Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

Viscount Camrose Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 1st September 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Harding of Winscombe (Con)]

My Lords, if I may, I will reiterate points that the noble Lord, Lord Birt, has made. A number of us are struggling to keep up. Much of what the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, said made a lot of sense, but I certainly do not feel sufficiently sighted on the amendments and I would like to request from the Minister a proper briefing as soon as we possibly can. We have multiple days in Committee and I feel that we will keep going round the issue of how AI is being addressed in the Bill. At the core, we are all trying to stand on both sides of the fence: we are very nervous of these powers, which appear to have been snuck in without much scrutiny, but, on the other hand, at Second Reading many of us were clear that we want to see AI captured in the Bill. I am very much in two minds and would welcome a proper briefing from the experts.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness the Minister for introducing this debate and for her helpful advance briefings on these amendments. I also welcome all noble Lords back for what, I am sure, will be a productive Committee stage. It is worth noting at the start of Committee that, sadly, our cyber adversaries did not take the summer off. In July, a small power generator was attacked and, in August, an attack on Manchester Airports Group compromised the data of 8.7 million of its customers.

That said, I begin by saying that we on these Benches support the intention behind the Government’s amendments. I absolutely recognise the concerns expressed by all the other speakers thus far; procedurally, this is a very unusual way to go about it, but we support the intention. We have been calling for an increase in the scope of the Bill and for cyber security measures to be undertaken by businesses and individuals, rather than the Government, where possible. We feel that these new amendments go some way to achieving that.

However, while we support the intentions, the context around them remains challenging. The difficulty that we face when trying to scrutinise and improve this Bill—and I am sure that we will return to this—is that it essentially exists, at least for now, in a vacuum. The Government’s goals are the right ones and their intentions seem to be clear, but we lack the overall holistic framework that is so important for systemic, strategic approaches to cyber security. Perhaps when the Minister stands up she can provide an update on the publication date of the national cyber action plan because, as I said at Second Reading, a cyber Bill can stand or fall only in the context of an overall cyber defence strategy, and we need to see it.

Most evident is that this currently seems to be a Bill without a department. The amendments delegating and separating powers between the Secretary of State and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster reflect this. I am really concerned—I would appreciate some reassurance from the Minister on this—that the decision to scrap DSIT, the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, has left this Bill in limbo. A minimum of 30 teams are being split across at least three departments, and this seriously important Bill, which we are all counting on to protect us from enemies known and unknown, is adrift between departments. At the very least, the Government should set out as soon as possible who will have lead responsibility when this Bill is passed.

I thank the Minister for her clarifying remarks on the referral schemes that her amendments introduce. As I have noted, we support the attempt to expand the scope of this Bill and give businesses the ability to be self-sufficient. That support extends to the establishment of a voluntary referral scheme. However, this new voluntary scheme needs to have a clear and accessible framework and a timeline for implementation. If it is to act as an extra layer of security outside the Government’s immediate remit, vendors must know what they are expected to report and the mechanisms for doing so. There is little use setting it up if these are not made explicit at the earliest opportunity. The consultation is welcome, but some idea as to the form the Government intend this scheme to take would be helpful, alongside an indication on timing. I hope the Minister can give more clarity in her closing remarks. If not, I hope she will be able to write to me and all Members of this Committee.

I was originally going to make the point that the mandatory referral of a vendor outside current NIS regulations will necessarily be ad hoc and that, as such, defining “qualifying transactions” would not be proper. Instead, Amendment 153 was an attempt to provide clarity for decision-making without inhibiting the Government’s ability to act. However, given that the Minister said in opening that the Government have no intention of setting up a mandatory referral scheme, we must question why they feel the need to give themselves the powers to do so. Powers should not be granted and come into existence if they are never to be used. At the very least, given that the Minister has now said that the Government would consult on the definition of a qualifying transaction before any scheme is established, the amendment should ensure as much. The Government will now have the opportunity to bring these amendments back on Report. The mandatory referral scheme should be redrafted to reflect the Minister’s statement and be conditional on the defining of qualifying transactions. I hope the Minister will agree to this.

