Trade Bill

Baroness Brown of Cambridge Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 4th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lansley]

My Lords, if we are going to anticipate the longer group of amendments, which impact on Schedule 4, I will say a word about Amendments 103A and 107A, which are in my name.

I shared, I confess, the view of my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for quite a long time. The conclusion I came to is that we pretty much have to accept the structure which says that we have an independent Trade Remedies Authority, rather than one integral to the Department for International Trade. The analogy is with competition activity. The European Commission runs its own competition regime from a directorate-general of the Commission, with a commissioner in charge. We may think that is right or wrong, but the point is that it is internationally recognised that in that respect, the Commission operates at a significant remove from the day-to-day political pressures in a single country. In this country, we do not operate on the basis that we have a government department providing the competition authority; we do it independently. There is a better analogy there. There is also the analogy of the International Trade Commission in Washington, which is recognised as operating independently of the day-to-day political pressures that otherwise might be exercised in the US Administration or if it were subject directly to Congress. There are analogies that cut both ways, but I am persuaded that having a separate Trade Remedies Authority is best.

It is tricky, because we do not have that many people who are very good at managing trade remedies. We are going to end up with one set of them in the Trade Remedies Authority and another set sometimes in the Department for International Trade having to judge the recommendations being made by the Trade Remedies Authority. I am not quite sure that we shall have enough people to do all those tasks. I hope we do, but it will not be immediately obvious.

Paragraph 2 of Schedule 4 states that a chief executive of the Trade Remedies Authority is to be,

“appointed by the Chair with the approval of the Secretary of State or, if the first Chair has not been appointed, by the Secretary of State”.

My Amendment 107A would simply leave out paragraphs 17 to 23, which all relate to the circumstances where a chief executive is appointed by the Secretary of State. We do not want to leave in statute for the longer term that the Secretary of State may appoint the chief executive. It should be the responsibility of the board. That is generally true for most other independent bodies of this kind. I do not see any reason why we should trespass across that if the independence of the Trade Remedies Authority is integral to its function.

All this seems to have been written in the expectation that it would become law at about the same time as the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Bill did back in September. Back then, there was not a chair-designate of the Trade Remedies Authority, nor was there a chief executive-designate. We now have both. There is no practical reason why the chair cannot be appointed alongside other members of the board, so that they can take responsibility for the appointment of the chief executive. I see no grounds for leaving in the Bill this statutory provision compromising the body’s independence.

My Amendment 103A would specify that, when the Secretary of State came to approve the appointment of a chief executive as proposed by the chair of the board, that should be subject to a report from the International Trade Committee of the House of Commons. I looked at the January 2019 updated guidance from the Cabinet Office on the 50 leading appointments made with pre-appointment hearings by Select Committees. Back in 2008, when I was Secretary of State in the Department of Health, we had seven such appointments, which I think was the largest number of any single department. The Department for International Trade has no such appointments—it is quite a new department—but this is its principal body. In so far as the Select Committee on International Trade is to have a view, it seems that it should have a view about the chief executive and the chair of the Trade Remedies Authority. To be honest, I may have got the amendment wrong; it may be that it is better that the chair be appointed by the Secretary of State following a report by the International Trade Committee—forgive me if I have got it in the wrong place—as the chair is more likely to be the person who should be the subject of scrutiny by the committee. I may reserve that point, as distinct from what is written in Amendment 103A.

I cannot see a good reason why there should not be such scrutiny. The criteria seem threefold: is it important, does it have impact, and does it require independence? All three seem to apply in the case of the Trade Remedies Authority. The amendment would not require the approval of the Select Committee; it would simply require a hearing to take place and a view to be expressed. We know from precedent that on nine occasions Select Committees have made a negative report on appointments proposed by Ministers. In six of those cases, Ministers have proceeded in any case. The amendment is not to prevent Ministers making the appointment that they wish to make; it is to give the Select Committee in another place an opportunity to make a report on the proposed appointment of a chair.

[Baroness Brown of Cambridge (CB)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 101A and 103B in my name. I thank my noble friend Lord Kinnoull for adding his name to both amendments and the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, for supporting 101A. I have two further amendments in the next group—do not worry, I am not suggesting that we amalgamate these, but I will provide some common background that applies to all four amendments before I speak briefly and specifically to Amendments 101A and 103B.

