Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 12th January 2022 Lords Chamber

The Government seem to be set on a course that will increase the prison population and sentence inflation without concentrating significantly on cutting reoffending through helping offenders to avoid crime, thereby achieving an overall reduction in the levels of crime and its huge social and economic costs for society. That is why we need an independent and serious royal commission on criminal sentencing. Such a commission would focus government and public attention on the great deal of real, hard evidence that there is about the ineffectiveness of long prison sentences, and the need for a new, rebalanced, humane and evidence-based approach to using the criminal justice system to cut reoffending through rehabilitation and reform. I beg to move.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

I will speak briefly in support of this amendment. There are five reasons for my support.

First, the debates on this Bill have shown the enormous disparity of views that can be expressed about sentencing. We have ranged from restorative justice, which I warmly support, to long prison sentences. We need to look at it in whole and strategically.

Secondly, the Sentencing Code shows how complicated the system we have devised is. It needs simplification so that people can understand the system better.

Thirdly—and this is a point on which I have found Her Majesty’s Treasury more enlightened than many—are we getting value for money? I doubt whether the present system is delivering value for money.

Fourthly, a royal commission in itself is value for money. It is certainly far better value for money than management consultants, who are often deployed to look at these issues.

Finally, the time is right. I see no reason why we cannot take a comprehensive and strategic view of where we are going. I have expressed no views on what the outcome should be; I am interested solely in the mechanism of getting a strategic approach that simplifies sentencing and delivers value for money.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Lords Hansard - part one & Report stage
Wednesday 15th December 2021 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd]

66B: Clause 96, page 85, line 31, at end insert—
“(2A) The code must provide for reviews to be made or other measures taken by the Secretary of State on a regular basis to ensure—(a) compliance with the provisions in the code of practice as to the giving of discretionary and community cautions, and(b) the consistency of application of the code of practice as between different police forces or Crown Prosecution Areas.”Member’s explanatory statement
The purpose of the amendment is to make provision for regular reviews or other measures to ensure compliance with the Code and consistency of practice across England and Wales.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, when the Bill seeks to put the cautions regime on to a statutory basis, it is plainly a very important step forward. Although I welcome it, it is unfortunate that this is being done largely by secondary legislation—an issue obviously addressed in many other contexts, about which I do not wish to speak today.

However, it is clear that even in this skeletal Bill, one critical issue is omitted—addressing the issue of lack of adherence to practice and lack of consistency. I outlined the powerful evidence of this in earlier debates and suggested a solution. That is needed because of the significant evidence that cautions can blight the lives of others and, as cautions are in effect part of the sentencing system, they must reflect transparency and command public confidence.

It was, however, evident from the speech of the Minister in Committee that the need to deal with this is recognised as an issue. He said that

“scrutiny and monitoring of out-of-court disposals is vital to successful implementation, accountability and public perception.—[Official Report, 8/11/21; col.1576.]

The Government did not like the way in which I suggested that this be done in the amendment that was before the Committee, but the Minister has very helpfully discussed the issue. The amendment now before the House very much leaves the means to ensure consistency and adherence to the code to the Secretary of State but reflects the principle of the necessity of scrutiny for consistency and adherence to principle. I look forward to the Minister explaining what Her Majesty’s Government intend to do in relation to consistency and how, in due course, the House can review the details of that.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I have Amendments 66C and 66D in this group and will speak to Amendment 66B, but I will take them in reverse order if noble Lords will bear with me.

Currently, first-time offenders can be given a fixed penalty notice—an on-the-spot fine—by the police for a range of offences of disorder including dropping litter, being drunk and disorderly, and the possession of cannabis or khat. This Bill removes fixed penalties for disorder, so if the police want to enforce the law they will have either to arrest those responsible, taking up valuable police resources that should be spent on more serious crimes, or to take no action, leading to an increase in anti-social behaviour. Amendment 66D would retain fixed penalties for disorder.

Currently, first-time offenders can be given a simple caution, where the salutary effect of being found out, arrested and taken to a police station is, in most cases, enough to ensure that they behave themselves in future. It is quick, simple and effective. This Bill removes simple cautions, so if the police want to enforce the law they will have to impose conditions on everyone they caution, including considering whether to impose restrictive conditions, unpaid work conditions, attendance conditions and/or a fine. The police must also consider the views of any victim, including imposing any conditions that the victim or victims suggest. Compliance with conditions must then be monitored and action taken for any breach.

