Budget Responsibility and National Audit Bill [Lords]

Alison McGovern Excerpts

Monday 14th February 2011 Commons Chamber

[Ms Eagle]

This is how we can get into difficulty with forecasts, which are static when they are made but apply to a dynamic situation. The hon. Gentleman knows, for example, that our debates in the House are, in part, about the effects on growth of a drastic fiscal consolidation. Our contention has always been that cutting too far too fast will suppress growth to such an extent that the deficit reductions that were hoped for will not come about. That is an essential part of the economic debate that, as far as I can see, we have been having since the Budget in June last year.

Forecasts can be affected by subsequent events and by Government policies. That demonstrates that what matters most is not forecasting for its own sake, but the judgment of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Government, and the extreme fiscal choices that they have made.

[Alison McGovern (Wirral South) (Lab)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that we have another independent forecaster, the Bank of England, which was made independent in 1997? What lessons from the interaction between the Treasury and that independent forecaster ought to be applied to the relationship between the Treasury and the OBR?

[Ms Eagle]

In order to fulfil its duties, the Bank of England produces its own forecasts, which do not always agree with what were previously Treasury forecasts and will now be OBR forecasts. There are also a number of independent forecasters out there with their own view of the situation. Forecasts range from optimistic to pessimistic, and those of us who watch these things learn to take account of that. Regarding OBR forecasts or forecasts of the Bank of England as statements of the unvarnished truth will quickly get us into difficulty.

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[Alec Shelbrooke]

My point is proved by that sedentary intervention. Labour Members think that the whole financial crisis is down to the banks.

There is no doubt that the banks contributed to the global recession, but there is equally no doubt that this country was one of the worst placed countries in being able to deal with the downturn. Let us not forget what a structural deficit is. Again, I see Opposition Members shaking their heads, completely in denial of the fact that this country was living way beyond its means. One does not rack up a £1 trillion debt in the good times if one is acting sensibly. While £120 million a day in interest is going to foreign nations, we see councils around the country, especially Labour-run councils, cutting front-line services that impact on the public and trying to blame the Government, yet never mentioning what we could have done with that £120 million a day. We have to get a grip on the economy.

I want to return to the OBR, because I am conscious, Mr Deputy Speaker, that you have been trying to keep the debate on track. Let us consider the name of this body —the Office for Budget Responsibility. “Responsibility” is a word that has been lacking in the governance of this country and its fiscal policy, not only in the Treasury but, as we recently learned from senior civil servants, in other Departments that lost control of spending. We in this House have to be responsible and move things forward.

[Alison McGovern]

The hon. Gentleman rightly says that we should be cautious. How successful does he feel that previous attempts to add caution to Budgets were? The National Audit Office has previously examined the assumptions made by the Treasury. For example, it was assumed in the March 2010 Budget that GDP growth was 0.25% lower than it really was. Would he like to comment on how those previous attempts at caution might feed into the OBR’s future work?

[Alec Shelbrooke]

As the hon. Lady suggests, previous forecasts and attempts at caution came from many different angles. The public will recognise that the OBR is giving us a proper set of figures that can be relied on. If the Chancellor of the Exchequer then ignores those figures and ploughs ahead, not only would the calls from the Opposition be deafening but the public would know that the Chancellor was acting against their interests.

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[Alison McGovern (Wirral South) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Elmet and Rothwell (Alec Shelbrooke), whose robust arguments I always enjoy, if not agree with.

The purpose of this Bill is to separate politics and economics, which is not always an easy job but is one that it is important to do. There is a body of academic understanding about the importance of the independence of judgments, forecasting and transparency, and that importance is recognised and understood on both sides of the House. In many ways, the Bill makes clear Labour’s economic legacy of the past decade—rules-based economic policy. The reasons for the sustainable investment rule and the golden rule were clear: after decades of boom and bust, it was felt that the way forward was to establish clear lines of accountability and rules by which economic policy might be set.

[Alec Shelbrooke]

I agree that the golden rule was important, but how does the hon. Lady respond to the fact that the dates of the cycles were moved to fit in with what the then Chancellor was claiming instead of sticking to the timeline that he originally outlined for the fiscal cycle?

[Alison McGovern]

Understanding the business cycle has been the job of economists since the dismal science began. The fact that it is difficult does not make it the wrong thing to try to do. I applaud some of the work that has been done by the Treasury and others in trying to find a better way forward. The hon. Gentleman asks an important question that cannot be dismissed by saying, “Oh, this is just people politicking.” Understanding the business cycle is extremely difficult.