Finally, let me make a general point about the definitions used in these amendments and throughout the Bill. The proposed criterion of being “essential to the economy” is unworkably vague. It is not an adequate representation of the different types and scales of risks. I suggest, for example, the Cyber Monitoring Centre’s five-level severity scale as a model more reflective of the grades of threats facing the United Kingdom. I am not arguing that it is necessarily the right model, but it is at least tested and quantifiable. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Lloyd of Effra (Lab)]

I thank noble Lords for their comments, views and questions, and I will endeavour to respond to them.

In respect of why the power is being granted to the Secretary of State or the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, it is to anticipate any unforeseen machinery of government changes. It is nothing more than that—to avoid future changes that would be needed when government departments change. On the skilled persons list, I am advised that that is currently available on the NCSC website, so it is accessible to all.

I come back to the heart of the questions: why is this power needed? It is needed because, even though we are taking powers on critical suppliers, it can be the case that vendors have the capability and intent to cause harm, particularly where they have a link to a third country. That is the element I would highlight today. It is through such vendors that a third country can gain access to or control of critical systems, enabling disruption to UK national infrastructure, surveillance through access to data at scale or espionage through access to sensitive information. The risk landscape is evolving quickly, which is why we are taking action now. On the questions posed by the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, this is very much in the context of all the other things we are doing—all the other powers in the Bill, the scope of the Bill and the Government’s cyber action plan. This is an additional power focused in particular on being able to act earlier in a preventive manner.

On the definition of “qualifying transactions”, the amendment contains a power to create a statutory referral system. This system would need to state which procurements or transactions were in its scope, but, as the noble Viscount mentioned, we do not anticipate needing to do that now. The process of the Bill is such that we will enact both the mechanisms in the Bill and the voluntary referral mechanism. We will then be able, in the period of assessing the effectiveness of the Bill, to look at the effectiveness of the voluntary referral route. Should we need to introduce a mandatory route—obviously, we have done this in different areas of national security—we will be able to do so.

On scrutiny by Parliament, I appreciate that the fact that we tabled these amendments over the summer has meant that not everybody has been able to familiarise themselves with them and we have not been able to have as many in-depth discussions as we would normally when Parliament is sitting. I would be extremely happy to meet noble Lords with officials so that, after Committee, we can go through all the questions and points of detail that have been raised in this session on how these powers will be enacted, parliamentary scrutiny, the consultation process and all the elements that we have set out in our amendments.

A few noble Lords focused on AI. The power could be extended to high-risk AI models that are procured by operators of essential services. The test for using the vendor power direction does not specify or distinguish particular types of goods or services, in keeping with the technology-agnostic approach of the Bill. If an operator of an essential service were using a vendor-supplied AI model in connection with its network and information services, and this would give rise to a national security risk, it could be in scope of the power. That is very much in keeping with what I believe I said at Second Reading about other areas of connection with network and information services in the rest of the Bill and where that may apply to AI.

With that, I beg leave to withdraw—

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

Before the Minister sits down, I note that there are a lot of “just in case” elements of the Bill; to me, it feels that there are rather too many. For example, I refer the Minister back to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster v the Secretary of State. Any department is, at any time, subject to machinery of government changes, but never in any Bill that I have seen—admittedly, I have not seen that many—have both been specified, so why is it so in this Bill? Why do this now? Why not simply make a choice and amend later if necessary?