There is no evidence that the existing system of conditional cautions is any more effective than simple cautions, and conditional cautions, of which diversionary and community cautions are a more complex and complicated version, take far more police and other agencies’ time. Can the Minister explain why the Government are getting rid of simple cautions? If the answer is that, given the choice between the bureaucratic nightmare of imposing conditions and a simple caution, the police choose the latter, I have to tell the Minister that, faced with the bureaucratic nightmare of imposing conditions, the police will either release the accused with no further action being taken, allowing the accused to get away with it, or argue that the accused should be charged and sent to court. In fact, I wholeheartedly recommend to the police that, in every case where a diversionary or community caution is being considered, they refer the case to the CPS so that independent prosecutors can advise, not least on the sentence—or, as the Bill calls them, the conditions—the police intend to impose on the accused.

The police want to retain simple cautions. We want to retain simple cautions. Amendment 66C would retain simple cautions. I must say, the Minster has his work cut out to convince me not to divide the House on this issue.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, ably explained, the amendment in his name aims to try to ensure compliance with the code of practice and consistency of application of the code. Academic research into the existing system of conditional cautions is of mainly inappropriate and inconsistent conditions being imposed. I referred to this in detail in Committee. It was not challenged; the House can therefore take it as fact.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I think we might now be in double figures for the times I have been asked that question. I have set out in my remarks, fairly I hope, what lies behind it. The work from the National Police Chiefs’ Council lies behind this; a third of police forces have gone there; and many more are considering it. Whether one calls that evidence or not, that is the basis on which these reforms are predicated. I have answered this question before, and I answered it in Committee. I appreciate my answers may not satisfy the noble Lord, but that is the basis on which we think this is a good idea; and quite a number of police forces already think this is a good idea.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I thank all who participated in this debate. I will deal very briefly with the two points that have arisen.

First, the system to ensure consistency and compliance with the code will apply to whatever system is brought into effect, including the conditional cautions or fixed penalty notices. I am very grateful to the Minister for his statement, and it seems to me there is now a proper basis for going forward. I think it is fair to say that, when fixed penalty notices and cautions came to be used much more frequently, attempts were made by the judiciary from about 2005 onwards—therefore spanning both Governments—to try and put in place such a system. I am afraid we did not get very far, but it is encouraging to know the Minister is now behind this.

I hope for two things. One is for us to go forwards, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, has said, with the magistrates doing matters locally, and I hope the MA will positively engage. The other is for a national basis. National consistency is important, because to the man on the Clapham omnibus—or whatever the modern phrase is—whether you get required to do something by the court or by the police, it is still part of the same system and it is still the law that requires it. Therefore, I look forward very much to scrutinising, when this comes back, the proposals put forward by the Government in the code.

As to the second part, I am again grateful to all who have taken part. If I may respectfully say so, I think there is a certain lack of wisdom in getting rid, without an adequate evidence base, of something that has been as useful in the past as a simple caution. However, I beg leave to withdraw the first amendment.

Amendment 66B withdrawn.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Wednesday 17th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I strongly support this amendment, as I have supported the PMBs on this from the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, over recent years. The reasons for raising the age by the—goodness knows— modest enough margin of two years, from 10 to 12, are cumulative and compelling. If there is any objection to this amendment, it is that it does not go far enough, but I do not make that objection.

I have three reasons for supporting this. First, a 10 year-old’s mental capacities are not comparable to those of an older adolescent or adult. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has made these points about maturation, and I will not repeat them.

Secondly, criminalising these youngsters while they are still developing their identities and character and growing socially and emotionally is deeply damaging to their self-esteem and future prospects. Brand a child of 10 or 11 a criminal and that is how he will come to see and identify himself, and so he will behave in future. The subsequent criminal records of those who have been thus branded bear this out. Their records attest to it.

Thirdly, whatever their wrongdoing and however grave—to call it criminal is of course to beg the question—they will be dealt with in the same basic way whether they are convicted under the criminal justice system or dealt with through corrective welfare processes. If they need to be detained securely, they will be. The necessary measures can be imposed whichever route is taken, whether they are prosecuted as criminals or treated as however gravely miscreant children requiring correction. The public will not suffer if in future they are recognised as children who have done something dreadfully wrong rather than wicked criminals. On the contrary, the public will benefit. These children are more likely to lead law-abiding lives in future if we change our system at last.

