House of Lords Reform

Andrew Turner Excerpts

Monday 27th June 2011 Commons Chamber

[Susan Elan Jones (Clwyd South) (Lab)]

Article 21 of the universal declaration of human rights declares:

“The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.”

I cannot believe that in the 21st century anyone could seriously argue for a wholly or mainly appointed second Chamber. I believe that the nation should move to a 100%—or, if that is not possible, at least an 80%—elected Chamber. That the Deputy Prime Minister is fronting this charge should not prejudice us unduly. I, for one, would be pleased were we to see the end of that very British creation—peer creation. Under the Blair Government, the number of peers increased by 37 per year, but let us not forget that it was that Government who abolished 555 hereditary peerages—so a net reduction of 181. Under the Government of my right hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Mr Brown), on average 11 peers were added per year, but under this Prime Minister—the Prime Minister who wishes, by non-consensual methods, to abolish 50 Members of this House—the number of peers in the House has increased by 117.

[Mr Andrew Turner (Isle of Wight) (Con)]

Is the hon. Lady aware that 50 of those were appointed by the current Prime Minister, and 54 by the former Prime Minister?

[Susan Elan Jones]

I would welcome the hon. Gentleman saying that he would support the consensual method for retaining the number of MPs. I thank him for that.

Let us consider where we are with the House of Lords at present. It is the second largest parliamentary Chamber in the world behind only—would you believe it?—China’s National People’s Congress, which has 3,000 members, and which meets for two weeks a year. It is not an upper Chamber. The House of Lords is the biggest upper Chamber of the 80 upper Chambers recorded by the Inter-Parliamentary Union, and the United Kingdom is the only bicameral country in which the second Chamber is bigger than the lower. It has been argued in this debate that somehow, as if by osmosis, the House of Lords works rather well. We have heard how it brings in the shy who would never stand for election—those rare creatures who suddenly, by osmosis, will find themselves in the second Chamber. I cannot accept that, and I cannot accept that we can seriously be thinking of any Chamber in this Parliament being predominantly or wholly un-elected.

The House of Lords reform White Paper plans to reduce the size of the Lords to 300 Members, but let us not forget the coalition agreement—even if, sometimes, the coalition partners do. The agreement states:

“Lords appointments will be made with the objective of creating a second chamber that is reflective of the share of the vote secured by the political parties in the last general election.”

However, such proportionality might give us 86 more Tory peers and 99 more Liberal Democrats, and therefore a Chamber of 977 Members if no new Labour or independent peers were created. Some of the proposed transition arrangements to the new system would leave all the current peers alongside the new peers for several Parliaments, which would mean approximately 1,000 or more Members next door.

We have to go down the route of a more democratic upper Chamber. I would be slightly concerned to see 60 appointed Members. For all the good that the Bishops do as individuals, there is a case for giving the matter some consideration. I say that even though I am a member of the disestablished Church in Wales. We also need to consider whether the single term of 15 years allows proper electoral accountability. I was interested to hear that when the new Iraqi constitution was drawn up, the west commended it because it was democratic. There was a strong commitment to elections, but there was no mention of an upper House, and there was certainly no mention of an appointed Chamber. It is extraordinary that as so many countries around the world are exploring democracy—just think of the middle east—we are sitting in this House and seriously suggesting that there can be any merit in a wholly or mainly appointed second Chamber. The modernisers need to speak in this place for a new and modernised pluralistic Britain.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Stevenson (Carlisle) (Con)]

On 18 August 2011 it will be the 100th anniversary of the Royal Assent of the Parliament Act, which has been used on only seven occasions. It is probably one of the most important, if not the most important, Acts of Parliament, for the simple reason that it establishes the primacy of the House of Commons over the House of Lords.

Having read some of the debates from 1910 and 1911 on the Parliament Bill, I find it interesting that at that time further change was expected. Indeed, the preamble to the Bill actually states this. No less a person than Winston Churchill said that the Parliament Bill was not meant to be the last word but the first. Speaking in the 1911 debate, he said that further legislation would include

“a measure for creating that fair and evenly constituted second chamber.”—[Official Report, 22 February 1911; Vol. 21, c. 2036.]