Materials are very important to us. I happen to be a materials scientist, so I would say that. They are important economically and strategically: obviously, they are the start of the supply chain for anything we manufacture. Advances in materials underpin the technologies and devices we depend on, from the structures and blades of wind turbines, to batteries for electric vehicles, to materials which allow the slow release of drugs in the body, to materials that enable faster communication of data—do not worry, I shall not give a long list. While we have world-leading academic expertise in materials, many of our materials industries are under pressure, as the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, highlighted. Many of these industries share some common features and it is these common features that make the Trade Remedies Authority so important for them.

Many, such as steel and ceramics, are energy-intensive, so as we decarbonise our economy they will increasingly need to invest in new technologies, such as carbon capture and storage, hydrogen-fired kilns and things to drastically reduce or eliminate their CO₂ emissions. They are affected by our very necessary requirements for high environmental standards. Many are located in economically vulnerable parts of the country and, as the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, mentioned, many have experienced serious problems in the past arising from dumping and subsidy by overseas Governments. Current world trade issues, such as the US-China trade dispute, resulting in overproduction in many areas in China, and Brexit, are understandably causing concern.

So our materials producers, along with many other industry sectors, welcome the establishment of the Trade Remedies Authority in the Bill. They think the UK needs a strong and independent authority to investigate alleged dumping and subsidy cases and to recommend remedies. Producers need to know that the TRA will be a body that understands the impacts of dumping and subsidy on UK companies, to give them the confidence to continue with their investment programmes—investment that will be critical to delivering the Government’s clean growth strategy. We have already heard a bit about the definition of the membership of the TRA and its governance. Both Clause 10 and Schedule 4 make the independence of the TRA a very clear objective. However we have already heard that this does not sit entirely comfortably with the chair and non-executives being appointed entirely at the discretion of the Secretary of State. By contrast, the TRA will have wide discretion in the way it conducts trade remedy investigations, which is clearly crucial for its independence.

However, in combination, these factors build a degree of uncertainty into the system for manufacturers. A strong message about the composition of the TRA board, giving assurance that individuals with current experience in the manufacturing industry, from both a management and worker perspective, would be there alongside trade remedy experts, economists, academics, legal experts and people with other relevant skills would help remove uncertainty and risk for UK producers. Indeed, as the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, reminded us, because trade remedies have been a Brussels competence, trade remedy expertise is likely to be in somewhat short supply in the UK. It is critical that the TRA board is not made up mainly of theoretical modellers and economists but has a real balance of theory, analysis and practical, hands-on experience. The recent move by the Government to accept the principle of involving those most affected by trade policy in its development—for example, through the recruitment of a diverse stakeholder strategic trade advisory group—is very welcome. Trade remedies should be no exception, with both producers and trade unions involved.

Amendments 101A and 103B would ensure that both manufacturing and trade union experience are present on the TRA board, and that there is consultation with stakeholders before appointments are made. I hope the Minister will be able to confirm that the Government recognise the benefits of this broad approach for the TRA membership.

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[Baroness Brown of Cambridge]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendments 90A and 90B in my name. Again, I thank my noble friend Lord Kinnoull for adding his name to both amendments.

As we have heard, the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act sets the overarching rules under which the UK’s new Trade Remedies Authority will operate. The Act states that trade remedy measures do not need to be adopted if the TRA or the Secretary of State decides that they do not meet the economic interest test, as we have heard. When applying the EU’s equivalent—the Union interest test—special consideration must be given to the need to remove the injurious practice, that is the dumping or subsidy by another country, and restore competition. It is this special consideration that gives the EU test a presumption in favour of the adoption of measures. The materials industry, in particular, is concerned that this consideration is absent in the UK Act.

I appreciate that government amendments at Report stage of the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act improved the wording around the economic interest test and Ministers have assured manufacturers that the intention is that there is a presumption in favour of adoption. However, the words contained in the Act fall short of such a presumption. Amendment 90A would give clearer direction to the TRA in exercising its duty to conduct an economic interest test. The intent is to establish firmly a presumption in favour of adoption of measures and hence to continue the protections that UK manufacturers currently benefit from while we are members of the EU. I recognise that the Government have indicated that the presumption in favour of adoption is their intent and that there may be other ways to strengthen this message to support and assure our manufacturers. I look forward to the Minister’s response as to how this might be addressed.

