Andy Slaughter
Main Page: Andy Slaughter (Labour - Hammersmith)Judicial Review and Courts Bill (Ninth sitting)
Andy Slaughter Excerpts(2 years, 5 months ago)
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The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (James Cartlidge)
The employment dispute resolution system has responded impressively to the challenges presented by the pandemic. Despite the enormous challenges they faced, employment tribunals have now succeeded in returning to pre-covid levels of hearings. I should stress, because we have had a wide-ranging debate about technology and the role of digitisation in the courts, that a key reason for that is that employment tribunals have been among the greatest users of technology in enabling hearings to go forward. However, they still face significant challenges from a growing backlog. The pandemic has highlighted the need for a speedy and efficient process for making and amending rules for the employment tribunals.
Since the establishment of employment tribunals in 1996 under the remit of the now Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, responsibility for the rules and governance of employment tribunals has rested with Ministers in BEIS, as the Department responsible for employment law. This is the only area of the tribunal system where responsibility rests with a Minister in another Department; all other matters heard in the justice system have procedural rules that are the responsibility of independent judicial-led committees or of the Lord Chief Justice.
Clause 32 transfers the powers to make rules for the employment tribunals from the Secretary of State for BEIS to the tribunal procedure committee. It also makes the same committee responsible for rules in the employment appeal tribunal. Being judiciary-led, the TPC is better placed to make these rules. The transfer will allow for the development of a more closely aligned tribunal system. It means that we can respond more quickly when we need to amend procedure rules, for example to help to address the backlog in claims or in circumstances such as the pandemic. Schedule 5, introduced by clause 32, gives the TPC the same powers to make rules for the employment tribunals and the employment appeal tribunal as for the first-tier and upper-tier tribunals, and aligns the rule-making process.
It is important that the TPC has the right knowledge and experience when considering making or amending rules. Schedule 5 provides for two additional members to sit on the TPC. One will be appointed by the Lord Chancellor and will have experience of practice or advising in the employment tribunals and the employment appeal tribunal. The second will be appointed by the Lord Chief Justice and will have experience of sitting in employment tribunals. This will ensure that the TPC can call on the right level of expertise when making decisions.
Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to be here again under your chairmanship, Sir Mark. Let me say first that we are not opposed to what the Government are proposing in this clause and, indeed, this part of the Bill, which is largely administrative. There are a few issues that we wish to raise. I think that I can do that logically under this clause and then be very brief—or even silent—on some of the other clauses.
The Minister is right that employment tribunals—industrial tribunals, as they were—go back some years and have a distinct history. In some ways, they were the forerunners of the tribunal system, which has effectively overtaken them in terms of procedure and organisation. Employment tribunals have a broad jurisdiction for employment matters, save in important respects such as their very limited role in breach of contract cases and no role in relation to personal injury. They are administered by Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service, but are outside the tribunal structure.
As the Minister said, employment tribunals are under either the joint supervision of the Ministry of Justice and the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, or the Secretary of State for BEIS. That is anomalous. There have been many attempts over the years to correct and address the issue. Such proposals were made back in the 2001 Leggatt review, so we are catching up after 20 years. There have been various other measures in the interim. The 2004 White Paper proposed a tribunal process that should be separate from both the civil courts and the rest of the tribunal structure. The 2015 Briggs review preferred to put employment tribunals in with the civil courts. A case can be made for either of those options, although the drawback of placing tribunals in the civil court ambit is the lack of provision for lay members. Lay members are an important part of how employment tribunals work, and we would be loth to lose them.
There can also be conflicts of interest. BEIS is quite a substantial employer, and there could be something of a conflict by placing this part of the tribunal system within a non-judicial Department. For all those reasons, and the fact that we have a working TPC, what the Government have proposed seems to have a certain logic. The “but” is—and this is a feature of the Bill generally—that opportunities are being missed.
The Law Commission recommended last year that the Government look at time limits for bringing claims, look again at the issue of breach of contract, which I have already mentioned, and look at the key element of enforcement. Many employees—despite the difficulty of bringing claims, particularly if they have been dismissed or the claims deal with complex issues of law—win their cases and then cannot enforce against the employer. There is nothing to deal with those points. The Minister began by saying he thought the tribunal law system is doing a good job, and the people who work within the employment tribunal system do a very good job. However, they work under a great deal of pressure, and the Government have contributed to that pressure.
We have the debacle over charging for bringing claims, which the Government introduced in 2012-13. Unsurprisingly, to anyone except perhaps the Government, the number of claims fell by two thirds after that. Consequently, they felt able to shut down large parts of the network. The Supreme Court ruled that unlawful and claims began to climb again, although a lot of the damage that was done has not been unpicked. The latest figures I have show that, of the £32 million that was supposed to be repaid to claimants, only £18.5 million has been repaid. That is shocking. It shows that people have been unlawfully deprived of what should rightfully be theirs and that they paid fees that were deemed to be unlawful.
