Financial Services and Markets Bill

Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st March 2023 Grand Committee

The senior managers and certification regime was introduced following the report of the banking standards commission, chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie. It aimed at increasing both responsibility and accountability within the professional financial services sector. To a large degree, it was intended as an enforcement tool—a mechanism through which senior individuals could be sanctioned for systemic failings and serious misconduct that occurred on their watch. Although I would not advocate its removal, and it is arguable that it has contributed to improving standards of behaviour across the industry, many are sceptical as to whether it has been effective, because there is no hard evidence that it has been used as the stick which was originally intended. I therefore regret that I am also unable to support Amendment 241D.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, in rising to follow the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, I have to comment on a couple of the points that he made. When he referred to Amendment 216 and suggested that we could rely on the discretion of the regulators, I regretted that the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, was not here, because I am sure that he could have given some extensive account on that basis. We have cause for concern about the actions of the regulators. The noble Viscount also suggested that the relaxation of the ring-fence in the case of SVB, allowing its purchase by HSBC, was not important or significant. Of course, relaxation of rules under emergency weekend conditions is reminiscent of stopping contagion—rather like the kind of emergency steps we took in the face of the Covid-19 pandemic, where lots of things were done that would not be seen as viable under normal conditions.

On Amendment 216, I confess that I can see the arguments for why this should be considered too technical. However, the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, about the fact that we do not have sufficient controls otherwise make the case for it.

On the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, we have a problem where the primary purpose of insurance companies and pension managers has been chasing after massive profits, not looking to long-term security. While we are in that situation, we need find rules to manage it.

Responding to the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, again suggesting that what has happened in recent weeks suggests that the ring-fence is not working, I think that a military analogy might be quite useful here. If you are in a city under attack and your walls are very nearly overtopped by the enemy, you do not at that point pull the walls down and start reconstructing them. You reinforce those walls. The events of the past couple of weeks have demonstrated that what we have now is not enough of a security system—that is patently obvious—but the answer is reinforcement rather than pulling everything down and starting again, because we saw fit to take actions after 2007-08 which we are hoping will make those defensive walls hold this time.

I would have attached my name to Amendments 241C and 241D had I been able to keep up with the flood of legislation we have before us. In reflecting on them, I want to quote an economist on the New York Times, Ezra Klein:

“Banking is a critical form of public infrastructure that we pretend is a private act of risk management.”


That is the context in which I hope the Minister can today reassure us that, as we come towards the end of Committee and in the new environment in which we find ourselves, the Government will seriously rethink this Bill, particularly key elements of it such as competition and ring-fencing, before we get to Report. I have to borrow from a letter in the Financial Times this weekend —I am relying on this as a source—the fact that apparently the correct name for a group of black swans gathered on the ground is a bank.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I did not prepare a speech on this, but recent events and the speeches have moved round to what a fundamental issue we are approaching here. One important issue, which underlines the Government’s changes on Solvency II, is how to get investment into our economy. That is a fundamental need that we have. It is possibly intertwined with how much national risk we are prepared to take. I do not intend to try to solve that now.

If we look at recent events and the responses to them, we see that we have different risk appetites in different countries, in how they will accept failure and what, in essence, they are prepared to bail out. As my noble friend Lady Kramer said, it appears to be the assumption that the Canadians would bail out the pension fund. Maybe they think that is a decent quid pro quo for getting a large amount of infrastructure investment and other investments. That is a balance that it is legitimate for a country to make, but I do not think it is one that we have made here in the UK. We have said “No more bailouts”. That may be something that can never be absolutely held to, as we know, but we do not operate on a principle that it is going to be the case.

Let us look at what happened with Silicon Valley Bank in the UK, where there was not really a great deal wrong other than it suffering the repercussions of what happened in the US and a bank run through co-ordination and a loss of confidence. What does that say about our challenger banks, if people are not prepared to rely on the amount of the deposit guarantees that we have? For industry, we have next to nothing. The Americans are talking about raising their amounts of guaranteed deposits because they realise that businesses will not trust smaller banks with large deposits if there are not higher guarantees. That worries people in the United States, because they do not want to lose their regional banks and to have everything go into large systemic banks. It should worry us that we have lost a challenger bank and that it has gone into a large systemic bank.

