Criminal Justice Bill (Tenth sitting)

Alex Norris Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 18th January 2024 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire (Chris Philp)]

As always, Dame Angela, it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship.

Clause 32 introduces schedule 4 to the Bill, making reforms that are more than technical: they are significant reforms to the confiscation regime in part 2 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, to which I suggest we refer henceforth as POCA. That Act was passed over 20 years ago. The measures that we are introducing apply only to the regime in England and Wales contained in part 2 of POCA; there are separate confiscation regimes that apply in Scotland and Northern Ireland in parts 3 and 4 of POCA respectively. We are discussing with the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Department of Justice whether the reforms introduced by the Bill should also be applied to the regimes in Scotland and Northern Ireland. If they so wish, no doubt there will be amendments in due course.

In 2018, the Home Office commissioned the Law Commission of England and Wales to review the confiscation regime and make recommendations. The commission’s report was published just over a year ago, in November 2022. It contains 119 recommendations, which have shaped the measures we are introducing in this Bill; essentially, we are implementing the Law Commission’s recommendations.

Reform is necessary to ensure that the confiscation regime operates as efficiently and effectively as possible, prevents criminals from retaining the ill-gotten gains of their criminality, and makes it clear to offenders and victims that crime does not pay. We will achieve that in schedule 4 by streamlining processes, creating realistic confiscation orders and expediting enforcement.

The Government have consulted extensively on the measures for reform, which benefit from over 20 years of operational insight. These reforms will support the delivery of key objectives in the economic crime plan 2 and the fraud strategy to reduce money laundering and increase asset recovery. The 10 parts of schedule 4 contain a number of reforms, which, broadly speaking, do what I have set out; I would of course be happy to go through them in detail should any Committee member so wish.

I note that the hon. Member for Nottingham North has tabled amendment 62. I propose to respond briefly to that amendment once the hon. Gentleman has spoken to it.

[Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Dame Angela. I rise to speak to amendment 62.

Clause 32 and the weighty schedule that it introduces deal with confiscation orders and the regime that governs them. As the Minister says, they are not technical; they are substantial and important. It is safe to say that it is a matter of unanimity across the House that where people are convicted who have benefited, and in many cases made huge sums, from crime and its attendant misery, that money should be recovered from them where possible. Convicted criminals should not make out ahead as a result of their crimes. They should always know that that is what we believe in this place—perhaps they should have priced it in as a cost of doing business that they will not benefit from the misery that they bring.

It is no great surprise that we believe strongly in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, but it is important to ensure that it remains effective, two decades on, and that gaps are closed wherever they may exist. The Law Commission work commissioned by the Home Office was very valuable. Its 119 recommendations will help us to improve the process by which confiscation orders are made, ensure that orders are made realistic and proportionate, and improve the enforceability of orders. Those are noble goals, and we are grateful to the commission for its excellent work. We welcome and support clause 32 and schedule 4.

There is only one small change that I would suggest, and I am interested in the Minister’s views on it. I am grateful that he is letting me make my case first; sometimes with groups of amendments we get the case against what we are about to say before we have said it, which always seems a little unkind. I would like to see what he thinks about my amendment 62.

The Committee took evidence from Kennedy Talbot KC that dissipation was a material factor in delaying or preventing restraint orders. He suggested that we take it out. His evidence was of great interest:

“I am sure that the Committee is familiar with the power for the court to make restraint orders preventing people who are suspected of crime, and then charged with crime, from dealing with their assets. At the moment, a statutory proposal in the Bill is that the risk of dissipation factor—such risk needs to be established for an order to be made under case law, not under statute—should be specified. The answer, in my view, is to scrap the risk of dissipation, so that it is not a requirement.

In many cases, what prevents prosecutors from applying for restraint orders is that they feel they cannot meet that test. Normally, that is because the case is brought to them some time after an investigation first started. The defendants are often aware that they are being investigated, and the case law more or less establishes that unless you can show that a defendant is on the point of selling his house or moving £100,000 to the UAE or whatever it may be, you cannot get a restraint order. Scrap the risk of dissipation.”––[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 14 December 2023; c. 102, Q44.]

The challenge put to us by Kennedy Talbot KC is that although the risk of dissipation factor is well meant and was designed to find a fair balance as to effectiveness and proportionality between the individual and the collective, it is acting as a perverse incentive not to pursue confiscation orders or pursue assets. I do not think that that is what we want.

I must say, my amendment is possibly not the most elegant way of making that a reality. It would simply delete paragraph 25 of schedule 4, which relates to the risk of dissipation. There may be—in fact, there doubtlessly will be—other ways in which that could be done, and we would be very interested in that.

