Pension Schemes Bill

Viscount Younger of Leckie Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 26th January 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

If the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, had listened, she would know that I said I thought what the Government were doing had gone too far, because there were instances where there was a necessary flow between the raising of funds and that flowing into new investment.

A number of noble Lords on this side of the Room have been talking as though this Bill stops pension schemes investing in listed assets or investment companies. It certainly does not; it merely says that they do not qualify if asset mandation is introduced. We ought to be concentrating on whether this is a valid policy objective—the Minister knows that I do not subscribe to that—to get money out of pension funds and into the real economy. We then ought to concentrate on which flows achieve that; certainly not all flows of buying investment trusts or other listed vehicles will achieve that.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak in strong support of a number of carefully drafted amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and once again ably supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. I will also speak to my Amendment 127.

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[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, briefly, it is not appropriate for legislation to tell the trustees of pension funds, in any case, that they can make investments in some types of structure but not in others. It should be entirely up to the trustees, in exercising their fiduciary duties, to determine what investments they make and the structures through which they make them to deliver a maximum level of risk that they are happy to accept.

The Government will succeed in realising their target of increasing pension fund investment in UK infrastructure by adopting fiscal and economic policies that encourage growth. We will then see a natural return to the much higher levels of UK equity investment by pension funds that used to obtain many years ago. If the Government require, nevertheless, some potential or possible mandation, it is right that there should be a cap. But, as my noble friend Lord Remnant said, it is inconceivable that any pension fund manager would be likely to invest more than 10%—I would say considerably less than that—in asset classes traditionally defined as alternative assets.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, briefly, this group again underlines a central point that we have been making: mandation should not be in the Bill. Time and again, we have heard concerns about the risks of picking winners and the unintended consequences that inevitably follow. I raised these issues on the previous group, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles and Lady Altmann, have today and previously put those concerns firmly on record.

However, I am grateful to noble Lords for their thoughtful efforts to limit or mitigate the impact of the mandation power. I thank my friend, the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, supported by my noble friends Lady McIntosh of Pickering and Lady Penn in particular, for their remarks on these issues. However, our view remains unchanged and, for reasons already rehearsed at length, asset allocation mandates have no place in this legislation. There is no compelling evidence that they are either necessary or effective in increasing productive investment in the UK.

If we are serious about addressing the barriers to UK investment, we must be honest about where those barriers lie. They include governance and regulatory burdens; risk-weighting and capital requirements; liquidity constraints and scheme-specific funding; and maturity considerations. None of these challenges is addressed, let alone solved, by mandation. If, notwithstanding these concerns, the reserve power is to be retained, significantly stronger safeguards are essential: a clear cap on the proportion of assets that may be mandated; more robust reporting and evidential requirements before regulations are made; explicit conditions for access to any transition pathway relief; a strengthened savers’ interest test; and rigorous post-implementation review. The question of when and on what basis the power should be sunsetted is one that we will return to on the next group, but the fundamental point must be clear: mandation is the wrong tool and the Bill risks embedding unjustified and anti-competitive discrimination between equivalent investment vehicles, driven not by evidence or public interest but by a narrow and self-interested approach. I will address those issues in more detail in a later group but, for now, I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to the specific amendments raised.

However—before she gets up—I wish to turn to Amendment 118 in my name. It probes the power that allows regulations made under new Section 28C to include assets of various classes under the broad heading of private assets and to permit the future inclusion of additional asset classes. I appreciate the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, on this part.

I touched on this matter in some detail in the previous groups, so I will not repeat those arguments here. However, this amendment once again draws attention to our concern about the specific types of asset that the Government have chosen to list on page 46 of the Bill. It remains an issue about which we are deeply concerned, and one on which we will continue to work closely with other noble Lords though to Report.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I apologise to the noble Viscount for jumping up prematurely. These amendments relate to the level of any asset allocation requirements and the potential treatment of investments in private equity and private debt as qualifying assets for the purpose of any asset allocation requirement.

I will start with the with the level of any asset allocation requirement, a question raised by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh in her Amendment 114 and the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, in Amendment 112. Both would cap the percentage of default fund assets that could be required to be invested in qualifying assets. I understand why noble Lords were keen to table these amendments and to look for a cap. I have to say to the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, that I am shocked by such cynicism in one so young. I will explain the—perfectly rational—reason the Government have not done this; I hope that she will find it very satisfying and feel suitably chastened at that point. We do not expect to need to exercise the power, but to do so would be a significant step and, as noble Lords may have picked up by now, the Government’s general approach has been to design the power so that it can be used as a backstop to the commitments used in the Mansion House Accord. I underscore that point.