The point here is that, the Government having depressed the level of claims in a dramatic and significant way, and then seeing them rise again, there has been no sufficient response to that. The backlog was down at 22,698 in March 2018, but according to figures from March this year—the Minister may have more recent ones—it is now at 50,287. That has more than doubled in two years. Part of the reason is that there has been no strategic effort to restore the employment tribunal system to what it was before earlier cuts were made. We are not short of suggestions. Last summer, the Employment Lawyers Association produced a long list of what the Government could do: through ACAS; reviewing of the administrative capacity of each tribunal; using standard case management procedures; dealing with case management applications on the papers; using hybrid hearings where accommodation is a problem; improving the provision of legal advice; and allowing multiple claims to be put on one claim form.
I would like to see a number of things in the Bill, and the Minister may be able to address some of these points when he responds. The Minister says the measures will make the process more streamlined, which they may do, but only up to a point. The proposals will address the real, chronic and ongoing problems in the employment tribunal system only to a limited extent. We have the debacle over the fees, where many are deprived of their rights and are unable to bring claims or, after bringing claims, are not refunded the money they are owed. There is a long wait to get to a tribunal—I think the average resolution time is 45 weeks, which is appalling—and we also have those problems with enforcement, even if employees win their case. The system really is in a parlous state. I wish there were measures in the Bill, or elsewhere, to address those issues.
James Cartlidge
I will respond briefly, because I really would emphasise that the clauses are limited in their impact on employment tribunals. I certainly hope that no one is under the impression that I am pretending they are a wholesale, comprehensive reform of the employment tribunal system. I have in no way implied that.
I welcome the recognition by the hon. Member for Hammersmith that it is, in his words, anomalous that the rule-making powers are held by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. To that extent, I therefore assume he welcomes the transfer. As he said, it certainly makes sense, and there are many positive aspects in its favour. Having more flexibility in the way the rules are made for employment tribunals will enable them to better respond to the backlog and related issues. Of course, that is not in itself enough to drive down the backlog or improve the overall user experience.
The hon. Gentleman asks what other steps the Government are taking. We are recruiting more employment tribunal judges. We also have a very positive initiative called the virtual region, which we estimate will save about 500 sitting days in employment tribunals. It is a virtual region of judges who, because cases are heard online, can sit pretty much anywhere in the country and hear an employment tribunal case anywhere else in the country, underlining how important technology has been.
It is a bit strange that, when my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings—who is not here this morning—spoke about his desire to revert to in-person hearings and roll back the digital progress we are making, he seemed to get a lot of sympathy from the hon. Member for Hammersmith. If we were to do that in the employment tribunal sphere, we would have a massive backlog, and we would have far more limited means of dealing with it. I am bound to say that we would be reducing access to justice, both for those seeking to bring claims and in terms of the judicial ability to respond with things like the virtual region.
I will not go any further. One should recognise when clauses have a very specific purpose, which these do. The measure is positive and will help us to improve matters and, alongside some of the other things we are doing, it shows we are driving forward a positive agenda for employment tribunals.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 32 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 5 agreed to.
Clause 33
Composition of tribunals
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
James Cartlidge
The clause will make the Lord Chancellor responsible for determining the composition of employment tribunals and employment appeal tribunals through secondary legislation. That duty can be delegated to the Senior President of Tribunals, the President of Employment Tribunals, or the President of Employment Appeal Tribunals. It also sets out a framework within which the Lord Chancellor or the presidents must exercise the power. That is the same approach as in the wider unified tribunal system. The clause will align the approach taken in employment tribunals to those tribunals, and will ensure that panel composition is a judicial function.
That does not mean that we will lose the unique characteristics of employment tribunals, or that we intend to move away from the current structure. Rather, the clause will provide the necessary flexibility to ensure that the composition of an employment tribunal or employment appeal tribunal can be tailored to the needs of users and the complexities of cases. It will mean that the handling of cases can be streamlined while ensuring that tribunals have the right composition to make fair and informed decisions.
Andy Slaughter
Again, we do no oppose the change. I make only one point, which I think the Minister alluded to, but that it may be useful to have on the record. It clearly makes sense to give discretion to the Lord Chancellor in terms of the composition of tribunals, but the distinctive lay element of them has been successful over the years. We would not want the change to alter that. The presumption should be in favour of it, save in circumstances where there are good reasons to derogate from it.
James Cartlidge
An individual with experience of appearing before employment tribunals and an employment tribunal judge or lay member will be appointed to sit on the committee so that the needs of the wider employment sector continue to be represented in the rule-making process. The tribunal procedure committee is also able to request external expertise to support the development of rules, including a representative to reflect the needs of business.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 33 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 34
Saving for existing procedural provisions
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
James Cartlidge
The introduction of legal case officers has played a valuable role in helping employment tribunals to tackle the demands of the pandemic. They free up judicial time by allowing straightforward non-contentious administrative decisions to be made by legal case officers under the supervision of an employment judge. The clause will align an employment tribunal’s power of delegation to legal case officers with the wider tribunal system. It will also allow the TPC to make rules for legal case officers. The decisions of legal case officers are always reviewable by the judiciary, and that will remain the case.