We may have to re-examine what our risk appetite is around things such as deposit guarantees. It is not pertinent to these amendments, but we have the same kind of risk issues when we expand and try to get insurance money into more risky investments. The same can be applied to what we want to do with pension funds. I suppose I had better declare my financial services interests as in the register again, just for the record. The recent history is that our institutions are not very good at investing in UK assets. Of the fallout from LDI, one of the things that is already under way is that pension funds will invest less in gilts. They will want to invest in something else—something that they can repo. They will therefore invest in corporate bonds but, to get the liquidity to be able to repo, they will be US corporate bonds. We will have yet another shift from investing in something in the UK. Even if that was the systemic risk concentrations of gilts, nevertheless it is a shift away from investment in UK assets, or not taking an opportunity for a switch in assets to be able to invest in those in the UK. Some of this is to do with our size. Maybe the Canadians have thought about that; I do not know. I am just sort of tossing these thoughts in. They are not hugely relevant to these amendments, but they are hugely relevant to the big issue that underlies the change on the matching adjustment —that is, how do we get investment into the UK economy? I should think absolutely every person in this Room wants that. It is hard to do it in a piecemeal way by changing the eligibility to the matching adjustment.

I do not fully trust the consultation process that we have in this country, because the pre-consultation process is dominated by an industrial lobby which knows what it wants. The consultation responses are weighed, and they are inevitably heavy with what the industry wants and why, and there is much less that comes in to counteract that. Therefore, we go down the track of accepting the proposals of the Government and getting what the industry says—but where is the backstop? This is where we come to the backstop that my noble friend has put in. The backstop is that it is for Parliament, through primary legislation. She does not say in her amendment, “Thou shalt never amend ring-fencing” or, “Thou shalt never amend the things that the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards did”. It says that it requires primary legislation. It says that this should go back to the body—albeit different people at a different time—and that there should be that analysis. This is the same sort of thing that the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, was saying. Maybe you could get legitimacy from Parliament through a better accountability mechanism but, absent that, the only one we have is that it has to come back to primary legislation. With a Whip system and a government majority, that does not necessarily guarantee anything, but it will get at least a thorough airing and, in normal circumstances, you would get some toing and froing and some reasonable amendments if necessary.

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[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

May I comment on the issue of stress tests, which the Minister also raised during Questions this afternoon? You can stress test only risks that you know are there. It depends on the underlying model that you create to examine in your stress tests. Thus stress tests did not pick up the LDI problem at all because it was not there in the models that were used. In financial services, risks appear in entirely unexpected places, and relying on stress tests is, and has been demonstrated to be, a very weak answer. She should reconsider her reliance on this argument.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

Since it is related, I also question the readiness for a 1-in-200-year shock. We have seen very similar kinds of mathematical approaches, if you like, taken to issues such as flood risk and other climate risks, and they have been found to be very ineffective in dealing with problems. They only increase the failure to understand risks.

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

I would point to stress tests as one of the tools that the Bank of England, including the FCA and the PRA, has in its toolbox for securing financial stability. It is not the only tool that it uses. The noble Lord is right that it tests against certain scenarios, which are updated each year to take into account the changing picture around the world and look at different risks, but it can test for only the risks that we have thought about. It is a tool in the toolbox, not a solution to everything.

The noble Lord mentioned LDI. The picture there is mixed. It was identified as a source of risk by the Financial Policy Committee but the extent of movement in gilt prices that it was then stress-tested against was far greater in the scenario that we saw unfold. It may be a good example of the benefits of being able to horizon-scan and look for risk—risk was identified—but also of the limits of some of that work. I completely acknowledge that. The same applies to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett.

Amendments 241C and 241D relate to important regulatory reforms introduced following the global financial crisis and the recommendations by the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. I pay tribute to the important work of that commission and to its members who are here today. It has had a lasting legacy in improving the safety and soundness of the UK’s financial system.

Amendment 241C relates to the ring-fencing regime, which, as we have heard, is a major post-crisis reform separating retail activities from investment banking activities in large banking groups. As required by the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, the Treasury appointed an independent panel, chaired by Sir Keith Skeoch, to review the ring-fencing regime. The legislation required this review to take place after the regime had been in operation for two years; that review concluded in March 2022. I say to my noble friend Lord Trenchard that the Skeoch review looked at the questions about the effectiveness of the ring-fencing regime, and it is in the context of that review that we are discussing the way forward.

In December, as part of the Edinburgh reforms, the Chancellor announced a series of changes to the ring-fencing regime. These broadly follow the recommendations made by the independent review. It concluded that the financial regulatory landscape has changed significantly since the last financial crisis—a point made by my noble friend Lady Noakes. UK banks are much better capitalised and a bank resolution regime has been introduced to ensure that bank failures can be managed in an orderly way in future, minimising risks to depositors and public funds.