It is high time to banish the long shadow of the tragic Bulger case—it has already been mentioned today—that, alas, is still cast and obscures the realities and common sense on this issue.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I also rise to support Amendment 220. When I was chairman of the Commission on Justice in Wales, we looked at this issue and had extensive evidence, including from the Children’s Commissioner for Wales. Without hesitation, we recommended that, were it free to do so, Wales should raise the age of criminal responsibility to 12, consistent with United Nations obligations it has untaken.

I agree completely with what has been said about the profound changes in the understanding of mental capacity that have taken place over the last 10 years in particular. I urge the Government not to delay any further a change to make our country no longer a laggard on this issue but one that is at least catching up. There are problems, such as knife crime, but the age of criminal responsibility is not the way to deal with them.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, it is very good to see the Committee refreshed and to have the opportunity to meet earlier in the day, so I thank the powers-that-be for making this possible.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Wednesday 10th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

I support the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for very much the same reasons advanced by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. I very much favour the preservation of a judicial discretion; it is absolutely essential.

I worry very much indeed about sentencing inflation. When I was at the Home Office working as a Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the back end of the 1980s, I was a Prisons Minister. At that time, the prison population was around 40,000; it has now doubled—it is well into the 80,000s. Are the streets any safer? Does the community feel safer? The answer to that is manifestly that no, it does not.

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, is utterly right when he says that longer sentences mean more people in custody. What is the consequence of that? If you pack people into prison, there is overcrowding and the chances for rehabilitation and retraining are greatly diminished. I know that from my personal experience: for three years or so, I was on the monitoring board of a local prison near me in Lincolnshire—actually, it was just over the border—and the chances of prisoners getting proper courses were very small, so the chances of rehabilitation were thereby much diminished.

The purpose of this clause is to ensure that, in the generality of cases, a prison sentence is the starting point. That is what is intended by using the phrase “exceptional circumstances” as the proviso. That is to say that it will be disapplied in a small minority of cases. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, made a very important point that we need to keep a grip on: exceptional circumstances may not exist, but the sentence could be unjust. So the noble and learned Lord is in fact saying to this Committee—and he is absolutely right—that the impact of the Government’s proposals is to drive the judiciary in particular cases to impose a sentence that they know to be unjust, because they cannot find exceptional circumstances. I find that wholly deplorable.

The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, enlarges judicial discretion to make it more in accordance with the principles of natural justice. I very much favour that, and I hope that the Committee will do so as well.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, in the light of what my predecessor as Lord Chief Justice, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has said, I can be very brief.

First, I wholeheartedly agree with him. Secondly, I do not think that we should beat about the bush at all about the change to the word “exceptional”. Any lawyer knows that the intention is to raise the bar significantly. You use that word only when you want to try to minimise the discretion or ambit of when it is to happen. I hope that the Minister will accept the clear intention of the change and answer the question posed in the earlier debate by the noble Lord, Lord German, about the difference. There is a clear and obvious difference.

Thirdly, having had a little less time as a judge and coming to the job a bit later, I can see an argument, which one has to accept, for saying that, by setting a minimum term, Parliament is giving an indication of what it thinks is appropriate. Perhaps that was not the right road to go down, but we have gone down it. But where this Government are wholly wrong—I do not think that we should mince our words about that—is in saying that a judge should impose a sentence that is not just. In refusing this amendment, the Government are saying, “We don’t care if injustice results: you must look at the circumstances, and if they are not exceptional” —a high bar—“you must impose an unjust sentence”. Have we really sunk so low as to require our judges not to do justice?

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, this has been an interesting debate. I agree with the points that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has made, but I want to give a different perspective that partly undermines the argument put by him and all the other noble, and noble and learned, Lords who have spoken. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said that, ultimately, it is for judges to pass a sentence that is just. He pinned his argument on that single point.

We talked about youths in the previous group. For youth justice, the overarching purpose when sentencing is to reduce reoffending. That purpose supersedes the overall position of needing to be just in the sentence. That is why there is a minimum sentence in youth courts of four months. The reason is that, when you go to youth offender institutions or things like that, you are invariably told by the prison offers and teachers dealing with the young people that they need to be there for a duration of time to get their education. That is the justification for having a minimum sentence of four months in youth cases.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Wednesday 10th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

It was a privilege to add my name to this amendment, which has been so ably moved by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, speaking the words of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester. I associate myself with everything that has been said and particularly with the work being done by Revolving Doors and the Centre for Justice Innovation.

This particular amendment raises a problem with this part of the Bill. One can understand why putting in a condition or requirement in relation to the victims might appeal to a certain type of politician, but they forget that, if you are legislating, you need balance. Why put something in about victims without putting something in about the whole point of this, which is to try to deal with offending?