When we consider the importance of rules-based economic policy, it is important to reflect on the fact that the Office for Budget Responsibility is to fiscal policy what the independence of the Bank of England was, and remains, to monetary policy: that is, it is an external-to-the-Treasury body that is charged with an important economic function that will drive the policy prescriptions that the Government make, in liaison and discussion with, and working alongside, independent chairs and officials from the organisations concerned. I have no doubt that that is an extremely difficult job. I wonder how real that independence can be. That is an important question for us to consider as the Bill moves through the House. The OBR’s work will be inextricably linked with Departments.

That point was brought home to me by the answer to a parliamentary question in which I asked the Department for Work and Pensions for forecasts of the number of young people who would be unemployed through the life of this Parliament. The Minister of State, Department for Work and Pensions, the right hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell (Chris Grayling) wrote:

“The Department produces projections for business planning purposes which are aligned to the overall independent claimant count forecasts published by the Office for Budget Responsibility”.—[Official Report, 31 January 2011; Vol. 522, c. 587W.]

I wondered what the nature of that alignment would be. I understand that it will be an iterative process as business planning projections are made and discussed in challenged conversations with the OBR. It will not be easy to maintain the independence of this body, but we must all strive to do so.

If you will allow me, Mr Deputy Speaker, I will take this opportunity to say that I mentioned that parliamentary question in Treasury questions last Tuesday, and said that

“the Government’s own business planning projections show that the proportion of young people on the dole by the end of this Parliament will be reduced by less than 1%.”—[Official Report, 8 February 2011; Vol. 523, c. 153.]

I misspoke, and should have said less than one percentage point.

It will be a difficult job behind the scenes to maintain the independence of the OBR. Lars Calmfors, who has been mentioned, has argued that it will be difficult to stop or prevent behind-the-scenes negotiations with the Treasury. However, I believe that the Government have set such store by the independence of the OBR that they want it to succeed and its independence to be maintained. As hon. Members have suggested, it could have increased accountability to Parliament via the Treasury Committee. I am sure that the members of that Committee will be perspicuous in demanding that accountability and independence.

To conclude, I will make a few remarks about rules-based economic policy. I take it from this debate that it is agreed across the House that the right way to make economic policy is to set out ahead of events the rules and principles that the Government wish to stick to, and that the Government should allow themselves to be held up and judged on the basis of those rules. What could possibly be the problem with that approach to making economic policy? In some ways, we are already seeing the problem. Young people in this country who are unemployed because of the global shock face significant difficulties. We have to ask ourselves how the rules that we have set as the basis of our economic policy allow us to act to ensure that our economy runs well. Surely, economic measures are the tools to aid a well-functioning society, not the other way round. If so, our economic policy must be able to respond to shocks.

Not only must the Government say what the rules for their economic policy are and allow themselves to be judged by independent bodies on those rules, as they are doing; they must also say how they will respond to crises. Should this country find itself in a further economic downturn, facing an even worse situation for residents of this country, especially those on the lowest incomes and at the start of their careers, who face severe unemployment, how will the Government use the flexibility in their economic policy to return the country to growth, and how will their economic rules take account of the possibility of shocks? This is a significant challenge for the Government and I hope that all hon. Members will add to the scrutiny of the Bill as it progresses.

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[Kate Green (Stretford and Urmston) (Lab)]

Like colleagues throughout the House, I welcome putting the Office for Budget Responsibility on a statutory footing and the opportunity that it offers for independent forward financial forecasting. That will enable us to see clearly the impact of policy decisions on the public finances, and it will set the context for, and inform, future policy choice. However, as has been pointed out, the OBR and its forecasting mechanism do not of themselves correct or reshape policy mistakes. It is the Government who set the fiscal mandate, and the OBR is there to say whether that mandate has been met. There is no requirement on the OBR to offer any critique of that mandate, or to judge whether it is fair.

We cannot examine only whether the Government have achieved their forecasts. I support the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Wirral South (Alison McGovern), who suggested that there was a larger context to address—whether the Government’s policies reflect the right policy ambitions and produce the right social outcomes, and whether the spending on them is effective. To that extent, I am particularly interested in Ministers’ comments on the relationship between the OBR and the other organisation highlighted in the Bill, the National Audit Office.

Like my hon. Friends, I am concerned about the Government’s current mandate to eliminate the deficit within four years. We are concerned to critique not just the mandate but the policies that will bring about the achievement of it. We are extremely concerned that those policies will have a harsh impact on the lives of the people across the country whom we represent, and we are concerned about their impact on growth, employment and intergenerational fairness. That last point is specifically highlighted in the draft charter, and I would be interested to hear the Exchequer Secretary explain how the OBR will judge and assess long-term intergenerational fairness. It is not sufficient simply to say that we cannot pass on to tomorrow’s children the deficit of today, because today’s children are bearing the burden of the policies that the Government are adopting to address that deficit. I would welcome an explanation of exactly what Ministers mean by intergenerational fairness and how the OBR will assess it.