Andy Slaughter
We do not oppose the clause. There is always a hesitancy in transferring powers from a judiciary to a lay or administrative officer. As the Minister says, it is done in other parts of the tribunal system. We just wish for reassurance that it will be kept under review, and that where changes are made—I am talking about the system, rather than individual cases—we will look at it again, and ensure that it is working properly and that applicants are not disadvantaged in any way by the changes.
James Cartlidge
Yes, that is a fair point. Judicial functions can be delegated to HMCTS staff across tribunals and the wider civil justice system, including in employment tribunals, as the hon. Gentleman acknowledged. The Bill gives the tribunal procedure committee the same powers to make employment tribunal rules on judicial delegation as it has for the unified tribunals, so that it is consistent. This will allow for the creation of harmonised tribunal rules and greater alignment across the tribunal system. We always keep all matters under review. This positive change is in keeping with the way the wider unified tribunal system works.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 35 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 36
Responsibility for remunerating tribunal members
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
James Cartlidge
This is the final clause related to employment tribunals. As a consequence of the history of the establishment of employment tribunals, authority for the remuneration of pay and expenses for employment tribunal judges currently rests with BEIS, in contrast to the remainder of the tribunal system, where responsibility for the remuneration of panel members sits with the Lord Chancellor. The clause will transfer responsibility for that remuneration from BEIS to the Lord Chancellor, bringing employment tribunals in line with the wider tribunal system.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 36 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 37
Discontinuance of investigation where cause of death becomes clear
Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 69, in clause 37, page 49, line 33, at end insert—
“(4) After subsection (2), insert—
(2A) The coroner is not to decide that the investigation should be discontinued unless—
(a) the coroner is satisfied that no outstanding evidence that is relevant to the death is available,
(b) the coroner has considered whether Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights is engaged and is satisfied that it is not,
(c) there are no ongoing investigations by public bodies into the death,
(d) the coroner has invited and considered representations from any interested person known to the coroner named at section 47 (2)(a) or (b) of this Act, and
(e) all interested persons known to the coroner named at section 47 (2)(a) or (b) of this Act consent to discontinuation of the investigation.”.
This amendment would ensure that certain safeguards are met before a coroner can discontinue an investigation into a death.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 70, in clause 37, page 49, line 33, at end insert—
“(4) After subsection (2), insert—
(2B) If a coroner is satisfied that subsection (1) applies and has complied with the provisions at subsection (2A)(a) to (d), prior to discontinuing the investigation, the coroner must—
(a) inform each interested person known to the coroner named at section 47(2)(a) or (b) of this Act of the coroner’s intended decision and provide a written explanation as to the reasons for this intended decision,
(b) explain to each interested person known to the coroner named at section 47(2)(a) or (b) of this Act that the investigation may only be discontinued if all such interested persons consent, and
(c) invite each interested person known to the coroner named at section 47(2)(a) or (b) of this Act to consent to the discontinuation of the investigation.”.
This amendment would ensure that family members and personal representatives of the deceased are provided with the coroner’s provisional reasons for why the coroner considers that the investigation should be discontinued, to ensure that family members can make an informed decision as to whether to consent to the discontinuation.
Amendment 71, in clause 37, page 49, line 33, at end insert—
“(4) Omit subsection (4) and insert—
(4) A senior coroner who discontinues an investigation into a death under this section must—
(a) as soon as practicable, notify each interested person known to the coroner named at section 47(2)(a) or (b) of this Act of the discontinuation of the investigation and provide a written explanation as to why the investigation was discontinued, and
(b) if requested to do so in writing by an interested person, give to that person as soon as practicable a written explanation as to why the investigation was discontinued.”.
This amendment would ensure that family members are informed in writing for the reasons for a discontinuation of an investigation, without being required to request this information.
Amendment 72, in clause 37, page 49, line 33, at end insert—
“(4) Section 43 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (Coroners regulations) is amended as follows.
(5) In subsection (3) after paragraph (a) insert—
“(aa) provision for the establishment of an appeals process for interested persons who disagree with the decision to discontinue an investigation under the provision in section 4 of this Act.”.
The purpose of this amendment is to ensure the Lord Chancellor establishes an appeal process for families who disagree with the decision to discontinue an investigation.
Andy Slaughter
We now come to the part of the Bill that deals with coroners, to which we have tabled a number of amendments and new clauses. We appreciate that the clauses in the part of the Bill we have just discussed, and indeed in other parts of the Bill, are very much a template for the Government to take forward procedural changes to parts of the courts and tribunal systems. We essentially have two things to say about that.
First, we are not against any of that per se, particularly where the aim is to make what is proposed more streamlined, efficient and economical. However, we must look at safeguards, because often in the process, as we have seen in earlier parts of the Bill on criminal procedure and online procedure, there can be dangers to current users of the system that need to be addressed. Secondly, as addressed in our new clauses, the Government are not short of advice on improvements to the coronial system, including most recently through the report of the Justice Committee, which we debated in Westminster Hall, but many opportunities for improvement simply have not been taken. We highlight some of those around representation, and vulnerable representation, which we will come on to. That is disappointing, given that that report is only the latest in a whole series, going back to Tom Luce’s report in 2003—although there are many more recent than that—that have drawn attention to the limitations and the need for improvements in the coroners system. We just wish that there was more to address that, either in the Government’s response to the Justice Committee report or in the Bill.
