Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill (Second sitting)

Alex Cunningham Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 18th May 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Sarah Champion]

That is very reassuring.

[Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)]

Q I have a number of questions across different areas, so short answers would be appreciated. First, Phil touched on the disproportionate impact on specific communities of minimum custodial sentences. Do you think the Government have given enough consideration to this aspect of the criminal justice system?

Phil Bowen: Very quickly, I think the proposal in clause 100, which reduces judicial discretion about imposing minimum custodial sentences, is a regrettable step. I have seen no evidence to suggest that that discretion has been misused. I am not sure on what basis that clause was proposed, and we have been arguing for its removal from the Bill. I see a place for minimum custodial sentencing, but I tend to be against anything that fetters the discretion of judges.

Adrian Crossley: Statutory minimums can have a function when we want to give a standard approach to the severity with which society regards a certain offence. My view, though, is that over a decade or two, judicial discretion right across the board—not just in this clause—has been steadily eroded, and I do not find that particularly helpful in criminal justice. Judges are well equipped to make decisions about what is in front of them, and they are well advised. No guidelines can ever foresee the variety that life can bring you, and my view is that the more judicial discretion there is, the better our criminal justice system is likely to be.

[Alex Cunningham]

Q That is helpful. I will move on to cautions. Do you have any concerns about the new two-tier system of cautions?

Phil Bowen: In general, we support the move to the two-tier system. It is something that was called for by the National Police Chiefs’ Council, as you know, in 2016. Fifteen forces already operate such a simplified framework. The concerns we have are twofold. One is that in consultation events that we have already held with a number of police forces, they strongly suggested that they wanted to retain the flexibility to issue the community caution—the lower tier—without conditions. In the existing framework, they are able to issue a simple caution that does not involve conditions. Police forces want that flexibility, and the new framework proposed by the Government does not allow that in the lower tier.

The second issue, which speaks to previous comments about disproportionality, is that we would strongly argue that it should be possible to offer the community caution—the lower tier of the two tiers—to individuals who accept responsibility for their behaviour, rather than requiring a formal admission of guilt. This is an idea that was raised in the Lammy review and has subsequently been raised in the Sewell report. We think it would be better if that lower tier could be offered to people, who are required only to accept responsibility for their actions. As the Lammy review suggests, that may encourage the participation of people from groups who tend to have less trust in the police and the criminal justice system.

Adrian Crossley: Drawing from the 2014 audit, there are some learnings from the two-tier system, most notably the training of officers so that they can refer people to the intervention that is appropriate and useful, better inter-agency communication, and sufficient time for implementation. Once that is done, our view is that this is a great step forward. We are very enthusiastic about it. This is about intervening and offering help, not just having a meaningless warning. We have spoken to charities that have actively said that these sorts of interventions, which encourage somebody to engage with treatment, can really make a life-changing difference to people. It is unrealistic to expect them suddenly to go into full rehabilitation, but it can make an introduction and open up doors that sometimes people feel are just not open to them. We see that there is real strength in this approach. We have also heard a number of police forces suggest that it would be enormously helpful to them if community resolution remained on the books. Certainly, it is currently the most widely used disposal.

[Alex Cunningham]

Q So the simple caution should remain?

Adrian Crossley: No, not the simple caution. It is a community resolution. It is slightly different and more like a contract with the police force that they can enter into to take the matter further. That is enormously popular with the police right now. Just to be clear, our view is that the thrust of this two-tier system is that there is a condition attached to allow the disposal of tier one and tier two. We think that is a very positive thing.

[Alex Cunningham]

Q It has been suggested that the community caution requires a formal admission of guilt. Evidence suggests that offenders from a BAME background are far less likely to admit guilt than a white offender. Could the requirement of a formal admission mean that BAME offenders miss out on the benefits of a caution?

Adrian Crossley: I think that risk is entirely possible; this is quite well documented. We have to look at ways to challenge that. Phil briefly touched on the “Chance to Change” pilots that are currently being operated, which look at this slightly lesser form of admission.

