Employment Rights Bill

Debate between Lord Young of Acton and Baroness Jones of Whitchurch

Committee stage
Wednesday 21st May 2025 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business and Trade and Department for Science, Information and Technology (Baroness Jones of Whitchurch) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. I think it would be helpful if I first clarify where the law stands on this.

On Amendment 101B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, let me make it clear that religious and philosophical beliefs are already protected by the Equality Act 2010, including in the workplace. However, political belief—in the sense of a party-political affiliation or opinion—was not included as a protected characteristic in the Equality Act 2010. The noble Lord referred to the Grainger case. That case and the definition that the noble Lord read out referred to the issue of philosophical belief, which is already protected by the Act.

In 2015-16, the Equality and Human Rights Commission reviewed whether Great Britain’s equality and human rights legal framework sufficiently protects individuals with a religion or belief and the distinction of a religion or belief organisation while balancing the rights of others protected under the Equality Act 2010. The review found that the definition of religion or belief in the Equality Act is sufficiently broad to ensure wide protection for many religions or beliefs. It recommended no change to the definition of religion or belief or to the approach that the court should take in deciding whether any particular belief is protected under the Act.

We are not convinced that a political opinion or affiliation should be specifically protected by amendment to the Equality Act 2010 in contrast to other religions or beliefs. The extent of protected beliefs has been developed in case law, and we have not been presented with strong evidence that any legislative amendment is necessary. The amendment the noble Lord is proposing would potentially cause legal uncertainty over its relationship to the protected characteristic of religion or belief in Section 10 of the Equality Act, which has a much wider application than just the workplace.

The Government frequently receive calls for new protected characteristics—there have been over 21 suggested to date. While some of these carry merit, it simply would not be practical to include these all in the legislation, which would quickly become unmanageable for employers and service providers to follow, and for courts and tribunals to process and judge.

The noble Lord referred to the European Convention on Human Rights. The courts and tribunals will always be required to balance competing rights on the facts of a particular case, including the rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and freedom of expression under Articles 9 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as academic freedom.

Noble Lords have referred to a number of individual cases. They will appreciate that I cannot comment on individual cases. However, I can assure them that free speech is a cornerstone of British values. We are firmly committed to upholding the right of freedom of expression, which is protected by Article 10. I also absolutely agree with my noble friend Lord Monks that, in many cases—and preferably in all cases—it is ideal for these issues to be resolved by common sense at the workplace.

Turning to Amendment 141A, I seek to reassure the noble Lord that further legislative provision on this matter is not needed. Through the Bill, the Government are creating a day one right against unfair dismissal. As the noble Lord, Lord Young, acknowledged in his explanatory statement, additional protections for employees already exist under Section 108(4) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, which currently ensures that claims for unfair dismissal on the grounds of political opinion or affiliation are not subject to any qualification period. I can reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, that, while dismissal on the grounds of political beliefs and affiliations is not automatically unfair, if brought to a tribunal, the tribunal could find that it was unfair based on the circumstances at hand.

As we have said, these issues will very often have to be decided by a tribunal, based on the facts of the case. This will obviously also have to apply to the noble Lord’s amendment as well. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, that the delays in employment tribunals are a very real challenge that we are very conscious of, and we have already reported elsewhere in other debates on the Bill that we are taking steps to address this.

Relevant case law sets out the circumstances where political beliefs may constitute a philosophical belief for the purpose of the Equality Act 2010. In these cases, discrimination provisions could apply. Following a judgment from the European Court of Human Rights, the qualifying period for bringing a claim of unfair dismissal relating to political opinions or affiliation was removed, further strengthening employees’ access to justice in instances of unfair dismissal based on political views. The Bill ensures that claims for dismissal on this basis continue to be treated in the same way as claims for automatic unfair dismissal by carving them out in a new Section 108A from the requirement that any employee must have started work before a claim can be brought.

We regard this as the right approach. Making dismissal for political opinions automatically unfair, as this amendment seeks to do, would fundamentally change the way that free speech is considered in relation to dismissal for the holding of views or the expression of views that the employer regards as unacceptable. It could sweep up such a wide range of views as to be unworkable. As sufficient protection against dismissal for political beliefs already exists, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw Amendment 101B.

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

I thank all noble Lords who spoke in support of my amendments. I echo the tribute made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, to the journalist Patrick O’Flynn, who has just been taken from us so ahead of his time. I appreciate the remarks from the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, who I note did not oppose the amendments, although she was a little bit sceptical about the case I had made. I also thank my noble friend Lady Verma for her intervention.

In response to the Minister’s remarks, as she says, some political beliefs are protected by the Equality Act. The issue is that not all political beliefs are protected by the Equality Act. I gave some examples and I will give just one more: an employment tribunal decision that a belief in Scottish independence is protected, but a belief in unionism is not. There is often not much rhyme or reason to these employment tribunal decisions, because the Grainger test leaves so much room for bias, interpretation and subjective judgment. I am merely asking the Government to bring the Equality Act into line with the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 14 lists the characteristics that should be protected and includes the words “political … opinion”. That means all political opinions, not just those you disagree with.

