Future Free Trade Agreements
Debate between Angus Brendan MacNeil and Marcus Fysh(5 years, 2 months ago)
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Mr Fysh
The hon. Lady makes a good point. The earlier the involvement in these conversations, the more confident communities can be about a mandate that the Government can take to a negotiation, and the process of ratifying whatever comes back from the negotiation can then take place in a timely manner, which I think is essential. I shall talk about the NHS in a bit more detail later, but I see no reason why there should be those fears about it. Indeed, I can see reasons for it to benefit, and for its users to benefit, as a result of deals with, for example, the United States that might allow earlier and cheaper access to drugs than is possible now.
This debate is, of course, about future free trade agreements, but those agreements, and the trade strategy, are inevitably coloured by consideration of what our potential relationship with the EU might be, and what obligations we might enter into in order to acquire it. I now want to say a little about the impact of the restrictive nature of the proposed withdrawal agreement, including some of the prejudices to our future trade policy and strategy that it sets up.
The withdrawal agreement commits us to paying a lot of money without real limits, and with oversight by the European Court of Justice of the exact obligations that will be required. It allows the possibility of an extension by up to two years of the transition period that is being contemplated. We do not know at this point what sort of competition or anti-competition legislation the EU might produce in the next four years, but it might affect our economy, and might have an impact on what we could or could not do with future trade partners, either during that time or afterwards. The agreement gives the joint committee very wide powers of interpretation of what it says, and, in fact, powers to change what it says, as if it had the effect of law and Acts of Parliament. That means that the position in another two to four years’ time is very uncertain.
It should be noted that the agreement proposes the acknowledgement and implementation of the current EU system of geographical indications. I am not necessarily opposed to their being implemented in the same way in the future, but that really should be a matter for the future trade negotiation, which we have been told all along cannot take place during the article 50 negotiation period.
What is slightly more worrying for us in this discussion of future trade policy is that the agreement strengthens the current requirement for “sincere co-operation” within the common commercial policy to which we are subject as members of the EU, which effectively means that we are obliged not to undermine the EU’s interests in any international forums. I do not think we should be in the business of trying to undermine its interests, but that requirement may well restrict what we can discuss with future free trade partners during the transition period. That, I think, adds to the uncertainty that already exists about the transition period, and about what has or has not been agreed by the EU and the UK. Whether and how the EU’s existing free trade agreements with the rest of the world will apply to the UK during the transition period remains opaque, as does the extent to which the UK is able to sign free trade agreements during the transition period in the context of that sincere co-operation.
Within the backstop provision for after the transition period should nothing be agreed, there is a hard veto for the EU on any superseding agreements. Article 20 of the protocol is very clear that there needs to be a joint decision by the EU and the UK for future alternative arrangements to succeed the backstop. So whatever the best endeavours clause does or does not do, that is still a hard veto that needs to be dealt with.
The reality of the operation of the backstop as written for the UK is very dramatic from the point of view of trade and competitiveness. For example, the EU will be able to increase state aid during the period after 2019, but the UK must maintain it at current levels. If that happened for four years, it could really undermine the competitiveness of some of our domestic producers, which is exactly what we have said we need to think hard about in future trade agreements. Because of how the annexes operate, state aid provisions would effectively be applicable to our defence manufacturing industry for the first time in a way that they are not in the EU. That would enable the European Commission to take cases in our courts against defence manufacturers and/or the Government in instances that were considered to be state aid to the defence manufacturing industry.
Those are the sorts of hostages to fortune that are lurking in the backstop, and that is one reason why I am against it. We need to be very mindful of that sort of leverage over our future arrangements with the EU, whether on the status of Northern Ireland within our constitution, if our fishing is open to European actors, the status of Gibraltar, or our defence capability and sovereign ability. Those are all potential hostages to fortune in the current backstop arrangement, which is a big part of the reason why I am opposed to the current proposal and want those backstop arrangements to be replaced now, or at least to have full legally binding guarantees that they will be replaced over time.
As the backstop is currently written, it envisages a customs union. There has been much talk about whether that means frictionless trade.
Angus Brendan MacNeil
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, who serves with me on the International Trade Committee, for giving way. He has clearly laid out his opposition to the backstop for various reasons, and I respect what he has said on that, but where does he go then: to no deal or to the revocation of article 50?
