Investigatory Powers (Communications Data) (Relevant Public Authorities and Designated Senior Officers) Regulations 2025

Lord Harper Excerpts

Tuesday 1st July 2025 Grand Committee

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to be here today to bring forward these regulations, which are enabled by the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, during the passage of which some nine years ago I recall sitting for many hours. The IPA provides a framework designed to protect the public by giving law enforcement and the intelligence services the tools they need to prevent, detect and prosecute crime. It also safeguards the privacy of individuals by setting out stringent controls over the way the IPA powers are used.

Communications data reveals the who, where, when and how of a communication but not, I emphasise, its content, such as what was written or said. CD is routinely relied on as evidence in 95% of serious organised crime investigations and has played a significant role in every major terrorism investigation over the past decade.

These regulations will update the public authorities listed in Schedule 4. Only those public authorities listed in the schedule are permitted to use the CD powers in the Act and therefore have the authority to compel communications data from telecommunications or postal operators. In addition to this safeguard, Part 3 of the IPA sets out the specific statutory purposes for which the communications data may be acquired by the relevant public authorities. The Communications Data Code of Practice provides guidance on the process of making a Part 3 application under the Act, which ensures that the power is used only when it is both necessary and proportionate. The IPA requires public authorities to have regard to the code in the exercise of their functions.

These regulations add 11 new entries to the schedule: the Intellectual Property Office, an executive agency sponsored by the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology; the Driver & Vehicle Standards Agency, an executive agency sponsored by the Department for Transport; the Security Industry Authority, an executive non-departmental public body sponsored by my department, the Home Office; Counter Fraud Services Wales, an organisation hosted by the Velindre University NHS Trust; the integrated corporate services counter fraud expert services team—a bit of a mouthful—situated within the Department for Business and Trade; the integrated corporate services counter fraud expert services team situated within the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero; the counter fraud and investigation team situated within the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs; and the South East Coast Ambulance Service, the North West Ambulance Service, the West Midlands Ambulance Service and the East Midlands Ambulance Service.

Except for the four ambulance trusts, the public authorities to be added are all new entrants to the schedule and to CD powers. Following their addition to Schedule 4, the seven newly added public authorities will be able to apply for an independently approved authorisation via the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office, which, if granted, can be used to compel tele- communications or postal operators to disclose CD for the purposes set out within their designation in Schedule 4. They will not be given the power to internally authorise CD applications.

The four entries relating to the English ambulance trusts retain their CD powers and the ability to internally authorise applications. The umbrella definition of “an ambulance trust in England”, which included a total of 10 English ambulance trusts, has therefore been removed and replaced with the four named individual ambulance trusts. Therefore, six English ambulance trusts will be removed from the schedule because they have confirmed to us that they no longer require those CD powers. The Welsh Ambulance Services NHS Trust and the Scottish Ambulance Service board will also be removed from the schedule, having confirmed that they no longer need to retain their CD powers.

This SI makes no change to the ambulance service in Northern Ireland and its designation in the schedule. The regulations will amend the Insolvency Service’s designation to include the Department for Business and Trade following the machinery of government changes. There is no change to the Insolvency Service’s ability to acquire CD for the purposes already listed in Schedule 4.

In summary, communications data is vital for evidence in criminal and national security investigations. These changes will enable the aforementioned public authorities —I have mentioned them in this introduction—to carry out and fully work through their essential statutory duties in order to safeguard the public from threats. I commend the regulations to the Committee.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, I will not detain noble Lords for long. I have three questions for the Minister. First, I want a little detail on the process that is undertaken by the department. Who triggers the review into which organisations have these powers, whether that is as a result of requests from organisations that currently do not have powers but require them or whether it is a periodic review that the department will undertake? It would be helpful to know a bit more about the process.

Secondly, I have a question on the powers that are now given to the Driver & Vehicle Standards Agency, which is an executive agency of the Department for Transport. I have looked at those powers and at the other parts of the Department for Transport that have similar powers. They all seem very sensible, so I support the change that is being made. My question is on the Driver & Vehicle Licensing Agency, which is another executive agency of the Department for Transport. As far as I can tell, it does not have these powers, but I would have thought that the same arguments that apply to the DVSA—around public safety and the criminality involved in, for example, forging driving licences, which are important identity documents—would also require the use of communications data. Why has the DVSA been given these powers and not the DVLA? Surely the arguments for one are also true in the case of the other.

