Lord Wolfson of Tredegar
Main Page: Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Wolfson of Tredegar's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, under Clause 18, where an asylum seeker provides late evidence, this should damage their credibility. Amendment 33 in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and the noble Lord, Lord Green of Deddington, would provide that a person’s credibility should also be damaged where that person fails to produce ID documents when they enter the UK or are intercepted at sea. We do not support the clause or believe it should be part of the Bill, so we do not support the addition to it. A person’s credibility should be based, as it always has been, on the full picture and the worth of the evidence that is submitted.
As we have just heard from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, where people are fleeing the horrors of war and risk to life, they may not bring the right documentation, or it may have been lost or stolen along the route. As we can see from recent horrors around the world, I am not sure that it would be anybody’s first priority to go back to wherever they were to find any documentation they might have—it would be to get out of danger. However, under the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and the noble Lord, Lord Green, they would be penalised: it would be a failure by the claimant to provide identifying documents. Such a carte blanche failure to produce identifying documents would mean that such people seeking asylum would automatically be excluded from doing so. I do not think that that would be something that the country or, indeed, this Chamber would want.
There are other issues I wish to raise that are more relevant to the next amendment; however, if this amendment is put to a vote, we will vote against it.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for raising the issue and of course I understand the concerns that lie behind it.
Clause 18 adds two new behaviours to the existing credibility provisions in Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004. It introduces the principles that providing late evidence without good reason or not acting in good faith should be damaging to the claimant’s credibility. Where, conversely, there are good reasons for providing evidence late, that would not affect the claimant’s credibility.
The concept that certain conduct should be damaging to credibility is not new. Decision-makers must already consider the claimant’s conduct. It is then open to the Home Office or the courts to decide the extent to which credibility should subsequently be damaged. The focus of Clause 18 is, therefore, the Home Office and then the judicial decision-making process. It is intended to address the issue of late evidence raised in unfounded protection and human rights claims and put beyond doubt that behaviour designed to abuse the system will be taken into account. Clause 18, therefore, is intended to apply to those individuals who have made a protection or human rights claim and have been issued with an evidence notice as per Clause 17. It is not intended to apply, for example, to individuals immediately when intercepted in the territorial waters of the United Kingdom.
Against that background, I suggest that Amendment 33 is unnecessary. The destruction, alteration or disposal of a passport without reasonable explanation, or the failure to produce a passport on request to an immigration officer or to the Secretary of State—again, without reasonable explanation—are behaviours to which Section 8 already applies. The good faith requirement in the Bill is intended to address behaviours such as those mentioned in the amendment, as well as any other behaviours that a deciding authority thinks are not in good faith. Specific instances of a lack of good faith are necessarily caught by the broader provision that refers to good faith: the greater includes the lesser. Therefore, there is no need to single out the behaviours prescribed in this amendment.
As to the detail of the amendment, I say that verification of someone’s identity normally takes place on land. However, should a claimant be in possession of their passport or identity document and fail to provide this when requested by an immigration officer, Section 8 will apply, as I said. Moreover, where evidence is provided late following receipt of an evidence notice in a protection or human rights claim—again, without good reason—this should be taken into account as damaging the claimant’s credibility.
As this amendment refers to specific examples of behaviour designed to abuse the system, and that type of behaviour as a whole is already caught by the provisions of the Bill, I respectfully suggest that the amendment is necessarily unnecessary. For those reasons, I respectfully invite my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe to withdraw it.
My Lords, I thank those who have spoken in this brief debate. The very real problems of refugees, noted by the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, and of course the fact that some people do not have passports are very well understood by me. That is why my proposal is to add an extra factor that needs to be taken into account, not least to reduce the power and profiteering of the traffickers. As has been said, tribunals and officials can then take a fair view.
Having said that, I think that there seems to be a chink of light in some of the comments from my noble friend Lord Wolfson on how this would work. Perhaps we could discuss further before Third Reading what the Government’s approach will be, the associated regulations and so on. I am very conscious that we need time for many votes today, especially as the electronic system seems a bit slow, so for today I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, I do not want to add much to what the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, and my noble friend Lady Lister said in support of this important amendment. They outlined some of the problems well.