Mr Fysh
I do not think it is as clearcut as that. In the Malthouse compromise, which some might have read about, there is a proposal to replace the backstop with a permanent arrangement that is effectively a zero-tariff environment for the time being with a trade facilitation agreement, which allows very efficient trade to take place across the border. It would not be a unilateral exit from the backstop, and there would not be a time limit on it; I understand communities in Ireland wanting some certainty about that. I actually think it is a much better idea to replace the backstop within the withdrawal agreement if we want to pass the agreement now, and if that does not happen we should keep offering to do exactly that. I will come on shortly to some of the back-up plans should that not be acceptable either.
The customs union arrangement within the backstop would oblige us to continue to adopt the common external tariff and would potentially oblige us to have the common commercial policy. There is a great deal of uncertainty about the physical operations at our borders. What the annexes of the withdrawal agreement backstop say is required, in black and white, is that every transaction between Great Britain and Northern Ireland and vice versa, and between Great Britain and the EU across the channel, would require an a.uk physical, stamped certificate, effectively showing where the duty has been paid in the customs territory it is coming from. That is a massive administrative burden. Based on the HMRC numbers of transactions with the EU, the number the CHIEF—customs handling of import and export freight—computer has to handle will be going up from 55 million currently to 255 million in the future. That means there will be an extra 200 million of these things every year; that is over half a million physical certificates a day that HMRC officers will somehow have to process. That is wholly unrealistic, and when one talks to the Government in detail about it, or to the EU, they admit this is totally unworkable and will not be introduced. How then can they say they cannot introduce alternative arrangements now that would have another two years to be implemented on the ground?
In addition to those physical stamped certificates there would have to be export declarations into the export control system, which would enable the logging of whether a tariff needed to be collected or indeed whether rectification was needed in the inward processing relief systems. So the idea that this is a frictionless system is wrong, and it needs to be replaced. It is unworkable; it is full of friction and it also prevents an independent trade policy for the time that it persists.
If we were to continue to offer the Malthouse proposals even if we could not get a withdrawal agreement done, we would continue to offer a stopgap measure of a zero-tariff, simple free trade agreement, or an agreement between the UK and the EU to prefer each other’s trade for a period of time, which could be notified to the World Trade Organisation under article XXIV of GATT—the general agreement on tariffs and trade. That is a very simple thing to propose, in a sense: because it would be a goods-only agreement, it would not need ratification by all 27 member states, and it could be agreed and implemented very rapidly.
If the EU did not want to do that either, although that would be best because it would be absurd for us to be charging tariffs on each other, we would need to look at other things we might do. We heard discussion earlier of some elements of the unilateral free trade policy that we would potentially need to put in place to prevent price rises for different goods. That does not mean we would have to unilaterally reduce our applied tariffs for every product; we can make that choice product by product.
We have already heard on the grapevine that we are not planning to zero-tariff agricultural goods in our future tariff policy. That makes sense in many ways, because we need to take a nuanced approach. We need to look, product by product, at where domestic producers need some sort of tariff or programme so that they are not exposed to world prices immediately.
We also need to consider an interesting strategy that would encourage other countries to enter into free trade agreements with us. It would propose that we would take a unilateral free trade approach for a period but that we would reintroduce tariffs going up towards the bound tariff level—the common external tariff level—after, say, two or three years. That would encourage the countries that want the continuation of free trade to enter into free trade agreements with us to achieve it.
In the meantime—coming back to agricultural products and taking beef as an example—while we might have a tariff, we would still have a tariff rate quota that allowed some nations zero-rated access to the UK market up to a certain quota. We could open those quotas that would have been for the EU to the rest of the world. The EU would then have a choice. It could enter into a free trade agreement with us and have a quota or it could see the markets that it currently has in the UK being opened to the rest of the world. I personally think that it will want to have a free trade agreement, at least on a temporary basis.
Angus Brendan MacNeil
I am trying to follow what the hon. Gentleman is saying as closely as I can. He talks about working on a tariff-by-tariff basis and making judgments or decisions depending on domestic demand or production, but this would open us up to a retaliatory or mirror action from the European Union. For example, if there were no citrus fruits such as oranges here and we decided to get rid of tariffs on oranges, impacting the Spanish and Portuguese orange producers, they could ask themselves what tariffs had existed only to protect the United Kingdom as part of the EU pot. They could then pluck out those tariffs, and we would find ourselves in an even more disadvantageous trade situation.