The other area is that provoked by the report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee on the arguments around the ambulance trusts. It makes a reasonably coherent argument that there seems to be some inconsistency. I understand that organisations that require these powers must demonstrate that they have a compelling need and that they have appropriate compliance activities in place. It seems a little odd, therefore, that the powers are being removed from all the ambulance trusts in England. They are being restored for four of them but I do not understand, because there is no detail set out, what it is about those four that means that there are compelling needs that do not apply to the others. Also, of the four that are kept, only one had requested to keep the powers; the others had not expressed a preference. Given that organisations are supposed to have a compelling need in order for them to have these powers—I remember the debate when, as the Minister set out, the Investigatory Powers Bill was going through both Houses of Parliament; I was Chief Whip at the time—it seems to me that, in the case of three of those ambulance trusts, the compelling need case cannot have been made because they did not respond to say that they needed the powers. The powers appear to have been left with them only because they had not specifically said that they did not want them, but that does not appear to be the legal and policy test applied by the department. I would be grateful if the Minister could set that out.

I have a final point on resourcing. The instrument and its Explanatory Memorandum say that there is going to be an increase in requests made to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office because all these organisations will need approval to use these powers. The assessment by the department says that it expects those requests to be minimal, but it does not set out the basis on which it has reached that conclusion. Obviously, there are resourcing requirements that will flow from that, so it would be helpful if the Minister could set out the basis on which that conclusion was reached.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to noble Lords for the short and useful debate. As my noble friend Lord Jones, who I have known for a very long time, said, it is useful to challenge the Executive on a number of matters to date.

If I may, I will start with my noble friend Lord Jones, who made an all-encompassing comment regarding the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. The current IPC is Sir Brian Leveson. He will be well known to Members of this House and has served in a number of capacities, including as a High Court judge. The commissioner is assisted by a team of 13 commissioners, who must all have held senior judicial office. Together they are responsible for the use of investigatory powers by public authorities. They are supported by a body of civil servants, known as the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office, which includes authorising officers and inspectors. Self-evidently, as I mentioned earlier, they were put in place by the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. Their responsibilities include a statutory obligation to inspect the use of certain investigatory powers and to exercise delegated functions, as part of which they independently review communications data under Section 60A applications submitted by public authorities.

My noble friend touched on a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Harper, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, on the budget. In the financial year 2023-24, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office operated within a budget of £15.74 million, of which it spent only £13.06 million. That was confirmed in the IPCO annual report 2023, which was published in May of this year. I hope that helps my noble friend.

I am grateful for his service, not just in both Houses but on the Intelligence and Security Committee, and for his kind words about my service. I hope that also answers in part the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Harper—who I will come back to in a moment—and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower.

The noble Lord, Lord Harper, made a very valid point about what the process is for a public authority to be added to Schedule 4. Public authorities can be added to Schedule 4 either through primary legislation or by the use of a delegated power provided at Section 71. The delegated power provided at Section 71 provides that we have an enhanced affirmative procedure, which includes the requirement for a 12-week statutory consultation with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.

The changes being made here are, in a sense, the result of the bodies themselves asking either to be included or removed from the Act. If they wanted to be added to Schedule 4, they had to supply a very comprehensive business case that officials in the Home Office have examined and evaluated in some detail. The Home Office has then had to include a 12-week consultation process with public authorities and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. In this case, the consultation period for the new additions began on 23 October 2024 and completed on 17 January 2025. The IPC agreed that the seven public authorities had made a clear case for access, and the IPC response informed the Home Secretary’s policy assessment to include the amendments in the regulations that we have put before the Grand Committee today.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

I would be grateful if the Minister would allow me to probe this a bit further. To be clear, on the ambulance trust, given that the wide-ranging power for all ambulance trusts in England already existed in the schedule, what exactly was the trigger for a consultation? These trusts already had the power; this just changes the way the power has been described in the legislation. Further, if there was some kind of interaction between the trusts and the department and some trusts specifically asked for this, for those that did not, given that there was a conversation and a consultation process and there is supposed to be a compelling need, why has the power been left in place for those ambulance trusts that did not say they needed it?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord puts his finger on the point that, originally, all ambulance trusts were included in the schedule. As part of their general reflection, the six English ambulance trusts that are being removed by the regulations today specifically said they do not need those powers anymore. That left Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Scotland and Wales equally said they do not want the power, so they are being removed, and Northern Ireland has not requested removal and therefore is in the schedule.

