Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill
Lord Strasburger Excerpts(11 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Armstrong of Ilminster (CB)
My Lords, the issue raised by this group of amendments, long as it is, is straightforward enough. We rely on the police and the intelligence and security agencies to protect us and our liberties from the threats to our way of life presented by terrorism. Their ability to do so depends to a large extent on their ability to have access to the data derived from the use of communications by the would-be terrorists.
The regulation of the use of communications data was last reviewed 15 years ago. Since then there have been great changes, as many speakers have said, in the technology of communications, the significance of which, for the regulation of communications, needs urgently to be reviewed.
The threat from terrorism has unquestionably increased. The sophistication of those who use communications for malign purposes has also increased. As we have been told, the efficacy of the activities of the police and intelligence and security agencies in this area have been impaired by the activities of Mr Edward Snowden.
The Government published the draft of a new Communications Data Bill earlier in this Parliament, two or three years ago. That was scrutinised by a Joint Committee of the Houses of Parliament, chaired by my noble friend Lord Blencathra—since I was a member of that Committee, perhaps I may call him that. That committee made extensive criticisms of and recommendations for the draft Bill and the Government accepted almost all of them.
There is reason to believe—indeed, as my noble friend Lord Blencathra has already said, he and I have seen—that the Home Office produced a revised version of the draft Bill, to take full account of the Joint Committee’s recommendations. Unfortunately that revised Bill has not been allowed to see the light of day, let alone been submitted to Parliament for consideration. That will not now happen until there is a new Parliament. If a revised Bill is not introduced until after the election, it might be that it cannot be passed until well into 2016. That would be another year’s delay, which we can ill afford.
The present Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill provides an opportunity to put into effect, within the next few months, the measures proposed in the revised Communications Data Bill, insofar as they affect the response to the enhanced threats from terrorism and the agencies responsible for countering those threats. That is what the amendments seek to achieve. The amendments also provide for a sunset clause that would ensure that the whole matter is reviewed early in the new Parliament. Since we do not have the revised version of the draft Communications Data Bill, those responsible for these amendments have had to rely on the original Bill. No doubt the amendments are to that extent defective. But Parliament should not be denied the opportunity of considering whether and how to achieve the changes required immediately and without the delay consequent upon waiting until the next Parliament.
I expect—though I cannot commit them—that those who are putting forward these amendments would be prepared to withdraw them if the Government would undertake this evening to introduce on Report revised versions, taking account of the criticisms and recommendations of my noble friend Lord Blencathra’s pre-legislative scrutiny committee, but also adopting the proposals in the amendments for confining the changes to the police and intelligence and security agencies and providing a sunset clause ensuring that the issue has to be considered in the wider context of a review of the regulation of communications data by the new Parliament. With that qualification, I fully support the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord King, and his colleagues.
These amendments provide an opportunity to address without delay acknowledged shortcomings in the effectiveness of the present regime. It is suggested that they would be an unacceptable intrusion on the liberty of the citizen. That can be much exaggerated. It is not government agencies that will store the data, and those agencies will be able to obtain access to the stored data only subject to demonstrable need and justification and subject to rigorous procedures and controls that were examined and found fit for purpose by the committee—as my noble friend Lord Blencathra has said.
Even so, they will of course represent some potential interference with the freedom of action of those whose data are extracted from the store. But those are or may be the people whose freedom of action we wish to limit or restrain, because their intentions are malign and, if realised, will compromise the life, liberty and happiness of the rest of us. The price of liberty is eternal vigilance, but if vigilance fails or is frustrated, it is life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness that pay the price.
Lord Strasburger (LD)
My Lords, I confess that I do not really know where to start. I think it is true that all the previous speakers are former members of what I would call the security establishment: they are former policemen, former Home Office Ministers or former spies—I am not sure in which category I would put the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong. I think I am the first to speak more as an individual and a non-politician; my history before I came to this House was quite outside of politics, in business.
As we have heard, these amendments regurgitate large parts of the utterly discredited draft communications data Bill. They seek to slip into the Bill large parts of the highly controversial snoopers’ charter, word for word. With just one exception, the amendments fail to correct any of the many significant, fundamental and deal-stopping flaws identified by the Joint Select Committee on the draft Bill that reported at the end of 2012. I had the honour of being a member of that Select Committee under the very able chairmanship of my noble friend Lord Blencathra. The committee sat for five months; it met 20 times, including three times in the Recess; it interviewed 54 witnesses and received 19,000 e-mails from members of the public. As we have heard, its members included two former Cabinet members, Lady Thatcher’s Cabinet Secretary, one noble Lord who has since become a government Minister, an ultra-loyal Conservative MP and a former Conservative Home Office Minister. That was hardly a hotbed of lefty liberals. The committee reached a unanimous verdict that the draft Bill was badly written, far too broad in scope and badly costed, and noted that the security agencies would do better to make better use of the information they already had.