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I urge your Lordships to support all these future-proofed AI protections and to reject the idea that we will be adequately protected under this Bill with a technology-neutral approach. We need to accept that, as the noble Lord, Lord Tarassenko, and many others, including the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, and the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, have shown us, there is a huge AI-shaped hole in this Bill.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

My Lords, I shall begin with Amendment 12 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Tarassenko, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. I completely understand the necessity and urgency of taking action on these things. The noble Lord, Lord Tarassenko, set out the absolute urgency and the growing weight of the problem that we need to solve here. I have my doubts—I am delighted to carry on talking about this—about the significant expansion of and change in the role of AISI to take on these additional responsibilities. Those are practical doubts; I am certainly not disputing the desirability of fixing this problem.

Equally, we have to think practically about how this works alongside the Information Commissioner’s Office and the relative role of each. I thought my noble friend Lord Holmes set it out very well. We are going to need to look carefully at who regulates what—we are going to come to this in the next group—but we need to do so with quite a bit more information about their resources and goals and how we see each regulator taking this forward. I am afraid that there is a very much larger discussion that we will have to take forward on this matter.

Although I understand the desire to maximise the use of AISI in giving it these statutory functions via Amendment 85, we on these Benches are hesitant about consolidating powers in a separate non-governmental body. No matter how effective that body continues to prove to be in its original and existing role, taking power outside Parliament may not be the most effective way to ensure rigour and accountability. The Secretary of State should of course have regard to what AISI says and closely monitor its output, but I am concerned—although willing to be convinced on this—that placing it on a statutory footing risks diverting responsibility away from the Secretary of State. We hold the same position on Amendment 92. Giving AISI standard-setting, inspection and enforcement powers risks creating an unaccountable body with a greatly increased remit out of what is currently a vital and successful research body. I feel that that risk is too great for both sides.

Instead, we would rather see powers vested in the hands of accountable public figures. It is for this reason that we support the principle behind Amendment 84 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, which would provide the Secretary of State with the power to shut down AI systems during large-scale emergencies. It would also provide a necessary stopgap in the hands of an accountable Secretary of State while requiring Parliament to be informed of the decision taken. Additionally and importantly, it would not inhibit the growth of safe and responsible AI across the AI sector, which could be an additional worry with the pre-deployment checks in Amendment 85.

Amendment 75 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, would introduce red lines for relevant AI digital services. I confess that I was very impressed when I read the red lines because I thought that she had written them herself, but she gave away—perhaps foolishly—that they came from the brilliant Stuart Russell. Needless to say, the list is entirely sound, at least for today. We agree that AI services should not partake in actions that threaten the safety of individuals, businesses or nations, but our hesitation arises from the fact that, while their logic is clear, the red lines themselves are necessarily speculative at a moment in time, however eminent and wise their creator.

Further, AI models would have to demonstrate that they cannot perform the capabilities listed, so they would essentially be asked to prove a negative. Aside from the fact that this would place an administrative burden on the providers, as we all know, AI models develop in ways that are nearly impossible to predict and quantify. I am unclear how frontier labs would be able to engineer their models so that, for example, they would demonstrably not self-improve so as to pose

“a risk to the authenticity and integrity of the processed data”.

Similarly, I am unsure how the regulators will be expected to quantify these capabilities because, to a large extent, they are a function of not just ability but degree. In theory, the requirement not to support the development of chemical weapons might be violated by a model that simply gives basic chemistry lessons. Would that model be banned or would it be forced not to answer questions about chemistry? I do not want to trivialise this matter by giving too simple an example, but I am trying to convey just how difficult it will be to design the precise scope and extent of the necessary regulations. I worry that they currently seem arbitrary. They would be onerous on firms and regulators and slow down safe and responsible growth where it exists in our domestic AI industry.

I would suggest a different or additional approach, principles based rather than capabilities based. Ensuring, for example, that labs and associated businesses are focused on integrity, prevention, human control, threat minimisation and transparency, rather than attempting to regulate specific examples of AI malpractice, could prove more effective at serving the dual goal of AI growth and AI safety. As I have argued many times, I am afraid, in other Bills and debates, the only way legislation can keep ahead of technology is to pursue principles over rules about specific features.

