Employment Rights Bill

Debate between Lord Young of Acton and Baroness Fox of Buckley

Monday 14th July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

My Lords, I refer noble Lords to my register of interests. I ask noble Lords, when considering my amendments, to spare a thought for the great British pub. A year ago, the Chancellor promised to “turn the page” for British pubs. As she pulled a pint in the Humble Plumb in Southampton in June 2024, Rachel Reeves said that Labour would revive this “important institution”—I think we can all agree that pubs are important institutions.

Yet no sooner had she said this than she raised national insurance contributions for employers and lowered the threshold at which they are paid from £9,000 a year to £5,000. At the same time, she announced that business rates relief for hospitality brought in during Covid would be cut, while the minimum wage would rise by 6.7%. UKHospitality, which represents pubs, bars and restaurants, has estimated that the total extra cost for its members from the Budget measures announced last autumn will be £3.4 billion a year. This impact has already been felt, with 69,000 hospitality jobs lost since last autumn. According to the British Beer and Pub Association, roughly one pub is set to close every day this year—the Campaign For Real Ale is even more gloomy. If BPPA’s forecast comes to pass, it would take the number of pubs in Britain to its lowest level in a century.

What are the Government doing to save what they call an important institution? Gareth Thomas, the Business Minister, has said:

“We are determined to make the UK the best place in the world for businesses to start and succeed, and that includes our great British pubs”.


He went on:

“We’re working with industry to slash red tape … to ease the pressure on pubs and help them grow as part of our Plan for Change”.


Yet, far from slashing red tape, Clause 20 will add a whole new ream of it. As I am sure noble Lords are aware, Clause 20 amends the Equality Act to make employers liable for the harassment of their employees by third parties, for example, customers and members of the public. It does not cover third-party sexual harassment, mind you—employers are already liable for third-party sexual harassment thanks to the worker protection Act—but non-sexual third-party harassment. I have called this the “banter ban” because I believe it will mean employers will be liable for jokes, remarks and expostulations overheard by their employees—banter—that they find offensive or upsetting by virtue of their protected characteristics.

Why do I say this? We know from the way that the definition of harassment has constantly been expanded by the employment tribunal that it now encompasses overheard conversations—you can now sue your employer for failing to protect you from overhearing something uttered by another employee. The Minister will argue that Clause 20 requires employers only to take “all reasonable steps” to protect their employees from harassment, and expecting employers to protect their employees from overhearing remarks made by customers or members of the public is not reasonable. In short, the Government will argue, the tribunal will not hold employers liable for indirect, non-sexual harassment of their employees by third parties. This is a false alarm, faux outrage.

I wish I shared the Minister’s confidence about that, and note that UKHospitality is not so sanguine, which is why it supports Amendment 43, which would absolve employers of liability for indirect third-party harassment. If the Minister really believes that indirect third-party harassment—overheard remarks, banter—would be out of scope, why not accept my amendment? This would be a huge relief to beleaguered publicans who will not have to worry about employing “banter bouncers” to eavesdrop on customer conversations and will help reduce the increased insurance premiums which Clause 20 will inevitably mean.

The Minister will say that plenty of service providers and businesses already ask customers to treat their employees with respect and to not say or do anything that could be construed as harassment. The vast majority of customers follow this advice, I agree, but the fact that these guidelines are being voluntarily observed is a reason to not make them mandatory, not a reason to make them mandatory. Is it not preferable that customers should observe good manners out of consideration for workers, rather than fear of being penalised for non-compliance?

If noble Lords cannot bring themselves to support my amendment, or at the very least abstain on indirect harassment, I hope that they will consider seriously Amendment 44, which would create a carve out for

“conversation or speech involving the expression of an opinion on a political, moral, religious or social matter, provided the opinion is not indecent or grossly offensive”.

How could any noble Lord possibly object to that? Do we want people in pubs to be constantly looking over their shoulders and lowering their voices if they express an unfashionable or contentious point of view, or do we want them to enjoy the same right to speak openly and freely on political, moral, religious or social matters that we enjoy in this House?