That last observation is made particularly pertinent by the revelations following the atrocities in Woolwich and Paris, in which all the terrorists were well known to the security agencies long before the events. In all, there were about 100 criticisms of the draft Bill in the Select Committee’s report and many of them were serious and fundamental. As far as I can see, these amendments deal with just one of those criticisms, which means that they are still infested with the remaining 99 flaws. I will not detain the House by going through each of them, but noble Lords may read about them at their leisure in the report, which I commend to the House.
When Edward Snowden released his revelations, about six months after the Select Committee reported, we learnt that GCHQ’s Project Tempora is the world’s first “full-take” data interception system, collecting 100% of internet traffic—content as well as metadata. Former committee members were surprised, and some were angered, by that revelation because during the committee’s proceedings Home Office officials had three times claimed that there was a 25% capability gap in what the agencies could collect—although those same officials were not able to justify that figure of 25%, even in private sessions. Snowden showed that the 25% so-called gap probably does not exist at all and that in fact the agencies are already, and have been for some time, acquiring far more data than the draft Bill would have delivered—and without the knowledge or consent of Parliament and the people.
Serious Crime Bill [HL]
Lord Strasburger Excerpts(11 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Strasburger
“Investigatory powers and crime: legal privilege and journalistic source material
(1) In section 22 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (obtaining and disclosing communications data), after subsection (9) insert—
“(10) Subject to subsection (11), nothing in this section shall authorise the obtaining and disclosing of—
(a) items subject to legal privilege, or(b) journalistic source material,for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime. (11) The obtaining and disclosing of the items and material referred to in subsection (10) may be authorised by a judge in accordance with the procedure set out in section 22A.
(12) In this section—
“items subject to legal privilege” has the same meaning as in section 10 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984;
“journalistic source material” means material which may identify a confidential journalistic source.”
(2) After section 22 of that Act insert—
“22A Authorisation by a judge to obtain communications data: legal privilege and journalistic source material
(1) This section applies to an application for a warrant or authorisation under section 22(11).
(2) A person designated for the purpose of this Chapter may apply to a judge for an authorisation.
(3) The application must be made in writing and must set out the grounds on which the application is made.
(4) An application for an authorisation under section 22(11) must be made on notice to any person to whom the authorisation or notice which is the subject of the application relates save that notice of an application is not required if the service of such notice may seriously prejudice the investigation to which the application relates.
(5) Where notice of an application for an authorisation has been served on a person, he shall not conceal, destroy, alter or dispose of the material to which the application relates except with the leave of a judge until—
(a) the application is dismissed or abandoned; or(b) he has complied with an authorisation given on the application.(6) An authorisation shall only be issued or granted if the judge is satisfied that—
(a) it is necessary for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime, and(b) the conduct authorised is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by that conduct, having particular regard to the importance of the protection of legally privileged communications and journalistic sources.(7) In this section “judge” means a Circuit Judge.
(8) In this section and in section 22(10) “serious crime” means the committing or suspected committing of one or more of the offences in England and Wales specified in Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Serious Crime Act 2007.””
Lord Strasburger (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 49B seeks to repair a serious flaw in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, a defect that has emerged only recently. Your Lordships will recall that many people inside and outside this House have been warning for years that RIPA as a whole is not fit for purpose because, among other things, its scope is far too broad; it has large built-in loopholes; its oversight provisions have proved to be hopelessly ineffective; and it has been left behind by several generations of new technology.
Perversely, the Government have been claiming for years that RIPA is the best thing since sliced bread so far as the regulation of intrusive powers is concerned. But in July this year, the Government finally bowed to the inevitable and accepted that all is not well with RIPA. They set up a review of the Act under David Anderson QC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. His report is due before next year’s election, with a view to legislation in the next Parliament, but the particular problem that has just appeared will not wait two years to be dealt with; it needs to be addressed immediately. It concerns the misuse of RIPA by the police in two ways: to uncover journalists’ sources and to access legally privileged information.