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[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I first congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Birt, on what is a really comprehensive vision expressed in this group of amendments. I speak in strong support of those amendments, on which both he and the noble Lord, Lord Londesborough, have spoken so cogently. Together, they address one of the most glaring defects of the architecture of this Bill: the fragmented, inefficient model of 12 separate sectoral regulators. I think that the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, asked the right questions about how to co-ordinate and how to be fair, but I am afraid I come to very different answers and to the same conclusion as the noble Lord, Lord Birt. Cyber threats are sector-agnostic. Malicious code and supply chain exploits do not respect the boundary between Ofwat, Ofgem or the CAA. Expecting 12 separate bodies to recruit scarce elite cyber forensic talent is a fantasy that results in weak, uneven enforcement.

Furthermore, multi-sector businesses face duplicative compliance obligations across separate competent authorities in the current scheme. Under Amendments 7, 9 and 11, the noble Lord, Lord Birt, would correctly widen the definition of digital service providers to include the creators, distributors and managers of software and digital platforms. As the Synnovis pathology attack proved so catastrophically to London hospitals, our critical infrastructure is entirely dependent on third party software code. If we do not bring software and platform providers into scope under Clauses 7 and 8, we leave the front door wide open to cyber crime. Amendment 88, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Birt, which I actually prefer to my own Amendment 87, would replace this maze of regulators with a unified, specialised body, the office for cyber resilience. The OCR would centralise enforcement, establish common auditing baselines and maintain sector-specific expertise under a single roof.

Amendments 76 and 77 would ensure that, when the Secretary of State specifies new essential activities under Part 3, they must act on the expert recommendations of the OCR, targeting any activity whose disruption carries severe economic, societal or national security impacts. I entirely agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, had to say and think, sadly, that we would all benefit from a bit of musical accompaniment.

This structural foundation would enable a vital reform suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Birt: Amendment 89 would establish a register requiring software and platform providers to certify products as safe by design; and Amendment 91 would introduce annual independent cyber resilience audits modelled on statutory financial audits.

Under Amendment 90, the OCR would work hand in glove with the UK Cyber Security Council to validate and enforce workforce competence standards across all regulated entities. I remind your Lordships that Amendment 99, in the name of my noble friend Lady Northover, has been degrouped but is relevant to the relationship between the potential OCR and the UK Cyber Security Council.

This is a comprehensive but significant group of amendments that hang together extremely well. I urge the Government to look very closely at what could be a really effective scheme of regulation.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Birt, for introducing this debate and all noble Lords who have spoken. I appreciate the rigorous strategic thinking that the noble Lords, Lord Birt and Lord Londesborough, have put into the proposal for an office for cyber resilience, but I will try to keep my remarks to the principle of a single regulator.

As others have set out very powerfully, I see the appeal of having a single regulator: it is easy to issue directives, to store data and information centrally, to take a systemic approach overall and to better manage the hiring of scarce, skilled resources. That said, as my noble friend Lady Neville-Jones pointed out, it is important to see the value of sectoral regulators supported by a centre-of-excellence model. More sector-specific expertise, more direct communication with the industry and more flexible approaches are all easier to achieve with smaller, more specific regulators. At a sufficient level of abstraction, it almost does not matter which of those models you go for; it is about having resourced, skilled and empowered people performing monitoring and enforcement activities, regardless of the body under which they sit.

More broadly, the point is that, while differences between a more centralised or more sectoral approach are worthy of debate—I do not think we would ever hit the extremes of either of those—what actually matters is ensuring that, whichever route the Government choose to take us, they make certain that the regulators are adequately resourced and that they exist within a wider strategy.

I am not sure, and look forward to finding out, whether the first of those is the case. The Government have chosen the more sectoral approach, but we do not yet know how the regulators are going to be resourced and what additional resourcing needs will be needed to cope with the increased responsibilities that will be laid at their door. I look forward to hearing from the Minister on how the regulators are going to be funded, how the funding needs will be calculated and how they are going to be supported in this significant expansion of their role.