I am interested in what the Minister has to say in response because, if he is not willing to accept my amendment, I think it is incumbent on him to say whether he shares Kennedy Talbot KC’s concern. If he does, how else might we clear that test? But if he does not share it, why not, because that seemed a pretty reasonable point to me?

On Scotland and Northern Ireland, the Minister pre-empted a question that I was going to ask. This seems like another area where a four-nations approach would be desirable, so that there are no parts of the Union where someone is treated differently, or where it is better to base oneself to exploit differences in regimes. The Government have tabled an awful lot of amendment for this Committee stage. I would hope and expect them to slow down that approach over the rest of this Bill’s stages—in this and the other place—but we would very much welcome it, and they would have nothing to fear, if they tabled an amendment. Perhaps the Minister will say whether any further conversations are planned. Clearly, very effective conversations have taken place on the rest of the Bill, but I wonder whether conversations on this have ground to a halt. Could the Minister tell us whether this is an ongoing process?

[Chris Philp]

I will first respond to the questions about amendment 62, to which the shadow Minister just spoke. I agree with the concern that he is raising. We must ensure that the barrier is not set too high, and that these orders can be made so that, where there is a risk of dissipation, the assets can, essentially, be placed under control so that they cannot be sold—or “dissipated”, as the Bill puts it.

As the hon. Gentleman said, there is already case law that the court has developed. It cannot be done arbitrarily. The court is essentially freezing someone’s assets, or preventing them from disposing of them at least, and there should be some sort of test before that draconian—but, of course, sometimes necessary—step is taken. That is currently in case law; all we are doing here is putting it on to a statutory footing. Law enforcement partners have welcomed that, because it provides clarity where currently there is simply case law.

Therefore, the Committee could reasonably ask itself whether the way in which this is drafted is reasonable and whether the test is set at the right level. The relevant part is part 8 of schedule 4, which starts at line 18 of page 119 and sets out exactly what the test is. As we would expect, the first test is that the first to fifth conditions in this section of POCA already apply. Secondly, the critical phrase is in paragraph 25(2)(a):

“there is a real risk that relevant realisable property”—

meaning stuff that someone can sell—

“held by any person will be dissipated unless the Crown Court exercises the powers”.

Therefore, the test is set as there being a real risk that the relevant property may essentially be sold off. That is where the threshold is: “a real risk”.

[Alex Norris]

Will the Minister give way on that point?

[Chris Philp]

I will in just one moment. Then, to determine whether there is a real risk, the schedule sets out towards the end of page 119 what the court may have regard to. That includes the nature of the property and the extent to which steps have already been taken, which is only one consideration, not a determinative consideration. Other items include the circumstances of the person and evidence of their character, which means that, if they are a crook, the court would take extra care. It would also have regard to the nature of the defendant’s criminal conduct. Are they a fraudster? Are they into money laundering and moving cash around? It will also take into consideration the amount of money involved and the stage of proceedings. Presumably that means that the further advanced the proceedings, the more sensitive the court will be. None of those different factors is individually determinative, but they should all be considered. On page 119, line 24 of the Bill, schedule 4 inserts in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 the critical phrase,

“there is a real risk”.

I would be interested to hear the shadow Minister’s view on that point, and not on any other points he may wish to intervene on.

[Alex Norris]

The Bill defines many terms, and I hope that “crook” will become one such term at a later stage. It is a great phrase.

In previous debates, the Minister has said that putting things on the record may be valuable to future court interpretation. What I am hearing from the Government is a clear message that by “risk of dissipation”, we are talking about not acts of or in the throes of, but a much broader definition. That would be enough comfort to me on my amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Philp]

That is a bit of wishful thinking.

[Alex Norris]

Tick-tock, Minister. Tick-tock.

[The Chair]

Order. It is my fault—I started it—but let us concentrate on the Bill. I call the shadow Minister, Alex Norris.

[Alex Norris]

It is absolutely right that we do that, Dame Angela.

The clause and the schedule govern suspended bank accounts and, more pertinently, what happens to the money in those accounts. We should say on the record that it is right that banks are vigilant to the possibility of fraudulent activity and, when they suspect that it is taking place, that accounts are suspended. We know that that sort of regime and the culture of the industry have changed significantly in recent years. We could argue that there is a commercial disincentive to doing that, but banks clearly understand that being a trusted part of a system that does not want fraudulent activity or to have money washing around is good for everybody. That work and its creative use should be recognised, because, as the Minister says, if we held strictly to a criminal standard, there would be all sorts of reasons why that money would not be stopped. We know that good uses of terms and conditions for holding an account have been employed by the industry, which is welcome.

