Crime and Policing Bill (Fifteenth sitting)

Alex Davies-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th May 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 50 would amend the Children Act 1989 by inserting a new section 2A to suspend parental responsibility for any individual convicted of serious sexual offences involving or relating to children. It is not in a child’s best interests for a person who has committed a serious sexual offence against a child to retain any legal rights over them, whether that child was the direct victim or not. The new clause would put child safety above all else, by ensuring that there is no ambiguity about the offender’s legal standing as a parent.

Although the courts do have the power to strip parental responsibility when it is in the best interest of a child, families and former partners of perpetrators are currently required to instigate and fund proceedings to secure these orders to protect their children. The costs for these types of proceedings can run into tens of thousands of pounds. However, under the new rule, the automatic suspension would make proceedings simpler. The new clause would send a powerful message that those who commit serious sexual offences against children forfeit the rights of parenthood. Parenthood comes with responsibilities, chief among them being the duty to protect. Breaching that duty in the most serious and damaging way should have equally serious consequences under the law.

There is wide public and cross-party support for measures that prioritise the protection of children over the rights of offenders. The new clause would ensure that the law reflected both moral clarity and practical necessity, putting children first and ensuring that legal rights are not abused by convicted predators. It would introduce a long overdue legal safeguard for vulnerable children by ensuring that no individual convicted of a serious child sex offence continued to exercise legal power as a parent while in prison, unless and until a court independently decided that it was safe and appropriate for them to do so. It would strengthen the child protection framework and put survivors’ welfare and dignity at the centre of family law.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Davies-Jones)]

New clause 50 seeks the automatic removal of parental responsibility where a parent has been convicted of a serious sexual offence against a child. To begin with, I wish to be clear that child sexual abuse is an abhorrent crime that leaves a lasting impact on victims and their families, and those affected have my deepest sympathies. The shadow Minister’s motivation in tabling the amendment is laudable—protecting children and vulnerable adults is a top priority for this Government—but there are several compelling reasons why we cannot support it.

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[Matt Vickers]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause seeks to amend the Sentencing Act 2020 to ensure that the starting point for sentencing anyone convicted of the murder of a child is a whole life order. Specifically, it would amend schedule 21 to insert the murder of a child as a stand-alone aggravating factor warranting the highest penalty available under the law.

The murder of a child is one of the most heinous and incomprehensible crimes in our society. It represents a total breach of the duty of care and protection that adults owe to children, the most vulnerable members of our communities. Unlike many other forms of homicide, the murder of a child is rarely spontaneous and often involves an abuse of trust, authority or access. These are crimes that permanently scar the moral fabric of society and must be treated with the utmost severity in our justice system.

Under the current law, a whole life order for child murder is applied only in cases involving additional aggravating factors, such as abduction, sexual abuse or premeditated sadism. This creates an unjust distinction that can result in disparities in sentencing. A child’s life is not made more or less valuable by the specific nature of the crime. The act of taking a child’s life should, in itself, warrant the strongest possible sentence. The new clause would eliminate ambiguity and bring clarity and consistency to sentencing practice, ensuring that the most severe punishment is applied to the most serious offence.

By making the starting point for child murder a whole life order, Parliament would send a powerful and unambiguous message that the deliberate killing of a child will never be met with any leniency. That would not only strengthen public confidence in the justice system, but serve as a deterrent to those who might commit such unforgivable acts. It would reinforce the principle that the protection of children is paramount, and that their murder is an attack on the very core of civilised society.

The new clause would recognise the unique horror of child murder and ensure that our sentencing laws reflect that reality. By adopting the measure, we would show victims’ families that their suffering is acknowledged, and uphold the principle that the life of every child must be fiercely protected in both law and practice.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

The new clause seeks to make the starting punishment for child murder a whole life order. I thank the shadow Minister for his commitment to tackling crimes involving children and reiterate the offer made at the last sitting by the Safeguarding Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Yardley, that if he seriously wishes to address these crimes and all the others we have debated throughout the Committee’s sittings, we stand willing to work with any Member across the House to make that a reality. As yet, no acceptance of that offer has come forward.

