Standards in Public Life

Alistair Carmichael Excerpts

Tuesday 7th June 2022 Commons Chamber

[Michael Ellis]

I respectfully disagree with the right hon. Gentleman. The Prime Minister enhances the role of his office. [Interruption.] The proof of the pudding is in the eating. The Conservative party had, proportionately, the largest electoral victory since 1979—it speaks for itself. The Prime Minister has secured the electoral support of the largest number of people in this country for many years.

The ministerial code makes it clear that the Prime Minister will normally agree to an investigation, and that, in the unlikely scenario that the Prime Minister does not agree to an investigation, the independent adviser can then request that the reasons for not doing so are published. There is, therefore, a check on the Prime Minister’s power to refuse consent for an investigation. The reasons would have to be published and they would have to be clear. Those are important improvements in independence and transparency.

Lord Geidt is clear that this is a “workable scheme”. The Government are also clear that this is a scheme that upholds the constitutional position. I would add that Lord Evans, in writing to Lord True in response to the Government policy statement, stated that the new process for initiating investigations

“represents an improvement in the process for regulating the Code, which we welcome.”

[Mr Alistair Carmichael (Orkney and Shetland) (LD)]

The Minister seeks to justify the Government’s position by tying it back to the principle of parliamentary privilege, as if that is somehow an absolute and inviolable principle. But it is a principle that we in recent years have watered down in relation to the creation of the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority and now the Independent Complaints and Grievance Service. This is not any more the trump card that it used to be. If this House is to be subject to independent investigation as Members, why should the Prime Minister and his Ministers be treated differently?

[Michael Ellis]

There is the Executive, the judiciary and the legislature, and there are different arrangements for the three branches. One would not expect anything contrary to that.

Let me touch on the relationship. The Government greatly value the work of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, but as the careful balancing of the powers around the initiation of investigation demonstrates, we consider it right that the Government assess recommendations on their individual merits. This work takes time and involves testing the strengths and weakness of proposals and options to develop a workable response. This is as true for the recommendations made in relation to the ministerial code as it is for the other areas covered in the extensive report issued by the CSPL just over six months ago. We have said that the Government are carefully considering those and other recommendations, and that is precisely the work that is taking place. The report was extensive, and the work to consider it is as extensive. I assure the House that the Government will respond to the Committee’s other recommendations in due course. The Government are happy to update the House via an appropriate statement when doing so.

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[Mr Alistair Carmichael (Orkney and Shetland) (LD)]

It is a crying shame that we do not have more speakers on the Government Back Benches today, because the contributions we heard from the hon. Members for Devizes (Danny Kruger) and for Weston-super-Mare (John Penrose) have been good and thoughtful. I found more to recommend in the contribution from the hon. Member for Weston-super-Mare, but when listening to them both I was left thinking that surely, with a bit of good faith on both sides, this is a debate that we as Parliament could have that would put our politics into a better position. I regret very much that I do not see that political good faith coming from the Treasury Bench, and in the absence of that we must look for it among Government Back Benchers—[Interruption.] Obviously I have been too generous in my praise, as the hon. Member for Devizes is about to leave the Chamber, so I will not pursue the point any further than that.

There is one point in the Government’s position with which I have some sympathy, because there are other important issues that the House ought to be discussing. The cost of living crisis is unparalleled in my adult life—I cannot remember anything like this since my childhood years in the 1970s—and the strategic challenges of a ground war in mainland Europe are something I thought I would never see in my life. Those substantial issues demand and require the attention of Parliament.

However, I part company with the Government on two points. First, the position in which the Government have put themselves cannot be just wished away, and they will not move on to those important issues unless and until they address the position in which the Prime Minister has put them. Secondly, if those big and pressing issues are to be dealt with, that requires the Government to be led by a Prime Minister who has the political and moral authority to deal with them. It is apparent from the outcome of the vote of confidence last night among Conservative Members, that the Prime Minister has lost that moral and political authority, and it is difficult to see how he can regain it, certainly while he continues to behave in the way he does. The Government’s position on the report by the Committee on Standards in Public Life, and the ministerial code as a consequence, tells me that this Government are bothered not about improving things, but rather about protecting their own position, and especially that of the Prime Minister.

We have heard some remarkable mea culpas from the Prime Minister in recent weeks and months, but the actions that followed those mea culpas have been somewhat pedestrian, shall we say? They certainly do not match the rhetoric of the mea culpa. To suggest that, somehow or other, the problems within 10 Downing Street and the Government as a whole can be addressed simply by shifting the desks around and taking a few people here, a Spad there and a principal private secretary elsewhere out of a job underestimates and genuinely lacks an understanding of the scale of the crisis that faces our democracy.

Having said that, the mea culpas that we have heard from the Prime Minister have also been fundamentally undermined if it is true, as it has been reported, that last night, in the 1922 committee, he said, “I’d do it again.” If that is correct, it is difficult to see how the apologies given to the House and to the public are in any way sincere. Essentially, the position is that we require a practice, a code of conduct, that reflects the expected standards of behaviour. We should start with those standards of behaviour, and measure behaviour by them. Instead, we are getting a code that looks at the standard of behaviour prevalent in Downing Street and seeks to match that. It is, if I may say so, the very opposite of levelling up.

The report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life should be taken as a whole. It is not something to cherry-pick, unless of course there is some overwhelming, pressing reason as to why that should not be the case. On that point, the hon. Member for Weston-super-Mare did produce some genuinely good and valid points. Again, it takes me back to the position that the House found itself in with Owen Paterson and lobbying last year, when the Government sought to proceed in a way for which they had not first built the political consensus. It would be quite easily possible to build a political consensus, but that requires the Government to take a lead—one that we have not seen from them.