I thank some of the organisations that provided briefings to us, including Justice, the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers and, principally, Inquest, which I will say a bit more about when we debate the new clauses. It has been an outstanding organisation in representing, and fighting the cases of, bereaved families for many years.
I have concerns about clauses 37 to 39. Clause 37 will broaden the circumstances in which coroners can discontinue investigations, Clause 38 gives coroners powers to hold inquests in writing, and clause 39 enables the wider use of remote hearings, including the power to hold remote hearings with juries. I will argue that the increase in discretion to discontinue investigations in clause 37 risks important evidence not being tested and complex cases not being publicly scrutinised. I will describe the lack of evidence to support the introduction of clauses 37 to 39 and how evidence instead suggests the need for careful safeguards to ensure that proper investigation and scrutiny is permitted where necessary, with due weight given to the wishes of the family. I will also argue that the Bill should be amended to include provision on public funding for bereaved families at inquests where state bodies are involved.
Chapter 4 deals with coroners and suggests that it will improve the efficiency of the service in the light of the backlogs in coroners’ courts due to the pandemic. The measures in clauses 37 and 38 were recently recommended by the Chief Coroner in his 2020 annual report. I am not aware of some other cause or evidence— the Minister may want to point me to some—for these measures to be introduced. It is notable that none of the conclusions or recommendations in the Justice Committee’s May 2021 report on the coroner service provides any justification for these measures, despite the Committee’s detailed analysis of the current state of the coronial system. It is extremely concerning that the argument that these measures are needed to address the covid-19 backlog of cases in the coroners’ courts is unevidenced, especially given the strong argument that the measures will lead to corners being cut and crucial opportunities for hearing and scrutinising evidence missed.
In its report, the Justice Committee found there to be
“unacceptable variation in the standard of service between Coroner areas.”
In the absence of a national coroner service, which the Committee recommended but the Government have refused, a central concern is the widespread inconsistency in approach by individual coroners in relation to all aspects of the inquest process—a postcode lottery, in other words.
James Cartlidge
The hon. Gentleman has twice referred to the backlog in coroners’ courts caused by the pandemic. Can I be absolutely clear? Does he accept that the pandemic has had a very significant impact on the backlog in the coroners’ courts?
Andy Slaughter
The pandemic has had a substantial effect on almost every aspect of our waking lives and on backlogs throughout the court system. That does not abrogate the Government from responsibility for dealing with the backlog so called, or indeed for other reasons why backlogs have been building up in the system over that time.
I mentioned Tom Luce’s fundamental review, in which he wrote:
“The phrase we have heard more than any other during the Review is ‘the coroner is a law unto himself’. Virtually every interest has complained of inconsistency and unpredictability between coroners in the handling of inquests”.
Clauses 37 and 38 will further entrench levels of coronial discretion and inconsistency, adding yet more challenges for bereaved families forced to navigate the inquest system. The Government have not evidenced how these measures will address the stated problem of reducing the backlog of cases in coroners’ courts. The latest statistics on the coroner service indicate an 18% rise in deaths in state detention. Many of those cases are complex, meaning that these provisions are unlikely to apply.
Let me deal specifically with amendment 69 and amendments 70 to 72, with which it has been grouped. Clause 37 broadens the circumstances in which a coroner might discontinue an investigation into a death. The current law, the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, holds that where a coroner has commenced an investigation, they must proceed to an inquest unless the cause of death becomes clear in a post-mortem examination. The Government claim that is a costly and unnecessary step where the cause of death may become clear through other means, such as medical records. As such, clause 37 will amend section 4 of the 2009 Act to allow for an investigation to be discontinued if the coroner is satisfied that the cause of death is clear, thus removing reference to a post-mortem as a necessary requirement for discontinuing an investigation. If the investigation is discontinued, the coroner cannot then hold an inquest into the death unless fresh evidence later comes to light or a successful challenge is brought to the decision.
There are a number of concerns about that, and about the implications of the Bill for inquests and bereaved families. Amendment 69 seeks to address three main issues: the need to test evidence; what happens in article 2 cases; and the need to safeguard the wishes of families.
On the need to test evidence, I am concerned that clause 37 would allow a coroner to discontinue an inquest based on evidence that could change if tested. The current wording states that a coroner must discontinue an investigation into an individual’s death if they are
“satisfied that the cause of death has become clear in the course of the investigation”.
While the Chief Coroner states in his 2020 annual report that such a provision could include evidence such as medical records, the Bill itself does not clarify the types of evidence that could be used, and effectively allows any evidence obtained during the investigation to be used to justify discontinuance, without the opportunity for it to be challenged at a later stage.
