Debates between Neil Parish and David Lidington during the 2015-2017 Parliament

Iranian Nuclear Programme

Debate between Neil Parish and David Lidington
Thursday 2nd July 2015

(8 years, 11 months ago)

Westminster Hall
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David Lidington Portrait The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
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I, too, welcome you to the Chair, Mr Amess. I congratulate the hon. Member for Dudley North (Ian Austin) on securing this debate. I thank my hon. Friends the Members for Tiverton and Honiton (Neil Parish) and for Central Suffolk and North Ipswich (Dr Poulter) for their contributions, and the two Opposition Front-Bench spokesmen for theirs.

It will be no surprise that I am unable to speculate about quite a few details, because negotiations are continuing in Vienna today. Although all questions asked during the debate were perfectly reasonable, many can only be answered if and when there is a final agreement between the E3+3 and Iran. At present, there is an interim agreement—the so-called Lausanne parameters—and ongoing negotiations. The Foreign Secretary is in Vienna today to take forward conversations with the Iranian negotiators, having met his five counterparts a few days ago.

I can tell the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) that throughout this process, which it is fair to say has commanded broadly bipartisan support under successive Governments, Foreign Office Ministers have sought to keep Parliament informed about negotiations, and we will certainly continue to do so. I expect that, in the event of a final agreement being reached, a statement to Parliament will be made by the Foreign Secretary or another Minister, so that Members have the chance to see the detail of what was agreed.

When we and our E3+3 partners and Iran agreed the key parameters for a comprehensive agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme on 2 April, we set ourselves a deadline for reaching a final deal. That deadline passed on Tuesday, as hon. Members mentioned, without an agreement being reached, but that does not mean that the process has definitively ended in failure. It demonstrates our resolve not to be hurried into an unsatisfactory agreement on the substance, including on the vital technical details—I accept what Members from all parties said about consideration of the technical details being essential to any judgment about the nature of a final deal, should one be secured. It is important that all sides have the assurances they need and that we get those details right. We have to be confident that any deal is verifiable, durable and addresses our concerns fully. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman: substance is the key to this, not any particular question of timing.

All parties remain committed to achieving a deal. Nobody wants another long extension, so the interim agreement—the joint plan of action—has been extended for seven days to allow negotiations to continue.

Just over two weeks ago, the House debated these issues, and the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood), replied on behalf of the Government. I have picked up from this debate, as I did from the record of the previous one, that hon. Members in various political parties are concerned about the detail and worry that Iran might be granted too many concessions.

Although I cannot give a running commentary on the detail of the negotiations, I reiterate my strongest possible assurance on behalf of the whole Government that we will not do a bad deal. Any deal must achieve the Government’s prime objective of preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. That means more than just a verbal or written commitment: it means the inclusion of detailed undertakings by Iran that are sufficient to give us confidence that their nuclear programme will be entirely peaceful. Anything less is completely unacceptable.

We have an historic opportunity to find a solution to a long-standing source of tension, instability and global concern that, if unresolved, will undoubtedly threaten our security and that of our partners. In a week when we have seen tragic violence and bloodshed in the wider region, we should reflect on how much progress we have made towards reaching a solution through peaceful, diplomatic and negotiated means. A great deal is at stake—for this country, for our partners and for the people of Iran.

Let me give a bit more detail on the parameters within which we hope to agree a deal and its implications for Iran, for the region, and for the UK. In addressing the Lausanne parameters, I hope that I will answer at least some of the questions and concerns raised during this debate.

The parameters for a deal agreed in Lausanne are a sound basis for what could be a very good deal that is durable, verifiable and addresses our concerns about proliferation. Under the Lausanne interim agreement, Iran’s enrichment capacity, enrichment level and enriched uranium stockpile would all be limited, and the facility at Natanz would be Iran’s sole location for enrichment.

Hon. Members mentioned research and development capability. Iran’s research and development on centrifuges will be carried out under the Lausanne parameters, based on mutually agreed details relating to scope and schedule. When I say “mutually agreed”, I mean agreed not just by Iran, but by Iran and the six international partners with whom it is negotiating. The Lausanne deal also requires the Arak heavy water research reactor to be redesigned and modernised to exclude production of weapons-grade plutonium. Taken together, these measures will ensure that Iran’s break-out time—the time taken to produce sufficient fissile material for a nuclear device, should Iran ever attempt to do so—will be extended to at least 12 months.

A robust and credible regime for monitoring compliance by Iran will be put in place under the Lausanne parameters. Iran would need to implement the modified code 3.1 and the additional protocol to the comprehensive safeguards agreement. The International Atomic Energy Agency must be able to use the best modern monitoring technologies and have enhanced access to sites to make sure that if Iran ever tried to break out towards a nuclear weapon, the international community would be alerted and have sufficient time to respond.

Neil Parish Portrait Neil Parish
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What faith have we that this agreement, which should deal with enhanced access to nuclear sites in Iran, will happen? We have had agreements like this before, but still have not had access to the sites.

David Lidington Portrait Mr Lidington
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I want to say a little bit more about access in a few moments, but to answer my hon. Friend directly, questions about access and verification lie at the heart of the detailed negotiations going on today. Unless we and our partners are satisfied that the IAEA will have the access that it believes it needs, there will not be a final agreement.