Our view is that we have to address the mischief here. If there is mistrust in this system, then there are two things that can be done. First, proper independently chaired scrutiny panels can look at the way these are run and the advice that they give to people when they enter the police station. I know that the Government have already suggested that that might be a way of dealing with this.

Above and beyond that is access to legal advice and to legal aid. We are seeing an attrition of people’s access to legal advice. My experience is that when people are properly advised about what is in front of them, when they understand that they are being treated fairly and decently, and when they understand the evidence against them, then they are in a position to make an informed choice.

If it is just a choice about, “Do you trust the police?” then I can entirely see how some communities would have reservations about that and even, when it comes to sentencing, well-founded reservations about pleading guilty. A system that is transparent and provides good training, a good understanding of what they are involved in and, clearly, good legal advice at an early stage, could combat that.

[Alex Cunningham]

That is helpful. Can I—

[The Chair]

I am afraid I have to strike a balance and I have to switch to the Minister, for his questions. I am sorry.

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[Sarah Jones]

Q This question is for Matt. In the “Getting the balance right?” report, the conclusion was a modest reset of the scales. There is a disagreement as to whether the Bill is modest. Can you appreciate the arguments that have come from many organisations that the breadth of powers in the Bill could have two impacts? The first is that it is not a modest reset, but quite a significant one, potentially going too far in the other direction. Secondly, you talked about the blame that the police have received on social media for decisions on protest. I completely agree. Given the breadth of powers in the Bill, is it possible that the police might be more likely to be seen to be making decisions that are subjective or political or whatever it might be, because we as legislators are not clear enough on what the police should and should not be doing in those situations?

Matt Parr: I have got quite a lot of sympathy with what you say. We were very clear in what we said that any reset should be modest. We also said that, because of article 10 and article 11 rights, some degree of disruption is not just an inevitable by-product, it is sometimes the whole point of the exercise of protest, and on that basis, it has to be encouraged. Zero protest is certainly not the aim as we saw it; zero disruption was not the aim either—some degree of it is inevitable. It is just a question of where the balance lies.

I take your point. Some of the things in the Bill we were not asked to comment on. For example, imposing conditions on one-person protests—clause 60 in the Bill —we were not asked to comment on. Some of the specific areas such as access around Parliament—clause 57 and then clause 58 if Parliament moves—we were not asked to comment on, either. There are things that we did not really look at, and therefore I have not got a judge on what effect they might have and what the potential benefit might be.

Perhaps the most contentious would be the third of the proposals that we were asked to look at that widens the range of circumstances in which police can impose conditions on protests: static assemblies or processions. It could be either type. We said that at the moment there are four acid tests. In the disruption one, it was “serious disruption” to the life of the community. As I understand it, the proposal is that that is modified to “significant impact” and so on. Ultimately, these will have to be judged in the courts. It struck me that it clearly aims to set a lower bar. Personally, when I reviewed it, I did not think the bar was necessarily the problem. There is just as much of a problem with educating and training the police officers and making sure they understand how article 10 and 11 rights can be properly tempered. It was a question of training and understanding as much as it was of where the bar was for disruption.

Interestingly—again, I am probably simplifying it a bit too much—there is quite a stark difference between London, which obviously gets a disproportionately large number of protests, and elsewhere. Senior police officers outside London—again, I am generalising—tended to think they had sufficient powers, and senior police officers inside London tended to think that more would be useful. I think that is a reflection of it.

I think yes is the short answer to your question. I think there are dangers and, as ever, the bar for measuring what was significant or what was serious should be a high one. We all recognise that. It should not be done on the flimsiest of pretexts. Again, it would then be open to challenge, and I think police officers would only wish to use it when they were confident.

[Alex Cunningham]

Q Clause 108 grants the Secretary of State the power to prevent the automatic release of prisoners who are considered to be a significant public protection concern. Some experts have expressed concern that the clause could create a cliff edge whereby an offender prevented from being automatically released would be released at the end of their term without licence. Can you confirm that that is what you understand by this? If that is the case, would it not put civilians at greater risk?