It is clear that when the Parliament Bill was being debated back in 1911, further reforms were intended. At that time, some suggested the abolition of the House of Lords and that we should have just one Chamber but generally, overall, the view was that there should be two Chambers, and that view still prevails today. Interestingly, during the last 100 years we have effectively had a muddle. We had legislation in 1949, 1958, 1963, and more recently in 1999, but we have ended up in a thoroughly unsatisfactory mess. We now have an opportunity to put that right.

All three main parties in their manifestos have made a commitment, however lukewarm, to reforming the House of Lords. We have been talking about reform of the House of Lords for years, and it is about time that we got on and reformed it in such a way that we do not need to be debating it for the next 100 years but have a settled will. To achieve that, two key issues need to be dealt with. The first is the principle of reform, and the second is the practicalities of reform—the composition of the House of Lords and its powers. For today’s purposes, the most important is just getting across the principle of reform. To deal with that there are three key issues.

The first and most important issue is, quite simply, that we live in a democracy and power belongs to the voters. Voters exercise that power through the ballot box. As democratic authority derives from the electorate, the composition of any chamber or council should be decided by the people. It is extraordinary that we elect members of councils, MEPs, Members of devolved Assemblies and parish councillors, we even elect captains of golf clubs—

[Mr Andrew Turner]

Does my hon. Friend think that there would be any objection to electing magistrates?

[John Stevenson]

We are talking about the democratic institutions that make laws and byelaws, so I would take a different view on that point. We elect Members of this House, but for whatever reason we do not elect those who sit in the second most important part of our democratic institutions. For that reason, the House of Lords lacks true legitimacy and accountability. However great its expertise, diversity or experience, it is simply not elected. Of the 71 major Parliaments around the world, 61 have an elected or partly elected second Chamber. In fact, Canada is the only other major democracy with a fully appointed upper Chamber.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Andrew Turner (Isle of Wight) (Con)]

To start at the end of my speech—if there is time, I will move towards the beginning—the main problem with the House of Lords is not a lack of accountability, independence or democratic accountability, it is the sheer number of peers. Let us take the number of peers appointed since the last election as an example. The former Prime Minister appointed 58 new peers in his working peers and dissolution honours lists. In November, the current Prime Minister appointed another 54. This is not sustainable, but there is no reason in law why it cannot go on for ever.

We should set a limit on the number of peers by Act of Parliament. That would prevent a Prime Minister from overriding the limit without changing the law. I believe that the limit could be 850 or 450, but let us take 850 to see how such peers would emerge. If we start with the current figure of 828 peers and, for argument’s sake, let us say that 20 peers die over the course of this Parliament, there would be 42 vacancies to fill in 2015. If the turnout at the next election was 60%, then 40% of voters would have chosen not to vote for any political party. Let the Prime Minister—or better, someone else—appoint that 40% of new peers from among people with no political affiliation. That means that 17 of the newly appointed peers would have no political affiliation, leaving 60%—or 25 seats—to fill with political appointees.

If the Conservative party won a majority of, say, 60% of seats in the House of Commons, the Conservative Prime Minister could appoint 60% of the remaining vacancies in the House of Lords—that is to say, 15 peers. The Leader of the Opposition, having won, say, 25% of the seats, could nominate that 25% of the remaining vacancies, or six peers, and so on. Therefore, the outcome in the House of Lords would be proportional to the number of seats in the House of Commons, thus representing the views of voters and those who did not vote. That would be a much more efficient way of achieving the Deputy Prime Minister’s aim of creating an independent, accountable and democratic upper Chamber.

Let me turn to how the House of Lords can be more democratic. An elected upper Chamber would, in fact, confound our democracy. The Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949 emphasise the supremacy of the House of Commons as the representative body of the people. However, if these reforms go ahead, that statement will no longer apply. The second Chamber, also elected by popular vote, will have as much of a democratic mandate as the House of Commons. It would quite justifiably claim to be a representative body of the people. As representatives of the people, those in the elected upper Chamber would have as much right to refuse to ratify legislation as we in the lower House do. That would cause a constitutional crisis of epic proportions. That would be the danger if the newly elected upper Chamber, with as much of a democratic mandate as the House of Commons, decided to amend statutory instruments. That would be the consequence of making an unelected House an elected House.