UK Constitution: Oversight and Responsibility (Report from the Constitution Committee)

Baroness Finn Excerpts

Friday 4th July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Beith, for so eloquently introducing the debate on the report today. I also take the opportunity to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, who unfortunately cannot be here today, for her excellent leadership as chair of the Constitution Committee. It was a real privilege to sit on the committee at the time of the report’s preparation and publication, and I welcome the opportunity to reflect on its findings and the Government’s response today. I pay tribute to the brilliant clerks for their hard work and dedication. I am always unfailingly impressed by their ability to make sense of our sometimes lengthy and arcane discussions.

The report raises fundamental questions about how we govern ourselves and how we safeguard the integrity of the United Kingdom’s constitution. It is a reminder that the strength of our constitutional arrangement lies not only in its traditional flexibility but in the checks and balances that uphold it. The responsibility for different parts of the constitution is split across several government departments, and the Prime Minister holds ultimate responsibility through his allocation of ministerial responsibilities and ability to transferred functions between departments.

I welcome the Government’s recognition of the need to safeguard and uphold the constitution and their acknowledgement that further work is required to reinforce and protect the democratic foundations of our nation. While the strengths of the UK constitutional arrangements lie in the flexibility of the uncodified system, it is important to recognise that strains have been placed on the constitution, and it is imperative that we make meaningful reforms to ensure its continued resilience and integrity.

On the centre of government, the Government’s response recognises the importance of constitutional safeguarding within government, and that the Prime Minister is ultimately responsible for overseeing the constitutional arrangements. The Government also recognise the role of the Cabinet Secretary in supporting the Prime Minister in safeguarding the constitution. This was pointed out by the report, but the Government have rejected recommendations for setting out the Cabinet Secretary’s official responsibilities. There are potential risks in not formalising that responsibility, so can the Minister explain why the Government have chosen not to adopt this recommendation and why they have refrained from formally clarifying the Cabinet Secretary’s constitutional duties?

Without clarity, there is little hope of strengthening foundations. From my own experience in government, I know that the Civil Service often struggles with preserving institutional memory. Proper record-keeping and the retention of constitutional knowledge are essential. For example, when I was working in the Cabinet Office during the coalition Government, the Minister there, much to his astonishment, discovered during the course of an inquiry that there existed a rather chaotic room which housed the Cabinet Secretary’s so-called personal files. At the time there was no registry of these files; they were just thrown into the room. As a result, officials kept finding extra files after the initial request had gone out. The inquiry had been assured that it had been given all the documents—and then more files would come up, much to the exasperation of my noble friend Lady May, who was the then Home Secretary.

Over time, there has definitely been some longer-term institutional memory loss. The systematic documentation of precedent is crucial not only to maintain institutional memory but to enhance the quality of advice to Ministers. We saw an example of precedent not being followed this week with the ratification process in respect of the UK’s treaty with Mauritius. As my noble friend Lord Callanan pointed out on Monday, the Government have failed to follow a convention that, under the Ponsonby rule, requires that a substantive debate in the House of Commons on a treaty be granted when requested through the usual channels. This is the first time the Government have had to deal with the ratification process, and it is for the Civil Service to advise Ministers correctly on the constitutional precedent. Both my noble and learned friend Lord Bellamy and my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth referred to the need for clearer understanding of what happens if the Prime Minister becomes incapacitated or dies in office.

So, while I welcome the Government’s recognition of a need for a centre of expertise on constitutional matters, setting out the propriety and constitution group in the Cabinet Office to undertake that role, there is a case to go further. For the entire time I was in government, the propriety and constitution group did not always draw on the available precedent; there was a search for, or more of a scramble in search of, principles. My noble and learned friend Lord Bellamy made a powerful case for the need to hold those principles and all that information in one place.

As it stands, the propriety and constitution group does not have the institutional memory, and it is not clear to which Minister it is accountable. This is not a peripheral issue; it is central to the resilience of our constitutional framework. How, therefore, do the Government intend to safeguard the UK’s constitutional integrity across further Administrations if they fail to preserve such vital institutional knowledge within the Civil Service?