It is important to have a suspended account scheme in place so that those funds have somewhere to go. We support this clause and schedule. Earlier this week, I was getting very excited about the use of regulations rather than putting things in the Bill. This is a case where that is the right approach, and we look forward to good engagement while that is being developed.

Paragraph 114 of the explanatory note says:

“For the past…15 years, organisations in the financial sector (and to a lesser extent in other parts of the Anti-Money Laundering Regulated sector) have been suspending accounts and transactions where criminality is suspected. Organisations have been doing so on a private law basis taking into account their terms and conditions and threat analytics.”

Clearly, this has been going on for a while, and we are now catching up with a regime so that we can give some shape for releasing that money. It is sensible that the funds have somewhere to go, and of course we would support the purpose of that money being to go back into tackling economic crime. That is a good, virtuous loop.

I hope that the Minister will address this. We know that there has not been a scheme to release this money. Are we to understand from that paragraph of the explanatory note that there are 15 years’ worth of suspended funds just sat there? I do not see anything about that in the Bill, and I wonder whether the Minister can make it clear whether he anticipates there being anything in regulation that would mean that funds that predate the legislation would be out of scope of the scheme. I do not read anything about that in the Bill; as I said, my reading is that they are in. That gives rise to a very obvious question: how much money is there? That will be an issue of great interest for colleagues.

The beginning of schedule 5 says that financial institutions “may” take part in this scheme. I wonder whether the Minister got a sense from the consultation responses and the conversations that he has had with the industry of how widely he expects financial institutions to participate in the scheme and of whether there is a degree of risk—or any anxiety in the Home Office about there being a degree of risk—of displacement to financial institutions that are known not to take this action. Again, I suspect that most of the major players are doing this activity and therefore would wish to be part of it. I would be interested to know how widespread the Minister expects take-up to be.

It is right that there is a compensation mechanism for individuals who have their fund suspended and taken away, because mistakes can and doubtlessly will be made in this sort of scheme. Paragraph 5(1)(c) of schedule 5 governs that this ought to be part of the regulations, and we support that. I presume that that would be a liability against the scheme in its aggregate. Paragraph 5(2) states that it is possible to cap the amount of compensation money that the scheme can pay an institution. What is the reason for that? Clearly, there are institutions that are not being careful, so I presume that the measure covering the money they pay to the scheme is an incentive for them to be more careful in how they handle and freeze accounts. However, is there not a risk that shareholders or executives decide to cap the contribution at the compensation sum, so that they do not inadvertently create a liability on their balance sheet? The Minister might say that that will be covered by regulations, but there is nothing in the Bill to say that once a financial institution is part of the scheme, it must always be part of it, or that, for every account it suspends, it must send all of the money, in full, to the suspended accounts scheme.

The Government may not know the answer to that yet, but they must have thought about it because they have set up a compensation cap. If someone has had their account frozen incorrectly and they have not engaged with it for a number of years, that money is going to a suspended accounts scheme. If they then come back and say, “Hang on a minute, I’d like my money back,” it is not unreasonable—in fact, it is very reasonable—to think that they should get it back in full. The Government have chosen to cap that. That might be because they want to encourage good behaviour, but I am keen to get an explanation from the Minister. I really look forward to having, hopefully to a pounds and pence level, a sense of how much he thinks will go into this scheme when it is opened on day one.

[Chris Philp]

I mentioned this in my introductory remarks. It will apply to all the balances currently held, which includes all those balances accumulated over the last 15 years. The estimation is that that adds up to £200 million. We estimate that the inward flow each year will be £30 million or more. I hope that gives the shadow Minister a sense of the quantum.

We expect wide take-up across the whole financial services industry. Obviously, financial institutions are already suspending accounts, to the tune of £200 million up to date and, we think, £30 million or more a year going forward. Our engagement suggests that there will be wide take-up.

On the shadow Minister’s point about the limit to the compensation, the last words of paragraph 5(2) of schedule 5 are “in any period”, which I presume is to ensure that the scheme remains solvent. He is right to say that any compensation will be paid from inside the scheme and not subsidised by the wider taxpayer, so it will be internally financed, not creating any wider financial liability. It may be the case that, if there is one big claim, the “in any period” caveat would allow for the compensation to be paid over more than one period.

The shadow Minister also asked whether this might inadvertently create a perverse incentive for financial institutions to only make transfers up to the limit of the cap. Clearly, where that cap is set requires some thought. That is a very good question to dig into when these regulations are brought forward and debated. I will make sure that colleagues in the Home Office designing these regulations do so with that concern in mind. When we bring the regulations back, the shadow Minister or his colleagues can have a look at how that is designed. He has made a good point, and we will make sure it is reflected in the way in which the regulations are designed in due course.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 33 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 5 agreed to.

Clause 34

Electronic monitoring requirements