Afghanistan (International Relations and Defence Committee Report) Debate

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Department: Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office

Afghanistan (International Relations and Defence Committee Report)

Baroness Fall Excerpts
Monday 24th January 2022

(2 years, 3 months ago)

Grand Committee
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Baroness Fall Portrait Baroness Fall (Con)
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It is an honour to follow the noble Lord, Lord Alton. He asked many important questions and I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say later. Like others, I welcome the chance to reflect on the report that I and my fellow members of the International Relations and Defence Select Committee published nearly a year ago just as we witnessed President-elect Biden take the oath. I want to thank the excellent secretariat, my colleagues on the committee, many of whom are here today, and the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, for her brilliant chairmanship.

Whatever one’s view of President Trump, being his friend and ally on the world stage was complicated—his presence being irregular and erratic—which is why I, like many others, welcomed Biden’s return to a more multinational approach to solving the world’s problems. Last year, we saw an immediate change of course—the decision to rejoin the Paris peace accord, for example—which is why I hoped that, at the very least, President Biden might pause and reflect on making the decision to press ahead with the withdrawal from Afghanistan. It made the fact that he went ahead with such speed all the more disappointing.

By the time I started working in No. 10 under the David Cameron Administration in 2010, we had already been one decade in Afghanistan. British lives were still being lost and it was beginning to be uncertain what success would look like. A rethink was on the cards. It became clear that there was little support for the continuation of a large deployment of troops, but there is a big difference between a drawdown and the chaotic exit we saw last summer.

In recent years, with a small number of troops, we were able to bring—or help to bring—stability to the country, train the Afghan army and police, and support aid operatives doing so much good on the ground. However, when President Trump announced the withdrawal from Afghanistan, he did so with no discussion with his NATO allies and with no apparent concern that this undermined any chance of success at the peace talks. It was clear to us on the foreign affairs Select Committee, reviewing the fragile state of affairs at the time, that it would be impossible to deliver peace with no leverage, and that leverage must come from the ongoing presence of US and NATO troops. This was never a peace plan; it was an exit plan, and it turned out to be a disastrous one at that.

The decision to withdraw and the way in which it was done undermined US moral authority and western credibility globally, just when we need leadership so desperately as we face huge challenges such as Covid, climate change and the ongoing clash between China and the West. The events of the summer were grave days for all of us to witness, the good intentions of 20 years lying in tatters. Those many British and Afghans who risked, and in some cases paid with, their lives to bring stability and hope to Afghanistan deserved so much better. I think we all agree that this was not the endgame that any of us would have wished for.

As we try to pick up the pieces, there are still many unanswered questions. First, the speed and efficiency of the Taliban campaign seemed to surprise everyone. Why? This must have stemmed from either a failure of intelligence or a failure of leadership. We still cannot really tell which, amid the noisy blame game that has followed, but we should not allow that truth to be buried.

I pay tribute to all those who worked so hard to get friends and allies out of Afghanistan, but what of those left behind, as others have mentioned? I fear, as we all do, that many have been abandoned to their fate. Like others before me, I ask the Minister to report on recent numbers in the resettlement scheme.

Secondly, of the many people we let down, the terrible impact on the rights of women and girls in Afghanistan weighs heavily. We learn of hardship and threat to life every single day. What does that say about us and our values when we talk about human rights globally?

Thirdly, what does that tell us about our relationship with our closest allies? It is extremely disappointing, to say the least, that we were unable to exert more influence over the Americans. The NATO alliance is under pressure again, this time from Putin, and its ability to respond cohesively and effectively matters too much to allow NATO to dissipate as a relic of the last century.

Fourthly, our neglect is to the gain of others whom we do not call our allies, such as China, Iran and Russia. We have already seen the Chinese make inroads to Afghanistan and we are yet to know exactly how regional stability will play out. Twenty years on, we have simply delivered the very thing we were trying to avoid: a Taliban-run Afghanistan, a country which is likely to harbour terrorist groups and store up CT problems for us in the foreseeable—the very reason we went in there in the first place.

Fifthly, Afghanistan was already one of the most aid-dependent countries in the world before Covid and our withdrawal. With the effects of both, we are now looking at a humanitarian catastrophe worsened by the bleak winter and further waves of Covid. This was our mess in the creating, and I urge the Minister not to turn our backs on the people of Afghanistan; others have said this today. Whoever their masters may be, we must support them. I commend efforts to provide aid through UN agencies as well as other trusted NGOs and urge that this continues.

Those, like many of us in this Room, who ponder the withdrawal from Afghanistan should not forget why we went in there in the first instance. It was a NATO-led deployment in response to Article 5 after the devastating attacks of 9/11. However, it is often the case that the unified purpose of an intervention is far easier a task than to bring such a mission successfully to its end. No one wants forever wars. Perhaps we should put more strategic energy into thinking about what our mission is and what we owe to those who have supported and served with us on the ground.

Afghanistan seems fated to play a pivotal role in the 21st century, as it did in the century before and the one before that, from the advent of the great game to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 to the precipitation of 9/11 and the abrupt exit of this summer. The people of Afghanistan once again find themselves paying a heavy price for global politics. We should acknowledge our debt to them and continue to help where we can.