The reason that I put my name to this amendment goes to the way that the Bill has been structured. I apologise again for not being in my place last Wednesday. I am extremely grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for moving the amendment that I put in. This point raises exactly the same problem: we have a framework Bill. We do not have the draft regulations or, more importantly, the draft code of practice.

I entirely support this reform, but I do not think that many people realise what a critical role cautions play in the operation of the criminal justice system and, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has said in relation to an earlier amendment—I did not rise then because I thought that I could make the point now—the incredibly important constitutional and rule-of-law issues, which I underline. These relate to the relationship between the legislature, and how much detail it should go into on this, and the Executive—because the police are part of the Executive branch of government—and to what extent they should be allowed to punish, which has generally been the province of the courts.

I welcome these reforms because this is an important part of the sentencing regime—and it is part of it, whatever epithet one wishes to apply. But it seems to me that a much better approach to the Bill would be if this was brought together as a whole, so that we could say, “This bit ought to go into the Bill. That is dealt with in regulations. This should be dealt with in the code of practice”. We should have it all before us, so that we can make a sensible decision. I do not understand why this has not been done, but I hope that, before the Bill comes back on Report, we see draft regulations and a draft code of practice. Otherwise, we will all be plagued on Report with this type of really serious concern.

There are many more issues—the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has raised some of them this morning—such as the point that the Minister made very eloquently this morning about being able to alter levels of fines. Of course, in an age where we are perhaps going to see a lot of inflation, that is important, but why alter the number of hours? The gravity of the sentence with which a particular person should deal ought to be fixed.

Therefore, I hope that the Minister will look at, first, putting this amendment into the Bill and, much more seriously and importantly, at bringing the draft code of practice and the draft regulations, so that we could review the whole thing and do a proper job, as Parliament, consistent with the rule of law.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I am very glad to support the right reverend Prelate and the noble and learned Lord who has just spoken. The right reverend Prelate gave us a very careful analysis of the reasons that such an amendment would improve Clause 88 of the Bill, and the noble and learned Lord, the former Lord Chief Justice, reminded us of the constitutional context and the fact that the way that the Bill is structured, and the sheer complexity of it, are not really very satisfactory, especially when so much related material is not available to us at this stage. I hope that note will be taken of what he said on that latter point.

My feeling was that, as drafted, Clause 88 does not cover the ground properly, and that the inclusion of the requirement in this amendment—that consideration should be given to what provisions can be made for the “offender to desist” from crime in the future—would give the clause a necessary balance; a phrase that the noble and learned Lord used. The clause’s emphasis is very much on finding the victim’s views, which is entirely appropriate but limited in scope.

It is of course relevant to remember that, very often, one of the strongest views that victims have is that no one else should have to suffer what they have and that something should be done to make sure that the person who has done it does not do anything like that again and cause that sort of harm in the future. So these two things are not in opposition to each other: it is a complementary requirement for the clause to include a direct reference to measures to try to make it possible for the individual to desist from crime. There is a wide range of measures, but, in the context of this clause, the right reverend Prelate mentioned drugs and drug treatment. Of course, alcohol is also a very significant factor in many of the sorts of crimes that we are talking about.

This brings back memories of an incident that occurred during my time in the House of Commons, when some teenagers pulled down and stole the union flag from outside my office. They then made the mistake of exhibiting it around the pubs of the town, which led to the police catching them pretty quickly. The sergeant rang me up and said, “I do not really want to issue a formal caution because one of them wants to go into the Army, and that may prevent him doing so. I suggest that they club together, pay for its replacement and all write to you to apologise”. That was the kind of practical policing that, nowadays, is so surrounded by rules and requirements that it is often more difficult to do. But it was the right solution. I had some delightful letters, most of them insisting that their families had always voted for me. But it made a sufficient impact on the individuals—it was just a minor thing—making them less likely to commit crimes in the future. That is the emphasis that we need to add into this clause—an emphasis on trying to ensure that that individual commits no further crimes in the future.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

Well, we did have that exchange. I went through the way that it has been piloted in various police forces, and we had an interesting exchange. I am happy to look again at the record and see whether there is anything else that I can add, but I am not sure that will necessarily persuade the noble Lord in any event. Again, I am not sure it is helpful to go through those fundamental points each and every time we come to one of these amendments.