I share the desire, as many do, to ensure that those responsible for these terrible crimes are punished properly. The murder of the most vulnerable in our society causes extreme grief and devastation for loved ones who are left behind. Those affected have my deepest sympathies.

It may be helpful if I set out in what circumstances the murderer of a child would currently receive a whole life order. Everyone convicted of the murder of a child will receive a life sentence. That means they will only be released, after serving their minimum term, if the Parole Board is satisfied that their detention is no longer necessary for the protection of the public. Even if released—and I say “if”—the offender will remain on licence for the rest of their life, subject to recall to prison if they breach the conditions of their licence.

When a life sentence is imposed, the court must determine the minimum period to be served in custody for the purposes of punishment and deterrence. When sentencing adult offenders, the starting points are 15, 25 or 30 years, or a whole life order. Judges must then consider relevant aggravating and mitigating factors and adjust the minimum term accordingly.

Whole life orders are the most severe form of punishment that the courts can impose. These sentences have no tariffs and no possibility of Parole Board release. As such, they are reserved for the most heinous cases of murder. As of 31 December 2024, there are 69 offenders serving whole life orders in our prisons. There are certain instances of child murder that are regarded as so heinous that they are normally subject to a whole life order starting point. Currently, a whole life order will normally be the appropriate starting point for the murder of a child if it involved the abduction of the child, sexual or sadistic motivation, or a substantial degree of premeditation or planning.

Some instances of child murder may also fall within other circumstances where a whole life order is normally the appropriate starting point. Those additional circumstances apply to murders involving victims of any age—for example, a murder done for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause, or a murder committed by someone already convicted of murder. The court may also impose a whole life order for murders where it considers that the seriousness of the offence is exceptionally high, even if it does not fall within one of the categories of case specified as normally warranting a whole life order starting point.

There are several reasons why we cannot support the new clause. It is important to recognise that cases involving the murder of a child can be incredibly complex and it is therefore right that we do not introduce legislation that treats them all the same. Given their severity, whole life orders must be reserved for the most serious cases, and it is right that in other cases judges retain broader discretion to impose the appropriate minimum term in accordance with the statutory framework.

However, the Government recognise that there are serious concerns regarding homicide law and sentencing, which do need addressing. The Lord Chancellor recently announced a Law Commission review of homicide law and sentencing. The review will consider the law relating to homicide offences, including full and partial defences to those offences, and the existing sentencing framework for murder, as set out in schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020. Any changes to schedule 21, including to whole life orders, will therefore be considered in the context of the Law Commission’s review. The Law Commission planned to begin its work on the review earlier this year, and we understand that it will publish a timeline of that work shortly. It would not be right to anticipate the recommendations of the commission by introducing legislation on murder sentencing prior to the publication of its review. Instead, its findings should be considered independently and in their totality.

I thank the shadow Minister again for his commitment to punishing offenders that commit crimes against children. However, as I hope I have made clear, crimes against children are complex and need all due consideration in sentencing by the independent judiciary. I therefore urge him to withdraw his new clause.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

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The new clause would align sentencing practice with the lived reality of modern child sexual exploitation. It would make it clear that child abuse must never be a source of profit, and that those who attempt to benefit from such vile acts will face significantly enhanced punishment. In doing so, it would strengthen justice, deter future harm and place victims’ suffering at the heart of the legal response.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I understand that the purpose of the new clause is to create a statutory aggravating factor in sentencing for any individual who has financially benefited from the creation, distribution, possession or publication of any specified child sexual abuse offence. While I wholeheartedly agree with the spirit of the proposed measure, I must inform the shadow Minister that Sentencing Council guidelines already provide for courts to lengthen sentences where an offender has financially benefited from a sexual offence committed against a child.

