Victims and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd and Lord Sandhurst

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I oppose the Question that Clause 11 stand part of the Bill. This clause seeks to extend the right to prosecute to those with different qualifications from solicitors or barristers.

As my noble friend Lord Gove highlighted at Second Reading, the Crown Prosecution Service faces constraints in whom it can employ, and the criminal Bar is facing a retention crisis. Last year, a national survey by the Criminal Bar Association found that one in three criminal barristers intends to quit. It is obviously crucial that we have enough Crown prosecutors for cases, and we fully appreciate on this side the challenge that the Government face. However, I do not believe that this clause is an appropriate solution. Rather than carefully addressing the causes of those pressures and looking for proper solutions, this clause simply moves the goalposts. It redefines who is qualified to undertake what is highly serious work. That is not good enough.

While it has been argued that allowing CILEX members to prosecute will help to increase diversity, this argument should not be used as a smokescreen for what could potentially dilute standards. I dare say that is not what those truly calling for diversity want either, on their part. Genuine diversity in the legal profession is not achieved by lowering thresholds or by altering qualifications to fill gaps. It is achieved by facilitating pathways and by supporting structures within the profession, so that people from all backgrounds can succeed on an equal footing. To suggest otherwise risks turning diversity into a box-ticking exercise. It does not demonstrate an authentic commitment to broadening access to the profession.

We cannot risk lowering the quality of prosecution. This would not be fair on the defendant, and certainly not on the victim, and it is definitely not in the long- term public interest. Victims and defendants rely on the competence of the prosecutor. A victim must have confidence that their case is being handled by someone who is suitably qualified. Those who prosecute murders today will some years ago have prosecuted in the magistrates’ courts; they start at the lower level and they move up, gaining their experience moving from level to level as proportionate to their skills.

A defendant whose liberty may be at stake is entitled to proper assurance. These are not minor concerns; they go to the heart of our justice system. More widely, any weakening of our standards risks undermining public confidence in the justice system as a whole and weakening the supply, I suggest, of future prosecutors of serious crime. Can the Minister please explain what assessments were undertaken previously of the impact of this proposed change?

If we are to expand the pool of prosecutors, we must be absolutely sure that this shift is backed by sufficient evidence of good quality, and that any necessary safeguards are in place to ensure that standards will not drift or diverge over time. The Committee deserves clear evidence that this reform will enhance, and not diminish, the quality of prosecutions. We have not been shown that evidence. Without it, this clause risks creating more problems than it solves. I urge the Minister please to reflect carefully on these concerns and to ensure that any change to the thresholds is supported by robust, transparent evidence and proper safeguards. I beg to move.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I will make one or two brief observations about this, if I may. First, I must declare an interest, in that about 10 years ago I was made an honorary vice-president of CILEX. In case it is thought that I am speaking with the interests of CILEX in mind, I wanted to make that absolutely clear.

My first observation is this: the transformation of the way in which the legal profession operates and its financial position has been enormous over the last 20 or so years. Sometimes, I think we forget the huge difference there is in remuneration for those who practise in areas such as commercial and administrative law and those who practise in the criminal sphere. This is having a very serious effect on the ability.

How that problem is solved is a matter for Her Majesty’s Government, not for me, but it seems to me that, in looking at what the state can afford, it is necessary to look at the way in which an organisation such as CILEX has transformed itself, the qualifications that are given and the reality of many cases. As a judge, one sometimes feels that the best experience for being a good prosecutor is having done a lot of prosecutions, not necessarily where they had a first-class degree from a great university or whether she had done extremely well in the solicitor’s or Bar finals; experience is important.

Victims and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd and Lord Sandhurst

Committee stage
Monday 9th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group, in my name and that of my noble and learned friend Lord Keen, seek to ensure that the Bill lives up to its purpose in the name of victims.

Clauses 1 and 2 set out how offenders can in future be compelled to attend their sentencing hearing. But, as currently drafted, they contain no mechanism to involve the victims directly in the process. This is contrary to the Bill’s purpose to make provision for an enhanced experience for victims within the criminal justice system. Indeed, it is unclear in what situation a judge would be minded to make such an order without the request of the prosecution and what the criteria for such a decision would be in that instance.

If, in the absence of a request by the prosecution, the court’s power to compel attendance is not automatic, I look to the Minister to say why that is the case. Further, I ask her to clarify whether published guidance will be provided to judges as to what factors should be considered when making an order, beyond the practical considerations of officer safety.

The amendments which we advance, on the other hand, would overcome some of our concerns. They would enable the victims to have a say and to request that the offender be ordered to attend. As the Minister set out at Second Reading, the reasoning behind this Bill’s provisions is to compel attendance in the first place and to provide an opportunity for victims to look the defendant in the eye and explain exactly how a crime has affected them. The sentencing remarks are often their last opportunity for this. Why, then, should victims not be given a say whereby they can expressly request that an offender is ordered to attend? This would both give the victim a greater voice and give the judge greater clarity on how to proceed.