The problem with journalists’ sources was brought to light by the Met’s report on Operation Alice, which was its investigation into the “plebgate” affair. It revealed, presumably by accident, that Met officers had secretly used RIPA to get their hands on the phone logs of the Sun’s news desk and its political editor, Tom Newton Dunn. They then proceeded to trawl through a year’s worth of phone calls to find the source of the paper’s stories about “plebgate”. By the way, not a single prosecution has ensued from Operation Alice.
It then emerged that this was not an isolated case. We learnt that Kent Police had used RIPA to obtain the phone records of journalists working for the Mail on Sunday, and that the Suffolk Constabulary had used it against a journalist at the Ipswich Star. It would seem that there are many more cases but the police are very reluctant to reveal details. The Met commissioner steadfastly refuses to let on how many times his force has used RIPA in this way, or when or why, despite many demands that he come clean about this in his regular so-called transparency sessions, the most recent of which was in September.
Why does this matter? There is a well established tradition throughout the world that journalists do not reveal their sources, and many journalists have ended up in jail or worse—much worse—defending this principle. If potential whistleblowers in this country conclude that journalists can no longer guarantee their anonymity because the police can secretly identify them, a lot fewer whistles are going to be blown. They and we know what would happen to them if their cover was blown. They could be arrested; they would be intimidated; they would be ostracised; and they would lose their job and their pension. If insiders who know about wrongdoing stop coming forward because they can no longer be guaranteed anonymity, important information that deserves to be in the public domain will never see the light of day.
I will give the House a few recent examples. In uncovering the phone hacking scandal, the Guardian was helped by sources in the police, who provided important information on the condition that they remained unidentified. They did this in the public interest, knowing that senior ranks were promoting a false version of events to the press, the public and Parliament. If those sources had been identified, they would have faced the loss of their careers and their pensions.
In another example, two anonymous whistleblowers from inside BAE revealed wholesale corrupt payments by the arms company and that BAE had set up secret subsidiaries in the British Virgin Islands, which it was using to channel corrupt payments to Swiss bank accounts. Even more to the point, it was a third anonymous whistleblower, in an official position, who revealed to journalists that Prince Bandar of the Saudi royal family had been paid a total of £1 billion, plus a gift of a personal Airbus, in order to promote arms sales.
If it were not for whistleblowers, patients at NHS trusts such as Mid-Staffs would still be dying unnecessarily and police such as those at Hillsborough would still be covering up their failings, as would corrupt politicians, dishonest businessmen and child-abusing celebrities.
Prying into journalists’ sources is not what RIPA was intended for, as has been confirmed by David Blunkett, the Home Secretary who took it through Parliament. Two weeks ago, when talking about RIPA, he said that no one at the time imagined that,
“legislation secured through parliamentary debate would be used to fetter the right of a free press in a democratic nation to do a responsible job”.
RIPA was supposed to be a weapon against terrorism and other serious crime, not for investigating internal police disciplinary matters and the like.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for explaining the purpose of this amendment. I do not believe there is any difference between my noble friend and me, or indeed any of your Lordships who have contributed to this debate, on the key issue at stake here. We all agree that a free and fearless press is fundamental to a democratic society. A key element of journalism is the protection of sources, and I can assure your Lordships that the Government do not wish to do anything which would undermine the operation of the vibrant and independent press that operates in this country.
The amendment which my noble friend has moved seeks to require public authorities who acquire communications data under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 to seek the authorisation of a judge when the material requested is subject to legal privilege or relates to journalistic sources. However, this is unnecessary, given the strict regulation RIPA already contains and the additional safeguards we are already putting in place.
Communications data—the who, when and where but not the content of a communication—would reveal the telephone number a journalist or lawyer calls, but would not reveal any of what was said or written in a communication. Last month, the independent Interception of Communications Commissioner issued a statement in which he said that communications data,
“do not contain any details of what was said or written by the sender or the recipient of the communication. As such, the communications data retained by CSPs”—
communications service providers—
“do not contain any material that may be said to be of professional or legal privilege—the fact that a communication took place does not provide what was discussed or considered or advised”.
None the less, I recognise that this is a sensitive issue. It is personal information and RIPA already applies rigorous controls on its acquisition.
Communications data can only be obtained when their acquisition is necessary for a specified purpose, such as preventing and detecting crime, and then only when it is proportionate to do so. Anyone can complain to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal if they think the powers have been used unlawfully against them. The whole system is presided over, and reported on, by the Interception of Communications Commissioner, a senior judicial figure.