Andy Slaughter
The sensitivity of this is pretty clear. We have suddenly veered off to talk about backlogs in the Crown court. There will be ample opportunity to debate those matters in future. The relationship between backlogs and covid is a complicated one. No one is saying, clearly, that covid has not put pressure on the courts system—that would be bizarre—but the Minister is misinterpreting what I said. The Government have two responsibilities here. First, they must look at their responsibility for the extraordinary cuts in justice budgets that occurred post 2010, long before covid was ever thought of. For a whole raft of reasons to do with lack of legal aid, court availability because of court closures and so on—the Minister knows all the arguments—we have put ourselves in that vulnerable position, as we did in other areas, such as the NHS. The fact that the court service, including the coronial service, is in a parlous state is at the door of the Government—the Minister was not there, but his colleagues were in government during that time. So, first, they must take responsibility for that. Secondly, they must now take responsibility for reducing backlogs, whether they were caused by covid or were pre-existing before covid. Trying to exculpate himself from that, he does himself no service.
James Cartlidge
I look forward to debating that further. Labour have pulled their Opposition day debate on the backlog twice, one of which was for good reason, given the business that the House was debating. I will be delighted if they have an Opposition day debate on the backlog at their next opportunity, because it is important to stress the very positive things that the Government are doing.
The reason I made that point is that the whole purpose of the provisions is to streamline the courts in the coronial system, so of course it matters if the hon. Member for Hammersmith accepts covid causation in the coronial courts backlog and yet, for political reasons, the Opposition’s central message on backlog in the Crown courts magically does not relate to social distancing measures that have been so profoundly challenging to holding jury trials in particular and for cases with multiple defendants. But there we are. All I would add is that if he wants to go back to 2010, bring it on in that debate, because we know what their plans would have been had they got into government. He should always remember that.
On the specific points, I have great sympathy for those families who have had stressful cases in the coronial court or had cases in which they were disappointed with what happened. Obviously, as a Minister, I cannot comment on the specific cases raised by the hon. Gentleman. Those are determined by our independent judiciary, which is an important part of our constitution, but I sympathise with the families. Bereavement is an inherently distressing experience, we can all agree, and in part that is why we are trying where possible to address and reduce that anxiety with the measures in the Bill. For example, in this clause we are trying to reduce some of the bureaucracy that can come with bereavement.
The hon. Member for Hammersmith made a couple of other specific points about coroners’ courts and the Justice Committee report. He was recently a member of that Select Committee, and I pay tribute to his work on it, and to the Committee more broadly under the chairmanship of my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill). Recently, I spoke about such matters at length in a Westminster Hall debate on coroners, but to be absolutely clear, we have accepted six of the recommendations made by the Justice Committee in its report on coroners published in May. To enact some in the Bill is incredible timing—to have Committee recommendations in a Bill within six months. The obvious example is clause 41, dealing with the merger of coroner areas, which we shall come on to.
The other important specific point that I wish to make is on safeguards. Again, the hon. Member for Hammersmith is absolutely right. As I have said throughout the Committee’s proceedings, streamlining measures—generally technological, but not always, as some might be in procedure or when a hearing is held and so on— are there to improve efficiency, and in itself that can actually help families. For example, if we reduce the need to hold an inquest, particularly because it has proven to be unnecessary because the cause of death was natural causes, that can remove some of the bureaucracy that can be faced by a bereaved family.
Andy Slaughter
If those safeguards exist, as the Minister says, why are they not on the face of the Bill? They are, at least in part, in clause 38, which we are going on to discuss, so why would the Minister not accept some or all of the safeguards that we propose?
James Cartlidge
I will be addressing all the points, but the hon. Gentleman is right: clause 38 contains very significant safeguards.
The intention behind clause 37 is to provide coroners with the flexibility to discontinue an investigation into a death where a death from natural causes has become clear through means other than a post-mortem examination. It is intended that the clause will negate the need for unnecessary procedures and processes, freeing up capacity and resources for the coroner to concentrate on more complex cases. The clause should be read along with section 4 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, which it amends.
Amendment 69 proposes to introduce additional safeguards into clause 37, as discussed, by requiring additional conditions when a coroner seeks to discontinue an investigation into a death where the cause of death becomes clear in the course of investigation, which typically will be where medical evidence shows that the death was from natural causes. The safeguards include a requirement that the coroner seek consent from interested persons before discontinuing such an investigation. Although I understand the hon. Gentleman’s concerns, I would like to assure him that the amendment is not necessary. The 2009 Act already provides the safeguards that the amendment seeks to include in the Bill. Section 4 of the Act sets out instances where the coroner may not discontinue an investigation, which include violent or unnatural deaths, or deaths in custody or other state detention.
I also remind the hon. Gentleman that coroners are independent judicial office holders, and the way that they carry out investigations and inquests is a matter for them. Introducing a requirement for the coroner to seek consent from interested persons before making judicial decisions would be not only fettering their discretion but would, in effect, remove the decision from the coroner—that is, the judge, which is what they ultimately are—into the hands of an interested person or a number of interested persons. That is at odds with the most fundamental principle of judicial proceedings, which is that only the judge or the jury makes the decisions, having listened to all the arguments without fear or favour. We must be mindful that while interested persons have certain rights at the inquest, they do not control the inquest process or its investigations. That is for the coroner alone to determine, as a judicial office holder.