I hope I have responded substantively—and, I hope, substantially—to the amendments tabled by the right reverend Prelate. For the reasons that I have set out, I ask him to withdraw them.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

Before the noble Lord sits down, and to go back to the fundamental point about the code of practice and the regulations, is there not even a framework or some outline that we can look at so we could work out what is necessary in primary legislation and what is necessary in a code of practice? I must say that it is wholly contrary to the rule of law for a democratically elected body—I include the whole of Parliament in that—to pass legislation that has not been properly gone into.

Here we are dealing with the liberty of the subject. I think that most people do not appreciate the seriousness of a caution. When I was Lord Chief Justice, we had a number of cases where people found out years later the problem with having accepted a caution. In one case, for example, a person who was young and had no convictions of any kind could not go to America. There are other cases where a caution for a minor offence makes you into a “person of bad character”. These are matters that go to the liberty of the subject and they are of fundamental importance.

It is quite contrary to the rule of law to ask us to pass legislation for which there is no urgency. As the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby said, this is a long-standing problem. Could the Minister not reconsider? I entirely sympathise with the civil servants at the MoJ because they are hard-working. Of course, they have to work hard because of all the Government’s cuts to the Ministry of Justice; they are not responsible for that and nor is the Minister, who I am sure would like as much money as possible. Could we not, in this vital area of the liberty of the subject, do some proper work on it rather than wasting a lot of time debating principles? It would be so much more efficient, on an issue that is not urgent, if we could have a draft, a framework or something to look at.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, of course I understand the point made by the noble and learned Lord. We could have an interesting debate about whether that is properly encompassed in the phrase “rule of law”, but I take the underlying point that he makes. I have sought to set out where the code of practice would be relevant, where the Act ends and the code of practice begins. I am happy to have a further discussion with him on that point.

I agree that cautions are an important part of the criminal justice system. They can have consequences, as the noble and learned Lord set out, and not being able to go to America is just one of them. That is why in a later part of the Bill, which we will come to, the question of when a caution is spent is so important. We have sought to build that into the Bill, which I hope meets, at least in part, the point that he makes. I am happy to discuss this point with him further.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Wednesday 3rd November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I, too, support these amendments. The statutory duty of candour is vital not just to affect the culture of the police and enhance public confidence in policing but to give confidence to those police officers who face enormous internal pressures from their colleagues not to be candid. They need support; they need a statutory regime they can point to in order to justify to their colleagues what is required.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, quoted some of what the Home Secretary said in answering questions in the House of Commons on 15 June, and I will quote one other statement she made. She was specifically asked by Yvette Cooper about the duty of candour, and her response was that

“there is absolutely more to do here.”—[Official Report, Commons, 15/6/21; col. 132.]

I very much hope the Government will accept the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, but, if they do not, what more are they going to do in this area?

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

I rise briefly to support both amendments. The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, looks at this from the position of the victim. It is, of course, right to acknowledge the huge progress that has been made over the last 20 or so years in improving the position of the victim—but we have not got to the end of the road. The important point of his amendment is that it gives further protection to the victim at two important stages: first, where things have gone wrong and there is an inquiry, and secondly and much more importantly, in the victim exercising the right of review where there has been a failure to prosecute. It seems to me, therefore, that the duty of candour is yet another step in putting the victim—as is so often said by politicians on both sides—at the heart of the criminal justice system.

The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, looks at this from a broader perspective, which encompasses the position of the defendant and the greater public interest. We should think of experiences over the years. One can go back, for example, to a problem that arose in Tiger Bay in Cardiff over 30 years ago, where the inquiry into the Lynette White murder investigation went on and on. One cannot help feeling that, if there had been a duty of candour, it would have brought that very damaging case to an end.

I say nothing about the undercover policing inquiry as it is still ongoing, but it seems that there is ample evidence that we need to enshrine this duty of candour to protect the position of the defendant and the wider public interest by making it absolutely clear that the police owe that duty—and they should be grateful to have that duty imposed on them, because we need to restore, above all, confidence in our constabularies.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I support these amendments as well. I look at the situation from an unusual perspective and with the unusual experience of sitting as the senior judge in Scotland in a criminal appeal. It was a case of murder, and I was not able—because I was sitting in a court where all the evidence was already out—to develop what was at the back of my mind, which was that the police had identified the wrong individual, who was then accused and convicted. I will not go into the facts of the case for obvious reasons, but it struck me that the court at that late stage was powerless to deal with what I thought had not been a frank and fair police investigation. I make that point simply because stages are reached where the situation is beyond recall, but I was deeply disturbed by what had happened in that case and could not do anything about it. So I welcome the steps that are being taken to improve the standard of candour among the police at all stages in the investigation of crime and its aftermath.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Monday 1st November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I have a brief point to make. I find a great deal of attraction in the thinking behind the new clause. It has great force and has been eloquently moved. But the question I ask myself is: if one is going to extend these provisions to the primary carer of children, what about others for whom the primary carer is in charge? What about the vulnerable, the educationally challenged, the disabled and the aged? Once you begin to accept that the interests of the primary carer for children should be addressed in the way contemplated by the new clause, there is a lot to be said for widening its scope so that it applies to primary carers across the spectrum.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I rise very briefly to support the principle of these amendments. I warmly welcome what the Government are trying to do to roll back the use of prison for women. Everyone accepts that sending a woman to prison is generally something to be avoided at all costs. We need alternative provision as quickly as possible. However, we all know that this will take time. We have to deal with the situation in the interim.