Of the four remaining trusts, one of them determined that it wanted to retain the powers under the Act. Again, as part of the consultation, that went through the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office, which agreed. Three of the trusts did not respond to the Home Office in relation to the consultation and discussion that we had. They had not requested to be removed. We asked them if they wanted to stay on, and they have not responded. For the safety of the Home Office’s reputation and for the security of reducing risks, we have left them on, but we will continue to press them to ensure that, if they wish to be removed, they can be.

I have discussed already with officials that I think we should be going back to those trusts again. We can bring a further instrument forward, but I do not think it is appropriate that we take them off because they have not responded. There is an argument about whether they should have responded—that is a legitimate challenge to put to me and to the Home Office, and I am having discussions on it internally—but I do not want to take them off in case that decision was just a slip between cup and lip.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

I am grateful for that answer. I can certainly understand—and do not necessarily disagree with—a safety-first approach from the Minister. I have one further question: given that ambulance trusts broadly all do the same thing, has the Home Office or the health service undertaken any work to understand for what reasons those trusts that have wanted to keep the powers are using those powers, to test whether they are actually necessary? If they are necessary, for what reason do those trusts that do not want the powers, or have not asked for them, not need them? It does not seem entirely obvious why some ambulance trusts would need the powers and some would not.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

That is a fairly valid challenge. The decision to apply is for the ambulance trusts. They were initially all included. Some have determined that they have not used this power, and therefore they do not wish to have it any more. One trust has maintained the power because it wishes to use it, and three have not responded, so we have kept them on just in case because we do not want to risk operational errors.

The type of purpose that they could use it for may well be, for example, that an individual who comes into contact with the ambulance trust is in the middle of a mental health episode, is disorientated, does not know who they are and is not aware of where they are, what they have done or where they have been. There could be individuals who are involved in alcohol intoxication. There is a range of reasons why there might need to be access. As it happens, the vast majority of trusts have said they do not need or want this power. If one trust has said it wants to retain the power, it is reasonable that we assess that further downstream. But the determination is that the trusts themselves decide whether they want that power. Therefore, we are making sure that there are no operational risks in that.

On removing the authorities that did not respond, I am not particularly pleased that we did not have a response from three authorities—I will put that on the record. They should respond accordingly. But there is always the danger that, if we took them off now, they may end up using their powers without realising they do not have them any more. They may find themselves in a litigious position, and I do not want to see that either.

For the moment, that is a very valid challenge and this should be kept under review, but that is the logic behind it—if that helps the noble Lord.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Lord Harper Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 2nd June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Harper (Con) (Maiden Speech)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness. She started off her speech so well with her kind remarks about a speech that I had not yet given. Having listened to the rest of her speech, I fear that this is one subject on which she and I are destined not to agree.

It is a great privilege to be a Member of this House and to have the opportunity to continue in public service. I thank Black Rod and her team, the doorkeepers, the clerks and the Lord Speaker’s team, who all made me very welcome before my introduction and subsequently. I also thank the catering team, who looked after my guests so very well. I should also thank, for supporting my introduction, my noble friends Lord Young of Cookham and Lord Taylor of Holbeach, as well as my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie, who, whether or not he thinks it an honour, has been assigned as my mentor to keep me out of trouble.

Although I served in the other place for 19 years, I am well aware that this House is very different. I fear that this is the time to make a confession. In the coalition Government, the Liberal Democrats, as a matter of great principle, insisted that the coalition Government tried to reform your Lordships’ House. I was the lucky junior Minister tasked with preparing a Bill to elect this House. Noble Lords will be aware that this was kiboshed by my then colleagues in the House of Commons, who saw that it was a threat to the primacy of the House of Commons, and that Bill made no further progress. However, since I have been here, I have been very pleased to see that so many of those Liberal Democrats whom I worked closely with in the coalition Government have felt able to serve in this House for many years. I hope to see them here for many years into the future. There is hope for us all.