These controls apply to all requests for communications data, and I believe we have one of the most stringent systems to be found anywhere, with both strict internal controls and independent oversight. If any of your Lordships have doubts on this point, I would recommend reading the annual report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner. Sir Anthony May’s report, published in April of this year, includes a detailed account of how the system works and a full statistical breakdown of communications data requests.
However, we recognise the special considerations that apply to journalists, lawyers and a number of other professions which may involve access to sensitive information. We have announced plans to update the Acquisition and Disclosure of Communications Data Code of Practice. These changes will make clear that specific consideration must be given by the senior authorising officer to the level of possible intrusion in cases likely to involve the communications data of those engaged in certain professions who may have obligations of professional secrecy. These professions include journalism, as well as those of lawyers, doctors and Members of Parliament, and will also include those known to be close contacts of members of these professions. Any application for communications data that are known to be the data of members of these professions or their close contacts will have to state this clearly in the application. It will also require that relevant information is available to the authorising office when considering necessity and proportionality. This change will make clear in the statutory code what is already existing best practice.
We will publish the updated draft code of practice for public consultation as soon as possible, noting the acting Interception of Communications Commissioner’s request to expedite publication of the code. It is also worth pointing out that on 6 October the acting Interception of Communications Commissioner, Sir Paul Kennedy, announced that he had,
“launched an inquiry into the use of RIPA powers to determine whether the acquisition of communications data has been undertaken to identify journalistic sources”.
It would certainly be premature to take any legislative action in advance of knowing his findings.
The noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, asked whether David Anderson’s review of RIPA would cover this area. I am sure that David Anderson will wish to look at all aspects of RIPA interception and communications data, including this issue.
In the light of the protections already available, the very clear commitment to strengthen these through the code of practice and the ongoing inquiry by Sir Paul Kennedy, I invite my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Strasburger
My Lords, it has been an interesting debate. The House seems to have one view and the Minister seems to have another. I thank noble Lords who have partaken in the debate: my noble friends Lord Black and Lord Thomas, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Cohen and Lady Smith.
I do not think that the Minister was listening to what I said. Everyone outside the Home Office and the Foreign Office knows that the safeguards in RIPA have been proved ineffective time and again. I rather anticipated that the Government would try to fob us off with some tweak of the code of practice. Tweaking the code of practice is not going to offer the certainty that journalists need; it is not going to offer the transparency. All of this is still going to carry on in secret. We will not know what on earth is going on, and it will not give the press, the journalists or the media the opportunity to challenge the police’s intention to seek their phone records and others from the phone companies. So it will not take us any further forward at all.
I have to say that, as you might have detected, I am more than somewhat disappointed with the Government’s response. They have not listened to the debate. I hope they will reflect on the debate and come back with something more substantive. If not, I am quite sure that I and others, including those in another place, will return to this issue with a vengeance. However, for the sake of good order, I will withdraw my amendment.
Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Bill
Lord Strasburger Excerpts(11 years, 8 months ago)
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Lord Taylor of Holbeach
That is not the deadline that has been agreed by the party leaders. After all, 1 May is a deadline; it does not mean that the independent reviewer will not report before then if he feels that it is satisfactory to do so. It is important to remember that the presence of a sunset clause, while it is absolute in its end date, does not mean that legislation could not be considered before that time if a Government decided that they were in a position to present it in Parliament.
Creating a committee is entirely appropriate and democratic, but it will take time. I do not believe that committees are stuffed with placemen. My noble friend Lord Strasburger, who holds very strong views on this issue, was part of the joint scrutiny committee chaired by my noble friend Lord Blencathra which considered this Bill.
Lord Strasburger (LD)
For the past year or so, the Minister has resisted all the efforts by me and others to engage in a conversation or debate on these matters. I congratulate him on his sudden and total conversion to the idea that there should be a national debate and a review of RIPA.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I take that chiding. I am big enough to cope with it. I do not think I have ever failed to answer this House when it has asked me to consider a matter of this nature.
Clearly, Parliament will want to judge both the report of the Joint Committee and the new legislation that replaces this Bill. It will be a new Parliament; it will be a new committee. It will not be the committee chaired by my noble friend Lord Blencathra. The amendment would make it difficult for this to happen. It would also curtail proper public debate about this issue. I am not a last-minute convert in the way that my noble friend Lord Strasburger has described. I believe in transparency; I believe in talking about issues that concern the public. That new legislation will set out new powers and capabilities for the future—potentially wide-ranging powers. The legislation that we have before Parliament today just maintains the status quo, and we have heard the understandable concerns about the pace of its passage.