Jonathan Hall QC: Certainly most of those convicted of terrorism offences will have some sort of Parole Board referral anyway, so automatic release for people convicted of terrorism offences has virtually come to an end. I spoke—

[Alex Cunningham]

Sorry, can I stop you there? Can you explain the parole role in this, because my understanding was that it would not actually happen?

Jonathan Hall QC: Let us say I get a determinate sentence of eight years for robbery—no, let us say for fraud, a non-violent offence. I will be released automatically after four years. I understand the clause is intended to allow the Secretary of State to ask the Parole Board to look at me to see if I have become a dangerous offender while in prison. Let us imagine I have been radicalised and all the assessments are that I am a dangerous terrorist offender. The Secretary of State could refer that individual to the Parole Board to make a determination that they should now be treated like a violent or a sex offender. In other words, they will not be released automatically at four years, but would have to apply for parole. That is what I understand the clause does.

[Alex Cunningham]

Q The Bill vests that responsibility in the Secretary of State. He is the person to make the decision, not the Parole Board.

Jonathan Hall QC: Okay. I have to say that I have not looked at the detail. The Parole Board has a role in deciding whether that person should be released.

[Alex Cunningham]

Q Can I give you a quote from the Prison Reform Trust? It said in its briefing:

“Making release from custody discretionary, and contemplating the possibility that the period in custody could be doubled as a result, is not some minor alteration in the administration of a sentence. It is retrospective sentencing by the executive, a form of internment, circumventing the judicial process and all the protections it confers.”

Do you think the changes to automatic release have any constitutional implications?

Jonathan Hall QC: I will confine myself to talking about terrorist-risk offenders. I do not want to discuss anything outside my remit. If you are talking about people who are sentenced to be automatically released as, for example, Usman Khan was, if in the course of their time in custody it becomes apparent that they are very dangerous, it is appropriate to be able to make their case dependent upon the Parole Board.

As the evidence from the Fishmongers’ Hall inquest has shown, Usman Khan came out with a huge amount of risk, as a result of his behaviour inside. Does that have constitutional implications? The current law is that that sort of change, as you know from the emergency legislation that went through last year, is not contrary to article 7. Does it have big implications for individuals? Yes, it does. It is a decision that would have to be taken very carefully. Does it give rise to the risk of a cliff edge? Yes and no. As you know from the Usman Khan case, they had to be released, and there was no way of changing that.

The point about someone’s release being discretionary is that it is then open to the Parole Board to time their release, and to delay their release if they are not safe enough to be released. Of course, there is always a cliff edge. A person could go to the end of their sentence. The Parole Board could say, “We are not going to release you at all,” and then they would come out automatically. It adds something to put them in the hands of the Parole Board once they have been identified as a risk.

[Alex Cunningham]

Q Is it not a matter for the courts, or a judge, to determine the sentence on an offender, rather than the Secretary of State accepting advice from the Parole Board?

Jonathan Hall QC: It is a really good question. It is a power that will be exercised pretty rarely, I expect. I do not think that you can ask the judge who passed the original sentence to change the sentence. That would be an odd situation, to ask the sentencing judge to reconsider their sentence, on the basis of what happened in prison.

If you think, as I do, that there will be the rare case where you need to delay someone’s release, I cannot see an alternative mechanism, other than putting it in the hands of the Parole Board. You are right that it will disappoint some people, as I think we have discussed in the past. I am slightly concerned about the fact that for some dangerous terrorist offenders—people who have already been identified as dangerous—the role of the Parole Board has now been abolished altogether, because of the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021 that is now in force.

I do not think it is a bad thing to have the Parole Board looking at the small sub-set of individuals who are identified as very risky. In the course of my review into terrorism in prisons, I have seen evidence of individuals who are very risky and potentially becoming riskier because of how they are in prison. It seems right that they should know that, as a result of the risk and what they are doing in prison, their release may have to be delayed.