The second point is that the regulators should exist as a part of a wider strategy, which is not currently the case. I apologise to noble Lords for banging on about this, but it is very difficult to get the past the hole in the Bill in the shape of a wider national cyber strategy. Whether the regulators are many or one matters little without the bigger picture into which they fit. In an ideal world, we would review the overall cyber strategy and then debate what regulatory structures might be appropriate to deliver it but, for now, sadly, that is not the world that we are in.

The Secretary of State—or, indeed, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster; it is not reassuring that we still do not know which one—must commit to publishing the national plan, after which we can assess the efficacy of its many parts.

[Baroness Lloyd of Effra (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lords, Lord Birt and Lord Clement-Jones, for their introduction to this section and for setting out the motivation behind a single cyber regulator.

As others have pointed out, this is a question of sectoral expertise and cyber expertise. It is my view that, given the complex cyber landscape, establishing a single regulator would not be as effective as the approach that we are pursuing. Different sectors have different risks, technologies, operational environments, market structures and resilience challenges within their industries. To take an example, the energy sector has a greater reliance on operational technology—such as turbines, substations and gas pipes—as compared to the digital services sector, which is predominantly information technology-based. Noble Lords will see that the guidance on quantum, for example, differs in that respect. This is why expert regulators are needed to ensure compliance in a manner that reflects the realities of their sectors.

I do not recognise the assertion that there is a single internationally recognised model of best practice. There are very near neighbours who have the model that we are pursuing, which keeps the sectoral expertise. Additionally, I do not believe that it would be an effective use of resources to establish a new regulator, and the proposed 12-month establishment period would delay the implementation of this regime.

Finally, cyber would continue to exist within a multi-regulator landscape as there are separate regulatory approaches for telecommunications and financial services. I agree with the point made by many noble Lords—highlighted in particular by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, both at Second Reading and now—that a consistent approach to implementing and enforcing the regime is crucial. The Bill will drive this through by establishing common security and resilience requirements and secondary legislation for all regulated entities, clear guidance for regulators, and a statement of strategic priorities setting common objectives that regulators must seek to achieve. These will cover issues such as governance, skills, risk management, business continuity, supply chains, incident response, and appropriate testing and exercising. They will be consulted on, and any relevant secondary legislation will be subject to the affirmative procedure.

Regulators will supervise and enforce the common requirements while providing guidance that is tailored to the risks and operational realities of their sectors. Crucially, information-sharing gateways and cost-recovery mechanisms will bolster the well-resourced, experienced regulators who stand ready to collaborate while best supporting their respective sectors. I believe that the Bill’s approach gets the right balance between sectoral expertise and a common approach.

On Amendment 91, which would require specific organisations to conduct an annual independent audit, I agree that independent assessments play an important role in providing assurance and leveraging external expertise; that is why the current framework already enables regulators to require independent audits or inspections. However, it is for the sectoral regulators to set the frequency and nature of audits, bearing in mind proportionality and their expertise in the risks and operational realities of their sectors. We will continue to drive uptake of assured independent audits across sectors, using the range of levers that the Bill provides. That is what the current framework provides for and what the implementation of the Bill will ensure.

I turn to Amendment 90, which would require the proposed OCR to work with the UK Cyber Security Council in order to ensure sufficiently qualified cyber security professionals among regulated entities; I note that the amendment laid by the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, on this topic will be debated later. The Government strongly support the need for the professionalisation of the cyber sector. We already work with the UK Cyber Security Council and regulators to encourage cyber professionalisation across NIS sectors. We also intend to set further expectations for regulators to encourage cyber professionalism through the Bill’s security and resilience requirements, which, as I just mentioned, will be set out in secondary legislation. They will address relevant training, skills and professional standards, and the Bill’s regulators must publish guidance on these requirements.