Mr Fysh
I thank the Chairman of our Committee for his intervention. I absolutely agree that it makes the most sense to have a free trade agreement. That is the simplest thing, and it would eliminate the absurdity of even having to discuss these matters. So it would be my first proposal, my second proposal and my third proposal to have just that kind of FTA. This is really the fall-back to the fall-back to the fall-back position—
Mr Fysh
The backstop to the backstop to the backstop, exactly. I really do not think that we should get into that position. Looking at the sensible contingency planning that the EU is doing in lots of other areas, I see no reason why it should not continue to be sensible and reasonable, just as we are, and I believe that we will get there.
I want to come back to the trade facilitation issues, because they are really important to the consideration of what trade costs and therefore to the potential value of future free-trade agreements as well as the value the EU’s current agreement. I would like to congratulate HMRC on its work to make trade efficient in the event of no deal at the end of March. Indeed, that work will also be applicable in the future if we are outside a customs union and the single market. These will all be very useful things.
The transitional simplified procedure that has been opened up to operators is really good news, but I think the Government should take it further straight away by making it available to intermediaries such as the logistics service providers that control a large amount of our trade. That would make the most sense, because it would enable them to be authorised consignees so that they could close out the transit documents that will be an essential part of future trade.
The Government should also look at a more comprehensive scope of waivers for transit guarantees, because the financial liability, especially of operators, cannot close out those guarantees. That will be essential to keeping our trade flowing. They should also look at underwriting some elements of the liability to duty in the EU, so that our export side can operate efficiently.
These things come down to the impact assessments that we have seen. When I have spoken to logistics service providers, customs brokers and others, it is obvious that these documents—the transit documents, the export declaration on this side and the import declaration on the other side—will need doing. It is more than we have to do now, so people need to get ready. I say to business: get ready. Businesses being able to do these things, and ensuring that their logistics service providers are able to do them, will be essential to enabling their trade to flow efficiently.
These measures cost about £50, not hundreds and hundreds of pounds. The value of the goods on a truck crossing the channel can be £10,000 if it is carrying bread or bread products and up to £300,000 for beef or beef products, so £50 is just a tiny fraction of that. We are talking about, at most, 0.5% of the value. According to the Government’s impact assessment, the cost of customs administration in the event of no deal would be 5% to 6% of the value, which is wrong by an order of magnitude. We must not underestimate the value of our future trade agreements based on a misapprehension of the real costs of trade.
Similarly, as the Opposition spokesman said, we should not get the gravity relationship wrong. In the UK, the factor of linkage between trade and distance is only about 0.23%. When we back that number out of the Treasury’s forecasts before the referendum, we get the figure of 0.9%. The figure of 0.9% is the intra-continental EU gravity factor, and it is my contention that the wrong one has been used in our models. That undercooks the benefit to us from free trade around the rest of the world and really overcooks the value of the EU’s trade. I am not saying that we do not want the EU’s trade—we absolutely do—but we want to trade with Europe and with the rest of the world. The referendum result was about us wanting both.
The Government really need to pull their socks up over what they have been saying about UK businesses’ access to Europe. The Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs has again said that there is a big risk of our agricultural products not being allowed into the EU, but that is simply not right. The EU has stated it will put contingency arrangements in place, that we will be listed on the right lists and that we will not be shut out in that way. It is simply wrong to say that we will. I personally think that it does our farmers a disservice to frighten them unnecessarily in that regard.
Similarly, the Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, my hon. Friend the Member for Watford (Richard Harrington), who is also in charge of no-deal planning at the Department, said on “The Week in Westminster” on Saturday morning that UK car manufacturers could not be sure whether they could sell their products into Europe because of the regulations. That statement is in grave danger of misleading the British public and the auto industry, and it could be devastating to the confidence of smaller players in the automotive market that may not be aware of what the rules are or what the EU’s position really is.
The reality is that the EU Council and Commission decided on 8 January that UK vehicle certificates can be registered in the EU. There is no reason for UK car manufacturers to fear that their parts or their cars cannot be sold to Europe. That is simply not the case. The Government need to look at themselves in the mirror and stop scaremongering, which is not in the national interest.
Quickly, because I know that everyone wants to get to speak, although it seems that I am the only one left on the Government Benches—
EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement
Debate between Angus Brendan MacNeil and Marcus Fysh(5 years, 10 months ago)
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Mr Marcus Fysh (Yeovil) (Con)
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie) and to have heard a free trade speech from the Opposition Benches. I welcome my hon. Friend the Minister. Let me also praise my right hon. Friend the Member for Chelsea and Fulham (Greg Hands) for his sterling work on these issues in the Department, and for his engagement with the various Committees of which I am a member.
