European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Alex Salmond and Angela Eagle

Committee: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 7th February 2017 Commons Chamber

[Alex Salmond]

At least the right hon. Gentleman is consistent: when he was Chief Whip he did not want detailed amendments either, in case democracy prevailed in these matters. Most people, on hearing a serious announcement from the Front Bench, would expect it to be followed by an amendment, so that it could be properly debated and tested.

[Ms Angela Eagle]

I agree with the right hon. Gentleman about a manuscript amendment—it would make things a lot clearer for all of us. Does he agree that the announcement that we may have a Hobson’s choice at the end of the process means that there will not really be a proper choice?

[Alex Salmond]

I very much agree with the hon. Lady, and she conveniently leads me right on to my next point.

English Votes for English Laws

Debate between Alex Salmond and Angela Eagle

Wednesday 15th July 2015 Commons Chamber

[Alex Salmond]

The hon. Lady is right in saying that these are not the McKay commission proposals, and that the Government dismissed those proposals. Has she had a chance to look at the diagram that the Leader of the House has so helpfully distributed? In box 3, in a circle that is half orange and half green, there is a letter P, which apparently refers to

“Further Ping Pong, if required”.

Has the hon. Lady any idea how many of the Bills that the Leader of the House is presenting will be subjected to the ping-pong procedure under his proposals?

[Ms Eagle]

I agree with the right hon. Gentleman about the diagram. It looks more like a plate of spaghetti than a way of legislating sensibly. As for his question, how often that “ping pong to the power squared” would actually happen would depend on how much disagreement there was between the other place and this place. I think that we in the House of Commons must think very carefully about quite how complex some of these legislative processes become if there is contention.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ms Eagle]

No.

There was particular concern expressed during last week’s emergency debate that the so-called Barnett consequentials had not been properly taken into account in the very prescriptive definition of what an “English only” Bill, or part of a Bill, actually is. It is not clear to me whether the changes to the draft Standing Orders adequately address that problem. The Government have not seen fit to address the point about cross-border effects short of Barnett consequentials made by the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon) in last week’s debate.

There are some dangers inherent in the Government’s proposals, which they would have been wise to avoid. Badly designed proposals on English votes for English laws risk not only legislative gridlock but making England, or the UK, ungovernable in some circumstances. As the proposals are currently drafted, there are three areas that give particular cause for concern, and I wish to deal with each of them in turn.

First, the proposals create an English veto, not just a voice, with all of the complications for our constitution that that entails. Secondly, the proposals apply not only to English laws but, much more problematically, to parts of Bills, statutory instruments, regulations, commencement orders and ministerial administrative actions, which, in our current system, are often achieved by statutory instruments. Thirdly, even more controversially and entirely without any consultation outside of the Government, these proposals have been widened so that they apply to Finance Bills.

The McKay commission ruled out a veto for English MPs. The Government have gone far beyond the proposals set out by McKay and have instead created a veto rather than strengthening the English voice. Not only do the proposals grant a veto on the UK Government in the Commons, but English MPs would be able to veto Lords amendments on English matters, curtailing the Lords’ ability to revise legislation.

The McKay commission recommended that the views of English MPs needed to be strengthened. In particular, it recommended the adoption of a principle that

“decisions at the United Kingdom level with a separate and distinct effect for England (or for England-and-Wales) should normally be taken only with the consent of a majority of MPs for constituencies in England (or England-and-Wales).”

That convention, along with the approach that the Opposition have suggested of considering an English Committee stage for English matters, is a much more proportionate response to the West Lothian question, and it would strengthen the voice of England.

Why, apart from to advance their own perceived partisan interests, have the Government chosen to go so much further? The proposed system for legislation is much more complex than our current system, as has already been pointed out, and it could quickly gum up the parliamentary works for a Government who lacked an English majority. It would also weaken considerably the accountability of any Government to the electorate for the delivery of their manifesto and their overall administrative record. It means that a majority of English MPs could stop a Government Bill in its tracks. The Government would then have to negotiate with them if they wanted to get the legislation through.