[Alex Cunningham]

Well—

[The Chair]

I am going to have to stop you there. I will switch to the Government side and Victoria Atkins.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Does anyone else have any questions?

[Alex Cunningham]

I misunderstood the line about the role of the Parole Board. I was concerned about what happens beyond the completion of the sentence. As the Minister says, the TPIM is used only in extremely rare circumstances, and it was unclear when that would apply and when it would not apply. Again, my concern is the cliff edge—somebody being released into the community without any licence conditions or further restrictions on their movements.

[Chris Philp]

Q To clarify, the serving of the full sentence is a matter for the Parole Board. It is open to the Parole Board to choose to release the prisoner after the automatic release point but before the end of the sentence, in which case there would be a period on licence between the release point and the end of the sentence. It does not follow automatically that they would be released with no licence period following, although it is possible.

[Alex Cunningham]

rose—

[The Chair]

Hang on a second. I think we are supposed to be taking evidence from our witnesses. Do you want to answer that, Mr Hall?

Jonathan Hall QC: Yes. To continue the thought, where someone reaches the end of their sentence, their sentence cannot be increased—for example, by adding an extra licence period. In a way, it sounds quite a sensible idea that if someone is very dangerous, when they get to the end of their sentence you should just add a licence on administratively, but that would be completely wrong in principle, because the point of a licence is that you can be recalled. If someone was sentenced to 10 years by a judge and got to the end of their sentence, and you then added on a licence period of, say, five years, if they were recalled—quite a few terrorist offenders do end up being recalled—they would end up serving up to 15 years. That would, of course, be wrong in principle.

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[Chair]

Anyone else? I will go to Mr Cunningham, you have about 10 minutes.

[Alex Cunningham]

Q Fine. Thank you, that is helpful. Clause 36(10) of the Bill says that

“In this Chapter—

“adult” means a person aged 16 or over”.

Given the wealth of evidence on maturity, do you think that the section and other provisions of the Bill that address sentencing 16 and 17-year-olds are appropriate?

Stephanie Roberts-Bibby: I go back to my original answer in which we are clear that the age in law for children is up to 18. We absolutely promote a child-first youth justice system which means that children up to the age of 18 should get treated as children, as they are in law. The evidence base in the debate about maturity strongly suggests that brain development continues until the age of 25, and indeed some evidence shows that it may extend to 28 for males in particular. We would absolutely continue to champion the idea that children should be sentenced as children until their 18th birthday.

[Alex Cunningham]

Q The Alliance for Youth Justice said:

“There is no evidence that the threat of harsher custodial sentences deters children from offending, no evidence that contributes towards rehabilitation or promoting long-term positive outcomes. Meanwhile, there is abundant evidence that imprisonment is extremely harmful to children and disrupts their healthy long-term development.”

How do you think the changes to youth sentencing proposed in the Bill will impact reoffending rates?

Stephanie Roberts-Bibby: A number of changes are presented, and I want to pick out some of those. We are broadly supportive of the proposals relating to youth rehabilitation orders. We are supportive of anything that prevents children from being drawn further into the youth justice system. That would include offering them greater support in the community, and making sure that they get their needs addressed. There is no evidence to show that punishment changes behaviour. What we know changes behaviour is pro-social identity, and giving children a positive image of themselves where they can build on their strengths, and aspire to contribute to our society and our economy. We are very clear that we would not want to see the Bill result in more children being pulled into the youth justice system, and indeed we would want to see children continuing to be referred into the services that rightly should be there to meet their needs and prevent them from offending, as we have seen in the last 20 years since the youth justice system was established.

[Alex Cunningham]

Q The number of children in custody has come down quite considerably in recent times, but it still stands at around 500, which is tremendously high. How significantly will the changes to youth sentencing in the Bill increase the number of children in custody? Will we see more children in prison?