Perhaps I might say something in response to the speech by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker—I nearly called him my noble friend; I should not say that. He talked about language and the way we communicate difficult ideas. He referred to the problems that elites and those of us with responsibility have in talking to the public as a whole—the use of language. I could not agree with him more. All Governments and all Parliaments must seek to identify through language. It is the thing that we have in common; it is the way in which we communicate with each other; it is the way in which I hope that I am convincing the noble Lord, Lord Judd, of the reason for having this particular date. Language is important.
Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Bill
Lord Strasburger Excerpts(11 years, 8 months ago)
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Lord Strasburger (LD)
My Lords, I start my contribution to this debate with the words of Benjamin Franklin, in a letter to the colonial Government more than 250 years ago:
“Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety”.
Having said that, nobody in this House more than I wants the people of this country to be safe—to be safe from terrorists, safe from paedophiles, safe from drug barons, safe from anyone who would do us harm. I am sure that every noble Lord feels the same way.
I am also confident that we all agree that there are some limits on the price we are prepared to pay to nudge the threats to our citizens closer to zero. For example, not many of us would be happy to see the Government installing equipment in everyone’s home to continuously record video and sound. We would not like it if all our letters were being steamed open by the authorities, and then scanned and recorded for no better reason than that we might one day go off the rails and commit a serious crime. Although these measures would probably reduce crime of all types, most people would consider the level of intrusion too big a price to pay. We all have a privacy red line we would not cross in return for some sort of reduction in the threat to our safety. It is a matter of where that red line is that we are debating.
By the way, some noble Lords may not realise that so far as our use of the internet is concerned, the red line has already been crossed. GCHQ’s Project Tempora is doing the digital equivalent of steaming open our e-mails and web browsing, and recording it all, with no differentiation between metadata and content. I have tried on many occasions in this Chamber to raise this huge invasion of our privacy, which is without the people’s consent, but have just been stonewalled by the Home Office, which would rather that we talk about something else and leave it to get on with trampling on our liberty and our privacy.
To return to this Bill, some will be surprised to hear that I support it, for two reasons. The first is that I accept that the ECJ judgment could leave our police and intelligence agencies with no communications data about those who have committed, or are about to commit, serious crime. We do not have time to discuss and agree a Bill to replace RIPA that would deliver the data on the bad guys and leave the innocent alone, and would provide the extra security and control that is needed. So we have no option but to pass this Bill to temporarily fill the gap. Although that means that vast numbers of suspicionless citizens will have their metadata collected and stored, I am reassured that this Bill, when it is enacted, will start life under a sentence of death in 29 months. I will come to my second reason for not opposing this Bill in a moment.
Although other noble Lords—in fact, every noble Lord—has referred to it in this debate, I cannot stand here without drawing the House’s attention to the scandalous affront to democracy that is the timetable for this Bill. The Home Office and everyone else knew about the ECJ judgment on 8 April. Despite being told by many specialists in the field that there was a consequential effect on the validity of the UK’s 2009 data retention regulations, the Home Office repeatedly asserted that there was no problem. Then suddenly, 13 weeks after the ECJ judgment and two weeks before the Summer Recess, the Home Office now tells us that there is a problem and an emergency Bill has to be passed within a week.
There are only two possible explanations for this chain of events. The first is pure incompetence and a failure to understand the judgment; the second one, to my mind, is that it is a ploy by the Home Office to suppress scrutiny of important and complex legislation. Last Tuesday I watched the Home Secretary struggle to explain the sudden panic to the Home Affairs Select Committee. Perhaps my noble friend the Minister could have a go when he responds to this debate. Why was this Bill not mentioned in the Queen’s speech, which took place eight weeks after the ECJ judgment? Was it a mistake or was it a conspiracy? No wonder there is such cynicism about and distrust of politicians out in the country.
