English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill

Viscount Trenchard Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

My Lords, we have had a very interesting set of amendments so far, but what strikes me about them is that they all seem to run counter to the principle of election—be that either direct or indirect election—and we need to be very careful about that.

I have given notice to oppose that Clause 9 stands part of the Bill for two reasons. First, elections are important for public posts that require the expenditure of large sums of public money. I believe that most of those positions should be elected. Secondly, there is a huge absence of detail in the proposal within new paragraph 9 in Schedule 3 for the appointment and scrutiny of commissioners.

The Explanatory Notes at paragraph 74 states that commissioners will be,

“independent appointees, made by and accountable to the mayor”.

I have difficulty understanding quite how they will be independent if they are made by and accountable to the mayor and function, as the Explanatory Notes explain in the same paragraph, as “extensions of the mayor”. Can the Minister say in what way they are independent and why “independent” does not appear in this paragraph? The Explanatory Notes then state:

“Commissioners would not replace elected members”—


and there has already been a debate about that as part of this group, but they then say that areas—whatever an area is defined as—will,

“have the freedom to use a combination of commissioners and elected members to lead on different areas depending on what works best for them”.

Will the Minister say who makes the decision about whether elected members have the capacity to lead an area of competence, whether that decision made by the mayor alone and will the appointment of commissioners be public appointments, subject to the Nolan principles of selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership? Perhaps the Minister can tell us whether the posts will be advertised and subject to equal opportunities legislation. Will there be an agreed job description and a person specification? Will there be competitive interviews or is it all a matter, in practice, for mayoral patronage? Will councillors of constituent councils be able to scrutinise the full-time commissioners—for they are full-time appointments—that the mayor may decide to appoint?

Schedule 3 states that:

“The mayor must determine the terms and conditions of a person’s appointment as a commissioner”.


Can the Minister tell us what scrutiny is planned about what those terms and conditions actually are?

We should just note that the appointment of a commissioner will end when the mayor’s term of office comes to an end. That means that a mayor who decides to resign will cause all the commissioners they have appointed to lose their jobs, which are, as it says in the Explanatory Notes, full-time jobs. It seems that the clear implication of the wording of the Bill is that if a mayor was to quit the post, all those appointed by the mayor would have to leave. I seek the Minister’s clarification of that point, for that is my reading of Clause 9 and Schedule 3.

I have noted that commissioners cannot approve local growth plans, local transport plans or spatial development strategy, but they are writing them, planning them and will be advising the mayor on them. I understand the formality of a decision to approve a plan, but what the plan is and how it has got there will clearly be heavily dependent upon the commissioner.

I understand that:

“The mayor must obtain the consent of the CCA to any arrangement for a commissioner to exercise a function”,


but does that extend to the appointments process itself? I wonder why there is no discussion by the Government of using the professional expertise of local government officers. So, not only are the Government dispensing with the ballot box in terms of any form of direct election to strategic authorities, but they are simply leaving an election of a mayor, following which we simply have a world of appointments. I am very concerned about what that means. I ask myself, “Whatever happened to the primacy of the ballot box?” because commissioners will not be elected, so voters will have no say in their appointment because the electorate will elect a only mayor and will have no role after that. Indeed, unlike with a Member of Parliament, the electorate will have no power of recall of a mayor.

We then have Amendment 196A in this group on special advisers. I listened carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, said about them, but I have not understood the difference between a full-time commissioner and a special adviser. The noble Lord talked about a special adviser having professional expertise. I understand that professional advice is needed—of course it is—but I have not understood what is wrong with professional local government officers, with their expertise in the areas that might, at the moment, be proposed for a commissioner.

There are a lot of very important questions for the Minister to answer. The level of expenditure has been mentioned twice so far this afternoon, and the consequent level of the precept, which might then be high. We must be really careful about this and not duplicate. I remember, because I was around when metropolitan counties were abolished and we moved to joint boards, that the expertise in each of the areas of concern we have proposed was held by an individual local authority that had a lot of officers dealing with that specific policy area on behalf of everybody else. The joint boards had councillors; I was privileged to serve as a councillor on a number of those joint boards at different times.

I just do not think that the Government have gone far enough in examining how to deliver some of their proposals on, say, local transport, which used to function in Tyne and Wear with a joint board. What exactly is the problem with that? As I said last week, I fear that we have upwards mission drift in this Bill, taking powers away from established local government. I believe that to be true, but I also think that we are in danger of reinventing processes that have previously worked pretty well. I do not think that Clause 9 and Schedule 3 can stand here without us challenging what the Government intend to do because there is already a demand in this group for us to have yet more commissioners.

I am, by the way, in favour of culture’s status being raised—it is absolutely correct to do that—but I am uncomfortable with the suggestion that every area of concern should have a commissioner. Indeed, that is not the Minister’s proposal. The Government are not proposing that that should happen because there will be a mixture of commissioners, with the elected leaders of the councils of the combined authority and the strategic authority.

I shall stop there, but I hope that the Minister can allay some of my concerns around the failure of the Bill to have anything worth reading in it and with nearly everything that is going to happen next coming in the form of guidance. As I said last week, I would be happier if I knew a little more about what the Government are thinking in terms of guidance.

With that, I shall respond at some point when we come to the right moment, but I very much hope that the Minister will take on board some of my comments.

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, I agree very much with most of what the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, just said. I have been unhappy with much of Clause 9 since I first read it, and I look forward to hearing what my noble friends have to say about it, because they have also added their names to the intention from the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, to oppose the Question that the clause stands part.