In considering these amendments, I am acutely conscious of the burden that legislation is placing on the judiciary. One has only to read the Sentencing Code to realise what Parliament is actually doing to the judiciary in terms of complexity. However, what is important about the role of Parliament is to set out the principles. If I might try to answer the question raised by the noble Viscount, it is the interests of the child that we need to put at the heart of sentencing. We have put other interests there, but we need clearly to specify that one of the factors judges must take into account, whether on bail or in sentencing, is the interests of the child. Extensive work has been done in Wales and elsewhere: modern research shows that imprisoning a mother has a very serious effect.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

I entirely accept what the noble and learned Lord is saying, but I am not sure I see the distinction in principle between having regard to the interests of a child—I accept that that is a very important consideration—and having regard to a vulnerable old person, or a person with serious educational disabilities. It seems to me that all of them are equally worthy of consideration in statute if you go down this particular road.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

If I might attempt to answer the noble Viscount’s question, paramount importance is given to the interests of the child because evidence has shown that, where there is abuse of children and where mothers are imprisoned, you pass on criminality to a new generation. That is the distinguishing factor. I therefore very much hope that we can look at these amendments for the principle. I am possibly not as keen as others on the detail, for the reasons I have given, but we need to show that one of the fundamental principles of sentencing is to take into account, through the interests of the carer, the interests of the child.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I agree entirely with my noble and learned friend who has just spoken that there is a principle here that needs to be considered rather than the granularity of these amendments. Indeed, I would say to the noble Viscount that, although we should try to achieve the protection of all people who are vulnerable, you cannot do everything at once. It is the whole of the life of the child in front of them that is affected if a parent is in prison.

The right reverend Prelate moved these amendments eloquently. I will say, very respectfully, that I think she omitted one or two key elements. These may lead one to the conclusion that we do not need quite complicated amendments but can achieve her aims, which I share, by a simpler method that is more evolutionary in its process. I might perhaps raise a couple of specifics. First, the information that the right reverend Prelate referred to is sometimes simply not before the court. That is because legal aid does not now provide solicitors with the earning potential—and it is not a high earning potential—to go out and investigate the reality of a child’s position. This means that the necessary information may not get in front of the court at all.

I had a conversation some time ago with somebody who was working as a manager of excluded primary school children in one of the London boroughs. She told me that she often rang the solicitors for 11 year-olds right at the top of the primary sector, or sometimes when they had just moved from the primary sector, to ask if they were aware of certain aspects of the child’s life—and they had no idea. They do not have the resources to make those inquiries. Furthermore, when cases come before the court, it is nowadays very rare in the Crown Court for a solicitor to be there instructing counsel in such cases, and, in the nature of the profession and the fees payable, counsel may have received the brief only the night before, and it may be a very junior counsel. These are the practical issues that judges encounter all the time.

I want also to say something about judges; I have a family interest in this, which I will not go into in great detail, despite the urgings of my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier. It is this: judges should be given credit for understanding the problems that the right reverend Prelate raised; she perhaps did not quite get there. Judges, many of whom are mothers themselves, hear these cases and understand perfectly well. They do not need a statute to tell them that it is not in the interests of a child for that child’s mother to be sent to prison .They do everything they can—on the basis of the information they are given, which may give rise to the real problem—to ensure that, if at all possible, a woman who has primary caring responsibility for a child is not sent to prison.

Whiplash Injury Regulations 2021

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Monday 26th April 2021 Grand Committee

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]]

As I said three years ago in Committee, I broadly welcome the tariff-based system. But today, as then, I wish to raise points in relation to advice, the proper operation of the new system, and the adequacy of the tariff.