RIPA was deeply flawed for many reasons when it was passed. Today it is also out of date, having been passed seven years before the first smartphone was introduced to the market—Apple’s iPhone—and internet on the move became ubiquitous. It allows too many public authorities to delve into too much of our data for too many reasons. While the equivalent in America is used less than 60,000 times a year, there are more than half a million access requests a year in the UK. But the biggest problem with RIPA is that it contains a deliberate and well concealed loophole that is used to claim legal cover for Project Tempora’s hoovering up of everything that everyone does on the internet and storing it. The British people were never asked, via their representatives in Parliament, “How do you feel about the Government helping themselves to all your private data?”. I presume that they were not asked because the Home Office knew what the answer would be—and it would not have been, “Yes please”, especially if it had been explained that it is as if there is a man or woman from the Ministry looking over your shoulder and making notes whenever you use the internet, at home or at work or on a train, or wherever you are. So instead of getting the permission of the British people, the Home Office used legislative sleight of hand to slip it in under the radar. That must ring alarm bells about related legislation such as this Bill being rushed through without proper scrutiny.
Parliament, too, must take its share of the blame for this state of affairs. For too long, parliamentarians have been asleep at wheel when it comes to watching our spies or resisting Home Office land grabs. Is it not to Parliament’s shame that it took an ECJ judgment to point out that the European directive on data retention, which the UK was heavily involved in promoting, fails to comply with human rights law in many ways? Many specialist lawyers are saying that existing UK law and regulations, after amendment by this Bill and its accompanying regulations, fail to answer at least two of the ECJ’s concerns, which leaves them vulnerable to challenges. As a former Conservative chairman and shadow Home Secretary said in the other place yesterday:
“While the Bill may be law by the end of the week, it may be junk by the end of the year”.—[Official Report, Commons, 15/7/14; col. 731.]
What then—another emergency Bill?
I said earlier that there was another reason why I am supporting this Bill. It is that the Deputy Prime Minister has been very astute in extracting a high price for his co-operation. I am particularly pleased that the long overdue review of RIPA will now happen and that Mr Anderson’s report will go to a Joint Committee for consideration. The new Government will have to take notice because RIPA will be heading for the buffers when this Bill expires in 2016. As other noble Lords have said, it is high time that there was a full debate in this country on how much privacy we are prepared to sacrifice for a bit more security. The setting up of a privacy and civil liberties council has the potential to redress the balance in favour of the citizen versus the state. Time will tell. The small but meaningful decision that the chair of the ISC must be from an opposition party will make a difference.
Finally, I am not a politician, but I hope that noble Lords will forgive me for making a political point. None of these important steps forward, and others that I have not mentioned, would have happened without Nick Clegg’s steadfast insistence. None of them would have happened without the Liberal Democrats being in government.
Security Services: Supervision
Lord Strasburger Excerpts(12 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Strasburger (LD)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Soley, for initiating this important debate. Let me start with two tributes. First, I pay tribute to our security services which do an excellent job of keeping us safe. My second tribute goes jointly to the American whistleblower Edward Snowden and to the Guardian, which has published his astonishing revelations. Both have been brave and highly responsible—all but one of the Guardian articles was approved in advance by the Government—and were it not for them, we and the rest of the world would still be in the dark about what the NSA and GCHQ are up to.
This scandal, for that is what it is, is not the fault of GCHQ, which naturally will grab all the tools it can until it is stopped. The blame falls on those in this country and in America who should have been watching over the spies. In the UK, I am talking about the Cabinet in this Government and the previous Government, the National Security Council and the Intelligence and Security Committee. These bodies are supposed to oversee the security services. It is their job to ensure that the British people are not only safe but that their privacy is protected and that intrusions into our private lives are proportionate and justified. In the case of GCHQ’s Project Tempora, they have all failed miserably.
The only way such highly intrusive powers can be granted in a democracy is with the informed consent of the people, via Parliament. Parliament was certainly not informed about Tempora, nor has it given its consent. We parliamentarians knew nothing about the way GCHQ was helping itself to the private data of every citizen until the Guardian exposed it. The Cabinet, the NSC and the ISC have all been asleep at the wheel while GCHQ ran out of control.
The ISC, which has the most intimate access to the security services and should have known what was going on, lacks resources and the skills needed to understand the technologies being used. It has clearly failed to ask the awkward questions it should have been asking. The ISC must be unfit for purpose, even in its recently modified guise, and there are questions about its independence. Parliament should not have had to rely on a whistleblower to reveal Tempora’s massive abuse of power.
Furthermore, the Home Office has deliberately ensured that Parliament is kept in the dark. Last year, I sat on the Select Committee on the draft Communications Data Bill, under the very able chairmanship of my noble friend Lord Blencathra, and listened to Home Office officials repeatedly justify the Bill by adamantly asserting that there was a 25% shortfall in the communications they could collect and that this gap was hampering the fight against terrorism. At no time did they disclose, not even in the two private sessions, that for years GCHQ has been collecting far more data than that Bill would have given it and that there is no shortfall. That deliberate deception of Parliament is an affront to democracy, and those officials should be seriously considering their positions.