The amendment relates to Clause 25(2), which says:
“Unless there are good reasons why the evidence was provided late”.
It bedevils any Government that as soon as you state, “Unless there are good reasons”, the argument then becomes, “What do you mean by good reasons?” Then you produce a list and people complain that the list does not include everything. So you state that there will be guidance and then the Government do not produce guidance for people to look at to see whether it is worth it or needs to be improved. I appreciate what the noble Baroness and my noble friend said about engagement with the Minister, but these are real issues because people will be excluded from asylum claims on the basis of late provision of the evidence—and we do not know what the good reasons are that will prevent those claimants being excluded as a result of being classified as having given late evidence. It is not satisfactory.
At this stage, on Report, there is this question for the Minister. The list has been produced. The Minister will say, exactly as the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, said, that by having a list, you will miss people out. That is why the amendment is trying to insert “but not limited to”. This is quite an unsatisfactory situation. Can the Minister not say a little more about what the guidance will say? Can he not give us a little more, in consultation with the Home Office, about whether there could be a draft of some sort, even at this late stage, to give some indication of what the guidance will be on what “good reasons” actually means? I appreciate that this is an ask for the future but the amendment tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Coussins and Lady Lister, is extremely important and goes to the heart of the problem with Clause 25 —notwithstanding the fact that many of us do not agree with the clause anyway. In seeking to improve the parts of the legislation that we do not agree with, what “good reasons” means is absolutely fundamental to our understanding.
As I say, I support the amendment; I appreciate that it seems to be a probing amendment. However, these are important issues and the Minister will need to go further to deal with them, I think.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, for her engagement with me, as the House will have heard, on the amendment, which she has redrafted since Committee, for the reasons she set out in her speech. I am also grateful to the amendment’s co-sponsor, the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett.
We have a proud history of providing international protection to those most in need. This is a responsibility that we take seriously, but we need a system that is efficient as well as effective. By introducing a statutory requirement to provide evidence before a specified date, the Bill redresses the current balance. It is right that decision-makers have regard to the principle that minimal weight is given to evidence that is late following the receipt of either an evidence notice or a priority removal notice without good reason. The House will appreciate that Clause 25 is therefore essential to the architecture of this part of the Bill. However, at the same time, it is important not to tip the balance too far. Decision-makers in the Home Office and the judiciary will maintain their discretion as to whether, having considered the principle and in the absence of good reasons for lateness, it is appropriate in all the circumstances of the particular case to apply minimal weight to late evidence, taking into account the claimant’s particular claim and any specific vulnerabilities.
I have been asked to define “good reasons”. This has not been defined in the Bill for, if I may say so, a good reason. We cannot legislate for every case type where someone may have good reasons for providing late information or evidence in relation to their protection claim. To do so would be impractical and would detract from the important principle that decision-makers are best placed to consider an individual’s particular vulnerabilities on a case-by-case basis. I say this because “good reasons” can include both objective factors, such as practical difficulties in obtaining evidence—for example, where the evidence was not previously available—and subjective factors, such as a claimant’s particular vulnerabilities relating to their age, sexual orientation, gender identity or mental and physical health. Decision-makers must be able to respond on a case-by-case basis.
I contrast that with Amendment 34, which would place an obligation on decision-makers not only in the Home Office but in the judiciary to accept that there were good reasons for late evidence in all asylum and human rights cases where either the claimant or the claim type fell into one of the listed categories. I suggest that this would undermine the principle that we want decision-makers and the judiciary to apply their discretion on a case-by-case basis. By setting out a non-exhaustive list—I appreciate that it includes the words “not limited to”—of potential experiences or categories of claimant, it is true that this amendment does not exclude those not listed in the amendment from having good reasons. However, in any non-exhaustive list, there is a risk of focusing attention on the factors in the list, thus putting other applicants with different issues at a relative disadvantage.
Just before the noble Lord sits down, can he say whether there will be any consultation on the guidance? Can someone write to me on that point?