In the light of these considerations, the independent review concluded that changes could be made in the short term to improve the functionality of the regime. Crucially, the panel stressed that these could be made while maintaining financial stability safeguards. The panel also recommended that, over the longer term, the Government should review the practicalities of aligning the ring-fencing and resolution regimes. I assure noble Lords that the Government remain firmly committed to the objectives of the ring-fencing regime: to protect core banking services, such as retail deposits, from risks elsewhere in the financial system while minimising risks to taxpayers in the case of a bank failure. As recent events have shown, it is critical that the Government and regulators have the necessary powers to act decisively in pursuit of these objectives.

In response to the review, the Government have announced their intention to consult later this year on a series of near-term reforms to the ring-fencing regime to implement the independent review’s recommendations. The proposed reforms will make the regime more adaptable, simpler and better placed to serve customers, while maintaining important protections for depositors and financial stability. Alongside this, and in response to the review’s longer-term recommendations, the Government recently published a call for evidence that explores how better to align the ring-fencing regime with the resolution regime. I assure all noble Lords that, in the context of that longer-term call for evidence, no decisions have been made on the longer-term future of ring-fencing. The call for evidence is seeking views on a wide range of options including the possibility of disapplying the regime where banks are deemed resolvable, which was one of the Skeoch review’s recommendations. It also seeks views on retaining or further alternative options for reforming the regime.

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[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean (Con)]

I apologise for not being able to attend the Committee last week because I was not in the Lords. I have been asked to speak to Amendment 241F, which was tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, who is currently in the Economic Affairs Committee interviewing the Chancellor. I shall speak also to my Amendment 241FD. I am grateful for the support of my noble friend Lord Holmes for the idea that there should be primary legislation in respect of any CBDC.

The Committee might be relieved to know that I am not proposing to go through the merits of CBDCs. I am very happy to do so if the Minister would like it, but the arguments are well set out in the paper, which was produced by the Economic Affairs Committee that I chaired, published on 13 January 2022 and entitled Central Bank Digital Currencies: a Solution in Search of a Problem? That might give noble Lords an idea of the conclusions of the committee.

The Government and the Bank of England are not convinced. They are still in search of the problem and the solution and a lot of work is being carried out on this. I do not propose to get into whether they are right or wrong about that, but I commend the committee’s report and the Government’s response, which was a letter to me dated 9 March 2022 which ran to all of seven pages—a commendable example of brevity from the Treasury.

On the first page of the letter, the then City Minister, John Glen, said:

“No decision has been taken by the government and the Bank of England as to whether to issue a UK CBDC, which would be a major infrastructure project.”


Indeed, it would. He went on:

“A decision will be based on a rigorous assessment of the overall case for a UK CBDC and will be informed by extensive stakeholder engagement and consultation. Exploring and delivering a UK CBDC, if there were a decision to proceed, would require carefully sequenced phases of work, which will span several years.”


Noble Lords will note that there is no mention whatever of Parliament in those considerations.

In their response, the Government acknowledged that there was

“a broad range of opportunities and risks, which require careful evaluation.”

In response to the committee’s request to get a commitment from the Government that this would require parliamentary approval, the sentence which stands out is:

“The government expects to fully engage Parliament—including through any possible legislation—in an open and transparent manner to ensure that there is a full and proper scrutiny of any proposals over the coming years.”


I am prepared to bet any Member of the Committee a bottle of champagne that, when the Minister replies, we will hear exactly the same words.

The problem with those words is that they are not a commitment to parliamentary scrutiny; they are not a commitment even to secondary legislation, which my noble friend Lord Bridges’s amendment calls for. They are certainly not a commitment to introduce primary legislation to implement something of this scale and importance, which is what my amendment calls for.

My noble friend Lord Holmes mentioned that the Chinese were keen on CBDCs. I am not surprised: they are a means of controlling and knowing what every citizen is doing with their money and how much of it they have. Although the Bank of England will say that its system would be devised in a way which acknowledges the privacy issues arising from CBDCs, I do not for a moment imagine that there will be any such undertakings in China. I can see the attractions of it; there are huge civil liberty and privacy issues at stake here.

There are also substantial risks to financial stability arising from a CBDC and how it is constructed. On the one hand, if you go the whole hog and everyone’s cash holdings are held digitally by the central bank, that clearly has all kinds of implications for privacy and stability. If, on the other hand, it is argued that the commercial banks will carry this out and you would be allowed to hold only a certain amount in a central bank digital currency, it rather defeats the object of doing it in the first place.

