Aviation Safety (Amendment) Regulations 2025

Baroness Foster of Oxton Excerpts

Wednesday 15th October 2025 Grand Committee

We must continue to ensure that aviation remains among the safest forms of travel, as the safety of aviation and the travelling public is a priority to this Government; these draft regulations represent a further step in ensuring that that remains the case. I beg to move.

[Baroness Foster of Oxton (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his comprehensive outline of this topic. I seek clarification on two areas.

In paragraph 6.4 of the EM, reference is made to low-risk parts. Paragraph 5.4 also talks about allowing

“certain aircraft components to be installed without needing a Form 1, as long as they are declared safe by the design organisation”.

I want a little clarification here on what is defined as a low-risk part. I ask this for the right reasons, having spent 25 years in the industry—much of that time onboard aircraft—and having dealt with primary legislation for many years as a Member of the European Parliament.

In 1990, there was an incident involving a BAC 1-11. When a windscreen was replaced, the incorrect screws were used. That caused what we would have called a rapid decompression; they called it an explosive decompression. I knew the crew. The captain survived; he was swept out of the window. Since that accident, there was also a rise in fake parts, about which the industry was very concerned. Barcoding was introduced to ensure that the equipment, parts and components were all absolutely authentic.

My point is that the component that caused the accident was a tiny screw. You would look at it in the round as being a fairly low-risk component. It was just a general thing; it was nothing complex. I ask the Minister: what do the Government consider “low-risk parts”? Would they be used on certain parts of an aircraft that would not require a Form 1? We cannot be too general about these things because there is always a chain of events; the smallest component can cause a technical incident or accident. That is my first point.

My second point concerns drones. I drafted the drone report in the European Parliament in 2015. It was about the civil use of drones and the rise in the industry. The CAA has been extremely good. We have a fantastic organisation in it—as well as an excellent Department for Transport, if I may say so, having worked closely with many members of that department over time. My question is: does the CAA intend to delegate the assessment of drone pilot competency and of drones’ flightworthiness to third parties? The CAA has introduced excellent training for drone pilots—it did that itself—but who would these third parties be, in terms of taking over the role that the CAA currently holds, in which it is absolutely diligent in giving out licences?

[Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con)]

My Lords, following on from my noble friend Lady Foster, I will touch on the second point she raised, because it is relevant. We have a situation where the CAA’s delegation and decision-making powers are being changed because of the nature of the arrangements with the European Union.

This whole set of regulations is part of a much broader project led by the CAA at the moment, which deals with, among other things, the simplification of the licensing and training of general aviation pilots—of which I am one. The issues around the changes in licensing are very important, because they bring about the ability of someone, who, like me, flies a single-engine piston aircraft, to fly an electric aircraft. I will not go into the shock-horror that the likelihood of me flying an electric aircraft is equivalent to my enthusiasm for driving an electric car, which is rather limited at the moment.

My question, which follows on from the point raised by my noble friend Lady Foster, is about the delegation of powers to the CAA. She raised a very good point on drones, but I would like the Minister to set out for us whether there were any changes as a result of these circumstances in the agencies, which can have a delegation from the CAA to make decisions, and whether that is adequate in terms of who looks into which agencies can have those delegated powers.

I will raise another point. This statutory instrument does not appear to have happened through impact assessments or anything else; it is a usual statutory instrument where nothing seems to have been necessary to draw to anyone’s attention. To what extent are the resources of the CAA being tested, as a result of these regulations or of ones that have been envisaged? As I think we are all aware, the CAA is short of cash. It is already doing a considerable number of functions, including coming up to date on the things that I have referred to: technology, licensing, the training of pilots and so on.

There is also the question of safety, which develops inexorably as we go along due to the rise of new-generation aircraft. There is also the issue around airports, including the changes in the control zone basis of airports, which must be costing the CAA considerable sums of money. Can the Minister also confirm that there are adequate resources for the operation of the CAA to pay agencies or others to which it delegates powers, and that he is satisfied that we will not need to go back to the Treasury and ask it for more cash? Safety in the air—the safety of training and the other uses of pilots et cetera—must be paramount if our skies are to be secure.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for attending the debate and for their input. I listened intently to the highly experienced noble Baroness, Lady Foster. She raised a valuable point about the minute parts that might cause a serious failure. I recall the example used, albeit not as a practitioner. The answer to that is that type certificate holders will have a design process in place to establish the potential failure impact of every part, and that design process has to be established by the CAA as adequate. Any potential failure must be shown to have a negligible effect on the functioning of the aircraft. The screw that the noble Baroness referred to, part of the assembly of a windscreen, would be considered within the design process so that it would not be excluded from form 1 if the design process for the more major component was safety critical. You could not exclude the screws and still have the windscreen assembly—that is the practical answer to that question.

The noble Baroness asked who the CAA will delegate to. I cannot give her the names of the third parties, but the CAA has set out stringent requirements for third parties to be qualified entities. Qualified entities will be subject to an audit regime to ensure continuing compliance with the CAA’s requirements. They will clearly need sufficient subject matter expertise and regulation capacity, and the CAA will accredit and monitor their performance to ensure continuing safety. The CAA has to set out in detail how it intends to assess the competence of qualified entities for drone flightworthiness, assessment and training. It has experience of doing that in respect of how it dealt with the pilots of fixed-wing and rotary aircraft, so we are entitled to conclude that those processes are robust.

The noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, referred to the delegation of powers. The criteria are more or less what I have just said, but if there is any omission from the explanation that I should have given as a consequence of his question, I will write forthwith. As for the testing of adequate resources for the Civil Aviation Authority, I believe that it is the Government’s responsibility to ensure that the resources are adequate and that it has adequate resources to pay the agencies to which this work should be delegated. Again, for the avoidance of doubt, I will write to the noble Lord and confirm that that is the case in respect of this element of these regulations.

The noble Lord, Lord Moylan, rightly asked whether the department, and I as the Minister proposing these regulations, take responsibility for them and for the proposal to delegate. The answer to that is, of course, yes. The department should not propose such regulations without feeling confident that it is competent to propose them and that what it is proposing is the right thing to do.

I believe that I have answered all the points raised. I conclude by saying again that the safety of aviation and of the travelling public is a priority for the Government. My department is committed to ensuring that aviation remains safe. The draft regulations form part of an important legislative programme which implements proportionate best practice in aviation safety regulation. I commend the regulations to the Committee.

[Baroness Foster of Oxton (Con)]

When I referred to the screws, the noble Lord quite rightly pointed out that we were looking at the design, et cetera, which makes sure that it is a bona fide part. The air accident that took place was not because the screws themselves were badly designed, or that they failed because of what they were, it was when they were fitted—it was the incorrect component. There is a differentiation here between something failing because of a design fault and something failing because the incorrect component has been fitted into a specific, probably critical, area of an aircraft. Could I just leave that with the noble Lord? I thank him.

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

I am very happy that the noble Baroness leaves it with me. I will make sure that I write to her. I recognise the issue that we are dealing with—the incorrect fitment of correct components.