The second two amendments in this group, Amendments 4 and 9, would also require the courts to consult the victims if the judge is minded not to make an order compelling an offender to attend sentencing. If a victim is deceased or incapacitated mentally or physically, our amendments would allow family members or another appropriate representative to be consulted in their place. Justice should not stop when the victim cannot speak for themselves. This would put victims at the centre of the process. It would ensure that such decisions are taken not behind closed doors but in consultation with those victims whom these decisions affect.

We cannot treat these issues as merely procedural. For a victim, a sentencing hearing can be a profoundly significant moment, and it is an opportunity for closure. I am sure that the last thing noble Lords would want is for a victim to feel disconnected, sidelined or unheard by the courts in the run-up to a hearing. This amendment would also give judges a chance to explain and justify their decisions. If the offender will not be in attendance or the judge will not exercise their powers to compel attendance, victims or their representatives deserve an explanation of why that is the case. This should happen both where a victim has made a request for an offender to be ordered to attend and where they have not. We do not consider this to be a heavy burden on the courts. It should instead be considered best practice. These steps would ensure that the judge’s decision-making process is consistently transparent. It would make our system more accessible and demonstrate to victims that they are a priority, not an afterthought, particularly at the point of sentencing.

This Bill was presented to Parliament as an opportunity to address these very concerns. Our amendments would fill real gaps in drafting. I am sure the Minister will want to reflect carefully on them. I look forward to hearing the contributions of other noble Lords to this debate. I beg to move.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I shall make two observations. The first relates to the remark made by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, in relation to how judges will exercise these powers and whether guidance will be given. No doubt the Lady Chief Justice will consider whether to give guidance, or such guidance might be given by practice direction or be the subject of discussion at the Judicial College, but the handling of this is entirely for the judiciary. It is difficult enough, and it certainly would not be in any way appropriate for the Ministry of Justice to give guidance. It seems to me that the exercise of this judicial power must be for the judicial branch of the state and it alone—unless, of course, Parliament in its infinite wisdom decides that it wants to set down the criteria. I strongly urge Members not to do that.

The second relates to a more practical point, and that is the ability of the victim to intervene in the decision and to be able to make a request. It is sometimes forgotten that a transformation occurred during the 2000s and the next decade in the way in which the Crown Prosecution Service dealt with victims. There was a time when the victim was regarded as peripheral to the way in which the courts operated and to matters that had to be taken into account. That position changed remarkably and for the better. I think it is appreciated that the judicial power to have someone brought into court has to be exercised with the greatest degree of thought. If the Crown Prosecution Service were to request this to happen, I would be astounded if it had not consulted the victim. In my experience, that is what often happens in these difficult circumstances. There is a discussion as to the best way of proceeding and it is very important that this is approached in that sort of way.

If the victim was to be allowed to make the request directly, this raises the question as to how. Is this to be done in open court with the discussion of the various issues? Is it not best left to the wisdom of the Crown prosecutor and the judge’s ability to ask questions as to the victim’s views? It seems to me this is a much more efficacious way of dealing with the matter rather than bringing the victim in personally—because there is no suggestion of a victim’s advocate for this—to what will be, if this power is to be exercised, an occasion of great difficulty. The last thing anyone wants to happen is to provide secondary victimisation by an awful scene in court. I urge the Government to exercise very considerable caution in considering this amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I will make a few observations. No one can doubt the revulsion towards sexual offenders who have attacked their own children or have the potential to do so, but there are two practical points that we must bear in mind.

First, the criminal justice system and the criminal courts, and the family justice system and the family courts, have been starved of resources by both Governments—there is no doubt about that. When sentence lengths are increased by both parties, we end up with a situation in the prisons that is a crisis. In deciding what orders to make in this kind of case, it is of paramount importance to have regard to the resource implications. It is no use saying that there is money for this. There is not. The courts system is starved, and the result of that is victims suffering in a whole host of other cases by the tremendous backlog. Both this Government and the last Government are responsible for the position into which the courts have been placed. When we look at this, please have regard to resources.

The second point, a point made by the noble Lords, Lord Russell of Liverpool and Lord Meston, is that it is important that we get correct the balance as to what the Crown Court is to do and what the family court is to do. I am not sure, having listened to this debate, that that is a matter that has been sufficiently addressed. The one thing you cannot have—because it is a waste of resources and does not deploy expertise correctly—is the lines not clearly drawn. I hope very much that, before this comes back, there will be the opportunity for those who have day-to-day responsibility in the judiciary and the Courts Service, together with the ministry, to be sure that we have got the most effective and efficient use of resources and the right kind of drawing the line. It is very difficult, but we cannot ignore the bankrupt state of the courts. It is a regrettable fact, and we must not make the mistake we have made in relation to sentencing.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I apologise for organising my notes here—I have been listening hard. I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this group, which concerns the operation of Clause 3 and the use of prohibited steps orders for the safeguarding of children where a parent or individual with parental responsibility has been convicted of serious sexual offending. The group rightly raises profound questions about thresholds, discretion, safeguards and consistency, and indeed, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, has pointed out, the balance between the two wings of the court system—the family and the criminal courts. I thank noble Lords for their searching and constructive contributions to this debate, all of which are motivated by a shared desire to protect children from harm.

