Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Baroness Finn Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 16th June 2025 Grand Committee

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group, but I want to make a brief comment on Amendment 89. It is inappropriate for the Government to have powers to extend to and include other benefits, because each benefit may well have a different dynamic as to whether there is a possibility of fraud. If you look at the DWP statistics, you will see that some of the other benefits have a very low incidence of fraud; it is universal credit that is out of line, compared to the rest. I do not think that the Government should be allowed powers to add to those three benefits. That would be highly draconian. If the present Government, or a future one, feel that there is a need, they should bring primary legislation. At that time, we can also take the opportunity to smooth the rough edges of this Bill, which might have become visible by then.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to this group of amendments, beginning with the Clause 74 stand part notice in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, which was moved by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. In our view, Clause 74 is not only necessary but foundational. It establishes the power to issue eligibility verification notices, which enable authorised officers to request information relevant to verifying a person’s entitlement to public funds or services. This is not an ancillary function; it is a mechanism that enables the Bill to work.

We broadly support Amendment 79B, which proposes the addition of a reasonableness test to the Secretary of State’s power to issue eligibility verification notices under Schedule 3. Throughout this Committee stage, we on these Benches have consistently returned to a set of core principles that should underpin the powers granted by this Bill: proportionality, accountability and clarity in the exercise of discretion. This amendment is very much in keeping with those principles. It would not constrain the function of the powers in question; instead, it would help to ensure that they are used lawfully, wisely and in a way that retains the confidence of both the public and those institutions asked to assist in their implementation.

Specifically, this amendment would require that the Secretary of State be “reasonably satisfied” that issuing an eligibility verification notice is both necessary and proportionate to the objective of identifying incorrect benefit payments. That is, by definition, not an unreasonable bar. It is not designed to frustrate the aims of the Bill or delay the work of the Government. On the contrary, it would simply formalise the expectation that the powers conferred under Schedule 3 should be exercised with care and justification.

This point is particularly relevant when we consider the position of banks and other financial institutions, which may be required under this provision to provide customer information. For those institutions, it is critical that the system is seen to be operating within a clear and lawful framework. They are being asked to co-operate in a sensitive and complex process. Ensuring that the Secretary of State is “reasonably satisfied”, and that this standard is explicitly in the Bill, would help to provide clarity, legitimacy and protection for all parties involved. As the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, made clear on the previous group of amendments, legislation needs to be made for the future and, as such, reasonableness safeguards must be on the face of the Bill.

Moreover, this amendment would reinforce public confidence in the system. When members of the public know that strong powers, such as those that allow government access to eligibility-related data, are being exercised only after a specific, documented and reasonable assessment of necessity and proportionality, they are far more likely to view those powers as legitimate. Trust, as we know, is a critical currency in any enforcement regime.

This amendment would not obstruct the use of eligibility verification notices. It would simply require that they be issued on the basis of reasonable grounds, with a clear and proportionate purpose. It would bring consistency to the Bill, reassurance to the institutions involved and greater credibility to the broader anti-fraud effort that we all wish to support.

We oppose Amendment 80, which would substantially limit the exercise of eligibility verification notices under Schedule 3 to the Bill by requiring that they may be issued only where the welfare recipient is already suspected of committing a DWP offence. I suggest that this amendment risks undermining the core function of eligibility verification and, in so doing, would weaken the entire framework that the Government are proposing to put in place to detect and prevent fraud. Let us be clear about the purpose of the eligibility verification power: it is not primarily an enforcement power but rather a tool of assurance and risk management, designed to help to identify cases where payments are being made incorrectly.

The core problem with this amendment is that it conflates suspicion with verification. It assumes that an authorised officer must already suspect a DWP offence before reviewing financial data. In practice, however, it is often the financial data itself—the information provided in an account—that gives rise to that suspicion in the first place.

I turn to Amendment 89. We support the principle behind this amendment, which seeks to ensure that the powers contained in this Bill—substantial powers, we must all acknowledge—are exercised only in relation to the specific benefits explicitly listed in the Bill. This is not a wrecking amendment, nor one that seeks to undermine the Government’s legitimate goal of strengthening our response to fraud and error. Rather, it is about ensuring that when we legislate new powers, they are accompanied by a clear, democratic mandate and appropriate parliamentary scrutiny. The provision that this amendment seeks to remove would grant Ministers the ability, by regulation, to extend the application of these powers to further benefits beyond those originally listed. I submit that such an extension should not be done by regulation alone but rather with the explicit consent of Parliament through primary legislation or a tightly scrutinised process.