After the coalition Government, we had the election in 2015, at which the Conservatives won our first majority for 23 years. My noble friend Lord Cameron of Chipping Norton asked me to be the Government Chief Whip. I hope your Lordships will indulge me: I should put on record a tribute to the late Sir Roy Stone, who was my principal private secretary when I was Government Chief Whip. He served in that capacity for over two decades. A finer and wiser public servant you could not wish to find. All those who came across him professionally will miss him, but the biggest loss will be felt by his family—his wife Dawn and his children, Hannah and Elliott. A fulsome tribute was paid in the other place. I wish to put mine on the record in your Lordships’ House.

When I was Government Chief Whip, I worked very closely with my noble friend Lord Taylor of Holbeach, who was the Government Chief Whip here. He made it clear to me that whipping in your Lordships’ House is a much subtler art than it is perhaps at the other end of the building. You do not have the same tools at your disposal. However, I did not realise quite how different it was until I sat in on my first few sessions of Oral Questions here. I marvelled at the magical abilities of the pen of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, which is amazingly able to select who can speak when there is a clash. I felt a certain level of envy that I did not have that power when I was the Government Chief Whip at the other end of the building. I suspect that his pen is authoritative, because noble Lords think that he exercises it with a certain amount of fairness and judiciousness. I hope that level of fairness extends, perhaps especially, to those of us who have been Chief Whips, so that we get a fair crack of the whip.

Turning to the subject matter at hand, I have some experience in this, having served as Immigration Minister when my noble friend Lady May was Home Secretary. The Minister shadowed our home affairs team for a number of years. A couple of weeks ago, he referred in this House to Labour having always had a very robust policy on migration. My noble friend and I were a little surprised. We had not spotted that enormous support when he was in opposition. However, it is always nice to see a sinner repenteth.

On this Bill, I will say a couple of things. First, when I was the Immigration Minister, I tried, as I know my noble friend Lady May did, to put in place tough measures but talk moderately and reasonably about this subject. I feat the Government are in danger of doing the opposite—talking tough but not having sufficiently tough measures. I will draw out a couple. First, we have seen illegal migration via small boats rise by 30% since the election and, secondly, the Government have removed with this Bill the deterrent, the Rwanda scheme, without replacing it with an alternative. There is not time now to dwell on these matters, but I give the Minister notice that I will be doing so in Committee and on Report. I look forward to our clashes perhaps across your Lordships’ House in due course.

Refugees from Ukraine

Lord Harper Excerpts

Thursday 10th March 2022 Commons Chamber

[Priti Patel]

Yes, and that is exactly what we have been doing.

[Mr Mark Harper (Forest of Dean) (Con)]

I welcome what the Home Secretary said about combining security with a generous approach, both of which are essential and must be delivered. In my experience of the Home Office, officials there who are focused on the protection of our country respond well to clear and decisive leadership, so may I check something so that it is clear? Does the Home Secretary retain overall responsibility for the whole of our refugee policy, including the humanitarian sponsorship scheme? People should know where the buck stops. When does she expect to come to the House to set out further details on that scheme?

Ukraine: Urgent Refugee Applications

Lord Harper Excerpts

Tuesday 8th March 2022 Commons Chamber

[Kevin Foster]

The hon. Lady will realise that it would not be appropriate for me to go into the detail of individual cases on the Floor of the House, but I am very happy to speak to her afterwards to see what we can do to resolve the situation.

[Mr Mark Harper (Forest of Dean) (Con)]

As a former Immigration Minister, I am very sympathetic to the need to do appropriate security checks. I have publicly defended the Government on this issue, but we need to grip the pace of this, which will require Ministers to take decisions to move things along quickly.

The Home Secretary announced the humanitarian sponsorship route a week ago. I heard what my right hon. Friend the Member for Ashford (Damian Green) said about weeks or months, but I was thinking about days. I expect a Minister to be at the Dispatch Box by Thursday to set it out. We have to start working at the pace these events require, so will the Minister commit to an update on the humanitarian sponsorship scheme on Thursday?