My Lords, I do not have the detail at my fingertips, but I can certainly undertake to write to the noble Baroness. I was just about to sit down after inviting the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, to withdraw the amendment for the reasons that I have set out.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his reply and all other noble Lords for their support on this amendment.
I was very happy to hear the Minister’s commitment, having discussed it with the Home Office, that there would be new guidance. Assuming that this new guidance on late evidence is genuinely expanded and strengthened, this has the potential to go a long way towards meeting my objectives. However, I underline the point just made by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, that it would be very helpful to be consulted on a draft before the two-month cut-off point when the new guidance would come into force. I would be very grateful if Home Office colleagues could take that on board. Although the noble Lord is an MoJ Minister, can he please keep on this as well, and ensure that the Home Office does not lose sight of this guidance in the greater scheme of things?
Assuming that this will be on track, it amounts to a satisfactory way of meeting my objectives and would give vulnerable and traumatised refugees some of the comfort that they deserve. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who propose these amendments: the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, speaking through the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. I agree of course with the importance of the UK carefully assessing whether asylum seekers have a well-founded fear of persecution, as required under Article 1(A)(2) of the refugee convention. However, we do not agree with these amendments which, when taken together, will effectively maintain the current standard of proof for all elements of the well-founded fear test.
There are other undesirable implications of the amendments which I will set out briefly. The House has heard short speeches supporting a number of these amendments. I have obviously got to reply to all of them, so I hope that the House will indulge me. I will try to address them in a comprehensible order, because some of the points are related and some are discrete.
I come first to the point made by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, who asked how Clause 31 would produce clarity. Clause 31 is drafted to introduce a step-by-step process for decision-makers, considering whether an asylum seeker has a well-founded fear of persecution. The central point I would make is that currently there is no such clearly structured test.
I have one more point of clarification. Could the Minister explain what the position will be for refugee asylum seekers who are under 16 and for whom any sexual relations would be a criminal offence?
I was coming to each of those points in my speech. I am not going to do so just yet, because I was, it is fair to say, on a different point, but I will come to those points in due course when I deal with the manuscript amendment.
Before the noble and learned Lord’s intervention, I was setting out the definition of “particular social group.” I was making the point that there is no universally agreed definition and no authoritative definition of that phrase. There is, as I have said, conflicting tribunal-level case law. For example, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham referred to the Fornah decision of this House in its former judicial capacity. The point there is that it is obiter. That is really important, because that bit is obiter: it is not part of the ratio of the decision. That really underlines my point that we cannot, with great respect, cherry-pick passages of decisions which are obiter, particularly decisions of the Upper Tribunal. Ultimately, it is for the UK, as a member state and signatory, and, for this Parliament—not the Home Office—to interpret the refugee convention. That is what we have sought to do here.
There are two clear conditions, and let me underline the following point: this is not a change in government policy. These conditions do not change the position—they reflect current government policy. The first condition is that members of the group share either an innate characteristic, a common background test that cannot be changed, or a characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to identity or conscience that a person should not be forced to renounce it.
The second condition is that the group has a distinct identity in the relevant country because it is perceived as being different by the surrounding society. The amendment would mean that a group need meet only one of the characteristics to be considered a particular social group. Obviously, that would significantly widen the scope of people who could qualify as a refugee but, relevantly for this debate, it would erode the concept that people deserve and need protection based on fundamental characteristics that go to the core of who they are, such as their faith or sexuality. It would broaden the definition to cover potentially transient factors such as an individual’s occupation, and that, we say, is incompatible with very purpose of the refugee convention.
I am not sure that one generally takes questions on Report. I am newer than the noble Baroness, and I do not want to be rude; equally, I want to maintain the approach of the House.
My noble friend is correct on that. Noble Lords are guided not to speak after the Minister.
I want to respond to the concern expressed in Committee about the impact the clause would have on vulnerable groups—particularly, for example, female claimants fleeing gender-based violence—and to respond to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham. Victims of gender-based violence may still be considered to be members of a particular social group for the purposes of making an asylum claim if they meet the conditions in Clause 32(3) and (4). In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, this clause does not therefore mean that women who are victims of gender-based violence are less likely to be accepted as a member of a particular social group: all cases are assessed on a case-by-case basis.