If there is the ability to move money into your CBDC account on any scale, in circumstances such as those that have occurred in recent days with some banks, where people fear stability, they will move their money out of the banks into the central bank digital currency, which is clearly a safer haven. That could create huge liquidity problems for the banks. Depending on how it is designed and operates, we could see ourselves moving towards the nationalisation of credit. At this point, I should declare that I have an interest as chairman of Secure Trust Bank.

All of this, we are told, is going to take a lot of time and require a lot of consultation. However, it seems to me that something as fundamental as this cannot be left for the Bank of England and the Treasury to cook up without proper consideration by Parliament, given the issues that are involved.

In paragraph 13 of its equally lightweight response to the committee’s report, the Bank of England states:

“The Committee cites privacy and identity as key considerations related to CBDC and points out potential reputational risk to the Bank of being drawn into controversial debates on these issues. The Bank recognises that these are important topics for the design of any CBDC system and that appropriate safeguards must be ensured if CBDC is to command users’ trust and confidence. These matters are being looked at as part of the Taskforce’s exploratory work and will be taken forward in the Consultation Paper.”


Then there is the important part:

“The Bank also recognises that these issues extend beyond the remit of the central bank. As such the Bank will closely support the work being undertaken by, and take its lead from, HMG”,


not Parliament. Once again, as with the previous set of amendments and as so often in this Committee, we are wrestling with the question of accountability and accountability to Parliament. Here, we are looking at a major change with huge risks to personal privacy, financial stability and the cost and availability of credit. The notion is that this can all be done without proper consultation by Parliament.

In speaking to these amendments, I am a reasonable person. My noble friend Lord Bridges’ Amendment 241F simply requires a vote in Parliament and looks to secondary legislation. I would support that, but I would prefer that if the Bank of England and the Treasury decide, having carried out their consultations, that they wish to proceed with this it should be the subject of primary legislation and subject to extensive debate.

Again, we have not made a lot of progress today, so all I ask of the Minister is for her to fill in the blanks in the undertaking that was given to the committee of this House. It was an all-party report, supported by the members of the committee. They included the noble Lord, Lord King of Lothbury, who knows a certain amount about central banking, and several members of the committee have great experience. I hope that the Minister will be able to say that she can give an undertaking on behalf of the Government—if not at this stage, certainly at a later stage, but ideally at this stage so that we will not have to discuss it again later—that there will be primary legislation and that the Government will instruct the various committees of the Treasury and the Bank of England to proceed on the basis that it will require primary legislation, a draft Bill and an undertaking to deal with the many issues that arise from a central bank digital currency, which I will not bore the Committee with now.

There has been a lot of talk about what caused the financial crisis in 2008 and the risks that occur. In my experience, the really dangerous thing in financial services is groupthink and belief in models. This is an absolutely classic example of thinking, “The Chinese are doing it and others are doing it so perhaps we need to do it as well. What is going to happen in future?” That is fair enough—have an eye to the future—but just because everyone else is going to do something that might increase risk is not a reason to copy them.

I have a simple request for the Minister: will she please give an undertaking that we will have legislation should the Government decide to go down this course in future?

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I rise briefly out of a sense of obligation and with a sense of déjà vu because on the previous financial services Bill I recall that I was the only Back-Bench speaker addressing a group of amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, on digital issues associated with the financial sector. As then—having written a thesis on artificial intelligence 20 years ago, when we were said to be almost reaching it—I argue that we are no closer now than we were 20 years ago. We now have big data, not genuine, rich artificial intelligence. If noble Lords do not believe me, they should try putting mathematical questions into ChatGPT and see how far they get. What they will get is plagiarism and statistics, not understanding.

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[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

Thank you. I rise to move Amendment 241FA. Patient, long-term capital is crucial for both the growth of innovative companies and investment in green infrastructure to support the transition to net zero. One of the key sources of patient and venture capital is institutional investors, in particular pension funds in the City. Compared with our peers, such as Canada, the Netherlands and Denmark, the UK sees relatively little patient capital funding coming from pension funds; while around 70% of venture capital funding in the US comes from pension funds, in the UK, the figure is under 20%. The Government must do more to enable pension funds to invest in the British economy.

I have tabled Amendment 241FA, which would compel the Government to review how to incentivise defined contribution and defined benefit pension funds to invest more in high-growth firms and diverse long-term assets in the UK. The review would cover three areas. First, we know that a significant barrier to increasing DC pension fund investment is the relatively small size of many UK DC funds. The Government could raise the threshold at which schemes are required to produce a value for members’ assessment; they previously legislated to do this for schemes smaller than £100 million but a review could explore raising the threshold significantly —up to £5 billion, for example—to deliver real change. I would appreciate the Minister replying to the merits of this particular point, if possible, but this figure is something that the review could explore.