I begin with Amendment 13, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, Amendment 14, in my name, and Amendments 15 and 19, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Meston. All these amendments concern and probe the four-year custodial threshold that currently triggers the duty on the Crown Court to consider making a prohibited steps order. I thank the Government at the outset for the constructive manner in which they have already engaged with the clause. They accepted, during the Bill’s passage through the other place, that the original scope of Clause 3 was too narrow. As drafted on introduction, it applied only where the offender had committed sexual abuse against their own child. Following sustained concern, the Government rightly expanded that clause, so that it applies where the offender has abused any child. That change was welcome and necessary.

However, while the class of victims has been widened, the custodial threshold remains set at four years. It is here that noble Lords have expressed deep unease. A four-year sentence is an extremely high bar. There are numerous sexual offences involving children that may result in sentences well below four years yet would plainly justify the imposition of a prohibited steps order to safeguard a child, such as sexual communication with a child, causing or inciting a child to engage in sexual activity, certain forms of indecent assault or online grooming behaviours. These may, depending on the facts, attract sentences of significantly less than four years. Yet it would be surprising to suggest that an individual convicted of such conduct should automatically fall outside the scope of a safeguarding measure which has been designed to prevent them from exercising parental responsibility without scrutiny.

I think all noble Lords accept that there is a balancing exercise here. The state should not intervene lightly in family life. We must be careful not to construct a regime which is too blunt and results in unnecessary or disproportionate separation of children from parents. However, equally, Clause 3 as drafted risks being too narrowly drawn and failing to engage precisely in those cases where concern is most acute. The current threshold risks excluding serious and dangerous individuals because the custodial term imposed falls short of an arbitrary figure. We look to the Minister to explain why four years was chosen, what evidence underpins that decision and why a lower threshold or an offence-based approach was not chosen.

Amendments 22 and 27 raise an issue of rather different but also troubling nature—the power of the Secretary of State by regulation to amend the list of offences to which Clause 3 applies. As drafted, that power is not limited to expansion. It allows the list to be amended. That necessarily includes the possibility of reduction. It is difficult to conceive of a principled reason why a future Government would wish to remove sexual offences from the scope of a safeguarding provision of this kind. That prospect should concern the whole House. We accept the need for flexibility. The criminal law evolves. New offences may be created, particularly in the online sphere, as was illustrated by the recent Grok AI scandal and by non-consensual deepfakes of women and children in particular.

I recognise that Parliament cannot foresee every future risk. Recent controversies involving emerging technologies only underline that reality. It is therefore sensible that Ministers should have the power to expand the list where gaps emerge. However, it is not at all clear why the power should run in the opposite direction. Our Amendment 22 seeks to ensure that the Secretary of State would be able only to expand the list of relevant offences rather than shrink it. Opposition to what is modest drafting would raise serious questions about the Government’s intentions. We hope that the Minister will reflect carefully on that.

In that context, we are grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Meston, for Amendment 27, which would add Section 15A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, on sexual communication with a child, to the schedule. This offence criminalises the deliberate sexualised communication with a child for the purpose of sexual gratification. A technology-enabled form of abuse can be profoundly harmful. It often forms part of a wider pattern of grooming. Its inclusion in the schedule would materially strengthen the safeguarding framework, particularly if the threshold under Clause 3 were to be revisited.

Finally, Amendment 34, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, seeks to extend Jade’s law to cover attempted murder. This amendment raises an important principle. While the law recognises that certain conduct is so grave that parental responsibility should be curtailed automatically, it is difficult to see why the distinction between murder and attempted murder should be a point of difference, particularly given the catastrophic harm that attempted murder can cause.

This has been a thoughtful and serious debate. The amendments in this group are aimed at strengthening Clause 3 to protect children from harm while respecting the practical policy constraints which the Government face. We have no doubt that the Minister will engage constructively with the issues raised and provide the House with the assurances and explanations that these amendments request.

Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd and Lord Sandhurst

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, we oppose Amendments 433 and 434, which seek to devolve policing and youth justice to Wales. Let me be clear: I make no observations on the principle of devolution for its own sake, but these amendments would make profound constitutional and operational changes. They are presented without convincing evidence that devolution of policing or youth justice would improve outcomes for victims, communities or young people themselves.

Policing and youth justice are not isolated administrative functions—

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

May I ask the noble Lord whether his staff have read the report that contains all the evidence? To say that this is put forward without evidence is not correct.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

I cannot answer that from the Dispatch Box, I am afraid; nor do I have many staff.

Policing and youth justice are not isolated administrative functions. They sit at the heart of a single, integrated criminal justice system spanning England and Wales. Police forces operate across borders daily; so too with the criminal justice system. Intelligence sharing, counterterrorism, and serious organised crime and public order policing all rely on consistent legal frameworks, operational standards and accountability structures. Fragmenting those arrangements would introduce complexity, duplication and risk at precisely the moment when policing faces unprecedented pressures.