Stephanie Roberts-Bibby: We really support the proposals and changes to remand. I will start with that point, if that is okay. We welcome the proposal that there be a statutory duty for the court to consider the child’s welfare and best interests when applying the prospect of custody test. We know that at the moment only a third of children in custody on remand go on to get a custodial sentence, which raises the issue of why so many children are being remanded in the first place. So we very much support the proposals around remand.

We particularly support the changes that would say that only a recent and significant history of a breach, or offending while on bail, would result in custodial remand. We recommend that those definitions be tightened or specified. We would recommend that “recent” refer to a six-week period, and “significant” refer to a situation where there is a potential to cause serious harm or injury. We are very supportive of measures that would reduce the number of children being drawn into the system, particularly into custody, so we support the recommendations around remand, but those measures in isolation will not reduce the number of children in custody. There still needs to be work in the community around appropriate accommodation for children, with holistic services that meet their needs. At the moment, there is a misalignment between the priorities of the criminal courts and available community provision for children’s social care accommodation.

We also think there is limited time to build an appropriate bail package. As we all know, there is more to do, although there is ongoing work around vulnerable children and reducing the likelihood of their being exploited.

We very much welcome the changes to the detention training orders, but some of them could result in an increase in the number of children in custody. It might be helpful if I talk through each of those changes. I am conscious of the time and that I am talking very fast, but I think those changes are quite significant. We welcome the fact that there will be more flexibility with their sentences, rather than the rigidity that we have now. However, there is a challenge that the fixed lengths mean that children may miss out on the opportunity to be enrolled in school, for training or for an apprenticeship.

We have some concerns that the findings of the impact assessment that the Government completed may mean that individuals making an early guilty plea may end up with longer sentences than they currently receive. While there would be no additional children’s sentence to detention training orders under this option, that would increase the capacity at any given point of the number of children in the secure estate. We have estimated that to be a potential 30 to 50 places, costing £5.3 million to £8.5 million per year.

[Alex Cunningham]

Q You are managing to get a lot on the record, but I would like to put one other question before I run out of time. Do you think the changes to youth sentencing will disproportionately impact any particular communities?

Stephanie Roberts-Bibby: We would suggest that some of the changes may further disproportionately disadvantage black and mixed heritage boys—that is indicated in the impact assessment that is currently being completed. We would be very keen to work on some mitigating actions that might prevent those unintended consequences disproportionately affecting those children further.

[The Chair]

Minister, you have until 5.15 pm.

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[The Chair]

If you do wish to furnish the Committee with further written evidence to support your comments, that would be most welcome. I think Mr Cunningham had a further question.

[Alex Cunningham]

Q Yes, in view of the fact that we have some time left. You talked about the secure schools system. How can we ensure that secure schools learn from the systemic problems in other parts of the youth custodial estate, including secure training centres? How could Her Majesty’s inspectorate of prisons assist with that?

Stephanie Roberts-Bibby: As I understand it, the inspection framework for a secure school will be Ofsted, quite rightly, because it is a secure school rather than a prison. Of course, there is a role that HMIP might play in helping to share and disseminate best practice. As is the case when Ofsted does an inspection in the secure estate, HMIP is part of that broader inspection team. There is a role for it to share best practice as it sees and finds it.

[Alex Cunningham]

Q I have an open question for you. One of my colleagues who was supposed to be serving on the Committee asked what the principal challenges in the youth justice system are.

Stephanie Roberts-Bibby: Some of the principal challenges come from the fact that services for children sit across everyone’s responsibility but no one’s responsibility. There is absolutely something about us continuing to reach out across the Government. We very much see joining services up as some of the leadership space that we are in and will continue to be in, so that children who are vulnerable to offending are seen and are not slipping through the gaps in service provision.

[The Chair]

If there are no further questions, I thank you very much for your evidence today.

Examination of Witness

Derek Sweeting QC gave evidence.

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[The Chair]

I call Alex Cunningham. You have about 11 or 12 minutes.

[Alex Cunningham]

Q That is a richness in time, Chair. Clause 46 covers criminal damage to memorials and mode of trial. How does the clause actually add to existing legal provision for these types of offences?