So what needs to happen now? First, there needs to be a vigorous public debate about what we are prepared to allow our security services to do and the boundaries of their reach into our private lives. I hope that the outcome would be permission for intrusive and up-to-date powers of interception for the police and security services where there are convincing grounds for suspicion of serious crime. Equally there needs to be a strong prohibition of mass untargeted surveillance of ordinary, innocent citizens. There will be a need for new legislation to replace RIPA, which was full of deliberate loopholes when it was written and is now hopelessly out of date. There needs to be very strong and sceptical oversight which reports directly to Parliament and has the necessary resources and skills and real teeth. Most of all, we need a sea change in the Government’s approach to the trade-off between liberty and control.
The Snowden cat is out of the bag. He has 58,000 secret documents, and so far the Guardian has published excerpts from just 17 of them. There must be much more to come. It will no longer do for the Government to sit Canute-like on the beach while a tsunami of further revelations engulfs their old policy of sticking their fingers in their ears and muttering that they do not discuss security matters. They must stop trying to shoot the messenger by attacking the Guardian. They must also stop pretending that Britain has the best oversight of its security services in the world when that oversight has spectacularly failed to spot and prevent intrusive surveillance of every citizen without Parliament’s knowledge and consent.
Our Government must now engage in the public debate about what spying the people will or will not tolerate—a debate that has been happening for some time in America, from the President down, and also in France and Germany. The status quo is no longer an option. It is time for the Government to engage fully in the debate.
Justice and Security Bill [HL]
Lord Strasburger Excerpts(13 years, 9 months ago)
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Lord Strasburger
My Lords, I am in a small but growing minority in this debate in that I am neither a distinguished lawyer nor a member, not even a former member, of the ISC.
When compared with many other countries, it is remarkable how much the British people hold the courts in high regard and respect their decisions. This is partly because our judges are seen as incorruptible, independent and wise, but the main reason is that court decisions are the result of a process that is fair and transparent. By “fair” I mean that the court will give no privileges to either side, even when one side is the state. This principle is known in European jurisprudence as “equality of arms” and is a very British concept. An important aspect of equality of arms is that each side has an opportunity to see the other side’s evidence, to challenge it and test it, and to call evidence of their own to rebut it. The decision that is made after that process has been respected as one that we have good reason to respect.
What does transparency mean in this context? The principle of transparency entails that proceedings should be open to the public unless there is a very good reason why not. The court should make plain the reason for its decision. No matter how high our regard for the judge, it is very hard to trust his or her decision if you do not know how and why it has been reached.
Closed material proceedings are a big departure from the principles of transparency and fairness. The Government are proposing that, in civil cases where they are the defendant and are being accused of wrongdoing, they should be able to stack the proceedings in their favour on what is probably the deciding issue in the case. CMP is not just a secret hearing with the press excluded; the litigants and their lawyer are also locked out. The Government’s lawyer would have a private meeting with the judge who will decide the case and give him or her so-called evidence that their opponent cannot see. I say “so-called evidence” because it will simply be assertions that have not been tested or challenged. It may be mistaken or could even be complete fiction. Even so, the Bill requires the judge to take this highly dubious information into account when reaching a verdict—a very one-sided arrangement that cannot in any way be described as fair.
What led to the creation of CMPs in the first place? They were introduced for Special Immigration Appeals Commission hearings involving foreigners for whom a national security deportation was being considered. Previously such appeals were held in total secrecy and, by comparison, CMPs were a bit less bad. We are now being invited to extend CMPs from this highly specialised application to civil cases, where the Government are the defendant and are being accused of wrongdoing.
However, that is not the end of this mission creep. Buried in the Bill, in Clause 11(2), is the power for the Secretary of State to amend the definition of “relevant civil proceedings” by statutory order, into who knows what areas of our justice system.
Of course, we have a good idea of how far the Government would really like to go in extending the scope of CMPs. The Green Paper sought to apply CMPs to all civil proceedings involving the Executive. Secret and unfair hearings, therefore, could have been invoked by a hospital trust fighting a medical negligence claim, or a local authority defending itself against a claim for maladministration. For now, the Lord Chancellor has rowed back on that ambition in the face of a mountain of protest, but he has shown us the ominous and dangerous road that he wants to take us down.