[Alison McGovern]

Does my hon. Friend think that in addition to that, the Government ought to consider the effect of unemployment on a person’s long-term career, and therefore on their family, as part of intergenerational fairness?

[Kate Green]

My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. Some superficially appealing terminology has been bandied about in relation to the Bill, but we need to know the substance of what Ministers understand to be fair.

Members in all parts of the House welcome the opportunity for transparency that lies within the Bill, but as others have pointed out, that transparency is potentially undermined if the OBR does not secure the resources necessary to ensure that its independence is not compromised. The OBR needs to be adequately resourced to carry out a full and proper analysis. In that context, looking at the full impact of policy includes modelling imputed behavioural change, about which the Government have so far shown themselves to be casual, including in their analysis on the introduction of the universal credit, which is one of their major policy proposals. Great claims have been made for the universal credit’s impact on increased benefits take-up and labour market participation, but the Department for Work and Pensions’ analysis of such behavioural changes to drive such outcomes is remarkably thin. How deep can the OBR dig when departmental analysis apparently does not do so?

There is two-way traffic in policy making and in analysing the impact of policy initiatives. The OBR has been set up specifically to reflect in its forecasts what we might call policy “knowns”, but as was pointed out, there are opportunities to allow for dynamic forecasting so that we can judge the impact of new policies on the public finances in future. I believe strongly that the creation of the OBR offers an opportunity to tie those two aspects of policy forecasting together, so that it is possible to verify departmental impact assessments at the time when policy is being considered—prior to its implementation—and as part of the process of legislative scrutiny and approval by the House.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Wirral South pointed out, there are tensions involved in ensuring that the OBR has a role in scrutinising policy making as it develops and emerges, but there is an important opportunity to enable Parliament effectively to critique, to challenge and to improve. How do Ministers see the OBR’s role in the context of iterative policy making, and how do they think that tension will be resolved?

I look forward to the ongoing process of the passage of the Bill to implement the OBR, and to its independent reports and analysis. However, it is important to understand that the Bill is a step on the way to better policy making and scrutiny rather than a job fully done. Of course, the OBR offers great potential to aid our understanding, but I am clear that it is just one element of how we judge policy cost and impact, and most importantly, policy success.

[Stephen Williams (Bristol West) (LD)]

I guess that you, Mr Deputy Speaker, and many hon. Members have a collection of fridge magnets. I have one back home in Bristol that I acquired on a visit last summer to Hughenden manor. Of course, Disraeli, who lived there, is a rich vein of quotes, and perhaps one of his most famous is that there are “lies, damned lies and statistics”, which is what this debate is all about. Statistics are never more controversial than in economics. There was quite a controversy surrounding the last quarterly growth figures—I will make no jokes about snow—but in forecasts and retrospective reporting, there are random factors, and such reports are often revised.

Forecasting, of course, is even more contentious than retrospective reporting on economic events. I am sure that all Chancellors have at least been tempted to inject political factors into what the hon. Member for Wirral South (Alison McGovern) called the “dismal science” of economics. Whether economics is a science at all is debatable, but it is certainly inexact as a social science, and very heavily influenced by politics. In fact, it was traditionally known as “political economy”.

In all Budgets and autumn statements, Chancellors forecast tax yields and outlined the effect of their policies on employment and unemployment. They said who would benefit and described the impact of their policies on the fiscal balance and debt. As a chartered tax consultant and in the last six years as an MP, I watched a decade of Budgets by the former Prime Minister and Chancellor, the right hon. Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Mr Brown), whose first act as Chancellor was to set up the independence of the Bank of England, to which many hon. Members have referred. The implementation of a Liberal Democrat manifesto commitment 13 years before we got around to joining the Government was welcome, but after 1997, the former Chancellor made up his own rules as he went along on everything other than monetary policy. The golden rule has been mentioned several times, but his best friend, Prudence, has understandably not been mentioned by Opposition Members, because as we all remember, in all his Budgets and forecasts, everything was rosy. The Chancellor always confounded his critics and said, “Everyone else is wrong. Lo and behold—what a surprise! —I have a marvellous thing to announce.” What happened? The 2008 crash happened.

[Alison McGovern]

On that very note, which was the more prudent: putting the country into a situation in which people could not withdraw cash from the banks or recapitalising the banks, as happened?

[Stephen Williams]

I was talking about events prior to the crash, rather than the policy response to the crash itself, which was in any case initially rather timid and slow. My right hon. Friend the Member for Twickenham (Vince Cable) repeatedly urged the Chancellor to nationalise Northern Rock, which was the first symptom of the crisis, but those urges were resisted for quite some time.