Report of the Iraq Inquiry

Debate between Tobias Ellwood and Julian Lewis

Thursday 14th July 2016 Commons Chamber

[Dr Lewis]

The answer to the second question is easy. What happened during those 13 years was the appearance on the international stage, in September 2001, of a group that had been around for a long time but had not previously succeeded in killing 3,000 people in the heart of New York and Washington DC. [Interruption.] Therefore, the issue at question, as we often hear quite rightly said in debates about international terrorism, was that the traditional policy—the technique of containment, which is usually the best technique to deal with rogue regimes that have weapons stocks—could no longer apply under the circumstances. It was feared that if an international terrorist organisation was, for any reason, supplied with a substance such as anthrax, rational deterrence would be ineffective in preventing the organisation from using it, no matter how suicidally.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr Tobias Ellwood)]

Given the role that my right hon. Friend plays as Chairman of the Defence Committee, I wonder whether he could qualify the statement that he has just made, which caused a reaction in the House. He suggested that somehow the events of 9/11 created a different scenario in Iraq. Does he not agree with me that in 2003, al-Qaeda was not present in Iraq, and therefore the relationship between 9/11 and Iraq, unlike Afghanistan, cannot be made?

[Dr Lewis]

I do agree that al-Qaeda was not present in Iraq at the time, but that is not the point that I was making. The point that I was making was that the west was in a major stand-off with Saddam Hussein, and people use other groups and organisations for their own ends. The danger was—the then Prime Minister said this at the time, and it is what convinced me to support him—that Saddam Hussein might, for reasons of his own, decide to make some of these weapons available to certain groups, not because he was allied to such groups but because he and al-Qaeda shared a common enemy in the west.

I want to move on. Some Members will agree with what I have said, and others will not. Let me continue with the second branch of my remarks, and then it will be for other Members to put their own perspective on the matter. I hasten to add that although my chairmanship of the Defence Committee has been referred to a number of times, I am, of course, speaking entirely on my own behalf as someone who was here at the time and took part in the debate and the vote.

When I look back at those circumstances, I say to myself that the primary reason why I supported and spoke in favour of military action was that I believed what I was told by the then Labour Government about the possession of anthrax and other weapons of mass destruction by Saddam Hussein. But here is where I have to make a major admission. At the back of my mind, and at the back, I believe, of many other hon. Members’ minds, was a second belief. It was the belief that if Saddam Hussein were removed, we might see the emergence of some form of democracy in Iraq. I was profoundly mistaken in that belief. From looking at the scenario as it developed, it is quite clear that what emerged was not any form of democracy; instead, there re-emerged the mutual hatreds between different branches of fundamentalist Islam that has led to bitter conflict for more than 1,000 years.

That was the lesson I drew from the Iraq war. It is also why, when it subsequently became clear that the same scenario would be played out in other theatres for the same sort of reasons—in particular, in relation to Syria in August 2013—I was determined not to make the same mistake again. Along with 29 other right hon. and hon. Members of the Conservative party and nine Liberal Democrats, I therefore voted not to take the same sort of action against President Assad as we had taken against Saddam Hussein. I remember hearing exactly the same sort of arguments in favour of removing Assad as everyone now accepts had been inadequate arguments for removing Saddam Hussein.

Members who feel strongly that it was the wrong thing to do in 2003 ought to check what the consequences have been of not taking the same sort of step in 2013. Since 2013 huge bloodletting has continued in Syria, but many of us still argue that if the choice is between an authoritarian dictatorship and totalitarian civil conflict engaged in by people who believe that suicide terrorism is the answer to the world’s problems and the fastest route to paradise, we should appreciate that very often there are no simple or easy answers in such dilemmas.

Saudi Arabia

Debate between Tobias Ellwood and Julian Lewis

Tuesday 5th January 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Ellwood]

I think I have answered that question very clearly. We do not differentiate in respect of our arms sales; they very much go hand in hand, and we do exert influence behind the scenes, not just in Saudi Arabia, but in other countries. I am sorry that things are not as in the public domain as the hon. Gentleman would like.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

It can never be said too often that in highly contested areas of this sort one often has to choose the lesser of two evils. The Minister has painted a convincing picture of the way in which important intelligence tip-offs against Daesh are furnished to this country, but can he use his and the Government’s influence to say to the Saudis that their protestations of opposition to Daesh would carry more weight if there were less support from Saudi Arabia for the spreading of extreme Wahabist ideology through mosques and in countries around the world?

[Mr Ellwood]

My right hon. Friend makes an important point. We are facing extremism, not just from Daesh, but from a series of extremist operators, including the Khorasan group, al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, Ansar al-Sharia and al-Nusra. They have one objective in common: to harm the west. It is important that everybody recognises that we will win not on the battlefield, but by winning hearts and minds. Nothing is more important than countries such as Saudi Arabia recognising the work it can do, which it is starting to do, in persuading the extremists and everybody else who might be encouraged to join those extremists that that is not what Islam is all about.