I cannot say, of course, that all women fleeing gender-based violence will always be found to be refugees, if that was the nature of the point that was being put to me. What I can say with certainty is that the structure of the definition does not preclude it. I think I heard, in the way the noble Baroness put the question, that the example was of a woman with “good grounds”. If she is asking, “Will this application be accepted?” good grounds is not the test and therefore, if good grounds is part of the question, I am afraid that that is why I necessarily gave the answer I did. I think if the noble Baroness looks at Hansard, she will see that I have now, again, answered the question directly.
I turn to Amendment 45A from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. It is vital that we provide protection to those in the UK who require it as a result of persecution they would face due to sexual orientation, but I suggest that it goes without saying that protection must not be afforded on the basis of one’s sexual orientation where the acts in question are criminal in the United Kingdom. I shall deal with both his points.
First, I note the explanatory statement on the amendment. For those who have not seen it, I shall summarise it. The obviously well-meaning intention of this amendment is to prevent applicants under the age of consent in the UK being excluded from refugee protection—I hope I have understood that correctly. I reassure the noble and learned Lord and the House that line 9 of Clause 32 does no such thing. That is because, although an asylum applicant may be under the age of consent in the UK, they can still be persecuted as a result of their sexual orientation. For example, a 15 year-old homosexual applicant may still be recognised as a member of a particular social group should they meet the requirements of Clause 32, even though they are not legally able to consent to sexual activity in the UK. I distinguish in this regard—I hope this is helpful to the noble and learned Lord—between sexual orientation and sexual activity. In that context, I come to the other point.
Let me say what should not need to be said—of course this is not the noble and learned Lord’s intention—but we are concerned that, as drafted, the amendment could allow convicted paedophiles and other convicted sex offenders to be granted refugee status in the UK, solely on account of their criminal acts relating to their sexual orientation. Of course, that is not the intention of the amendment: we are concerned that it is an unintended consequence of it. I hope that what I have said already deals with the intention behind the amendment and reassures the noble and learned Lord.
Lastly, I come to Amendment 46. Clause 36 provides the interpretive framework for Clause 11, which sets out Parliament’s position on Article 31(1) of the refugee convention. Clause 36 is still relevant in terms of providing the UK’s interpretation of key terms in Article 31 of the convention, such as immunity from penalties, so it is not just there to serve Clause 11, which was the first point made by the noble and learned Lord. The convention does not define what is meant by coming “directly” or “without delay”. Again, we have taken the opportunity to define those terms. We have taken into account that group 2 refugees will still be protected and not refouled, and will receive relevant entitlements so that the object and purpose of the convention are upheld.
Clause 36 is clear that there is discretion not to grant differentiated entitlements where a person could not reasonably be expected to have claimed in another safe country or where a person made a claim as soon as reasonably practicable. I made points earlier as to discretion and individual assessment. So this does not necessarily rule out the position taken by the House of Lords in R v Asfaw; it will all turn on the particular facts of the case.
Finally, I will prevail on the Home Office, I hope, to write to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, on the point she raised. For these reasons, and with apologies that it has taken a little longer than I anticipated, I respectfully invite the right reverend Prelate to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his very full and considered response and all noble Lords for their contributions. The strength of feeling is strong and again I make the point that these clauses are overly punitive towards women and victims of gender-based violence. I fear that that concern was not answered in the very full answer we were given. In particular, I still do not think that the responses given take any awareness of the trauma of so many of the women who come forward. I fear that to talk about “sufficiently detailed interviews”, as the Minister did at one point, would raise hackles on that front.
I have no doubt that my right reverend friend the Bishop of Gloucester will read Hansard very carefully and may well write off the back of that. I thank the Minister for making the promise to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister—I was about to ask him to, but he got in there before us. It is rather regrettable that we have not been able to persuade the Government on these points, and the Bill will not now adequately protect those who are subject to gender-based violence. That is the deep concern. That said, with deep regret, I will withdraw the amendment.