Chinese Embassy

Baroness Finn Excerpts

Monday 26th January 2026 Lords Chamber

I am grateful to right honourable and honourable Members for the ongoing attention that they give to protecting the UK’s national security. China has posed, and will continue to pose, threats to our national security. However, following detailed consideration of all possible risks around the new embassy by expert officials across government, I am assured that the UK’s national security is protected. Let me assure this House and the country: upholding national security is the first duty of government and we will continue to take all measures necessary to defeat these threats. I commend this Statement to the House”.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, the Government’s decision to approve planning permission for a new Chinese embassy at the Royal Mint Court site is profoundly troubling. We should be clear about the nature of the regime with which we are dealing. This is a state that our own security services have warned is actively seeking to undermine our democracy, has placed bounties on the heads of Hong Kong democracy campaigners living here in the United Kingdom, has spied directly on Members of Parliament, supports Vladimir Putin’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and systematically infiltrates our universities and businesses to acquire, and often steal, sensitive intellectual property.

Yet the Government’s response to this mounting threat has been characterised by confusion, equivocation and weakness. Ministers have shrunk from calling China what it is: a national security threat. They show a singular lack of transparency by refusing to publish their China audit. They have failed to place China in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme and properly support the prosecution of two men accused of spying on MPs in the other place. Now, astonishingly, they have waved through the creation of a Chinese super-embassy in the heart of our capital.

On the eve of the Prime Minister’s visit, one thing remains strikingly absent: any clarity whatsoever about this Government’s approach to China. From these Benches, we have been clear about what a serious and responsible policy on China must look like. It requires relentless scrutiny of the national security threat China poses and firmness in the defence of sovereignty. It requires the courage to call out, clearly, plainly and without equivocation, the systematic human rights abuses inflicted on millions of people in China and across its sphere of influence.

We are equally clear-eyed about the realities of the global economy. China is the world’s second-largest economy, and engagement is unavoidable. But engagement must never mean acquiescence, pragmatism cannot become passivity and economic interaction must be matched by strategic resilience, moral clarity and a willingness to confront wrongdoing wherever it occurs. This Government have failed that test. What they have offered is not balance but capitulation. Their failure of clarity, resolve and principle leaves this country weaker, not stronger, on the world stage.

On the question of the embassy, let us be clear about what has just been approved. This will be the largest embassy in Europe, not for one of our closest allies but for a state that spies on us, represses people on our soil and backs an aggressor waging war on our allies in Ukraine. It will be an embassy so vast that it includes a 208-room underground complex, with a basement running just metres from cables carrying some of the most sensitive financial data in the world and linking Canary Wharf and the City of London. The question for the Minister is simply: what is the purpose of such a large embassy? What is it for? Why have the Government approved such a facility for a country described by our intelligence agencies as a national security threat? Why does the Chinese embassy need to be on such a scale?

Perhaps most alarming of all is the fact that the Secretary of State who approved this development has admitted that he did so without seeing the unredacted plans. How can a Government that claim to put national security first possibly maintain that the risks were properly assessed when the decision was taken on the basis of redacted documents? I ask the Minister directly: how is that compatible with any serious conception of responsible national security? It has been reported, furthermore, that the Chinese authorities could legally refuse access to UK inspectors during or after construction. If that is true, we will not know what is being built beneath our feet. Does the Minister dispute these reports, and has China said that it will allow access?

This decision cannot be divorced from the wider pattern of behaviour we are witnessing. China is spying on us. It is subverting our democracy by attacking our democratic institutions, the Government and the custodians of our electoral system. It is engaging in transnational repression on British soil, intimidating dissidents, targeting Hong Kongers who have sought refuge here and attempting to coerce British citizens themselves. The Secretary of State’s permission letter made out that, so long as China undertook

“lawful embassy use of the site”,

everything would be fine. I ask the Minister: is it lawful to assault Hong Kong activists on our streets? Is it lawful to operate so-called “police stations” on British soil? Is it lawful to place bounties on the heads of people living under the protection of UK law? Is it lawful to pressure neighbours of Hong Kongers to lure them into embassies so that those bounties can be collected? The answer to every one of those questions is no, and yet we are now proposing dramatically to expand China’s diplomatic footprint here, adding hundreds of additional staff, despite clear evidence that, wherever China expands its embassy presence, transnational repression increases. Does the Minister seriously dispute that pattern?

The truth is simple: China poses a security threat on multiple fronts. That means that, yes, we need to engage, but with our eyes wide open. We must remain vigilant and call out national security threats. It is the first job of government. Giving China exactly what it wants is a damaging capitulation. The Prime Minister might benefit from easier small talk during his imminent visit to China, but it is the British people who will pay the price and the impact of this decision will be felt for years to come. This House should be deeply ashamed that such a decision has been allowed to stand, and the Government should think again, before they discover, too late, that the risks they waved through so casually are risks that the country will be left to bear.

In closing, I emphasise that all this plays into a wider narrative of neglect and disregard for our national security. At the same time the Government are greenlighting the Chinese Government to build their mega-embassy, they are also paying millions of pounds to surrender the Chagos Islands to Mauritius, which is itself in a long-standing friendship with China and has committed to supporting China’s core interests and major concerns so as to further deepen their mutual strategic partnership. As my noble friend Lord Callanan and other noble Lords have tirelessly pointed out, it is not our allies who welcome the Chagos deal but those who seek to harm us. It is Russia and China who have been fully supportive of the UK giving up its sovereignty of a key strategic asset.

I briefly touch on the Hillsborough Bill, on which the Government have been forced into yet another unedifying U-turn. When we debated this matter last week, the Minister was unable to answer the questions on national security that I raised, and this episode only reinforces the wider concern that the Government do not grasp what national security means in practice and instead treat it as something that can be traded away or manipulated for political convenience. The Government are fond of reminding the House that the first duty of any Government is the defence of national security. On that test, I regret to say, they have fallen at the first hurdle.