The powers outlined in Schedule 3, including access to personal financial information, the issuance of eligibility verification notices and the ability to act on suspicion of fraud, are not minor administrative tools. They represent a significant expansion of state capacity to inquire into private affairs in the name of public interest. That may well be justified in many cases, but it is only right that Parliament retains control over when and how these powers are extended to new areas of social security.

Supporting this amendment means drawing a line in the sand that the list of benefits to which these powers apply is not open-ended and that any extension should come back before Parliament for proper consideration. If, in future, a compelling case is made to include additional benefits, let that case be made here, in public, with scrutiny and accountability. That is how we ensure confidence in the law, in enforcement and in our broader welfare system.

This is not about resisting action on fraud but about ensuring that the tools we use to combat fraud are clearly grounded in public consent, which gives the system legitimacy. It is about protecting the balance of power between executive action and legislative oversight.

We have made the argument throughout Committee that clarity, transparency and accountability must be woven into the fabric of the Bill. This amendment speaks directly to those principles. It ensures that the powers in this legislation are not allowed to expand by stealth but only by clear, deliberate parliamentary decision.

I hope that the Minister will see this not as a restriction but as an opportunity: to reinforce the legitimacy of the powers the Government seek and to show that we are committed not only to effective fraud prevention but to the principled governance of that process. For that reason, we support this amendment.

Finally, in addressing the stand-part notice of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, on Schedule 3, we understand that this is an area of concern for many noble Lords across the Committee, but we do not feel that removing the schedule from the Bill is necessarily the most constructive way to go about this in Committee.

I appreciate that this is probing, and we therefore hope that the Government will use this opportunity, in responding to the stand-part notice of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, to address the concerns that we and many other noble Lords have raised in Committee, even if we do not support the noble Baroness’s stand-part notice.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who spoke on this. I promise not to speak for long on this but, since it is the first time we have discussed the eligibility verification measure, I will, for the record, try to explain how it works, and, I hope, help the noble Baroness, Lady Fox—I apologise for my failure to explain it to her hitherto. I will have a go at doing that, and I will talk to the amendments as we go.

Clause 74 introduces new Section 121DB and Schedule 3B to the 1992 Act. They contain the provisions for the eligibility verification measure, which enables the Secretary of State to issue a bank or other financial institution with an eligibility verification notice, or EVN, which will help the DWP identify incorrect payments in the social security system. Ensuring that the right person is paid the right amount at the right time will help prevent both fraud and genuine errors, meaning that people do not accidentally build up debts, with all the concern that that causes.

As I set out at Second Reading, this is a data-requiring measure. It will enable the DWP to ask for data from banks to help identify incorrect payments and verify eligibility for specific benefits. It is about requiring banks to look within their own data and provide limited, relevant information on the accounts they have identified that match the eligibility indicators provided by the DWP. Just to clarify, we will ask the banks to look at accounts into which we make benefit payments, and we will give them the criteria, which clearly can only be things related to eligibility for the benefits under question.

That limited information will help the DWP to identify where claimants do not meet eligibility criteria for the benefits they are receiving. Getting access to information is key to addressing the whole fraud and error challenge. But if your Lordships think about other areas, we have seen how the DWP getting access to data such as earnings information from HMRC has massively reduced income-related overpayments. In fact, if you look at people on PAYE and universal credit, earnings-related fraud and error have pretty much been wiped out by getting access to earnings data directly from HMRC.

I will speak to Schedule 3 in a few moments. Let me look first at Amendment 79B from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, which seeks to ensure that an EVN may be issued only when the Secretary of State is satisfied that it is necessary and proportionate to do so to achieve the aim of identifying incorrect benefit payments. This is the nub of it. Clearly, I agree that the power must be proportionate and necessary before we use it. We are bringing forward the legislation because we believe it is necessary, and we have already taken enormous steps to ensure that it will be used proportionately.

The reason it is necessary is that taxpayers deserve to know that every pound of their money is being spent wisely, and that benefits are being paid to those who need them and are legally entitled to them. This measure will improve the DWP’s access to important data to help verify entitlements, to ensure payments are correct, and to stop overpayments building up and debt accruing.

The National Audit Office made a telling point in the Commons at the evidence stage, basically saying, “If you want to enforce the eligibility criteria that Parliament has set, such as capital limits, you have to provide the DWP with a tool that goes a bit further than just asking people”. We do not know of other ways to get the necessary information to be able to pursue the kind of overpayments and fraud that are out there. However, I just remind the Committee that the measure has been designed with hugely strict safeguards, most of which are in the Bill, and they are supported with further detail in the code of practice, of which noble Lords have seen a draft, to ensure that the power is being used fairly and proportionately. The legislation sets out the benefits in scope, of which more later, and the type of information that can and cannot be shared under the power, and includes provisions to bar financial institutions from sharing transaction information or special category data.