Every pub is a parliament; let us not turn every pub into a library and accelerate the disappearance of this beloved institution. Let us remember what Samuel Johnson said about the Great British pub:

“As soon as I enter the door of a tavern, I experience oblivion of care, and a freedom from solicitude. There is nothing which has yet been contrived by man, by which so much happiness is produced as by a good tavern or inn”.


I beg to move.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

In the Mirror newspaper last week, Clause 20 hit the headlines. Deputy Prime Minister Angela Rayner claimed that reforms protecting employees from third party harassment would not chill free speech, and she rubbished claims that innocent workplace banter is the target. She said:

“Nobody should be abused while doing their job, but we’ve seen a horrific rise in violent abuse and harassment of shop workers and other public facing staff”.


She went on to describe those of us worried about the unintended consequences of this clause as resorting to

“spreading made-up nonsense”.

I feel the need to counter this misinformation because I fear Angela Rayner may herself be influenced by misinformation about what is in her own Bill.

I was especially alarmed when the TUC general secretary Paul Nowak told the newspaper that those of us opposing Clause 20 are

“insulting people’s intelligence by pretending that protecting workers from harassment is the same as banning banter”.

But actually, it is—and that is not my decision. It is present in the way equality law has been interpreted in employment tribunals, as has just been described, associating harassment with banter. Whatever the Government, Angela Rayner or the TUC think is in the Bill, it does not set out what constitutes harassment or, rather, what does not.

Therefore, in Committee, the Minister directed us to the definitions of harassment used in equality legislation, which is then interpreted in employment tribunals. It is important to note that under the Equality Act, as interpreted, harassment includes indirect harassment, which, as the EHRC guidance states, can include the following: spoken words, jokes, written words and posts on social media, physical expressions and gestures and, yes, banter.

As we have heard, employment tribunals hear many cases relating to workplace banter, with 57 cases in 2024. If we look at human resources literature, we see that it is full of advice to employers on managing banter in the workplace between their employees. One horrendous suggestion put out to employers was to monitor conversations and attempt to pick up or pre-empt any problems. Another suggestion was to send people on—wait for it—appropriate conversation training sessions. I have just been sent the details of a consultant—there is always a consultant behind all this—who is an inclusive language and banter specialist and runs workshops at £495 a shot. One of his first workshops is “What does the term transgender mean to you?”—I will not say what it means to me out loud or I might get done by the banter police. Anyway, cisgender is a term that I do not think we want to be put into the hands of the banter police.

We are not raising this issue to cause a fuss. The problem is that it is in the Bill. I have always argued against this broad and elastic definition of harassment; it is problematic because it undermines free speech, as I have made the case for many times in this House and in Committee. I also want to emphasise that it risks trivialising genuine cases of harassment and diluting the impact of genuine anti-harassment policies that require serious attention.

Employment Rights Bill

Debate between Lord Young of Acton and Baroness Fox of Buckley

Committee stage
Wednesday 21st May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 101B, which seeks to amend the Equality Act 2010, I will also speak to Amendment 141A, which seeks to amend the Employment Rights Act 1996. I declare my interest as the general secretary of the Free Speech Union.

These amendments would protect job applicants and employees from being discriminated against by employers for their political opinions or affiliations, provided those opinions are not

“unworthy of respect in a democratic society”,

incompatible with

“the fundamental rights of others”,

and are not connected to a

“party, group or organisation which is proscribed for the purposes of the Terrorism Act 2000”.

In the Telegraph on Monday, a government spokesperson said these amendments are not necessary because:

“Any employee dismissed because of their political opinions can already bring a claim of unfair dismissal at any point”.


Well, they can. But whether they are successful or not depends on whether their political beliefs satisfy the Grainger test—a reference to a case in which an employee sued his employer, Grainger PLC, for discriminating against him because he believed in manmade climate change. It was established in that case that, in order to enjoy protected status under the Equality Act, a belief had to satisfy five separate conditions. This is the Grainger test:

“The belief must be genuinely held … It must be a belief and not … an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of information available”—


remember that one because I am going to come back to it.