I think we have probably already discussed Amendment 90B. The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, already highlighted the issue of rules about the operation of trade remedies coming through secondary legislation as a result of the provisions of the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act. I will not go on for much longer about it because we have already heard the Minister’s response. But I would like to take the chance to emphasise again that these are hugely important rules that will have a profound impact on UK manufacturers’ ability to get a level playing field when overseas competitors are not playing by the rules. I also emphasise my strong conviction that these statutory instruments should be affirmative ones, approved by resolution of both Houses.

[The Earl of Kinnoull]

My Lords, I do not want to comment on the two amendments I have signed. I want to urge some support for the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara. I have in front of me Article 13 of the 1994 agreement which supplements Article VI of GATT. Entitled “Judicial Review”, it says:

“Each Member whose national legislation contains provisions on anti-dumping measures shall maintain judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose, inter alia, of the prompt review of administrative actions relating to final determinations and reviews of determinations within the meaning of Article 11”.


It then goes on to say that the tribunal must be independent of the authorities that have made the determination. It is an international obligation for there to be exactly what the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, proposes in his amendments. I think we need to pick that up and put it in the Bill.

Trade Bill

Baroness Brown of Cambridge Excerpts

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 13th March 2019 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Brown of Cambridge]

31: After Clause 10, insert the following new Clause—
“Assessment of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures
In determining whether the application of an anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measure meets or does not meet the economic interest test under Schedule 4 to the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act 2018, the Secretary of State or TRA must give special consideration to the injury caused by the dumping of the goods, or the importation of the subsidised goods, to a UK industry and the benefits to the UK industry in removing that injury.”

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[Baroness Brown of Cambridge (CB)]

My Lords, Amendments 31 and 32 are in my name and those of my noble friend Lord Kinnoull and the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering. Amendment 31 relates to the presumption in favour of adoption of trade measures and it will be familiar to noble Lords from Committee.

The Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act sets the overarching rules under which the UK’s new Trade Remedies Authority will operate. The Act does not have a clear or explicit presumption in favour of adoption of trade measures akin to the EU equivalent, the Union interest test. Considering whether measures are in the interests of the UK involves taking into account five different sets of interests. In doing that, unlike the EU approach, the Act does not give priority or special consideration to the interests of the complainant industry. That special consideration gives the EU test a presumption in favour of adoption of measures, which is absent in the UK Act. While government amendments on Report of the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act improved the wording around the economic interest test, and Ministers have privately assured manufacturers that the intention is that there is a presumption in favour of adoption of the measures, the words contained in the Act fall short of such a presumption.

I thank the Minister for helpful meetings with me and my noble friend Lord Kinnoull on this issue, and I hope that, in her reply, she will be able to clarify the presumption that the TRA will apply when it conducts the test. An explicit reference to special consideration of the need to remove injurious dumping would be particularly helpful.

Amendment 32 relates to the way that the detailed rules for the operation of trade remedies will be scrutinised. These rules will have profound impacts on UK manufacturers’ ability to level the playing field when overseas competitors do not play by the rules. Many of those rules about the operation of trade remedies will come through secondary legislation as a result of provisions in the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act. Trade policy generally, including specific issues such as these, is of such importance that we should be discussing it frequently in your Lordships’ House—a sentiment that I believe the Minister might also support. Amendment 32 would require the statutory instruments to be affirmative instruments, to be discussed and approved by resolution of both Houses. I am interested to hear from the Minister about the opportunities that your Lordships’ House will have to debate important trade policy issues. I beg to move.

[The Earl of Kinnoull (CB)]

My Lords, I added my name to these two amendments and I will be brief. I agree with every word that my noble friend Lady Brown just said. I add my thanks to Ministers and the Bill team, who have been very gracious and given of their time generously to discuss these issues. I have nothing to add to what my noble friend Lady Brown said about Amendment 31, about which I wholly agree.

I also agree with what she said about Amendment 32, but I have one more point to add. It arises out of the report of the Constitution Committee into the Trade Bill. Talking about the formation of the Trade Remedies Authority, it states:

“While we recognise the pressing timescales and uncertainties concerning Brexit, in constitutional terms, creating and empowering an important public body in such a manner is inappropriate”.


I very much agree with that assertion. I therefore regard Amendment 32 not only as a mechanism for debate but as a partial cure for the problem that the Constitution Committee has unearthed in its report. I therefore see it as being an attempt to try to somewhat address that problem. Can the Minister comment on that and, if she feels the amendment should not be agreed, how we should address the itch that the Constitution Committee identified?