[Kevin Foster]

The Government will be happy to update Members on Thursday on what is happening, whether through a “Dear colleague” letter or another appropriate forum. We intend that it will be weeks, not months, before we start welcoming people into the UK. This will be an unlimited offer that reflects people’s generosity, but I appreciate that we now need to get on and get it launched.

Ukraine

Lord Harper Excerpts

Tuesday 1st March 2022 Commons Chamber

[Priti Patel]

This statement is specifically about Ukraine, and the measures I have announced today will build on the wider work that is taking place in Government. We are operationalising the schemes, and there will be further announcements about the wider work, the sponsorship scheme, and things of that nature that will be brought forward. All our work on humanitarian aid relief, resettlement and support of refugees is based on our work directly with the Ukrainian Government and countries in the region.

[Mr Mark Harper (Forest of Dean) (Con)]

I warmly welcome the changes that the Home Secretary has set out, and I say gently to SNP Members that it is important to keep biometric checks in place. I still remember what happened in Salisbury. The Putin regime will not hesitate to send agents here to kill British citizens, and it is the Home Secretary’s job to ensure we keep people safe. I commend the work that our intelligence agencies have done to give us advance notice of what was going to happen. I urge the Home Secretary to continue looking at that intelligence, so that we keep our offer flexible and commensurate with the threat faced by our Ukrainian brothers and sisters.

Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism

Lord Harper Excerpts

Wednesday 24th November 2021 Commons Chamber

[Damian Hinds]

The incident that my hon. Friend mentions is a timely reminder, and our sympathies are very much with the victims and their families and friends. I will come on, if I may, to the important point that he raises about the distinction, or lack thereof, between the so-called political and military wings.

The threat posed by terrorist organisations varies depending on each group’s ideology, membership and ability to train members. Groups such as Hamas train members in terrorism, as well as preparing and committing terrible acts of violence against innocent members of the public. We have a duty to our allies, as well as to our own people, to tackle groups that inspire and co-ordinate terror on the international stage. Although we can sadly never entirely eliminate the threat from terrorism, we must always do all that we can to act against and mitigate the danger it poses, and to seek to keep the public safe.

Some 78 terrorist organisations are proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000. Thanks to the dedication, courage and skill of counter-terrorism policing, and our security and intelligence services, most of these groups have never carried out a successful attack on British soil. Proscription is a powerful tool for degrading terrorist organisations and I will explain the impact that it can have shortly. We propose to amend the existing listing of “Hamas-Izz al-Din al-Qassem Brigades”, or Hamas IDQ, in schedule 2 of the Terrorism Act 2000 to cover Hamas in its entirety.

Under section 3 of TACT 2000, the Home Secretary has the power to proscribe an organisation if she believes that it is currently concerned in terrorism. If the statutory test is met, the Home Secretary may then exercise her discretion to proscribe that organisation. The Home Secretary considers a number of factors in considering whether to exercise her discretion. The relevant discretionary factors for Hamas are: the nature and scale of an organisation’s activities; the specific threat posed to British nationals overseas; and the need to support other members of the international community in tackling terrorism.

The effect of proscription is to outlaw a listed organisation and ensure that it is unable to operate in the UK. Proscription is designed to degrade a group’s ability to operate through various means, including: enabling prosecution for the various proscription offences; under- pinning immigration-related disruptions, including the exclusion from the UK of members of groups based overseas; making it possible to seize cash associated with an organisation; and sending a strong signal globally that a group is concerned in terrorism and is without legitimacy.

[Mr Mark Harper (Forest of Dean) (Con)]

On my right hon. Friend’s latter point, is not one of the strongest reasons for proscribing the whole organisation to strengthen the role of moderate Palestinians and the ability of the Palestinian Authority to come to a peace agreement with Israel, and to send a clear message that extremists, who do not accept the existence of Israel and want to use violence, have no place in this process? Is not that one of the strongest benefits of the proscription that my right hon. Friend is setting out?

[Damian Hinds]

The signalling and messaging are important, as are the practical effects of proscription. I will come briefly to the middle east peace process, and our continuing hopes for a peaceful and sustainable future for all.