I take this opportunity to reflect on the role of the propriety and constitution group more broadly. I caution the Government to be careful about giving the group even more power. In its propriety role, it already controls all constitutional advice given to the Prime Minister. It manages the Honours Secretariat. It exercises day-to-day oversight of every major standards body in government, which includes the independent adviser on ministerial interests, the Commissioner for Public Appointments, the House of Lords Appointments Commission, the Civil Service Commission, the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments and the Committee on Standards in Public Life. Each of those bodies was intended to serve as a check on executive power, but instead they are line-managed by the Cabinet Office directorate.

The group’s remit extends to many areas, including public inquiries, major state events, the Privy Council and the Royal Household. It controls the freedom of information process at the heart of government and decides what the public are allowed to know and when they are allowed to know it. Indeed, its officials interpret the Cabinet Manual, to which many noble Lords have referred today, including the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, and my noble friend Lord Harper.

The point is that it is unclear to which Minister the group reports on all these areas. That is not really how a democratic constitution is meant to function. Civil servants are supposed to advise and to challenge, as my noble friend Lord Waldegrave pointed out. But Ministers are supposed to decide and then answer for those decisions. My noble friends Lady Coffey and Lord Hannan made some key observations in this regard. This has been a quiet but fundamental shift in the role of the propriety and ethics part of the Propriety and Constitution Group, which Ministers should watch with care.

There is obviously a need for a centre for constitutional affairs which functions effectively and is able to provide accurate advice to Ministers, but there would also appear to be a bit of a question mark over whether the centre should sit in the same group which has responsibility for propriety in government. Can the Minister confirm whether the Government have considered establishing a constitution unit which is separate from the propriety work of the Propriety and Constitution Group? As other noble Lords have rightly noted, the new Council of the Nations and Regions has made a strong start. However, it should serve to complement, rather than replace or compete with, the direct and formal meetings between the Prime Minister and the heads of the devolved Governments.

On the role of other Ministers, while I accept that constitutional oversight rests ultimately with the Prime Minister—I am absolutely mindful of the reservation expressed today by many noble Lords, including my noble and learned friend Lord Bellamy and my noble friend Lady Coffey—I think there is a case to assign some clear ministerial responsibility in this area. We talk about the centre of expertise: to whom would that be specifically accountable? The Prime Minister already carries an extensive portfolio of demanding responsibilities. Appointing a senior Minister to advise on constitutional matters and be accountable to Parliament for the work of the centre would not only alleviate some of that burden but potentially strengthen democratic accountability and transparency. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s views on the value of appointing such a senior and authoritative figure to carry out this role.

Finally, I turn to the critical matter of constitutional decision-making. When constitutional considerations are woven into policy development, tensions can arise. These are too often left unexamined. As noble Lords will know, the revised Ministerial Code, published by the Prime Minister in November 2024, expanded the powers of the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests, granting enhanced authority to investigate ministerial conduct.

The Committee on Standards in Public Life has gone further and recommended that the independent adviser and other key regulators such as the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments should have a statutory basis. Here I concur fully with my noble friend Lord Harper and the noble Lord, Lord Pitkeathley of Camden Town, that the constitution is best when it remains flexible and allows the political system to respond. In my view, the Government must be extremely wary of any proposal to put these powers in statute.

In the case of the independent adviser, it would elevate the role in a way that may come to challenge the authority of the Prime Minister, who is the sovereign’s chief adviser. The independent adviser was established to provide independent advice to the Prime Minister, not to act independently of the Prime Minister. This shift potentially undermines the intended balance, and I strongly urge the Government to keep it under close review.

To conclude, while I welcome aspects of the Government’s response, it is clear that further steps are needed to ensure that our constitutional framework remains robust, transparent and resilient. Safeguarding the constitution is central to our democracy and we must not shy away from the architecture that upholds our democracy. It is our duty to ensure that our processes are legitimate and accountable, so that citizens hold trust in our institutions. I thank the Government for their response and urge the Minister to consider the points raised. I look forward to hearing from her.