National Security Strategy

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Thursday 26th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Leader of the House for repeating the Statement. It was important that the Prime Minister should, in advance of the NATO summit, signal the priority the Government attach to defence and national security. On these Benches we support that approach, as we do the analysis by the Government of the perceived major threats confronting the United Kingdom. There is much in the strategy with which these Benches can agree. I am aware of the continuity of advice to successive Prime Ministers on defence and security from No. 10 sources. I think that is very helpful, and I pay tribute to that expertise.

Protecting our country and our people from threat is the primary responsibility of the Government, and that was explicitly recognised by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster in the other place. But that analysis and that primary obligation of government bring onerous and challenging responsibilities. First, I join my right honourable friend the shadow Home Secretary in the other place in thanking our security and intelligence services, and all our defence personnel, for the extraordinary work they do to keep us all safe.

Secondly, I say to the Leader of the House that over the last few months a pattern has emerged from the Government of a series of important announcements concerning defence and security intentions but with two glaring omissions: no specific detail and no specific funding. These omissions seriously damage credibility, and I shall touch further on these aspects in my questions.

Let me deal first with security and intelligence. The Statement and the strategy refer to the three pillars: security at home, strength abroad and increasing sovereign and asymmetric capabilities. These Benches welcome actions that build on the measures that my party put in place when in government, including the National Security Act 2023, which gives us increased oversight of adversarial action. It also introduced the foreign influence registration scheme. At home, protecting critical national infrastructure is paramount and there has to be a lead body for that. Is that the Home Office or the MoD, or is it a tandem operation? Are strategic discussions taking place as to who is taking the lead? It may be that there is to be a new joint task force, but any further information the Leader of the House can provide on that would be very helpful.

Within the United Kingdom, our citizens and businesses face cyber threats on an unprecedented scale. Given the recent identification by the Government of threats posed by China, may I ask three questions? First, are the Government confident that they have appropriate vetting mechanisms in place to understand whether imported Chinese goods pose security threats, and by whom and how are these mechanisms applied? Secondly, specifically in relation to energy infrastructure, how do the Government monitor whether potential malign activity is taking place, and are they satisfied with the robustness of the monitoring process? Thirdly, I have a very simple question. Will China be placed on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme?

On strength abroad, these Benches welcome the strategic defence review but express profound concern about the lack of detail on timing for many of the proposals and the vagueness surrounding money. In relation to the NATO summit, while the commitment to increase what the Government describe as national security spending to 5% of GDP by 2035, with 3.5% of that to be spent on core defence, is in principle welcome, there is no funding plan. We have been unable to elicit how the Government will fund even 3%. That omission—that lack of material detail—undermines the credibility of the Government’s intention.

To their credit, the Government understand the urgency of the threat—but not, apparently, the urgency of the money. For example, while the strategy document is in many respects admirable, I had to get to page 27 before I found reference to any specific sum of money, which is £1 billion to establish

“a new network of National Biosecurity Centres”.

On the next page, there is reference to £520 million to be invested

“in UK-based Diagnostic, Therapeutic and Vaccine manufacturing facilities”.

That is what I mean when I say there is a threadbare character about the Government’s funding specification. Can the Leader of the House shed light on when the 3% is to come through, when the extra 0.5% is expected to materialise and what the remaining 1.5% is to cover? If she cannot answer these fundamental questions, the Government are proceeding on a wing and a prayer.

On Monday this House will have a welcome opportunity to debate the Chagos deal. In relation to the defence budget, we understand that the cost of the deal will come out of the defence funding pot, which makes answers on increased defence spending all the more pressing. Promising more on the one hand, while whisking money away with the other, is adding to the opaqueness. That is what is damaging the credibility of what I am sure are the Government’s good intentions on our defence and security.

On these Benches, we shall support the Government’s efforts to strengthen our defence capability, to improve our security and intelligence services and to make our critical national infrastructure more resilient. I commend the Prime Minister on demonstrating maturity and responsibility when dealing with acutely challenging and fast-moving global situations, but these Benches will ask questions and seek clarity when that is what our national security interests demand.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I also thank the Leader for repeating the Statement. Most people in our country take for granted the liberties and freedoms we enjoy. In a way, that is a good thing, as they do not need to concern themselves with the need for vigilance against the threats we face. We enjoy our way of life as a result of the tireless work of those who have dedicated their careers to making us safe, and I pay tribute to them. Many distinguished servants of commitment are represented in this House, and I thank them too.