Secondly, the scope of the Government’s proposed English veto is very much wider than that envisaged by McKay. It appears to extend to secondary legislation of all kinds, including commencement orders, regulations and regular administrative actions such as the distribution of the English local government grant—an example that the Government have themselves chosen to highlight. The difficulty with that arrangement is that it would allow English MPs to exercise the powers of the Executive without being at all responsible for the consequences. If the Government’s proposed local government grant allocation is not passed, no money at all can be distributed. This could create an opportunity for English MPs to initiate a local government shutdown of the kind that intermittently strikes the US Executive, or to demand changes in the distribution that satisfy them at the expense of other areas.

[Alex Salmond]

I wonder whether there is another possibility. I am not saying that this Bill would be referred for the proposed procedure, but let us just imagine that Heathrow was being considered. If the Government had a larger majority among English MPs, it would take a bigger rebellion on Heathrow to affect the Government’s decision making. I wonder whether part of the reason why Government Front Benchers are so keen on this dog’s breakfast is that it would protect them from rebellions on their own Back Benches.

[Ms Eagle]

The Government, as currently constituted, have a majority of 12, or effectively closer to 16. With only English Members of Parliament they have a majority of 105. The partisan reasons for indulging in this are clear, but I think that the British constitution is more important than any partisan proceedings of one Government that happened to exist at one point in time.

The proposals on statutory instruments effectively bring into existence a new defacto English Executive, who appear to consist of the UK Government, but directed on some of their responsibilities by a subset of English MPs who are not meant to be in Government because they are from a party in opposition. That will create a chaotic and unprecedented situation that is hardly conducive to good or democratically accountable governance.

That position is repeated with Finance Bills. McKay was not asked to consider Finance Bills, and it is clear that the Government’s proposals are not thought through. In our system, a Government who cannot get their Budget though the House are essentially no Government at all. However, if these draft Standing Order changes are made, any Government who lacked an English majority could not govern. The Scotland Bill devolves certain substantial aspects of income tax. Budgets allow income tax to be collected, and that order has to be renewed annually. Under these proposals, it appears that English MPs, if they so choose, could block the collection of income tax, which is 25% of the Government’s revenue altogether. Thus the English MPs would have absolute control over English income tax, not the UK Government. Putting aside the potential for chaos that would cause, it seems to me that it is in danger of handing certain MPs power without responsibility.

To summarise, the Government’s plans are much more aggressive and wider in scope than is wise or proper. They are clearly conceived for partisan political reasons. Manifesto commitments to consult the Procedure Committee have been broken so far and are likely to be fulfilled only with days to go. The proposals, as currently written, create the potential for gridlock and chaos hitherto unknown in our constitutional arrangements. They create two classes of MP, and they are reckless with the future of the Union. I hope that the Government will not proceed with such haste but will, even at this late stage, think again and return with something more workable and less indifferent to the problems that this will inevitably cause.

English Votes on English Laws

Debate between Alex Salmond and Angela Eagle

Tuesday 7th July 2015 Commons Chamber

[Ms Eagle]

I am arguing that this is the wrong way to do this kind of change. The procedures and Standing Orders of the House should be House business. They should not be infected by Conservative or Labour Whips. It is the Government who have chosen to make these changes in this way. The right hon. Gentleman should be ashamed of himself.

We are now to believe that the Government should mandate changes to the Standing Orders of the Commons as set out in their manifesto and force them through using a whipped vote. This is a very, very sad day. The Government’s changes will turn their slim majority of 12 into over three figures if both Scottish and Welsh MPs are to be prevented from voting. I believe this is the real driver behind the changes, and it makes the outrageous procedural fix, of using Standing Orders rather than legislation to produce the change, even more unacceptable. I hope that even at this late hour the Government will think again. The unintended consequences of what they are doing could be very large indeed and the precedents they are setting are dire.

[Alex Salmond]

On a point of order, Mr Speaker. We all heard the Leader of the House indicate that tuition fees in England might be a measure subject to the procedure that he is outlining, anticipating not just the changes to Standing Orders but your certification if the change to Standing Orders take place. I know the Leader of the House does not understand the Barnett formula, but I know you do, Sir. Would that not therefore put you in a position of having to certify and disallow the votes of Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish Members of Parliament despite the clear direct and indirect effects that that would have on their rights to vote and on their constituents? Would that not be not just an invidious position, but greater than the shoulders any one man could bear—if I remember the quote correctly, when just such a measure was rejected in the 19th century?