I spent 20 minutes this morning watching the video of how this system is to work for unrepresented defendants. It is not easy, and the experience elsewhere has shown that it is difficult to devise a system whereby people can make claims online on something that is not very straightforward. I therefore wish to ask the Minister: what provision is being made to help unrepresented defendants understand the system, particularly those who are not as familiar with computers as Members of your Lordships’ House? Secondly, what advice will be given when a person has to decide whether the offer made by the insurers is a fair one? That is not an easy question. Will it be the CAB or some other third-sector provider, and what funds are being provided to cover this additional cost of the third sector, bearing in mind the immense pressure on it?

It appears that, unusually, the system that has been made has been designed, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, stated, by the potential defendants. It is clear that an independent review of the operation of the system itself, as distinct from the tariff, is needed, and I very much hope that a properly independent review can be set up within a year. There should be no difficulty with needing the requisite figures; we just want to know how this is dealing with unrepresented defendants. As to the review of the tariff, I hear what the Minister has said, but I very much hope that, whatever the timescale for the review, it will be independent and the evidence will be published.

Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 9th February 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]]

My Lords, given the experience of those who have put their names to the amendments in this group, I wonder whether I should say nothing so as not to damage the arguments—but I will join in.

It will be clear enough to the Committee that we on these Benches have considerable concerns about this part of the Bill. I hope that the Committee will understand that this does not mean that we do not take very seriously indeed the threat and actuality of terrorism and the work undertaken by our agencies. I say that because our amendments to the Covert Human Intelligence Sources Bill, which we completed earlier, seemed to be heard by some noble Lords as opposition to covert sources period when we were directing ourselves to authorisations to commit crime by the mechanism of making the action not a crime. I do not want too much to be read into what I am saying. This is not opposition, as I say, to the work of those who keep us as safe as they possibly can.

We are not hugely keen on TPIMs, especially on their acquiring extensions that take them back closer to control orders. We consider it appropriate to test these administrative measures in terms of how they measure up to the presumption of innocence, fair trial, liberty and all the matters that we as a society hold to be important, knowing the damage that might be done by letting them slip. We are of course aware of the Government’s argument that it is not the TPIMs themselves that we should be looking to, but the application of particular measures. If you look at that from a slightly different perspective, it is a good argument for legislative safeguards.

At the time of the last three-monthly report to Parliament on 30 November, only three TPIM notices were in force, there having been six the previous May. That begs the question as to the need for these clauses. The Home Office fact sheet on lowering the standard of proof tells us that this would

“increase flexibility by making it more practical for operational partners to demonstrate an individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity.”

That requirement should indeed be more than merely suspected.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, referred to the statement in the Commons by the Minister. The current standard of proof does not seem to have prevented the imposition of TPIMs. The current independent reviewer has made the same point, so this is not even a matter of administrative convenience. These measures may be civil but they can, quite understandably, be perceived as a parallel system of punishment without trial, but currently on the basis of the civil standard.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, seek to meet the Government part way. We take the view that the alterations are not justified. I have referred to the current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. To quote from his note on this part of the Bill,

“it is inevitable from the nature of intelligence that mistakes may be made. The significance of an individual’s actions may potentially be misinterpreted; their adherence to a cause overstated; their intentions misunderstood, if only partially. A safeguard that requires the Secretary of State to consider the intelligence presented to her by officials, and decide whether the individual has actually been involved in the terrorist-related activity that is alleged against them, and which allows a court to review that decision in the light of all information presented to it, is not an impediment to safeguarding national security.”

We oppose this clause standing part of the Bill.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, spoke with such eloquence in making all the points that I can confine myself to making four short points.

First, as he rightly stressed, this is an important part of the conditions for TPIMs because it enables a judge and the Home Secretary, when making the decision, to concentrate on the factual evidence in relation to terrorist activity. The other conditions are more difficult to establish, or it might be more a question of judgment, but this at least concentrates on the facts.

Secondly, the amendment seeks what some may feel is an overgenerous compromise. I do not think so; I think that it is right to say that, for the first and initial period, a lower standard can be acceptable.

However, thirdly, that cannot be acceptable when one is looking at longer periods where a person’s liberty is to be constrained—particularly with the amendment that we will come to next, which concerns the indefinite detention period.

Fourthly, and finally, it seems to me that there can be no justification for making such a change unless there is evidence. Indeed, what was said about the position in the other place has been clearly set out.