“It must be a belief as to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour … It must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance … It must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, be not incompatible with human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others”.


Noble Lords will notice that the test I am proposing is a simpler alternative to the Grainger test. It is, in essence, just the fifth limb of the Grainger test.

So what is wrong with the Grainger test? For one thing, it is overcomplicated and leaves too much room for the personal political views of the members of a tribunal panel to creep in. That is why it has led to some arbitrary and biased decisions. For instance, the tribunal has ruled that anti-Zionism is a protected belief, while a belief in Zionism has not been granted that status, at least not yet. A belief in manmade climate change is protected—that was the judgment handed down in Grainger plc v Nicholson—but climate scepticism is not, and that has been tested in the tribunal. A belief in democratic socialism is protected but a belief in conservatism is not, and that too has been tested. In the case of Ms K Sunderland v The Hut.com Ltd—a Free Speech Union case—the tribunal ruled that a belief in a small state, low taxes, freedom of expression and as few controls on an individual’s freedom as are consistent with human rights was not protected.

That is one reason why the Free Speech Union currently has five cases in which employees have been dismissed because of their links to Reform UK. One such case is that of Saba Poursaeedi, who is in the Gallery as I speak. He lost his job at the Hightown Housing Association because he was due to stand as a Reform candidate. He was told that Reform’s policies on immigration, net zero and housing were “in direct conflict” with the values of the Hightown Housing Association—as clear a case of discrimination against someone for their political views as you could hope for. He is taking Hightown Housing Association to the tribunal but, given the judgment in Ms K Sunderland v The Hut.com, he may not be successful. That is one reason to accept these amendments: to level the playing field so that many people with right-of-centre political beliefs enjoy the same protection as people with left-of-centre political beliefs.

Another difficulty with the Grainger test is that it disadvantages open-minded people who, as the late Lord Keynes did, change their minds when the facts change. Remember the second limb of the Grainger test:

“It must be a belief and not … an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of information available”.


Do we really want the Equality Act to encourage dogmatism and punish open-mindedness in this way? Why should someone’s belief be undeserving of protection if it is susceptible to changing if the facts change?

The amendments would bring the Equality Act into line with the European Convention on Human Rights. Articles 9, 10, 11 and 14 provide a higher level of protection than that granted by the Equality Act, particularly Article 10, which protects freedom of expression, including the expression of political views. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, would no doubt point out if she was in the House, if there is a discrepancy between the Equality Act and the convention then its shortcomings will be corrected by the courts eventually, since, as per the Human Rights Act, our courts must interpret legislation in a way that is compatible with convention rights.

However, bringing a claim before the employment tribunal is a time-consuming process and one that can be extremely expensive. The Free Speech Union helped a man to bring a case for unfair dismissal against Lloyds Bank to the tribunal two years ago, and it cost over £85,000. Not only can it be eye-wateringly expensive but it takes a long time, given the current backlog of cases. Mr Poursaeedi’s case has been scheduled for July 2027, more than a year hence. In the meantime, he and other victims of discrimination based on their political beliefs are awaiting justice. Why not short-circuit that process, bring the Equality Act into line with the convention and ease the burden on the tribunal at the same time, as well as protect people now from being discriminated against in this way, by accepting my amendments?

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I put my name down on Amendments 101B and 141A, tackling employment discrimination on the basis of political opinions, because I wanted to probe whether the Government can see that it is a real, contemporary issue that needs to be tackled, however they do it. We know from the history of the labour movement that in the bad old days, as it were, attacking people’s employment rights, sacking them and suspending them were used by employers to discipline the workforce, and they were often focused on people who had the wrong views in the workplace. Often, the trade union organisers who were involved in left-wing parties and so on were the ones who were targeted, and we had McCarthyite-type purges, red scares and anti-trade union blacklists of individuals in workplaces—shocking, but those were the bad old days and it would not happen today, except that I think we are witnessing something similar today even if the political opinions of the victims might be very different and it might take a different form. This is an under-discussed phenomenon, and I hope the Government will see that the Bill is a way of tackling it.