It is a criminal offence for a person to belong to, support or arrange a meeting in support of a proscribed organisation. It is also a criminal offence to wear clothing or carry articles in public that arouse reasonable suspicion that an individual is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation. The penalties for proscription offences are a maximum of 14 years in prison and/or an unlimited fine. Given the wide-ranging impact, the Home Secretary exercises her power to proscribe only after thoroughly reviewing the available evidence on an organisation. That includes open source material, intelligence material and advice that reflects consultation across Government, including with intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The cross-Government proscription review group supports the Home Secretary in her decision-making process. The Home Secretary’s decision to proscribe is only taken after great care and consideration of the particular case, and it is appropriate that it must be approved by both Houses.

Having carefully considered all the evidence, the Home Secretary believes that Hamas in its entirety is concerned in terrorism and the discretionary factors support proscription. Although I am of course unable to comment on specific intelligence, I can provide the House with a summary of the group’s activities. Hamas is a militant Islamist movement that was established in 1987. Its ideology is related to that of the Muslim Brotherhood combined with Palestinian nationalism. Its main aims are to liberate Palestine from Israeli occupation, the establishment of an Islamic state under sharia law and the destruction of Israel, although Hamas no longer demands the destruction of Israel in its covenant. The group operates in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

--- Later in debate ---

[Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)]

I draw the attention of the House to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests, which I will return to at the end of my remarks if I do not run out of time.

First, we need to put the measure in context. The nearest parallel is the proscription of both wings of Hezbollah. In terms of practicality, our engagement with Lebanon is very much less than it is with Palestine and Israel. We are unable to talk to the four Ministries that have Hezbollah Ministers and the French are then seen as the lead western European nation in that space. Our relative position in the very troubled country of Lebanon—we have made difficulties for ourselves because of the extent of the popular support for Hezbollah in Lebanon—is significantly reduced from that.

Of course, Hezbollah is only part of the Government of Lebanon. The difficulty we are giving ourselves here is that the jurisdiction of Gaza is run by Hamas. Nearly 2 million people are administered by the local Administration, who, strangely enough, have their own security forces. If you were responsible for administering Gaza, you might rather need them in one form or another, otherwise you would find organisations such as Islamic Jihad or Islamic State providing security instead. This, therefore, is a complex and difficult question that we have to address. We have already taken a position on what is plainly the stupid, illegitimate and immoral mortaring of people where you cannot tell where the targets are, simply flying weapons over the wall, because you do not have the capacity to engage in that targeting of what would be legitimate targets under international law as resistance. Of course those acts are illegitimate. That is why they have been proscribed.

However, we need to be careful because people do have a right to resist, and we must understand that we are talking about an occupied people. The history is very long, going back to the Balfour declaration in 1917. We delivered half of the Balfour declaration, perhaps one of the great moral projects of the 20th century, where we gave the Jewish people, who had suffered the most appalling, the greatest crime in human history in the holocaust, as well as the pogroms and all the other oppression in European history and elsewhere, a safe place in the state of Israel. Obviously half of that declaration is undelivered—the bit that said it would not be done at the cost of the rights of the people already there. Of course it has been. That is undone. That is why we have the Balfour project, led by our former consul-general in Jerusalem, Sir Vincent Feen, who is working away to draw attention to the fact that the work is half done and the United Kingdom still has to deliver the Balfour declaration. There is a duty on all of us to try to ensure that we assist—perhaps for the 21st century—a great process of reconciliation between the Palestinian and Jewish Israeli people to enable it to be an example of a great moral project where people come together to forge a future together. That is my hope.

My personal position is that the two-state solution is long gone. In the end, this will be resolved only by the peoples coming together, with us enabling and helping that to happen. I fear that the order does precisely the opposite.

[Mr Harper]

I do not want to misunderstand my hon. Friend. I have listened to him carefully. I agree with his last point about Britain wanting to encourage the Palestinian and the Israeli people to come together and live in harmony. When he was talking about the indiscriminate attacks that Hamas sends into Israel, he seemed to say that the only problem with them was that they were not more accurately targeted to kill certain Israelis, that they indiscriminately killed other Israelis, and that, if they targeted the weapons more accurately, that would be sort of okay. Did I hear him correctly? I fear that I may have misunderstood him but can he put me right? If that is so, I find that an offensive and extraordinary thing to say.