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I trust that my responses have provided reassurance to your Lordships and that the noble Baroness, Lady Brown, will withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Brown of Cambridge]

I thank the Minister for her detailed response. It is very encouraging to hear of progress with the implementation of the trade remedies system and with the work being done to ensure that, should we need it, provisions will be in place to support industry in this way on exit day should the TRA not be legally established by that point.

It was also good to hear the Minister say that the Government intend that we will act decisively on injury to domestic manufacturers, such as our ceramics industry, and I thank her for the reassurance that the intent of the Act is that there will be—I shall put it in inverted commas—“special consideration” for hurt to manufacturers when the economic interest test is applied. I am very comfortable with the strong reassurance she has given.

On Amendment 32, I accept the argument that there will be a large number of SIs containing a great deal of technical detail and that that is the reason for the negative procedure. I still have concerns that some very important issues will come through under the negative procedure. Trade remedy issues will be some of them, so it is with some reluctance that I shall not move Amendment 32. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 31.

Amendment 31 withdrawn.

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[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara]

I support the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, and congratulate him on the succinctness with which he has made his point. I have been confused for some time as to why the department might resist this. He has made the points exactly as I would have done. This is a key role with a public-facing responsibility and will hold the Government to account on issues of great importance. Indeed, it is the only body that the DIT will have as a marker; it behoves the department to raise the TRA to the appropriate level so that it is seen to have the importance that the department claims for it. For these reasons, it is absolutely right that we have an established routine that the person selected by the Minister to be the chair of this body—we are not expecting the same to happen for the chief executive or more junior staff, just the chair—should be seen by the International Trade Committee. As he says, it is a courtesy in some senses because the Minister can still appoint should they wish to do so. I support the amendment.

[Baroness Brown of Cambridge]

My Lords, Amendment 60 is in my name and those of my noble friend Lord Kinnoull and the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering. I also support Amendment 59.

The UK needs a strong and independent Trade Remedies Authority with a balanced membership to investigate alleged dumping and subsidy cases and to recommend remedies. Schedule 4 to the Trade Bill defines the membership of the TRA and its governance. As I have said before, and as the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, emphasised in moving Amendment 59, while both Clause 10 and Schedule 4 make the independence of the TRA a clear objective, this does not sit entirely comfortably with the chair and the non-executives being appointed entirely at the discretion of the Secretary of State.

The governance model of the Office for Students in the Higher Education and Research Act 2017 seems to offer a good model for delivering both independence and balance, and this is the model that has been used in drafting this updated amendment. It would require the Secretary of State to have regard to the desirability of members having between them experience in a number of relevant areas, including UK manufacturing, trade unions, consumers, regional economic growth, regulatory systems and international trade disputes.

The Government have suggested that the TRA should be managed by trade remedies experts rather than by stakeholders with vested interests, in order to be independent. However, the chief executive designate has already told a Commons Select Committee that she is not a trade remedies expert. A properly balanced group of non-executive stakeholders, supported by expert executives, could be effective, independent and balanced. I look forward to hearing from the Minister how the Government will ensure the combination of independence and balanced and relevant expertise that this important body requires.

[The Earl of Kinnoull]

My Lords, Amendment 60 is also in my name. I too have problems with the TRA as currently constituted, in that arguably it lacks independence and balance. It is in looking for independence and balance that the amendment has evolved. Amendment 59 very much deals with the independence point, and on that basis I strongly support it.

In Committee, I said that independence is important, because the TRA needs to be seen to be not a mere cipher for the British state but something which has its own life. There is a problem when one looks at Schedule 4 and sees that the chair is appointed by the Secretary of State, as are all the non-executive directors. The Secretary of State gets the chance to approve the CEO. The non-executive directors will always be in the majority and the Secretary of State has the power to remove them. On top of that, paragraph 34 of Schedule 4, entitled “Guidance”, says that the TRA must have regard to the Secretary of State’s guidance, which seems to me to mean instructions. It seems to be wrongly titled. Therefore, I worry that the independence bit of my beef is not coped with sufficiently. I look forward to hearing something from the Minister to assuage my concerns.

Balance is incredibly important. This cannot be an effective body if there is no balance—balance of experience and background. The point is obvious. Nowhere in Schedule 4 do I see anything that gives rise to a feeling that there would be balance, but I look forward to being corrected on that point.