Finally, I come to the intervention from the noble Lord, Lord Monks, and point out that Saba Poursaeedi did not lose his job at the housing association because he was tactless or undiplomatic; he lost it because he was intending to stand as a candidate for Reform UK. The association had no misgivings about his performance in his role; indeed, it promoted him. He was a model of tact and diplomacy when dealing with the residents managed by the housing association. That was not the reason he was fired. The noble Lord is, of course, welcome to join the Free Speech Union, and I hope that he does. I have reached out to Gary Lineker, not to defend him in any case he might want to bring against the BBC—which I do not think he intends—but because the police have said they may now be investigating his remarks. I reached out to him and said that, if that happens, we will provide him with a solicitor and, if necessary, a barrister.

Employment Rights Bill

Debate between Lord Young of Acton and Baroness Jones of Whitchurch

Committee stage
Monday 19th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I do not think it is appropriate to talk about an individual case, but can I make it absolutely clear here that we are committed to defending free speech and upholding academic freedom? The significant penalty showed that the Office for Students will take robust action where universities fail to do so. If you go to university, you must be prepared to have your views challenged, hear contrary opinions and be exposed to uncomfortable truths. We recently announced that we are giving the OfS stronger powers on freedom of speech. The sector needs to take academic freedom and freedom of speech seriously. We hope that the OfS report and regulatory action will incentivise providers to fully comply with their freedom of speech duties.

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords on all sides of the Committee who have contributed to an excellent debate. Just on the final point made by the Minister, the Government’s commitment to academic freedom and free speech and upholding them in universities was not particularly clear at the beginning of the Government’s term. Bridget Phillipson torpedoed the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act within days of getting her feet under the desk and agreed only reluctantly to implement some of the clauses that were due to be implemented last year, on 1 August, thanks to a judicial review brought by the Free Speech Union.

I am not sure that the Minister responded to the very good question that my noble friend Lady Noakes asked about whether the liability of employers for third-party harassment would extend to their employees overseas.

I would like to respond in a bit of detail to the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Carberry of Muswell Hill. One of the safeguards she mentioned against the overapplication of Clause 20 is that only an employee with the relevant protected characteristic could sue if they had been offended or upset—if they felt harassed—by virtue of that protected characteristic. But that is not quite accurate. You do not have to have the protected characteristic in question to sue your employer for failing to protect someone with that protected characteristic from being harassed, as established in the case of English v Thomas Sanderson Ltd, in which someone successfully sued their employer in the employment tribunal for not protecting a notional employee with the relevant protected characteristic, when she herself did not have that protected characteristic.

The noble Baroness also said she thought it very unlikely that an employee could sue their employer for failing to take all reasonable steps to protect them from overhearing remarks, jokes, expostulations et cetera made by customers or members of the public. But in the case of Sule v Shoosmiths in the employment tribunal, a woman did successfully sue her employer, Shoosmiths, for a conversation she overheard about immigration. She was a Nigerian lady and she overheard a conversation —not directed at her—which she found upsetting or offensive by virtue of her protected characteristic. If that woman had been employed in Downing Street and had overheard a conversation between the Prime Minister and his aides last week about the speech the Prime Minister was about to give about immigration, it may well be that she could have sued the Civil Service for not taking all reasonable steps to protect her from being harassed in that way—overhearing a conversation about immigration that she found offensive or upsetting.

If the noble Baroness, Lady Carberry, sincerely believes that Clause 20 is not intended to be invoked to ban banter, why not accept Amendment 88, which would exempt employers from being sued for indirect third-party harassment? We have heard the argument over and over again on the other side of the Committee that the amendments that my noble friends and I and other noble Lords have suggested as ways of improving the Bill and clarifying exactly what steps employers would need to take to protect their employees from third-party harassment are completely unnecessary because the clause is not intended for things such as overheard conversations—banter—to be in scope. But it seems a little naive to imagine that the clause will be applied only in ways that the Government currently intend. What about unintended consequences? The noble Baroness said that she was not anti-banter, just anti-harassment. I am anti-unintended consequences. If you want to avoid those unintended consequences materialising, these vexatious complaints being brought in the employment tribunal or eccentric decisions being made by the tribunal, why not clarify exactly what the limits of employers’ liability are by accepting some of these amendments?

The noble Lord, Lord Fox, accused me of erecting a straw man and said that I was trying to generate synthetic rage about the risks I claim arise from this clause. Well, it is not synthetic—it is real. I know this because the Free Speech Union has taken on at least five cases in which people have been silenced because of a misunderstanding about the scope of the Equality Act due to a belief that the Equality Act, as it stands, requires employers to protect their employees from third-party harassment.

The noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, mentioned that one of the likely consequences of this clause is that gender-critical feminist groups might find it difficult to book spaces in pubs and other venues for fear that trans and non-binary employees of those venues might object that merely inviting women with those views into the pub would constitute a form of harassment. That has happened three times. We have cases of gender-critical feminist groups being ejected from pubs because the managers have misunderstood what their responsibilities and legal duties are under the Equality Act. They believe that those duties extend to protecting their trans and non-binary employees from being harassed by allowing third parties to discuss views they find offensive, deeply upsetting or disagreeable.