I would like to assure the Committee that in his capacity as judicial head of the coroner service, the Chief Coroner will provide guidance to coroners accompanying all changes, which we expect coroners will follow.
Amendment 70 proposes that the coroner gives interested persons an explanation as to why they are considering discontinuing an investigation, to enable them to make an informed decision about whether to consent to the discontinuance of the investigation. Section 4 of the 2009 Act, which clause 37 amends, already provides that a senior coroner must, on request, provide a rationale for the discontinuance of an investigation. We expect the coroner to work sensitively with bereaved families to address any concerns that they may have regarding the investigation into their loved one’s death. However, as I have said, the decision on the direction of the investigation, including consideration of any discontinuance, must be for the coroner alone. In any event, section 4 has a narrow remit. It is to permit the discontinuance of an investigation where natural causes are found to be the reason for the death, and not in any other instances. Every day, coroners make the decision not to investigate deaths reported to them that they determine are of natural causes. Section 4 expressly prohibits the coroner from discontinuing an investigation where the coroner has reason to suspect that the deceased died a violent or unnatural death, or died while in custody or otherwise in state detention. That position remains unchanged.
Amendment 71 goes slightly further and proposes to set out in primary legislation a requirement for the coroner to provide to the bereaved family a written explanation of why they have decided to discontinue an investigation, regardless of whether a request has been received from the bereaved family. As I have said, section 4 of the 2009 Act already provides that the coroner must provide a written explanation for discontinuing an investigation on request. We consider that that ensures that only family members who actually require the information will receive it, and that additional work is not required of the coroner when it is not needed. After all, these are streamlining measures. The Government’s intention behind the measures on coroners in the Bill is to reduce unnecessary procedures in coroners’ courts and unnecessary distress to bereaved families. The amendment runs counter to the Government’s intentions and would add additional administrative process to the system. Providing such information unsolicited could also unintentionally distress bereaved families, although I am not suggesting that that is the hon. Gentleman’s intention.
Finally, amendment 72 would require a separate appeals process to be established for bereaved families who would like to challenge a coroner’s decision to discontinue an investigation into the death of their loved one. Although I understand that the hon. Gentleman wishes to ensure that bereaved families have recourse to appeal if they are not happy with the coroner’s decision, I must remind him that there is already a route for bereaved families to challenge a coroner’s decision by seeking judicial review of the decision. In 2020, there were just 20 judicial reviews against coroners’ decisions, of which five got permission and two were successful at hearing.
Additionally, an individual may apply to the High Court, with the permission of the Attorney General, for an investigation to be carried out if the coroner has not held one, or for a fresh investigation to be held, for example if new evidence comes to light. The High Court will allow a fresh investigation only if it would be in the interests of justice, but importantly, there is no time limit for making such an application, which of course is not the case with judicial review. We therefore do not think it appropriate to set up a seemingly freestanding, separate appeals process to deal with this single element of coroners’ judicial decision making.
I hope that I have adequately addressed the hon. Gentleman’s concern and assured him that appropriate safeguards are in place. On that basis, I urge him to withdraw the amendments.
Andy Slaughter
That was a disappointing response from the Minister. I was looking for any or all of the following: an explanation of why there are not safeguards in the clause that go beyond what is in the 2009 Act; perhaps acceptance of some, if not all, of the suggestions that we have made; and at least reassurances that the Government will look at mitigation. It is undeniable that the effect of the processes set out in this part of the Bill is to make it more difficult for bereaved families to be active participants in the process when all the evidence is that we should be taking steps to facilitate that.
The Minister mentioned the recommendations of the Justice Committee. I can tell him that the Justice Committee was extremely disappointed with the Government’s response. I will not go into that in detail now—it is outside the scope of these amendments—but I will quote from the debate that we had recently in Westminster Hall:
“I counted at least seven major omissions from the Government’s response, and many of them have been mentioned already…One is the provision of non-means tested legal aid,”
which we are coming on to.
“One is appeals on coroners’ decisions. One is the issue of pathologists’ fees. One is the national coroner service, which the report recommends. One is the inspectorate, which the report recommends. One is a complaints procedure. The last is the independent office.”—[Official Report, 28 October 2021; Vol. 702, c. 216WH.]
The significance of that is that, individually and collectively, those recommendations of the Justice Committee were trying to give some consistency and rigour to the way that coroners’ decisions are made. The reason I quoted Tom Luce was to point out that inconsistency has been the constant complaint over the years. Coroners, in a way that is not typical of the courts and tribunal system, can produce very anomalous responses to families in that situation.
The Government have chosen not to bring forward responses on the issues that I have mentioned that were raised in the Justice Committee report, and they have been generally quite negative about them, while not ruling all of them out. However, at the very least, we need the very specific safeguards that I have mentioned. Having heard everything that the Minister has said, we will press amendments 69 and 72 to a vote. I will not oppose the clause outright, but those amendments are, frankly, the least that is necessary to offer the safeguards that we have indicated.