[Crispin Blunt]

Let us be careful what we are addressing on that narrow point. Under international law, you have a legal right to resist. Not only is the use of those weapons unlawful because they are untargeted and indiscriminate; it is also fantastically stupid because it gives the Israelis’ argument about the threat they face from the Palestinian people its raison d’être. I deplore violence of any kind from the Palestinians because they are going to get smashed if they try to resist under international law. It is completely the wrong thing to do. That is why I want to work to give Palestinians assistance in finding a route to justice through using the law and the moral and legal authority that the Palestinian position has. Violence is a road to nowhere. That is why it ought to be condemned in terms of practicality as well as under the law where use of it is indiscriminate. But there is a position where resistance is allowed. For me, that “but” is wholly qualified by its stupidity, its inappropriateness and its uselessness in furthering the Palestinian cause. However, let us get back to the balance between the two sides.

The Israelis have been in gross breach of the fourth Geneva convention ever since the occupation of the territories in 1967, and the ensuing settlements are a grievous breach of international law. What has the United Kingdom done about it? What is the United Kingdom going to do about it? This is building the two-state solution out of existence; it is also taking territory that does not belong to Israel in a way that is proscribed by the Geneva conventions that came into force after the second world war.

Let us look at the contemporary position. Six non-governmental organisations have been proscribed by Israel. As I understand it, no evidence has yet been given to the British Government as to why that has happened. Why not? United Nations Relief and Works Agency funding from the United Kingdom is going from £70 million to £20 million, which puts a huge responsibility on civil society to try to make up the difference because of the desperate, desperate situation in Gaza. What will the motion do? It will have a terrible, chilling effect on putting anything into Gaza, because Gaza is administered by the organisation that we are about to proscribe.

Health Measures at UK Borders

Lord Harper Excerpts

Wednesday 27th January 2021 Commons Chamber

[Priti Patel]

I mentioned in my statement that the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Department of Health and Social Care are now supporting other countries around the world when it comes to gene sequencing and genomic testing capabilities, which will help to identify new strains and new variants. That is important, because it is a vital step in the global response, in terms of not just protecting our public here but identifying new and dangerous strains that could go around the world and then come to the UK.

[Mr Mark Harper (Forest of Dean) (Con)]

I welcome the proportionate nature of the Home Secretary’s statement. May I take her back to the question I asked her during the urgent question yesterday? Given that these measures are to deal with the risk of a new strain of the virus coming to the United Kingdom that might not be susceptible to the vaccine, and given that the UK chief scientific adviser said that the virus will be with us forever, is this a permanent regime, with countries being added to and taken off the red list as appropriate? If it is not permanent, what is the trigger for removing it in the future?

[Priti Patel]

My right hon. Friend asks a very important question. In terms of permanency, we are living with this virus; that is a fact. In better news, we are just weeks away from seeing people who have had the vaccine develop immunity, so circumstances are changing. We have known throughout this situation that things change, so we keep all our measures under review—whether it is changes to travel bans for specific countries or other measures, they will always be under review. The Government will not hesitate to take measures when it comes to preventing a new strain from coming to the United Kingdom once it has been identified and making sure that we take the right measures to protect the public. As I have said a number of times, at every stage we will keep the House informed and, importantly, we will make sure that advice is communicated to the British public, so that when things change, including at the border, they are kept informed.

UK Border: Covid Protections

Lord Harper Excerpts

Tuesday 26th January 2021 Commons Chamber

[Priti Patel]

Throughout the pandemic, all decisions have been made by looking at scientific advice, and the right hon. Gentleman will be well aware of that, and it is no different when it comes to protective measures at the border. He heard me speak about shutting the border when the mutant strain from Denmark was prevalent, and taking action around flights from South Africa and other countries, which was absolutely right. That was based on scientific advice, much of which has also been put out in the public domain.

[Mr Mark Harper (Forest of Dean) (Con)]

I recognise that the Home Secretary cannot talk about measures that are being discussed at the moment, but I hope that she can assure the House that, if decisions are taken today, as we expect, a Minister will be appearing at the Dispatch Box tomorrow to update the House on those measures. May I just ask her this: given that the chief scientific adviser has said that coronavirus will be with us “forever”, are the measures that are being contemplated expected to be permanent to deal with that permanent risk of a mutating variant of the virus that the vaccine cannot deal with, or temporary?