It is also well past the time when the ministerial code of conduct should have been underpinned by statute. I say that with some measure of regret because, as I said in my intervention on the Minister, here is an instance where the Government are seeking to rely on the adoption of parliamentary privilege, but the House has already reduced the scope of that parliamentary privilege. We have handed the investigation of complaints of inappropriate behaviour to the Independent Complaints and Grievances Scheme and handed the regulation of our expenses and other allied issues to the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority.

These issues were all debated in 2009 when IPSA was set up, and the question of privilege was taken very seriously at that point. That was one of the few votes— I think there were four—that the Labour party lost in 13 years in government, but it was necessary at the time because the public outrage at the expenses scandal, when people learned about what MPs had claimed for and been paid for, was such that significant change was necessary. It was necessary to modify the doctrine of parliamentary privilege to maintain the standing of Parliament itself, and we are back in that position here and now.

This is what we need to do. We need to get the parties together to build a consensus and have the discussion to ensure that we can have a ministerial code of conduct that can command the confidence of the public and of all parties in the House and not be seen to be the creature of any individual party. The position of the independent adviser on the ministerial code is now long past remedy. Given everything that we have seen in recent weeks and months, it is no longer tenable to say that, yes, he or she can initiate investigations, but only with the consent of the Prime Minister of the day. It is that requirement for consent that fundamentally undermines the office.

Trust has been breached. It is for the House to demonstrate that we understand the scale of the damage done and to repair it. The Government should have done that, but they clearly have no intention of doing so, so we in this House must.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

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[Michael Ellis]

With the leave of the House and yourself, Madam Deputy Speaker, I wish to close this debate.

Today has been a useful debate in which valuable points were raised about the importance of high standards in public life—something that, as I have set out, the Government take seriously. The recently published statement on standards in public life set out reforms that provide a measured approach to make certain that the highest standards are maintained, while ensuring democratic accountability of elected representatives to the British people via the ballot box.

As I set out in my opening remarks, the Government will not be able to support this motion. I have heard Opposition Members repeatedly say the same thing. They have said, “We need a break from the Prime Minister”, “We need to change the Prime Minister”, and “We need to change the leadership of this country.” I respectfully suggest that the way to do that is by winning a general election. I have been in this Chamber for many hours over months now, and the Opposition parties have hardly said anything about policies. That is because if they talk about policies, they lose, so they talk about personalities.

Labour’s proposal is for an unelected, all-powerful overlord to choose who a Prime Minister’s Ministers should be. In theory, therefore, if a Labour Prime Minister—if ever there is a Labour Prime Minister in the future—were to say that they had lost faith in their Minister for the Cabinet Office, that would be one thing; but if they were to say that they had faith in their Minister for the Cabinet Office, but the new overlord were to say that he or she did not, under Labour’s plan that person would get to choose who that Minister was. With the greatest respect, I do not think that would make sense.

Looking at the constitutional framework of this country, as the policy statement published by the Government sets out, the constitutional status and framework are a key consideration when we look to make changes such as this. To explain the Government’s position here, the Prime Minister’s role as head of the Executive means that he has sole responsibility for the organisation of Her Majesty’s Government. That includes the recommendation of the appointment of, the dismissal of and the acceptance of any resignation by any of his Ministers. Ministers hold office for as long as they hold the confidence of the Prime Minister.

I gave examples earlier where Labour Prime Ministers retained confidence in a Minister who had been in breach of a ministerial code. The same applies both ways round. The Prime Minister, then, is accountable to both Parliament and the general public for the use of his powers as head of the Executive. As the ministerial code sets out, all Ministers, including the Prime Minister, are in the same way accountable to Parliament and the public for their actions and conduct.

Parliament has an established scrutiny role to play through mechanisms such as Select Committees, oral and written questions and statements. In addition to those arrangements, in our parliamentary democracy the conduct of the Government is ultimately judged by the electorate at the ballot box. I have to say this clearly: the ministerial code is the Prime Minister’s document. It sets out his guidance to all Ministers, including him, on how they should act and arrange their affairs in order to uphold the principles and standards of conduct set out in the code. The management of the Executive is wholly separate from the legislature.

[Mr Carmichael]

I was struck by the Minister’s reference there to an unelected, all-powerful, unaccountable individual; it reminded me that Dominic Cummings was the subject of correspondence in July and September last year between the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments and the Cabinet Office, with regard to his activities post leaving Downing Street. ACOBA has never had a response to that correspondence. When will it get one?

[Michael Ellis]

I am afraid I do not know the answer to that question, but I will certainly look into the matter for the right hon. Gentleman.

In line with the Prime Minister’s constitutional role as head of the Government, the Prime Minister is responsible for matters relating to the Executive. That point has been raised by several Opposition Members concerning the justiciability of the ministerial code. The ministerial code and its application are a matter for the Executive, and the Government do not consider that it would be appropriate to legislate for the ministerial code or for the office of the independent adviser. As soon as one legislates in that way, one opens the matter up to judicial review and judicial intervention.

Codifying aspects of the constitution in that way would inevitably constrain our ability as a country to flex and evolve our constitution over time. It would also increase the risk, which as a former Attorney General and Solicitor General is one of my principal concerns, of the judiciary’s being drawn into political matters that are not suitable for judicial review. They would be reviewing the fact that a Prime Minister has said, “I have confidence in X”, and a judge would, by necessity, be being asked to say that the Prime Minister should have confidence in X or they should not have confidence in X—the judge would be substituting his or her view for that of the Prime Minister. We want to protect the judiciary from being politicised in that way, which is another key flaw in Labour’s proposals.