James Cartlidge
Over the past year, the coronial system has shown great resilience in how it has coped with the impacts of the pandemic in ensuring that death investigations have continued as far as possible. I pay tribute to our coroners and all of those who work in the coronial system. We are, however, aware that a considerable number of inquests have been delayed due to the pandemic restrictions, and coroners, along with the Chief Coroner, are looking at post-pandemic plans to ensure that the system recovers.
We expect that the coronial measures introduced in the Bill will play a major role in the coronial system’s post-pandemic recovery, as they will reduce unnecessary procedures in coroner’s courts. This will provide capacity to coroners as they address inquest backlogs in their courts. The Government’s priority remains to ensure that bereaved families are at the heart of the coronial process. The measures in the Bill support this priority. Reducing unnecessary procedures in coroner’s courts will reduce the distress of bereaved families. Clause 37 gives the coroner the flexibility to discontinue an investigation where the cause of death becomes clear and it has been revealed through means other than a post-mortem examination.
Where the cause of death has become clear otherwise than through a post-mortem examination, clause 37 will negate the need for the investigation to proceed to an inquest, reducing the distress for bereaved families. The clause does not remove the statutory requirement for a coroner's investigation into deaths in custody or other state detention to proceed to an inquest. Inquests into such deaths will still be required to take place as usual. We expect that the Chief Coroner will issue further guidance on this and the other coronial measures to ensure consistency of approach across the coroner areas.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 37 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 38
Power to conduct non-contentious inquests in writing
Andy Slaughter
I beg to move amendment 73, in clause 38, page 50, line 18, after “hearing” insert—
“(e) the coroner has considered the views of any of the interested persons named at section 47(2)(a) or (b) of this Act who are known to the coroner,
“(f) all of the interested persons named at section 47(2)(a) or (b) of this Act who are known to the coroner consent to a hearing in writing.”
This amendment will ensure that inquests are not held without a hearing if that is against the wishes of the deceased’s family.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 10—Publicly funded legal representation for bereaved people at inquests—
‘(1) Section 10 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1), after “(4)” insert “or (7).”
(3) After subsection (6), insert—
“(7) This subsection is satisfied where—
(a) The services consist of advocacy at an inquest where the individual is an Interested Person pursuant to section 47(2)(a), (b), or (m) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 because of their relationship to the deceased; and
(b) One or more public authorities are Interested Persons in relation to the inquest pursuant to section 47(2) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 or are likely to be designated as such.
(8) For the purposes of this section “public authority” has the meaning given by section 6(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998.””
This new clause would ensure that bereaved people (such as family members) are entitled to publicly funded legal representation in inquests where public bodies (such as the police or a hospital trust) are legally represented.
New clause 11—Removal of the means test for legal help prior to inquest hearing—
‘(1) Schedule 1 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph 41, after sub-paragraph (3), insert—
“(4) For the purposes of this paragraph, the “Financial resources” provisions at section 21 (and in The Civil Legal Aid (Financial Resources and Payment for Services) Regulations 2013 do not apply.””
This new clause would remove the means test for legal aid applications for legal help for bereaved people at inquests.
New clause 12—Eligibility for bereaved people to access legal aid under existing provisions—
‘(1) Section 10 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (4)(a), after “family”, insert—
“or where the individual is an Interested Person pursuant to section 47(2)(m) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 because of their relationship with the deceased.”
(3) In subsection (6), after paragraph (c), insert—
“(d) or they fall within any of the groups named at section 47 (2)(a), (b) or (m) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.”
(4) Schedule 1 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 is amended as follows.
(5) In paragraph 41, after sub-paragraph (3)(c), insert—
“(d) or they fall within any of the groups named at section 47 (2)(a), (b) or (m) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.””
This new clause would bring the Legal, Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 into line with the definition of family used in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.
Andy Slaughter
As we move on to clause 38, I will speak to amendment 73 and the three new clauses about legal aid for representation and other matters.
Clause 38 gives coroners the power to hold inquests in writing where they decide that a hearing is unnecessary. Currently, rule 23 of the coroners’ rules allows for documentary inquests to take place, where no witnesses are required to give evidence but a hearing must still take place. Clause 38 would change that by creating a new section 9C to the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, allowing a coroner to hold an inquest entirely in writing. New section 9C does include a list of considerations that the coroner must make before deciding to hold an inquest in writing. They include ensuring that all interested persons have been invited to make submissions; considering whether an interested person has put forward “reasonable grounds” for a hearing to take place; and determining that there is no public interest in holding a hearing.
The key concern with clause 38 is that there may be circumstances in which the bereaved family wants an inquest with a hearing but a coroner deems one unnecessary. Other interested persons invited to make representations may argue against a hearing. Holding an inquest in writing in this context could deprive the family of the opportunity to explore all available evidence and limit their ability to scrutinise the account provided by relevant authorities, including by hearing oral evidence and questioning key witnesses.
It is acknowledged that clause 38 provides some safeguards in this regard. However, we believe that those safeguards are insufficient. For instance, clause 38 does not mention the need to consider the bereaved family’s wishes in terms and there is no guarantee that they will be given any weight in the coroner’s ultimate decision. Therefore, it is not clear that a family’s wishes would constitute the reasonable grounds needed to decide against conducting an inquest in writing. The current drafting of the Bill leaves a wide discretion to individual coroners to determine whether reasonable grounds for a hearing have been made out by a family.