Policing in Wales is already delivered locally, is locally accountable and is responsible to Welsh communities. Police and crime commissioners in Wales set priorities based on local need. Chief constables in Wales are not directed from Whitehall on day-to-day policing. What is proposed is not so much localism but the creation of a new layer of political control over policing.

The amendments ask your Lordships’ House to place policing and youth justice under the control of the Welsh Government. This has been run by Labour continuously since devolution began. It is therefore legitimate to ask what that Government’s track record tells us about their capacity to take on these serious responsibilities. In area after area of devolved public policy, Labour-run Wales has failed to deliver. Educational outcomes in Wales have fallen behind those in the rest of the United Kingdom on many international measures. Health waiting times are persistently worse than in England. Major infrastructure projects have been delayed or mismanaged. Those are not ideological assertions; they are documented outcomes of more than two decades of one-party dominance and failure.

When systems fail in devolved areas, the response of the Welsh Government has often been to blame Westminster rather than to reflect on their own actions or inactions. If policing and youth justice were devolved, who would be blamed if and when crime rose, youth reoffending increased or serious failures occurred? Experience suggests that accountability would become more opaque, not clearer and more robust. Constitutional change should be driven by clear evidence of benefit, not by political symbolism. It has not yet been demonstrated how these proposals would reduce crime, improve public confidence or deliver better outcomes for young offenders; nor has it been shown that fragmentation would be avoided and how cross-border crime would be tackled more effectively, or failures remedied. For these reasons, we cannot support the amendments.

Sentencing Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd and Lord Sandhurst

Committee stage
Wednesday 26th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I support what is behind the amendments tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Jones, for two reasons. First, we still send far too many women to prison; we need to reduce that number. Secondly, a community sentence probably should be in priority to a suspended sentence.

However, it is not that simple. I will not come back to this point again, but the amendments show precisely why this should be left to the Sentencing Council, which can weigh up the detail of the terms and conditions that it is appropriate to attach to a suspended sentence, as you can make them almost as tough as a community order. The judgment of how the public perceive suspended sentences and community orders can also be left to the council. Unless we satisfy the public’s perception that we are punishing people, the result will be that the judges will think, “Okay, we’ve got to go above 12 months”. That would be a disaster, particularly in the case of women.

I support the excellent ideas behind the amendments. However—and I promise not to say any more about the Sentencing Council today—they are a very strong argument for changing this Bill and making it sensible.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to these amendments, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb.

Amendment 15, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, seeks to insert an explicit reference to Section 77 of the Sentencing Act 2020 to make it plain that courts may mitigate a sentence to a community order where appropriate. This amendment is not necessary. The Bill does not alter the courts’ ability to consider the full range of mitigating factors, nor does it disturb their discretion to impose a community sentence where that is the just and proportionate outcome. What it does is imposes an obligation to suspend a prison sentence where otherwise a prison sentence might be imposed. Those powers remain firmly in place. To single out Section 77 of the Sentencing Act for restatement in the Bill might imply that the legislation would otherwise curtail judicial discretion to impose a community sentence. That is not the case. For this reason, we do not consider the amendment to be needed or helpful.

Amendment 29A, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, would place a statutory duty on courts to consider a community order before imposing a suspended sentence order. Although we understand and appreciate the intention behind the proposal, we do not support it. The courts are already required to work upwards through a full hierarchy of sentencing options, including setting community sentences, before custody is reached. That is the well-established principle in law and practice. Sentencing judges are highly experienced in applying those principles.

To introduce a further procedural step will not add substance but create additional bureaucracy in an already very complex framework. It risks increasing administrative burdens on the probation services and court staff, and generating uncertainty about what additional assessments or reports might be required to satisfy the new duty. We should not legislate for processes that the system is not resourced or structured to deliver. Above all, a suspended sentence of imprisonment is, by definition, imposed only when the custody threshold has already been crossed. To require courts to revisit considerations that are already inherent in the sentencing exercise risks weakening clarity and undermining judicial confidence in the tools at their disposal.

For all these reasons, although we respect the intentions behind both amendments, we do not believe that they would strengthen the sentencing framework. We cannot support them.

Compensation for Miscarriages of Justice (Alteration of Overall Compensation Limits) Order 2025

Debate between Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd and Lord Sandhurst

Wednesday 17th September 2025 Grand Committee

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, it is an enormous privilege to welcome the Minister to the Dispatch Box on her first appearance. I welcome the fact that such an experienced lawyer now holds this position.

I turn now to the substance of the debate; the Minister has explained everything in such lucid detail that I can go straight to the two points that I want to raise, without going into the background. The limit was fixed in 2008 and, as the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, on which I sit, observed, the limit is being raised by only 30% whereas, unfortunately, inflation has been very much higher. We have the privilege of having the Financial Secretary to the Treasury here in the Room, and he will no doubt be very pleased to see that the Ministry of Justice is taking such good care of the scarce resources of the country.