What of the safeguards that the Government have trumpeted? We are told that the case judge will decide whether CMPs will be invoked, not the Minister. However, there is a disconnect between what the Government are saying on this and what is actually on the Bill. According to the Bill at present, judges will have their hands tied, with no discretion to consider the competing interests of disclosure in the interests of justice and national security. This, therefore, will effectively be a ministerial decision, with no effective judicial oversight.
What, then, is the problem that this Bill seeks to solve? The current system of PII certificates works well. It allows a balance to be struck between the requirements of justice and national security. If a Minister believes that disclosure could harm the public interest, he or she signs a certificate to that effect. The court then considers the issue, and the judge has a number of ways to handle the information in question. He can withhold it, release it, redact it before he releases it, protect the identity of the witness, and he has a number of other nuanced solutions. The PII system works well, and the Government have failed to bring forward a single example of where the PII system has led to a disclosure that has been damaging to our national security.
In fact, the Bill requires a Minister to “consider” the PII route before applying for a CMP, but the wording of this provision is so weak and easy to evade that, in effect, Ministers can and will demand CMPs without giving any serious consideration to the much fairer PII route. If this Bill is to proceed, before the Minister can ask for a CMP he should have to demonstrate to the court that for some reason a PII certificate will not do the job.
What do others think of this Bill? The House could do worse than listen to the views of the special advocates, specially vetted lawyers who are appointed to serve the court in CMPs. If anyone knows about the grimy details of this part of the justice system, they do. In a memorandum signed by 50 special advisers—which is basically all of them—they say that,
“CMPs are inherently unfair and contrary to the common law tradition … the Government would have to show the most compelling reasons to justify their introduction … no such reasons have been advanced … in our view, none exist”.
There you have it from the horse’s mouth. No reason has been advanced and none exists for making part of our civil justice system inherently unfair. That is the opinion of the specialist lawyers with deep knowledge of this type of proceedings and with no axe to grind at all.
What, then, is behind this solution without a problem? Over the past few months we have been offered a series of spurious justifications for this draconian Bill, all of them without any evidence to support them that stands up to scrutiny. I put it to the House that this Bill has nothing to do with protecting national security or preventing the CIA from withholding intelligence from our agencies because they do not trust our courts, or with saving the Government from having to settle civil cases for large sums because they cannot use sensitive data to defend themselves. All these reasons and others have been advanced at various times with little or no evidence to support them.
I put it to noble Lords that the real problem that this Bill is designed to solve is the justified embarrassment that the security agencies suffered when a recent civil case exposed their involvement in rendition and torture. In that case, the previous Government sought to conceal from the courts seven paragraphs that admitted what the Americans did to the litigant while he was in their custody.
The judge’s view was that:
“Of itself, the treatment to which”,
the litigant,
“was subjected could never properly be described in a democracy as ‘a secret’ or an ‘intelligence secret’ or a ‘summary of classified intelligence’”.
This Bill might have prevented the exposure of this wrongdoing and it may do so in the future if we pass it without major amendments.
Lord Lester of Herne Hill
I am sorry to interrupt my noble friend but that is not quite right. The previous Government attempted to provide that information to the United States Military Commissions, but were thwarted from doing so by the American intelligence authorities. What the British Government sought to do was entirely honourable and they did not seek to conceal it from our own court. I thought I should just place that on the record.
Lord Strasburger
I thank my noble friend for that. The Lord Chancellor has indulged in plenty of comforting rhetoric in an attempt to assuage the serious concerns that many people wiser than I have about this Bill. The problem is that there is a yawning chasm between his words and those in the Bill. For example, he assures us that the judge will decide whether CMP will be used but the Bill as currently worded makes clear that the judge’s hands will be tied and will have little option but to grant the Minister’s request for CMP, even if he or she believes that the case could best be tried using PII rules. The judge will not be able to adjudicate between the competing arguments of justice and national security.
As it currently stands, this Bill is a toolkit for cover-ups. As such it is a threat to our democracy and we have a lot of work to do to fix its serious shortcomings. I hope that my noble and learned friend the Minister will listen to the strong misgivings about this Bill around the House, among civil liberties campaigners and, particularly, the special advocates who have a much more balanced and independent view of these matters than the politicians and the security agencies.
I will listen carefully to the Minister’s response today and in Committee. I hope that he is able to give me comfort to support a much-improved version of the Bill in the future but there is a long way to go.