We therefore support a great deal in this strategy—its judgment on the threats we face and the changing security landscape, both in potential conflicts and in the emerging dangers through technological change, and the need to address them across all of government, the economy and society as a whole. There should be, of course, a high level of cross-party support. I hope the Government will bring regular updates with clear action plans of the many workstreams that fed into this strategy so that we can monitor and appraise for progress.

In many ways, the UK has a unique security need. But in many others, we can act as a global, open and interconnected country only if we secure the support and partnership of others. As an island nation, our shipping and data cables keep our economy alive. We were the first country to lay subsea communication cables, 175 years ago. Today we are almost exclusively reliant on them for communications. Shipping contributed to our growth in the Industrial Revolution, and today our consumers are reliant on shipped imports and key sectors on shipped exports.

This is why, for example, I was very happy to see Taiwan mentioned in paragraph 21. Taiwanese security and the openness of the South China Sea are critical to our technology industry and wider trade. I welcome the aircraft carrier task group currently in the region. It is a key shipping route, essential for our economy. I will refer to China a little later, but the Leader of the House may not agree with me on those aspects.

We agree that the way forward comes with the need for increased defence and lethal capability. We support the Government on increased defence expenditure, as the Leader knows. It would be helpful if she could indicate the breakdown of the sources of the 5%. What is the assumed level of growth of the size of the economy to meet the level of expenditure we expect to be necessary?

We do not depart from the level of funding, but we do say, with respect to the Government, that it should not have been transferred from the official development assistance budget. With respect, this is a strategic mistake, and we are seeing considerable reductions in programmes that have been part of the UK national security platform, and successfully so, for many years. It is no surprise to me that, in recent weeks, we have seen public statements from former defence and military leaders and chiefs, diplomats, and heads of the intelligence community of the UK, appealing to the Prime Minister not to cut the very programmes that have been national security focused in conflict prevention and conflict resolution, and in supporting allies to build resilient civil society and institutions against malign interference.

The western Balkans is rightly raised in the strategy. Twice in the Chamber I have asked for clarity on the continuation of the western Balkans freedom and resilience programme, funded by ODA. I hope that it is not under threat. If the Leader can provide reassurance on our posture within the western Balkans, that would be appreciated.

The FCDO network and our excellent diplomats were raised, and rightly so. I welcome what was said, but we have to recall that, in the spending review, there are year-on-year cuts to the operational budget of the FCDO going forward.

On other threats, such as biosecurity, I agree that we are less of an island than many might hope. Last night, I looked back at the UK’s first biological security strategy in 2018. DfID and ODA were mentioned on almost every single page—a recognition that biosecurity in the UK is weakened if it is also weak in countries where we have a large diaspora community or travel relationship. There was a reason why, 10 years ago, Ebola did not become Covid: it was because of the UK, through DfID and ODA. But this document makes no mention of it at all. In fact, with regards to official development assistance, there is only the most passing reference in paragraph 30.

We welcome the elements on research and development and the reconnection with Europe to regain the ground that we lost considerably under the previous Government. Page 11 says that we will go

“further than the agreements we have already struck”

with the EU. That is good news. In what areas will new agreements be sought?

We will consider the China audit next week, but the Leader may know that we on these Benches are concerned about the Government’s approach. In January, the Chancellor hailed £600 million of growth to our economy from extra trade with China over the next five years. In June, the Government announced £600 million for security agencies to tackle the threat from China. This is literally a zero-sum relationship this year. We would like to see legislative action on transnational repression suffered by people living here in the UK. The director-general of MI5 has made public warnings that China exploits education agreements and sovereign funds for espionage on an industrial scale. Although we welcome the first scheme, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, has heard me say that we regret both that China is not on the enhanced tier and that education and sovereign funds are exempted.

Finally, I want to look further to the future. The convulsive violence in the Middle East, Sudan and elsewhere will have a lingering effect here in the UK. Community cohesion and reducing tensions will now have to be a critical part of our national security strategy, because we know from previous conflicts that there is a lag, whereby young people affected by it now may well be radicalised in the years to come. Activities such as the Chamberlain Highbury Trust that bring communities together are examples of good work that we are doing in the UK, but, regrettably, as a result of the heightened conflicts that this strategy rightly seeks to address, we may well see further radicalisation within our shores in the future. Investment now is necessary so that we do not pay the price later.