[Priti Patel]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his important question. First, all announcements were made both in the conventional way and to the House, as Mr Speaker would expect. Secondly, as my right hon. Friend will understand, measures are always under review. Decisions will be taken through the consultative process within Government based on evidence, based on discussions and based on a number of facts. The virus, of course, is changing, although it is still with us. The vaccine roll-out is a new element, a new consideration, in terms of the nature of the measures that are being taken. It is fair to say that there has been a layered approach with these measures. As we have seen, there has been escalation and de-escalation. Right now, we have escalated the measures through the banning of the travel corridors, so these measures will be under review. Naturally, as the roll-out progresses, new strains may or may not materialise internationally. We will obviously have to take everything into consideration when it comes to permanency or the timetabling of the application of certain measures.

Channel Crossings in Small Boats

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Wednesday 2nd September 2020 Commons Chamber

[Chris Philp]

I have already pointed out that there are safe and legal routes into the United Kingdom. In addition to the vulnerable persons resettlement scheme that I have referenced already, which ran very successfully from 2015, there was also the vulnerable children’s resettlement scheme, the gateway scheme and, of course, the Dubs scheme—a commitment that we met in full. Many people claim asylum having arrived in this country on a visa as well, so the safe routes that the hon. Member describes do exist already.

Let me emphasise once again that the people making these crossings on small boats are leaving a safe European country—France—having often travelled previously through countries such as Germany and Italy, which are also safe countries with an asylum system. If these people’s principal concern is to secure protection from persecution, they have had ample opportunity to do so long before getting on one of these dangerous boats.

[Mr Mark Harper (Forest of Dean) (Con)]

Having had some responsibility in the past for the immigration system, I know how complex this particular subject is, so may I press the Minister on two points? First, I urge him to discourage economic migrants. If we were to improve our asylum decision-making speed, that would discourage them. Secondly, I urge him to use our development assistance, which the shadow Home Secretary mentioned, to focus on the source countries to ensure that people are not leaving for economic reasons and have more reason to stay at home. In that way, our 0.7% development assistance can help our national security as well.

[Chris Philp]

My right hon. Friend has a long track record of distinguished service in this area. I completely agree with his point about overseas aid. This country is the only G7 country meeting the 0.7% of GNI commitment, and that is part of our efforts to help source countries to develop economically. As he clearly laid out, that will reduce the economic incentive to migrate.

Operation Midland Independent Report

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Monday 7th October 2019 Commons Chamber

[Kit Malthouse]

The hon. and learned Lady raises an important point about the continuing confidence of victims to come forward. As she quite rightly says, false allegations not only betray those against whom the allegations are made, but those who come afterwards with similar allegations, who will naturally feel, in the wake of a large and difficult situation like this, that they are less likely to be believed. That is absolutely not the case, and we will do our best as a Government to continue the increase in public confidence, which has seen a significant rise in the number of historical allegations of child sexual abuse, into which an inquiry is under way already. People should have no fear that they will not be taken seriously.

The Home Secretary has commissioned an inspection of the Met police to ensure that it is learning lessons and embedding exactly the measures to which the hon. and learned Lady aspires. Once that concludes, the inspector will no doubt make a report available to the House, and I would be more than happy to come and update the House in the future.

[Mr Mark Harper (Forest of Dean) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry). I cannot say that on many occasions, but I agreed with every point that she made on this occasion. Following on from one of her points, the Sir Richard Henriques report is very critical of the then Deputy Assistant Commissioner Steve Rodhouse. The public will be surprised to learn that he is now the director general of operations in the National Crime Agency—an organisation for which the Minister has direct ministerial accountability. Does he have full confidence in Mr Rodhouse in that position? If so, will he tell the House why?

[Kit Malthouse]

I am sure that my right hon. Friend will understand that it is extremely important for credibility and trust in policing in this country not only that the police service is operationally independent, but that the organisations charged with its discipline and governance and for investigating complaints exactly such as this are also deemed to be independent. He will know that the IOPC, which is charged with that duty, has found no reason to conduct any action against that particular police officer. It would be inappropriate for me, as a Minister of the Crown, to intervene to countermand or to criticise that investigation in any way. However, both the Home Secretary and I will be carefully considering both the Henriques report and the IOPC report that came out this morning and what our next steps should be.