The aim has been to create a backstop to that rather than to fix a numerical cap in primary legislation. That is what it is designed to do. The accord is not a legal document, and its terms and definitions are not of a kind that could simply be lifted into statute. If the Government were ever to exercise these powers, we would need to define key terms precisely, and it is at least possible that those definitions might have some bearing on the precise percentage levels that are appropriate. We have therefore not taken the step of hard-wiring a fixed cap, although I underline that we have included various other safeguards, which I have repeated more than once, so will not repeat again in the interests of time.

In relation to Amendment 113 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, the Mansion House Accord commitment has informed the design of these powers, including the ability for government to require a proportion of assets to be invested in specified qualifying assets. I understand the point that she was making, but our approach has been deliberately limited, going no further than necessary to support the commitments already made. That caution is important, given that this is a novel—and, I discern, a not entirely uncontroversial—part of the Bill. Although we are aligned on the objectives, I would not want to suggest a change in policy direction where none is intended. Our aim is to give the DC pensions industry reasonable clarity about our expectations.

Amendment 119, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, interrogates the inclusion of private equity as an example of a qualifying asset. Its effect would be to remove private equity from the illustrative list in new Section 28C(5). Amendment 120 from my noble friend Lord Sikka would do the same, as well as removing private debt.

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Moved by

[Viscount Younger of Leckie]

115: Clause 40, page 46, leave out lines 1 and 2
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment probes the reasons behind the provision allowing the Secretary of State until 2035 to exercise the mandation power.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to open what I hope and assume will be another interesting debate. Once again, I hope it will shine a light on the flaws of mandation from new and specific angles that merit discussion.

Amendment 115 in my name is a probing amendment, which goes to the architecture of the power itself. The Bill allows the Secretary of State to exercise the mandation power up until 2035. Why has 2035 been chosen for sunset? Why is it that particular year? Was that date chosen because it aligns with some evidenced policy rationale, a defined market transition or a known obstacle that is expected to have fallen away by then? A sunset date sets the constitutional balance between Parliament, Ministers and the pensions industry. A sunset clause extending to 2035 runs beyond the life of this Parliament and would allow very broad discretion for a Secretary of State, not merely to encourage investment but to direct it, in effect, by setting targets and conditions. That is an extraordinary proposition when we are dealing with the retirement savings of millions of people.

I put a simple set of questions to the Minister. What analysis underpins the choice of 2035? Was it recommended by the department’s own evidence base? If the concern is a temporary set of barriers, for instance, a collective action problem, why is the power not time-limited to a shorter period, with a requirement for Parliament to renew it if, and only if, the evidence remains compelling? If the Government believe the power is genuinely a reserved power, why does it need such a long reserve? If the Minister cannot explain the logic of the date, it becomes harder to accept that the scope of the power has been calibrated with care.

Amendment 152 relates to the review process following the exercise of powers under Section 28C—the mandation power. This is another probing amendment intended to test why the Government consider a five-year period an appropriate timeline for regulations to be reviewed and why an earlier review has not been proposed. Five years is a long time in pensions and financial markets. It is a very long time in the life of a saver, because compounding does not wait politely while Whitehall decides whether its intervention has worked. If an allocation has been distorted, returns have been impaired, costs have risen or liquidity has been compromised, five years is long enough for the damage to become embedded in outcomes. It is also long enough for market conditions to have changed so significantly that any review risks becoming a rear-view mirror exercise rather than a real safeguard.

I ask the Minister directly, why five years? What is the justification? Is there evidence that a shorter review period will be impractical? Why are the Government not willing to commit to a more immediate post-implementation assessment, perhaps—let me be helpful to the Minister—within 12 months or two years, to ensure that any harm to savers is identified early? If Ministers believe the power is low risk, surely a quicker review should not trouble them.

There is a further point. The Bill speaks of not only assessing the effect on the financial interests of members of master trusts and savers in group personal pension schemes, but of such other matters as the Secretary of State may consider appropriate. What precisely do the Government envisage falling within those other matters? Does it include costs to schemes, liquidity, operational complexity, market impact and whether compliance has forced schemes away from diversified strategies that would otherwise have been in members’ best interests? Does it include, as many fear, political metrics dressed up as economic analysis, such as whether a mandated allocation has supported a preferred sector or class of domestic asset?

Most importantly, what happens if the review reveals that the financial interests of members have been harmed? What is the mechanism for redress and the practical remedy? Do the Government anticipate compensating schemes or savers? As the Committee will appreciate, we will return to the question of redress later in our proceedings.

I now return to the subject of market risk through Amendment 115, which is intended to ensure that any review explicitly considers two linked dangers. The first is that mandated investment requirements may become misaligned with economic conditions. The second is that directing multiple schemes into the same assets could cause market distortion or asset price inflation.