When the previous Labour Administration were in power in 2008, they thought that the limits set out then were fair and reasonable and reflected the public position at the time. Is there a reason why we cannot have the same position today and therefore raise the amounts? As the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee was told, there has never been a payment of the maximum amount, and only very few payments of the lesser amount. Is there therefore a real difficulty in being parsimonious—which is no doubt appreciated by His Majesty’s Treasury—in relation to these amounts? Could this be looked at again?

That takes me to my second question. The Ministry of Justice is in the unfortunate position of having a number of instruments and other pieces of legislation where limits are set, and it is very important that these are kept under regular review. There have been occasions when the ministry has failed to do so. Does the ministry now have a proper schedule for reviewing this and making certain that we do not have a very long period of time, such as that which has elapsed since 2008, before this kind of limit is reviewed? It may be that the Minister will want to take some time to investigate this, but I hope that there is a system in place for such limits to be looked at.

Those are my two observations. I again express what a great pleasure it is to see the Minister in her place and dealing with such an important subject.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

I join with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, in welcoming the Minister to the Dispatch Box.

Our legal system is based on the principle of fairness. This country prides itself on its judiciary. Trial for serious offences by judge and jury is a cornerstone of our criminal justice system. The law exists to right wrongs and to create and maintain a system in which honest subjects can live their lives under the even-handed protection of the law. However, those who suffer miscarriages of justice under the same system must be compensated fairly. A legal system without the means of self-correction is devoid of trust and justice.

We on this side of the Committee support the measures brought forward today. Compensation for those wronged by the system must be fair and proportionate. It is not just that those wrongly convicted and imprisoned have not had the maximum compensation increased for nearly 17 years; the onus is on the justice system to correct its mistakes and increase compensation payments as time passes. It was in the same spirit that, as my honourable friend in the other place the Shadow Minister for Justice noted, the former Lord Chancellor removed the compensation guidance that allowed deductions for living expenses saved while in prison. The justice system must be seen to correct its own mistakes, which is what this instrument aims to do. This is why we support it.

Crown Estate (Wales) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd and Lord Sandhurst

Committee stage
Friday 6th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

I shall speak to the amendments in my name. By way of background, we have had the benefit of the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond, speaking about what makes this issue what I would describe ultimately as a hearts-and-minds issue. The acquisition of the Crown Estate in Wales by conquest and inheritance, the imposition of English laws, the exploitation, as it is perceived in Wales, of Wales’s resources of coal and water and the fact that Scotland has been allowed to control its own estate turn this into an important political and hearts-and-minds issue. I have tried, through the amendments I have put forward, to recognise that. In saying that it is an important hearts-and-minds issue, we must bear in mind the view of the Welsh Government, of the same complexion as the Government here in London, that they want devolution. The overwhelming majority of Welsh authorities want devolution. The very strong feeling is, for the reasons that I have tried briefly to summarise, that there ought to be devolution of the Crown Estate to Wales.

What has bedevilled this problem is a failure to understand and give effect to the difference between ownership and benefit from an asset and management of an asset. Those of us who may be fortunate to have the odd spare penny or two know the difference. Allowing someone else who is better qualified to manage assets while ensuring that the policy towards those assets and the ultimate benefit appertain to the owner is an important distinction that I have sought to make.

The first step is to try to identify what is the Crown Estate in Wales. Is it valuable? Does it have any assets? Does it have any revenue? Noble Lords may recall that in the Second Reading debate I spent a little time—I am not going to do that today because it is unnecessary—going through the accounts of the Crown Estate Commissioners in respect of Wales. The revenue and asset values for the year ending March 2021 were clear, but there was nothing in the accounts thereafter.

I challenged the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Livermore, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, about how an accountant could possibly not be able to identify the assets and income. I am immensely grateful to him and the chief executive of the Crown Estate Commissioners and to one of the commissioners for a meeting I had with him. Having checked with him, and I am happy to say he agrees that I can say this, I was told by him that in the financial statements for next year—that is, for the year ending March 2026—it is the commissioners’ intention to provide a separate breakdown for Wales of the assets and revenue. That shows that you can identify what is Welsh and what is English, and you can show the resultant revenue streams and capital expenditure, so an awful lot of the obfuscation that has occurred can be got rid of. I do not want to comment any further. Let us wait for those accounts to be produced. It brings to an end the argument that you cannot really say what is Welsh and what is English and what is the benefit from it. We will know. It is a great pity that this was not done before.

Therefore, I think that what is before us now is, if this hearts-and-minds issue is to be addressed and dealt with, how do we take this forward? It would be very helpful for us to hear from the Minister about the discussions that have been taking place between his colleagues—I assume that they are his colleagues—in Cardiff and his colleagues here in London about dealing with this hearts-and-minds issue and, as the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, has been very careful to stress, obtaining economic benefits for Wales. The distinction that I try to draw is between ownership of and benefit from the assets and the management of the assets, and that is why I put forward Amendments 4 and 7.