Further, at the point where a family would be invited to make representations to the coroner on whether an inquest should or should not be held in writing, many families would not necessarily have legal representation to support them in making their views heard. That would put families at a disadvantage in comparison with other interested persons with the benefit of legal teams who were also invited to make representations and argue against a hearing.
I will refer to a particular case; my purpose is to illustrate the argument rather than deal with the specifics of the individuals concerned. Jessica died on 16 October 2020 at a women’s crisis centre called Link House. Jessica had mental ill health and had suffered from an eating disorder and depression for most of her adult life. The inquest into Jessica’s death was originally listed as a rule 23 documentary inquest. However, given emerging evidence that there were serious problems in Jessica’s care, representations were made to the coroner that the inquest should be adjourned. That request was granted, and a pre-inquest review is scheduled for later in the year, when lawyers will be able to argue that article 2 is engaged.
If clause 38 had applied in this case, Jessica’s family might have struggled to make clear their arguments that the coroner should proceed to an inquest hearing; an inquest in writing might have proceeded at the coroner’s discretion and against the family’s wishes. My amendment to clause 38 would ensure that the wishes of families are respected in decisions on whether to hold a paper-only inquest instead of having a hearing, as ordinarily happens. Some families may wish to have a hearing so that evidence can be fully aired and they have the opportunity to raise any concerns with the coroner directly. The amendment would ensure that inquests are not held without a hearing if that is against the wishes of the family of the deceased.
I move on to new clauses 10, 11 and 12. I start with a quote from Deborah Coles, the executive director of Inquest. She sums up the position we are in and why I am asking the Government to support the three new clauses on legal aid at inquests. Ms Coles says:
“It is now for the Government to put the experiences of bereaved people at the front and centre and ensure equality of arms, accountability, oversight and candour. There can be no more false starts, broken commitments or shelved recommendations.”
Ms Coles knows well what she is talking about. Inquest has worked on more than 2,000 cases and investigation processes, with 483 families currently needing their support after a bereavement. This work is done to secure more effective scrutiny of the state when people die. These are people who die in police custody, in prison cells, in health or social care settings, but also in major disasters such as Hillsborough and, more recently, Grenfell.
When these deaths occur, there is a fundamental inequality of arms when it comes to what follows. Inquests following state-related deaths are intended to seek the truth and to expose unsafe practices and abuses of state power. However, the preventative potential of inquests is undermined by the pitting of unrepresented families against multiple expert legal teams defending the interests and reputations of state and corporate bodies. What is more, bereaved families often struggle for legal representation, while public authorities have unlimited access to lawyers at the taxpayer’s expense.
I want to mention the intervention from the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton) in the Westminster Hall debate on 28 October. The Minister was there replying for the Government. The hon. Gentleman himself, with the assistance of many, had to work to get to a situation where there was representation for the families in the Shoreham air show case. There were 18 different public bodies, all of which had legal representation. That is at the far end of what can happen, but it is not untypical for there to be not just one, two or three, but four, five or six different public bodies represented.
I did not accept the evidence of Mr Rebello. He made some very cogent points, which we will come on to in clause 39. Lawyers are employed to represent the interests of state parties. Yes, they will have a general duty, as all lawyers do, to assist the court, and, yes, they may, albeit asked by the court, assist unrepresented parties—or they will volunteer to—but that is not the norm. They are there to—and are paid to—represent their clients. They will, on the whole, make points that seek to exculpate their client from responsibility. To see that happening day-to-day, year-to-year, in the coroner’s courts, where families are pitted in that way, is deeply disturbing, frankly.
Families will face hospitals, police and local authorities and other public bodies that have legal representation, often funded by the public bodies. Where these bodies do not have representation, they will still likely have formal assistance through in-house legal professionals or specialist inquest officers—none of which is available to most families. At the very least, public bodies will have witnesses who are experienced professionals, such as doctors, who will still have been provided with advice from a legal team prior to the inquest. All this, and yet a family suffering a bereavement and dealing with the trauma surrounding the circumstances of the death and the inquest process are likely to be refused the same publicly funded legal assistance.
Legal aid will be granted only under the Government’s exceptional funding scheme if it is considered that there is a wider public interest in the inquest or if it is an article 2 inquest. As many of the Committee will know, an article 2 inquest is held when there is a death in state custody, or if it can be argued that the state failed to protect someone’s right to life. Furthermore, to be granted legal aid under this scheme, families must currently also meet a financial means test.
In the absence of legal aid, some lawyers help bereaved families by funding representation through a conditional fee agreement—or CFA—otherwise known as no win, no fee. This funding arrangement has to be linked with a separate civil claim for compensation. If a CFA is not possible, either legal representation is provided free of charge by a lawyer, which can be unsustainable for law firms, or a family has to fund its own representation. This is simply unaffordable for many families—for most, I would argue. Legal aid provides families with the certainty that there will be equality of arms at the inquest and that they will not be alone during what is likely to be one of the most difficult periods of their lives.