Derek Sweeting QC: I think it changes things, rather than adds, doesn’t it? In relation to memorials, we will now find ourselves in the Crown court rather than the magistrates court. It is important to acknowledge that approaching the issue of damage to memorials only on the basis of value, for example, really underplays the quite significant sentiment that attaches to particular memorials and ought to be recognised. However, magistrates already have the power to imprison in relation to the existing offences that would apply. It seems a little unnecessary, I would have thought, to say that all these offences need to be covered by an offence that means they have to be dealt with in the Crown court, with all the extra cost and time that that would entail, particularly in a jurisdiction that already suffers from a significant backlog.

[Alex Cunningham]

Q So it is perhaps not really necessary.

Derek Sweeting QC: I wonder whether the sledgehammer is being used for a nut here. I think you have to reflect public concern about attacks on memorials, but this may just flip the problem from something that perhaps does not provide enough in the way of sentencing options to a much more onerous and ponderous procedure to deal with something that can involve, for example, removing flowers from a memorial, which you would not have thought would be something that could not be dealt with by magistrates. One would anticipate a range of sentencing options within the summary jurisdiction and perhaps in the Crown court as well, but not the need to go off to the Crown court for all these offences.

[Alex Cunningham]

Q What impact do you think the proposed changes in sentencing across the Bill will have on criminal cases?

Derek Sweeting QC: The answer is that we are probably likely to see longer sentences and more of them. I hope that does not sound too pessimistic, but that is the overall effect that you are asking me about. That is probably what we will see if the sentencing reforms are carried into effect, because to some extent they limit judicial discretion and extend the role of mandatory sentencing.

[Alex Cunningham]

Q I am learning more this afternoon about automatic release and the roles of the Parole Boards. Some stakeholders have expressed concern that changes to the automatic release point will make an already confusing sentencing regime even more confusing. What is your view?

Derek Sweeting QC: You are adjusting the release point within a sentence that has already been passed by the court. I think there is an argument that it might make things more complex, but on the face of it, it seems to me to be something that may actually provide a little clarity within the existing sentencing regime.

[Alex Cunningham]

Q What should happen instead of this provision in the Bill?

Derek Sweeting QC: Which one are you referring to?

[Alex Cunningham]

The provision about the changes to automatic release and referral to the Parole Board.

Derek Sweeting QC: I am not sure that we have commented on that, actually.

[Alex Cunningham]

Q Fair enough. Do you have any concerns about plans to abolish the simple caution and move to a two-tier out-of-court disposal system?

Derek Sweeting QC: The concerns around that are really that it is sensible to try to reduce the complexity of this area—I think the ambition is to reduce down to two—but I think the attachment of conditions to both of the cautions that are left, as a requirement, is not necessarily helpful. It would be useful to have something that was a more general tool that the police could use, that would not turn up in criminal records later on and so on, and that would give the police the option effectively just to give what is now the simple caution.

[Alex Cunningham]

Q Would you welcome provisions being added to the Bill as it exists today to tackle criminal child exploitation?

Derek Sweeting QC: Yes. I think we have drawn attention to the fact that those are not in the Bill, so it would be sensible, we would have thought, to try to do that and to be a bit more ambitious around the youth justice points in the Bill.

[Alex Cunningham]

Q I just love brief answers—this is great. The Bill amends the 13th-person rule by allowing a British Sign Language interpreter into the jury room. I do not know whether you would welcome this particular amendment, but how can we develop the system in order to allow more disabled people to participate in jury service?

Derek Sweeting QC: We do welcome, certainly, the British Sign Language proposal in the Bill. I think that, if anything, we were slightly surprised that there was not some consultation around it. There are jurisdictions in which this is a development and there is some learning about it; there is some practice as well. It involves, generally, two signers, so there is obviously a resource impact as well. This is not just about the interpretation of evidence; someone would go into the jury room when the jury retired. That is likely to require some additional training of signers, because it is a different role from just interpreting. Those are the sorts of things that we think might well have been covered by some consultation.