First, Amendment 4 is primarily to set a timetable. It is no use having a Bill, it seems to me, that transfers the assets on its passing without some clear preparatory work and a timetable to reassure investors and others that the transfer is orderly. Therefore, Amendments 4 and 7 put forward a timetable. I have put dates forward as indicative only: obviously, the timetable is a matter for detailed discussion between the Governments in London and Cardiff, providing that, during that period, the Crown Estate commissioners remain completely in control—they ought to take account of the views of Welsh Ministers but not be bound by them—and that the income thereof in the meantime is properly identified. This really provides a bridging period, dealing with the issue of the transfer of the assets but allowing their management to continue, and therefore really tries to address the problem that, as I understand it, some Government Ministers have put forward, that all this would wreak havoc with investment and jobs in Wales. I regard that as a fallacy. When one really looks at what we are talking about, it is accepting that the Crown Estate in Wales is a national asset of the Welsh people, but accepting that there needs to be an orderly transfer.

As to the future, I have put down a separate amendment, Amendment 5, which I will address in due course, in the second group of amendments, because it addresses this fundamental misunderstanding that is used to try to justify the preparation of an injustice which does such damage to the union.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group relate to the operation of the Crown Estate in Wales under the newly devolved approach. I should say at the outset that on this side of the House, we are opposed to the Bill in principle. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, tabled amendments to the Crown Estate Act during its passage through your Lordships’ House. The Official Opposition were clear at that point that the Government should resist those amendments. As my noble friend Lady Vere of Norbiton said then, we have set the Crown Estate on a very different path as a result of that legislation, and now is not the time to frustrate that process with a very different proposal on the direction of the Welsh part of the Crown Estate. That argument was right then; it is right now.

Amendments 1 and 6 in the name of my noble friend Lord Harlech would require the revenues of the Welsh part of the Crown Estate to be paid to the Exchequer after the devolution and transfer of functions to a new body. This would ensure that the existing revenues go to the Exchequer, which, as we all know from the rumours about the spending review next week, is already in great need of income. If control of the functions of the Welsh Crown Estate were to be devolved but the revenues continued to be paid to the Exchequer, that would at least achieve part of the aim of the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, without depriving the Exchequer of much-needed revenue. Perhaps the noble Lord is open to that.

My noble friend Lord Harper raised interesting and cautionary points about the Barnett formula more generally. Amendments 2 and 8 in the name of my noble friend Lord Moynihan seek to ensure that the Welsh Crown Estate is bound by the same borrowing limits as the Crown Estate itself. As noble Lords will recall from the passage of the previous Bill, my noble friends Lady Vere of Norbiton and Lord Howard of Rising spoke at length and pressed Ministers to secure that borrowing limit. We were pleased that Ministers accepted those calls and implemented a borrowing limit, even though this was placed on a statutory footing. The amendment which my noble friend Lord Moynihan has sensibly tabled seeks to ensure that the Welsh Crown Estate is similarly bound by an appropriate limit on its borrowing. Here I should mention, of course, the important points that he made about the impact that this transfer would have on the future of energy, in this country as a whole and in Wales in particular, and the difficulties in apportioning that.

Amendment 3, in the name of my noble friend Lord Moynihan, seeks to establish a backstop to prevent mismanagement of the Welsh Crown Estate. We know how poorly Wales is served by her current devolved Government. Whether it is education, healthcare or economic outcomes, Wales consistently underperforms, so much of this is the responsibility of the Welsh Government. Given that backdrop, it is understandable that noble Lords are a little more than reticent about proposals to take another step down that road, with a body as important as the Crown Estate and with such big assets. We on these Benches share the concern that motivates my noble friend in his amendment, and we would be interested to hear from the Minister whether the Government might consider some form of backstop such as that proposed by this amendment.

Amendments 4 and 7, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, reflect legitimate concerns about the untimely transfer of these powers in the event that the Bill is passed. Clearly, a sudden change so soon after we passed the Crown Estate Act, which sets a very different direction of travel for the Crown Estate, would be very disruptive to that new direction. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, would respond to that point in his remarks at the conclusion of this group.

In summary, we have serious concerns about the transfer of the Welsh parts of the Crown Estate to a devolved framework. There are many important issues that must be addressed before this proposal could go forward. We look forward to hearing from the noble Lord, Lord Wigley.

Sentencing Guidelines (Pre-sentence Reports) Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd and Lord Sandhurst

Report stage
Wednesday 4th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I wish to add a few sentences to what the right reverend Prelate said. I preface that by noting that, when we built the Sentencing Council, the legislation was discussed and agreed. It was clear when this Bill was introduced that discussion and agreement were needed. I find it very disappointing that we have not been able to get together to find a satisfactory way to deal with this legislation other than by dropping it—I regard that now as gone.