Sentencing guidelines are developed by the independent Sentencing Council for England and Wales. All sentencing courts must follow any sentencing guidelines that are relevant to the offender’s case, unless it is in the interests of justice not to do so. The overarching sentencing guidelines include “Commission of the offence for financial gain” and “High level of profit from the offence” as aggravating factors that courts can apply to any relevant offence. The sentencing guidelines for sexual offences also include “Commercial exploitation and/or motivation” as a high culpability factor, increasing the starting point that the courts apply when deciding on a sentence.

The new clause risks introducing confusion in the application of existing provisions. Furthermore, by specifying the offences to which the factor applies, it could inadvertently narrow the range of cases in which financial gain is considered an aggravating factor. For those reasons, I urge the shadow Minister to withdraw the new clause.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

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[Matt Vickers]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The Opposition believe that the Sexual Offences Act 2003 falls short in not addressing sexual relationships between first cousins. New clause 57 would abolish this loophole by explicitly prohibiting sexual relationships between first cousins, bringing these relations in line with prohibitions on other familial relationships. New evidence published by the BBC in February 2025, drawn from new data from the Born in Bradford study conducted by researchers at Bradford University, highlights the key health and social issues caused by consanguineous marriage between first cousins, which new clause 57 seeks to address.

A child of first cousins is twice as likely to inherit a recessive health disorder such as cystic fibrosis or sickle cell disease. Indeed, in the private Member’s Bill introduced by my right hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Holden), data was presented that showed the higher risk of birth defects, increased infant mortality rates and more heart, brain and kidney problems due to recessive disorders among children born to cousin parents.

The medical evidence shows that health conditions and genetic disorders are compounded by cousin marriage, particularly when the practice persists through generations in a family or wider community. There may potentially be thousands of such marriages each year. Some may argue that this is a minor issue, but if it involves an act that we regard as deeply damaging to the potential health of a child, it cannot be ignored. To do so would be deeply irresponsible.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Again, I thank the hon. Member for the new clause, which would extend existing offences relating to sexual activity between certain family members to first cousins. The Sexual Offences Act 2003 currently makes it a criminal offence for a person aged 16 or over to sexually penetrate an adult family member where they are related as a parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, brother, sister, half-brother, half-sister, uncle, aunt, nephew or niece.

The rationale for the offence in relation to sexual relations between family members generally is the fundamental breach of trust involved in particular family members engaging in sexual activity with other family members. It is also important to acknowledge that criminal offences help to ensure that patterns of abuse established in childhood are not allowed to continue into adulthood.

If the intention of the new clause, as the shadow Minister stated, is to prevent marriage between first cousins, this Bill is the wrong vehicle for that. The Marriage Act 1949 deals with prohibited degrees of relationship for marriage. It is therefore the case that under this new clause, although sexual penetration between first cousins would become a criminal offence in certain circumstances, first cousins would still be legally able to marry. Marriage will always be one of our most important institutions, and we must, and are, considering any recommendations to change wedding law carefully, including in relation to cousin marriage.

I acknowledge that the new clause does not seek to criminalise continued sexual relations between first cousins where the sexual relationship started before the Bill is passed. However, the practical reality is that many first cousins would be permitted to continue having sex, while for others it would become criminal behaviour. The new clause also seeks to make it a specific criminal offence for a person to sexually touch a child who is their first cousin, or to incite a child who is their first cousin to engage in sexual activity, where the child is under 18 and the perpetrator does not reasonably believe that they are 18 or over.

Regardless of the new clause, it is already an offence for anyone, of any age, to engage in sexual activity with children under the age of 16, even if that child purports to give their consent. These are serious sexual offences, and they are treated as such across the criminal justice system. We consider the existing protections for children under 16 to be sufficient. Therefore, for the reasons I have set out, I ask the hon. Member for Stockton West to withdraw the new clause.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.