Mandation can distort markets in ways that are entirely foreseeable. If multiple large schemes are required, either explicitly or implicitly, to invest in the same asset class, the demand shock can inflate prices. If market participants interpret government direction as a signal of future price support, price movements can be amplified further; these arguments have been rehearsed not only in Committee but at Second Reading. Artificial price inflation then risks reducing long-term returns for pension savers because you are requiring schemes to buy after prices have been driven up, rather than allowing them to invest on value and fundamentals. It is picking winners and losers, not through the discipline of markets but through the blunt force of regulation.

So I have further questions for the Minister, I am afraid. Has the department modelled the potential for asset price inflation in any asset class that might be subject to a mandated allocation? Has the department assessed the risk of crowded trades in which schemes find themselves paying more for the same exposure because the Government have forced them to compete with one another? Has the department consulted the Bank of England or the FPC on the risk that mandated flows could contribute to procyclicality or instability, particularly in less liquid markets? What is the Government’s plan if mandated allocations coincide with an already elevated valuation environment?

There is a second risk: that of regulation falling behind economic reality. Mandated asset allocations risk becoming misaligned with economic conditions because compliance takes time. Requirements to hold a specified percentage in a particular UK asset class within a fixed timeframe may no longer be appropriate by the time schemes comply. Economic conditions, market valuations and government priorities can change far more quickly than regulatory mandates. This creates a real risk of locking savers into allocations that are no longer in their best financial interests.

So, again, what mechanism will ensure that mandated requirements remain compatible with changing economic conditions? Will there be a duty to pause or suspend requirements when market conditions deteriorate? Will there be an explicit test that requires Ministers to show why a mandated allocation is consistent with the fiduciary duty at the point when it is imposed, not merely when it is first conceived? If Ministers insist that their fiduciary duties remain paramount, how do they reconcile that with a policy that, by design, substitutes government preference for trustee judgment? I am reverting back to that argument.

Amendment 209 would require the Government to review the barriers that may prevent pension and investment funds investing in the UK, including regulatory, tax and fiduciary constraints; and to report their findings to Parliament. Instead of beginning with mandation then asking later whether it has caused harm, the Government should have started here. If Ministers genuinely wish to increase productive investment in the UK, their first duty is to diagnose the barriers properly. Stakeholders have emphasised repeatedly to us that limited UK investment by pension schemes is not a failure of willingness but reflects real constraints: government and regulatory burdens; risk weighting and capital requirements; liquidity constraints; scheme-specific funding and maturity considerations; fixed fees; and the economics of administering more complex, perhaps even less liquid, investments at scale. Many of those may be solvable issues but they require the hard work of reform, not the easy headline of compulsion. Addressing these barriers is far more likely to increase investment sustainably than imposing mandation, and care should be taken to avoid adding further unintended obstacles through legislation.

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In summary, the Government accept the importance of robust safeguards, careful review, and transparency around the use of this reserve power. That is why the Bill requires the publication of two distinct reports and includes a sunset clause and a savers’ interest test. The amendments before us have helpfully drawn out those features and allowed me to explain the Government’s approach. However, I hope that noble Lords will feel able to withdraw or not to press their amendments.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I will be brief in closing this debate; I am conscious that I spoke at some length when opening this group.

First, the point raised by my noble friend Lady Noakes was a sound one. Amendment 130 probes the extent to which it is appropriate for regulations to override the trust deed or rules of a pension scheme. I listened carefully to the response from the Minister but I think—my noble friend may agree with me—that this is a fundamental issue that goes to the heart of scheme governance and trustee responsibility. I know it is an issue that she feels strongly about, and we do too, because it is vital that trustees retain clear and accountable responsibility for investment decisions made in members’ best interests. I will reflect on Hansard, as I am sure my noble friend will too.

I also just touch briefly on Amendment 153, tabled by my noble friend Lady McIntosh. As she highlighted, this amendment seeks to ensure that a review of the asset allocation mandation powers takes place within at least two years, as well as within five, and of course it reflects the same concern that I raised. I also listened when the Minister said that it was a matter of judgment by the Government. I take note of what she said—I will not give a view on that but, again, we will reflect carefully on it. Despite the best efforts of the Minister, I remain with the feeling that there is not a clear rationale or sufficient assurance, but we will reflect.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, raised a number of technical and specific points. Taken together, this group once again demonstrates the complexity of this particular area, the necessary safeguards and the prior steps required, and the degree of intervention that the Government risk embarking upon through this mandation power. Once mandation is introduced, it inevitably draws policymakers into ever more detailed interventions, and with that comes a cascade of unintended consequences, as I said before. We will therefore reflect on the Minister’s responses but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 115 withdrawn.