the wake of 7 October 2023. I am slightly surprised that that was news to him, but fair enough.

Current police powers under the 1986 Act are insufficient to address the intimidating effects of protests that are currently being experienced by religious communities. Let me be clear to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, that this is the lived experience of the Jewish community over the past two years. It is not about assuming the potential of harassment; it is about assessing and preventing the actual impact of harassment. Again, I commend the clarity and force of the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who spoke forcefully about the fact that it is about intention and impact. I am also grateful to him for raising the rationale for the Court of Appeal ruling out the judgment on cumulative impact in the previous secondary legislation. It had nothing to do with the cumulative nature of those regulations.

The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, touched on a number of things. We will probably not get to it tonight, but we are talking about facial recognition later in Committee, and indeed we have a consultation on it. We are not ignoring that, and we can attend to it. A number of Peers mentioned Palestine Action and the proscription. I am not going to relitigate discussions that we have had. My noble friend Lord Hanson has dealt with that very well on a number of occasions, but I will just add my tuppence-worth. You can very easily support the cause of Palestinian statehood and freedom and criticise the Israeli Government by supporting a range of organisations that does not include one such as Palestine Action, which has been proven to organise and behave like a terrorist organisation. I will say no more on that.

I fully appreciate the intent behind Amendments 371A to 371F, tabled by my noble friend Lady Blower, but the law must be clear to all concerned. I put it to my noble friend that this is already the case. The term “in the vicinity” is already used in Sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 and is clearly understood in that context. Substituting reference to

“within 50 metres from the outer perimeter”

of a place of worship could be unduly restrictive.

Moreover, the power to impose conditions purposefully applies regardless of whether the organisers of the protest intended for the protest to have that effect. What matters is the impact of the protest on worshippers, not the intentions of the protesters. There is a question that arises from the formulation that my noble friend Lady Blower uses in her amendment. If you are using a place of worship but not necessarily for the act of worship—say, you are taking your child to a Sunday school or to a youth club at your synagogue, your mosque or your gurdwara—would that be covered by her amendment? But that may be dancing on the head of a pin slightly.

The question from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, of harm having to occur for the offence to have taken place and the formulation of the wording gets the cart before the horse. He saying that harm has to occur for the offence to have been caused. I say that this is about preventing harm and harassment being caused in the first place.

The noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Walney, and my noble friend Lord Mendelsohn have put forward various other new public order-related proposals. The noble Lord, Lord Walney, seeks to give effect to various recommendations contained in the report Protecting our Democracy from Coercion, which he submitted to the previous Administration. Of course, I pay tribute to his long-standing work in this area on political violence and extremism.

I do not propose to get too far into the detail of these particular amendments, given that the Government have commissioned a review of public order legislation led by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven. It seems like hours ago—actually, it was hours ago—that he showed perspicacity in guessing that I might pray this in aid. His review will publish its findings in the spring, and it is right that we wait for the outcome of the review before bringing forward further public order legislation.

On the cumulative impact proposals that we are adding to the Bill, the Government consider the need, as demonstrated by recent events, to impose a duty on the police to take into account the impact of cumulative disruption. Because we have had these repeated protests that have left communities, particularly religious communities, feeling unsafe and intimidated, the legislation is an important step in ensuring that everyone feels safe in this country, while protecting the right to protest. This is a first step, but we will of course await the words of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, in the spring to see how we might develop these issues further.