I think it important that Ministers appreciate what the right reverend Prelate said. It is plain that pregnancy and maternity are characteristics, and one ought to ensure that all judges receive the same guidance as to obtaining pre-sentence reports. I know that the Minister and the Lord Chancellor are very keen that pregnant women do not go to prison, but they are not the law; the law is laid down by this unfortunate legislation. If there is one thing we can do to ensure that it does not wreak injustice, it is to allow the amendment proposed by the right reverend Prelate. There is a huge amount more that we should do, but, without a consensus and discussion between us, I do not believe that we can make any improvement. That is why I content myself with this very narrow point. We cannot be in a position where we cannot give guidance to courts that they should get a pre-sentence report to avoid sending pregnant women to prison.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who contributed to the Bill’s progress in Committee. In particular, I acknowledge the thoughtful and constructive contributions from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon. We have heard further thoughtful contributions today, not least from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester.

None the less, from this side of the House, I wish to place on record our broad support for the principles that underpin the Bill. The use of pre-sentence reports, when applied rigorously, consistently and with due regard to the individual circumstances of the offender, is an essential part of a fair and effective justice system. They play a crucial role in informing judicial discretion, ensuring proportionality in sentencing and helping to reduce the risk of reoffending through appropriate rehabilitative measures. We welcome the intention of the Bill to strengthen and clarify the expectations around the preparation and consideration of pre-sentence reports. These seek to embed good practice across the system and to promote greater consistency in the court’s approach to sentencing.

However, while we on this side support the direction of travel, we remain mindful that sentencing is a complex and sensitive area of the law. It touches not only on legal principle but on human lives, social outcomes and the effective operation of our prison and probation systems. In that context, I will take a moment to acknowledge a specific concern raised by noble Lords in Committee: the lack of clarity around the term “personal characteristics” as it appears in the Bill. This is not a small point. If the legislation is to provide clear and workable guidance to practitioners, including report writers and the judiciary, we must be precise about what we mean. Any doubt or uncertainty in this area risks inconsistent application. It undermines the very consistency and fairness that the Bill seeks to promote. I hope that the Government will reflect carefully on these concerns and consider whether further definition could be usefully provided.

More broadly, I echo the view expressed at earlier stages that, with just a little more time and careful consideration, we could strengthen and improve this legislation further. There remain questions that would benefit from additional scrutiny, and we should proceed with care. We must get this right, not only in the interest of justice but for the confidence of the public, the judiciary and those working on the front line of our criminal justice system. We on these Benches remain committed to working constructively with the Government, with noble Lords across the House and with all those who bring experience and insight to bear on this important issue.

I will turn briefly to the amendments in the first group. As for Amendments 1 and 7, spoken to by my noble friend Lord Hailsham, we recognise that Amendment 1 seeks to provide clarity about the range of matters that the sentencer may take into account. We invite the Government to consider these during the Bill’s journey through the other place.

Litigation Funding Agreements (Enforceability) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd and Lord Sandhurst

Committee stage
Monday 29th April 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, like others here today, I support the Bill and the amendments which the Government have laid. Like others, certainly including the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, I am grateful for the Bingham Centre’s helpful briefing note. It sets out the issues clearly, in particular in respect of retrospectivity and the need for the Government to give good reasons for that, which I believe they have done.

What is important in this case is that before 19 July 2023, government policy endorsed the use of litigation funding agreements. There had been discussion about whether they should be regulated and how they should be managed, but the policy was absolutely clear. I referred to that at Second Reading. The Supreme Court, for good reason, did not have to address that issue of policy as it was not appropriate, but the effect of its decision is that litigants have lost much-needed support. If we are to ensure access to justice, particularly against monopolists, we now require a statute to undo that Supreme Court decision and do the best we can to restore the status quo ante. We have to hope that this legislation does not induce a spate of future litigation of the wrong satellite nature, but simply allows matters to proceed as they were until July last year.

For good constitutional reasons, retrospective provisions are not the norm, but when Parliament reaches a considered decision to pass legislation that is fully retroactive and does so for good reasons then, providing the legislation is drafted carefully, the Supreme Court has ruled that it is not contrary to our constitutional norms. In that respect, I refer to its decision in AXA General Insurance Limited and others v Lord Advocate and others, reported at [2011] UKSC 46.

I agree entirely with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that we should not fear challenge at some later date in the ECHR. The balancing reasons are absolutely clear: this is for access to justice. There may be no perfect answer, but this is the right route—or the least bad route. I am confident that the Government will look further at the detail of the retroactivity provisions and will not bring this Bill to finality without taking care to ensure that it is properly addressed. In doing so, they will have weighed the public interest in access to justice and in established positions that might be damaged by the Bill. It is pretty clear to me, and I think to others here, that the overwhelming public interest is in allowing matters to be restored to the general form of what everybody thought they were in the summer of 2023.

