Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Lord Taylor of Holbeach and Lord Wolfson of Tredegar

Committee stage
Friday 30th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach (Con)]

My Lords, I am reluctant to involve myself in this debate, but I see this whole legislative process as being about practicalities in the end. It is good that we have had an exposition of the articulation of the motivation of the people seeking success for this Bill, but I am very concerned as a citizen because I think this is about palliative care and relief from suffering.

The Bill should have been about those very matters. However, it is not. It is about all the incentives, from government to public authorities. For those people that the legislation actually motivates, it is about promoting the idea that assisting dying—or assisted suicide—is available; whereas the medical profession prefers, and what all the medical colleges have said they want to see, is proper palliative care. We do not want a competition for the funding of one against the other. I can see that in individual and family lives—and the social life we have together, governed by a Government—the pressures are not going to be towards relief of suffering through palliative care but for assisted suicide. I do not agree with that and that is why I oppose the Bill.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I seek the indulgence of the Committee to say a word about my amendment. I am not speaking with my Front-Bench hat on, so to speak, because I understand that this group is going to carry on next Friday. I am in the middle of a trial and cannot attend then. I will speak to my amendment in this group now and will not summarise from the Front Bench but limit my comments to my amendment and the points which arise from that.

My Amendment 83B seeks to add

“despite any treatment they may be receiving”

It ties in with a point made by noble Lord, Lord Pannick, which I will come to in a moment because it is all tied together. The trigger for my amendment is in Clause 2(1), which reads:

“For the purposes of this Act, a person is terminally ill if”


and then there are two conditions, both of which have to be satisfied. The first is that

“the person has an inevitably progressive illness or disease which cannot be reversed by treatment”,

let us say—God forbid—one has pancreatic cancer, and it cannot be reversed by treatment. The second condition is that

“the person’s death in consequence of that illness or disease can reasonably be expected within six months”.

Two points arise out of that. First, there is the point which comes directly from my amendment, which would add

“despite any treatment the person may be receiving”.

Without this, it is unclear whether the six months is with treatment or without; in other words, you have pancreatic cancer and it cannot be reversed by treatment, so condition (a) is ticked. But when it comes to (b)—

“in consequence of that illness or disease”—

does it mean that illness or disease itself untreated or does it mean notwithstanding the treatment you have been given? I suspect it is the latter that the noble and learned Lord intends, but it is far from clear. It actually reads more like the former, although I suspect that it is the latter. That is why I tables my amendment, and I respectfully invite the noble and learned Lord to consider it. As I say, I apologise to him, the Minister and everybody if I am not here next week to hear the fulsome response.

The other point which arises from the “can reasonably be expected” wording is the question of whether that is the 50% point or not. I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is not here, but it seems to me as a matter of law that if I have a legitimate expectation in public law, I do not need to have a more than 50% expectation of it happening. There was authority at the highest level in the House of Lords that “legitimate expectation” means reasonable expectation. I am comforted—as always—by nods from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss.

Therefore, as a matter of law, I can have a reasonable expectation of X, even if I do not think that X is more likely than not. That is an important point which perhaps the Committee will consider going forward. People are reading that as a 50:50 mean or median. However, I can have a reasonable expectation of it raining tomorrow, for example, even if I think there is only a 30% chance of it. That is a reasonable expectation: it is not more likely than not.

I do not want to stray too far from my own amendments so I will now sit down, but I am grateful to the Committee for its indulgence.