This agreement is very important to the UK, and I support it. The total trade between Japan and the UK is worth £127 billion, and Leonardo, in my constituency, has a relationship with Kawasaki, producing helicopters, which it would like to expand. As my hon. Friend the Minister said, the Government’s impact assessment forecasts gains amounting to no less than £3 billion from the new agreement, partly as a result of increases in both imports and exports. Cheaper imports help our economy, which is one of the main reasons why we voted to leave the EU and its customs union.
After we leave the EU there will be great opportunities to improve on the Japan agreement, especially in respect of services, in which our economy has a strong interest. The Japan EPA states that world standards should be followed, and demonstrates how we can use methods of regulatory co-operation in the agreement that we make with the EU to guide, smooth and facilitate the handling of goods at our borders with it.
Angus Brendan MacNeil
Given the high praise that the hon. Gentleman is heaping on the European Union, might it not be important to have some bits of paper from both the European Union and Japan saying that this relationship could continue—as he has suggested that he would like it to—following the UK’s departure from the European Union? We would not want to find ourselves in a less advantageous position.
Department for Exiting the European Union
Debate between Angus Brendan MacNeil and Marcus Fysh(6 years, 2 months ago)
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Angus Brendan MacNeil
The other referendum was actually in 2016, but in both referendums—of 2014 and 2016—the Scottish people voted clearly to remain in the European Union, so, yes, I do respect the two referendums. I want that opinion to be checked again in the further referendum on Scottish independence within the European Union that, as the hon. Gentleman knows, is coming down the tracks in jig time.
A customs union, as currently suggested by the principal Opposition, can have myriad or infinite permutations. Have no estimates at all been made for that? All in all, this is one of the areas where the estimates are huge, the variabilities are massive and it is very unclear where the chips will fall.
The overall message that should be going out is that when boardrooms and when the people of Scotland look at the two parties in this Chamber—the Government and the principal Opposition—they have to start thinking and, particularly in the boardrooms, they have to start speaking. They do not have to enter into political debate, but they have to start to become very strident indeed in what they are saying. I meet too many of those from companies who come to me with their fears and their estimates of what might happen. In reality, they have to start saying what they want, because otherwise it will be too late.
I am reminded of the book, “On the Psychology of Military Incompetence”. In a number of military events that occurred, whether in Crimea—the charge of the Light Brigade was in Crimea of course—with the Boers in South Africa, in Mesopotamia or in Afghanistan, the common theme running through them all was the fact that the rank and file could not believe their commanders could get it so utterly wrong, and it was only when hot lead ripped through bare flesh that people then understood. There are companies that are too afraid to move and that, for one reason or another, will not say a word, but when they are taken down by the 2%, 5% or the 8% damage of Brexit, I tell those companies now that it will be too late to do anything about it then, so speak now.
Recently, my Committee went to the USA and Canada to look at the possibility of trade deals. The farmers lobby asked us why. Ford said a UK-US deal would be incremental, but that a UK-EU one would be existential. Certainly, when I saw the border with other Committee members, it was not as fast as the border at the moment between Ireland and Northern Ireland or as the border between France and Spain. These are some of the realities that are coming our way.
Angus Brendan MacNeil
I am very glad to give way to one of the Select Committees colleagues who were with me. I predicted at the border that some people would see what they wanted to see, so let us see what happens.
Mr Fysh
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that we saw the border between the US and Canada. The US and Canada have different regulatory and customs systems, yet they have a just-in-time, integrated supply chain that works perfectly well, so it is possible. The forecasts that he referred to earlier take no account of the possibility of such just-in-time supply chains continuing to work in a free trade agreement scenario.
Angus Brendan MacNeil
We were told that the average wait time was 15 minutes and just-in-time takes cognisance of that. If two minutes at Dover becomes four minutes, that will result in a 17-mile tailback. And, of course, no embarkation of ships takes place on the US-Canadian border after they have passed, or just before, the border point.
In summary, this Government exercise is costing about £250 million a year. It will cost the Scottish economy, which concerns me most, between £3.6 billion and £12 billion a year by 2030, and the way in which the two main parties are going at it means that the figure will probably be closer to £12 billion than to £3.6 billion. It really is time that the UK took a short, sharp look at itself. I predict that Brexit will probably collapse on itself. The economic reality will hit the rhetoric head first, and when it does so the rhetoric will just vanish into a pile of dust and be trampled by the economic reality, which is that the people want their jobs and they want the economy running, not the ideological purity of some Members of this House.