While I am sympathetic to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and his amendment, I am persuaded and now agree that the appropriate course is to leave this to the Civil Justice Council. It is now seized of the matter and will have the benefit shortly of the report from the European Law Institute—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, is a member—and will guide this country into making good regulations. Regulation will not be straightforward, but it has been managed with some trial and error in conditional fee agreements, and we are now without problems there. It has been managed in damages-based agreements, so I would be surprised if it could not be managed in litigation funding agreements, albeit that I am sure that some lawyers will do well out of satellite litigation in the early stages.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the Government again for bringing this matter with such expedition before this Committee. I wish to make two observations. First, I warmly welcome the Constitution Committee’s report, which is helpful and will no doubt help the Government further on the retrospectivity point.

Secondly, I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, put forward his amendment because it enables us to thank the Civil Justice Council and the Government for putting the terms of reference in such broad forms. As I mentioned at Second Reading, there is a lot of experience worldwide on that, but since then I have discovered more about the position in Australia and hope that the work done by the European Law Institute will in part reflect the substantial Australian experience. The Civil Justice Council will be able to look at that. Having heard what has been said in Australia, one has to take care, as not all are as responsible as the members of the litigation funders’ body. Others are tempted to enter into this area, so one might see that Australia has a lot of experience of how to deal with this, looking not to the creation of yet another regulatory body but to whether the courts themselves, through the Civil Procedure Rules, can be given the powers and guidance necessary to deal with the issues.

No doubt we will return to this in the autumn of 2025 for a very interesting debate.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd and Lord Sandhurst

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 320 and 328, which would repeal the Vagrancy Act. This 197 year-old Act does nothing to tackle and resolve homelessness, and nor does it prevent antisocial behaviour. In fact, by criminalising rough sleepers, it prevents them accessing vital services to support them to move off the streets. This is important in the context of people trafficking—modern slavery. Its victims are those likely to end up sleeping rough on the streets to escape danger. They need our help. Criminalising rough sleeping marginalises the most vulnerable and may mean that rough sleepers move away from, not towards vital support. It does not address the underlying causes.

The Act now has only two effective provisions. Section 3 makes it an offence in any public place to beg or cause a child to beg. An offender can be locked up for one month. Section 4 addresses what we call rough sleeping. It also encompasses those who are in enclosed premises for an unlawful purpose. This is used to deal with people who are thought to be “up to no good”. The fact is that there are perfectly good ways of dealing with all those people both within and without the criminal law. Indeed, on 9 March the then Secretary of State said in answer to a Parliamentary Question that the Act should be repealed. In this amendment, we offer a fully drafted way forward. If minor changes are needed, they can be made—there is no problem there.

The number of convictions for rough sleeping and begging have fallen consistently in the past 10 years. Indeed, in 2019—the most recent year for which figures are available—only one person received a custodial sentence for begging, and only 16 received a custodial sentence for being in enclosed premises for an unlawful purpose. The numbers are tiny. Let us throw away the sledgehammer. The police, local authorities and other agencies have ample powers.

Let me explain very briefly. The Highways Act 1980, Section 137, makes it an offence wilfully to block free passage along the highway. That is punishable by a fine. The Public Order Act 1986, Section 5, makes it an offence to use threatening or abusive words or behaviour. That, too, is punishable by a fine. Moving to civil measures, the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 introduced a wide range of measures to deal with the different types of anti-social behaviour. Recourse can properly be made to those measures for people who are repeat nuisances. They are all available under the 2014 Act.

Taking it very summarily in the short time available, there are civil injunctions to prevent nuisance and annoyance. Breach of those civil injunctions gives rise to civil contempt, with all the remedies available for that—up to 2 years’ imprisonment for the worst offenders, but it is done properly. Secondly, there are criminal behaviour orders. These can impose requirements as well as prohibit certain activities. Thirdly, there are community protection notices. These can be issued by the police, a social landlord or a local council if behaviour is detrimental to the quality of life of a local community. Fourthly, there are dispersal powers, under which a local council, following consultation with the police, may issue a public spaces protection order to place restrictions or impose conditions on activities that people may carry out in the designated area.

In respect of that, since 2014 the Home Office has issued statutory guidance under the 2014 Act, recently updated this January. Our amendment, as noble Lords will see from its terms, will strengthen that. We propose a co-ordinated package. Where something has to be done, the police and local authorities have the powers to do it. We ask the House to act now to put an end to this prehistoric, unjust and inappropriate law. I commend the amendments.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

Briefly, I entirely support the repeal of the Vagrancy Act, and there is no point in repeating what have been compelling, eloquent and, I believe, unanswerable points. Long experience has shown that arguments do not get better by repetition.

What I wanted to do, however, was to make four quick points from my experience in support of Amendment 292J in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath. First, the category of person dealt with is easy to identify. Therefore, that is not an answer. Secondly, the evidence of the risk of future offending is compelling. That in relation to Wales is set out—I need not repeat it—in the report of the Commission on Justice that I chaired and there is masses of such evidence. Thirdly, the proposal is plainly value for money. One has only to look at the cost of what it takes to deal with those who have gone wrong. Fourthly—surprisingly, some may think—the proposal would have enormous public support. When we canvassed views about it, and when I did so as a judge, one always found that the overwhelming majority felt that these people deserved a chance and support.