Secondly, we know that Local Government Pension Scheme funds have around £340 billion of assets under management, of which £30 billion is already invested in alternative asset classes such as VC. In order to mobilise some of this capital into regional green infrastructure and business, a review should look at adjusting the terms of reference for LGPS funds so that they could consider regional development as an investment factor.

Thirdly, a review should explore how the British Business Bank could put the necessary framework in place to allow DB pension funds to invest alongside it. DB pension funds have nearly £3 trillion in assets under management; unlocking even a small proportion of this would be a substantial boost to the amount of additional financing available to British companies and projects.

It is helpful that the Chancellor referenced exploring unlocking pension funds’ potential in his Budget speech. I would appreciate an update from the Minister on HMT’s work in this area. I am aware that the FCA is currently consulting on the value for money framework for DC pension schemes, for example, but does that work fit into a wider government strategy to incentivise DC schemes to invest in UK firms and green infrastructure?

I beg to move.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, for introducing this amendment. I have chosen to address simply the green infrastructure parts, and at this time of the evening I shall park the high-growth debate in the interests of not sidelining the main issue.

The idea of a review is useful here, because the evidence we have of other measures the Government have tried to take to encourage green investment is perhaps mixed—that is the charitable description. I refer to a survey published this month by Pensions for Purpose, which looked at the first wave of obligatory reporting of the scheme introduced in October 2021 based on the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures being done by the larger occupational pension schemes and authorised master trusts. That study found that this introduction by the Government was having very limited effects and that it was, to a large degree, being treated as a tick-box exercise. Where it was having an impact on investments, it was not driving towards green investment but rather to a portfolio decarbonisation—a stepping away from things rather than into the kinds of investments we need. This is something we are also seeing implicitly, in that the pension regulator is about to launch a publicity campaign for pension trustees, stressing the need to look at ESG responsibilities, particularly around climate issues—that has been its responsibility since 2019. It is clearly thought necessary to have a publicity campaign about this.

We really need to see steps forward and to see things joined up here. I am reminded of a debate last week with the same Minister, when we finally finalised the UK Infrastructure Bank Bill, which, of course, is looking at another source of investment going into green. I am very encouraged by the Government’s decision to include nature-based solutions there, which is obviously a cross-reference to our need to see much more private investment in nature-based solutions as well. Dare I say it, it would be nice to see some circular economy as well—if I can just put that in there.

On the idea of a review, we desperately need to see money going into green infrastructure. All the evidence we have says that is simply not happening. I also note that the Government need to create the frameworks in other areas of policy to make this happen. I was sitting here, thinking of when I was in this very same Room a few weeks ago with the Energy Bill. One of the things that could be a very good target for investment would be that if we are to get community energy schemes up and down the land—if we get delivery of the widely-backed Local Electricity Bill, as it is in the other place—that would be a great area to see pension funds investing in and supporting. I was at an event this morning debating social value and the importance of that in procurement.

We need to tie all these things together. All these things are running off at different angles, but we are still not creating an environment where people who are putting money into their pensions, seeking to invest in their own future, will have a liveable future for that pension to pay out in.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, it is obvious that the issue of pension funds investing in equities and longer-term growth prospects was highlighted by the LDI crisis in the autumn. I hope that, when the Government come to consider the consequences of that crisis, they will look at the letter that your Lordships’ Industry and Regulators Committee sent to Andrew Griffith MP, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, setting out the reasons it saw for the peculiar financial structures that led to the LDI crisis and the lack of long-term investment in equities and growth stocks by British pension funds. They traced this to the accounting regulations that are imposed on British pension funds—particularly the way in which liabilities are assessed—and noted that, since those regulations were introduced maybe 15 years ago, there has been a dramatic reduction in the investment by British pension funds in long-term equity assets and a focus mostly on rather low-yielding government securities instead.

The LDI scandal was produced by the development of a peculiar financial device using repos, which were then used to make some investment in equities. There is clearly a fundamental problem in the regulation of British pension funds, which has both reduced the returns on their investment and limited the sort of investments they might be able to make in growth assets to their benefit and that of the economy as a whole. There needs to be a major review on the regulation of pension funds, both to make them more secure—to avoid them resorting to very unstable financial constructions to try to increase their returns—and for the overall benefit of the economy.