I ask the Minister to set out fully what he believes is the evidence for this change. If he cannot do so in public on this occasion, there must be a means of informing those who are interested in this matter of the evidence so that it can be carefully reviewed before we impose on people accused of obviously very serious issues a standard of proof that really is completely unacceptable in any civilised society.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl) [V]]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has given your Lordships a very clear and succinct history of control orders and TPIMs—as one would expect, given his experience. He pointed out very fairly that control orders had the very same test that it is now proposed in the Bill should be used to decide whether a TPIM is appropriate. It is also worth pointing out that control orders were highly controversial and subject to a considerable number of challenges in the courts to see whether they survived a proper challenge based on the European Court of Human Rights and the convention. They survived that, which will reassure your Lordships.

I accept that the amendment put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, which is supported by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, is relatively modest, and I understand the reasoning for it, whereas the amendment put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, goes rather further and seems to involve a degree of subjectivity—although I will listen with interest to what he says—and that subjectivity might be difficult to satisfy.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)]

The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, has withdrawn from this group, so I call the next speaker on the list, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]]

I want to add only one point to what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, has just said, because I agree with the entirety of it. That one point is derived from my own experience of dealing with people who were imprisoned indefinitely under the IPP regime. During the hearing of several appeals, it became apparent that indefinite detention often makes someone more dangerous because you take away hope. I very much anticipate that we would never get to the stage where we made TPIMs that lasted for a person’s entire lifetime. The TPIM would have to come to an end at some stage, and, to my mind, giving someone a clear expectation of when the period of restriction is to end helps in dealing with the individual and prevents making him more dangerous by depriving him of any hope.

[Lord Strasburger (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I wish to argue that Clause 38 should not stand part of the Bill. In my contribution on Clause 37, I mentioned my general worries about the TPIM regime and how it circumvents all the safeguards in the criminal justice system. Those safeguards are there for a very good reason: to ensure that our trials are fair and that we do not punish people without a high degree of certainty that they deserve it. However, for the purposes of this debate, I will focus on the process that the imposition of TPIMs follows in place of a proper criminal trial and how unsatisfactory that process is by comparison with the real thing.

For TPIMs, a criminal trial is replaced by civil proceedings before a High Court judge. The Government present evidence to support their case for the target person to have their liberty and their other rights curtailed. I have called them “the target person” rather than “the defendant” because they have not been charged with anything and they are completely unable to defend themselves. That is because the evidence against them is presented in private to the judge without the target person’s knowledge. They are unable to see, challenge or contradict the so-called evidence because neither they nor their lawyer is aware of it. This process, known as closed material proceedings, is a very poor substitute for a proper trial, where evidence is presented in open court and the defendant’s lawyer can challenge it, present other evidence that contradicts it and cross-examine the person who provided it.

I mention all this because Clause 38, if enacted, would mean that a person made the subject of a TPIM in such an unfair and unsafe manner and confined to their home and subjected to other losses of their rights could find themselves in this position indefinitely, for ever, even for the rest of their lives. That is extremely harsh treatment for someone who may be innocent and has not been convicted of any crime. This treatment is far harsher than if they had been convicted in a criminal court and been sentenced to a few years in prison. In the worlds of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, when he was the Independent Reviewer of Terrorist Legislation:

“TPIMs … are as stringent as anything available in a western democracy.”


He considered the case for lifting the two-year cap, as Clause 38 would do, in his report on TPIMs in 2012. He concluded that the two-year limit was an acceptable compromise because two years was a serious length of time in the life of an individual and TPIMs should not be allowed to become a shadow alternative to criminal prosecution. Indeed, the Government themselves endorsed the two-year limit and in 2015 cited the observation of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, that there was no need to “put the clock back”. The Government went further and said:

“The two-year limit is a reminder that executive constraints of this kind are no substitute for the criminal process, and no long-term solution”.


What has changed the Government’s mind such that they wish to turn it into a long-term process? I am hoping the Minister will enlighten the House when he responds, and I hope that this time he can come up with something better than a meaningless reference to flexibility or that there is no need for it now but who knows what we might need in the future. To abolish the two-year time limit and replace it with an indefinite period of successive extensions, without even troubling the court, there would need to be a compelling operational case, would there not? However, no such compelling case has been made. In fact, no case at all has been offered by the Government, so far as I am aware. Given that fact, and given, as I mentioned earlier, the flimsy and unsatisfactory nature of the TPIM process as an alternative to our proper and fair criminal justice system, we cannot countenance allowing TPIMs to be made indefinite by means of Clause 38. It must go.