In fact, in a way, the opportunity was lost, by not consulting, to consider whether there are other categories of disability for which reasonable adjustments and accommodations might be made to enable people to serve on a jury, because it is an important civic duty and the wider the range of citizens who can undertake that duty, the better. So it is the right direction of travel, but we think the arrangements around it will obviously need some thought, some investment and some training for signers, and actually there might have been an opportunity to think a little larger about who else might benefit from similar adjustments or adjustments that are specific to their needs.

[Alex Cunningham]

Q You have already addressed the issue of remote juries. I was not too sure whether you were actually prepared to accept them in some circumstances. What is the clear position of the Bar Council in relation to the setting up of remote juries? I thought that this might be a great idea if we were having a covid pandemic every year, but that is not in fact the case—I hope.

Derek Sweeting QC: I hope it is not the case; I think it is once in a lifetime, as far as I am concerned. If I did not make the position clearer earlier, that was because we were really dealing with the general question of remote participation. I think, in the case of remote juries, that is an area where we do have significant concerns, and I think we would oppose the measure that is proposed in the Bill. The reason for that I think you have touched on already: this is not a measure that has been needed over the course of the present pandemic. It is said, I think, to be effectively a just-in-case measure, an emergency measure, but it is wholly unclear what the circumstances would be in which the measure would be required or executed—put into effect. So I think we do have concerns about that.

Fundamentally altering the character of a jury trial by, as the Lord Chief put it, having the jury as spectators rather than participants, which is certainly the view he was expressing about what the impact of remote juries would be—changing it in that way is a very significant change to a very important part of our justice system, a bit of the justice system that really has public confidence, and that we know from the research really recognises diversity and does not produce outcomes that are unfair. I think we need to be very careful and cautious about making significant changes. I think, if we are going to have a measure, it should not be a measure on which we say, “Oh well, there might be a need for it at some point.” If the point arises, it would be much better to consider itin the circumstances of any future emergency, if it occurs. We certainly would not like to see remote juries deployed outside of emergency conditions. There does not seem to be any reason to do that. There is no research about that and no evaluation of the effect on outcomes of having a remote jury. Even in Scotland, where it has been trialled during the pandemic, with much larger juries of 15, it is yet to be evaluated.

We would suggest that it ought to be approached with a lot of caution. It is not a measure that is needed; we can wait until it is needed. Equally, as I think is acknowledged, the technology is only barely there. Again, we ought to wait until the technology can be factored into the mix to consider whether it is a good idea.

[Alex Cunningham]

Q We look forward to the debate with the Minister. I want to return to the extension of the use of video and audio links. In your experience, are there any particular groups of defendants who would be more impacted than others if those provisions were brought in more wholesale?

Derek Sweeting QC: Those who are vulnerable; young defendants and those who may find it difficult to follow proceedings if they are held remotely, who may need particular access to their counsel, which is much more difficult if you are dealing with things remotely. There is a raft of problems that you may encounter when you physically separate the defendant from the trial process.

[Alex Cunningham]

Q Finally, what safeguards could the Government place in the Bill to ensure that clause 168 does not detrimentally impact fair trial rights?

Derek Sweeting QC: In the end, it will have to be managed judicially. I am not sure that we need to hem in the exercise of discretion in relation to that. There are already provisions in relation to what the judge must take into account when considering whether there should be remote participation. They are very difficult to apply to juries, by the way, but if they are followed, we will find that they involve a significant number of safeguards for the fair conduct of proceedings.

[Victoria Atkins]

Q A quick point of clarification. Mr Sweeting, in relation to clause 59, which is the statutory offence of public nuisance, you made reference to wishing there was a defence of reasonable excuse. I wanted to reassure you that it is in there, in subsection (3).

Derek Sweeting QC: Yes, I think my point was really about the suggestion that the statutory offence—these are the words—is to cover the same conduct as the existing common law offence of public nuisance but, yes, you are right that there is an offence of that sort in there.