Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Tuesday 4th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, I will try to get this debate back on track and deal with the issues that I think have been confronting us. The debate was ably introduced by the Minister and it has been predictably interesting, presenting some sharply contrasting views. It has also demonstrated a dichotomy between sincerely held views of former and venerable public servants and political views. There has been a further dichotomy within the political classes as to what constitutes responsible decision-making. As my noble friend Lord Murray indicated, even within the same party you can sometimes find a dichotomy of view—it happens, I say to the Minister. I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, that when it comes to a party having differences of view, I would think the Liberal Democrats could give master classes.

The position of these Benches was laid out clearly by my noble friend Lord Callanan. He also addressed the precipitate and surprising decision of the Government to delay their own Bill by, unusually, not proceeding with a committal Motion. The Minister, with admirable verbal gymnastics, sought heroically, if perhaps not completely convincingly, to explain that decision, but I think the reason is simple: the Government had concerns that the sensible amendment to the committal Motion that my noble friend had tabled was drawing support, and it may well have been that the Government were fearful that support for the amendment or a version of it would prevail and the Government would lose. But that was a judgment for the Government to make. I observe that the amendment was not prescriptive and would have left matters entirely under the control of the Government. What has now emerged is a welcome breathing space for the Government to consider and answer some serious questions about the agreement on which the Bill is predicated. Some of these questions have already been asked, but it will be my pleasure in a moment to add to them.

My noble friend Lord Callanan raised some of the most serious issues arising from the agreement, and it is interesting that the concerns he expressed were mirrored during the debate by a number of contributors. If we look at the agreement and at the trust fund, we find that there is an absence of knowing in detail what the views of the Chagossian people are on these issues. That was raised by a number of contributors, including my noble friend Lord Lilley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, has concerns about that.

The noble Lord, Lord Morrow, and my noble friends Lord De Mauley and Lord Bellingham spoke movingly about the treatment to which the Chagossian people have been subjected over decades. I found that moving— I say to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, that I am not being hypocritical in expressing that sentiment—and it was very much echoed by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hoey and Lady Foster of Aghadrumsee, who graphically described the lack of engagement in relation to current matters.

Then there is the issue of money—in today’s economic climate, a hot potato if ever there was one. The Chancellor is scratching around looking for every penny she can find, defence urgently needs upfront cash and taxes are almost certainly going up, yet the British taxpayer is going to be asked to pay almost £35 billion to Mauritius, a point that was raised by a number of contributors. My noble friend Lady Noakes gave a devastatingly forensic analysis of the costs and the Government’s disparate approach, and I will leave that to the Minister to respond to. Those concerns were echoed by the noble Baroness, Lady Foster of Aghadrumsee, and the noble Lord, Lord Weir of Ballyholme.

Then there was the position of China, and the not imagined but avowed objective of China to strengthen ties with Mauritius because of its strategic advantages, and China’s commitment to elevating the bilateral strategic partnership. These clearly cause concern to many of your Lordships, notably my noble friend Lord De Mauley. Even the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, nobly supporting his Government, said, “China is a threat”. I agree. That was again referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Weir of Ballyholme. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, that I was a Defence Minister for nearly four and a half years, and one of my areas of responsibility was south-east Asia. China is a resolute prosecutor of its own interests, with an overt desire to exercise influence globally. At our peril do we waver in our vigilance.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

I am so grateful to the noble Baroness. I just want to say that I am quite sure that the Mauritians would agree with that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

That is an unexpected source of encouragement, for which I thank the noble Lord.

Finally, and very importantly, the defence and security implications of this arrangement are clearly ringing alarm bells, as noted in the contributions from my noble friends Lord Lilley, Lord Blencathra, Lord De Mauley and Lord Bellingham. My noble friend Lord Bellingham helpfully distinguished between this agreement and the sovereign base areas in Cyprus, to which the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, referred. The whole point is that we have sovereignty in Cyprus and can control these arrangements, but we cannot under this arrangement: we are in the hands of the agreement and Mauritius’s disposition to us.

The Minister described the base as a prized military asset. I was very glad to hear that and, of course, I agree. It was also emphasised by the noble Lord, Lord Jay. But it is this aspect of defence and security to which I wish to devote my final remarks. The Minister already has a lot of questions to which a response is required, and the observations from my noble friend Lord Lilley certainly require comment, but here is my addendum.

With the help of the Bill, I have been endeavouring to knit together the components of the agreement with the text of the Bill. Seeking clarification from the Government on a number of vital points is part of a necessary scrutiny process, but His Majesty’s Opposition reserve their overall position on the Bill and will determine their approach at a subsequent stage in the procedure. In the meantime, let me set a general perspective.

We reach the ninth introductory paragraph to the agreement before there is any mention of

“protecting international peace and security”,

with specific reference to

“the long-term, secure and effective operation of the Base on Diego Garcia”.

Although I might have hoped for earlier recognition of the primacy of defence and security, this is where we are. But the drafting confirms that this is a pivotal part of the agreement, which then promotes defence and security to Article 3 of the agreement and enhances that status by including Annex 1, so progress has been made. I mention this because it goes to the heart of what the agreement stands for, what it is about, and the need for absolute clarity.

There is the further question of the extent to which material text in the agreement should be replicated in the Bill. I propose to raise a number of factual questions, which I appreciate may require the Minister to go back to her officials. I am content that she does that and can respond by letter, a copy of which could perhaps be laid in the Library. At least the Government have now helpfully provided some time within which to do that.

Going back to the agreement, under Article 3,

“the Parties shall not undermine, prejudice or otherwise interfere with the long-term, secure and effective operation of the Base, and shall cooperate to that end”.

That is an undertaking of fundamental importance by Mauritius to the UK. It explicitly implies that Mauritius should not enter into any arrangements, either on its own account or with any third party, which could be in breach of that undertaking. That, by implication, logically confers upon the UK a right to respond to such arrangements by taking whatever action is necessary to safeguard the base, and our interests and those of our allies on the base. Can the Minister confirm that that is the Government’s understanding?

An important protection is granted to the UK by Annex 1, paragraph—

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

Forgive me for interrupting, but the noble Baroness said a few minutes ago that the sovereign base area in Cyprus was not the subject of a treaty. It was the subject of three treaties: the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance and the treaty of establishment.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I hesitate to correct the noble Lord. I think what I said in response to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, was that the sovereign base areas in Cyprus and this arrangement are not the same. The point that the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, made was, in fact, about expeditiously communicating with Cyprus if we are going to do something. With the greatest respect to the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, I thank him for his intervention but I think we are slightly on different planes.

I had got to the UK’s position under Annex 1, paragraph 1A, which says that the UK shall have

“unrestricted access, basing and overflight for United Kingdom and United States of America aircraft and vessels to enter into the sea and airspace of Diego Garcia”.

That is good. Annex 1, paragraph 1B(i), says the UK shall have “unrestricted ability” to

“control the conduct and deployment of armed operations and lethal capabilities”

on Diego Garcia. That is strong; it is a clear reassurance and there should be no ambiguity as to what it means. But less clear is Annex 1, paragraph 1B(viii), which says the UK shall have “unrestricted ability” to

“permit access, basing and overflight for non-United Kingdom and non-United States of America aircraft and vessels, upon notification to Mauritius”.

If that is merely a courtesy intimation then it does not compromise the UK controlling the conduct and deployment of armed operations and lethal capabilities on Diego Garcia. If that notification requires the consent of Mauritius then it most assuredly does, so can the Minister confirm that such intimation is purely a courtesy and that consent to the proposed action is not required from Mauritius?

Under Annex 1, paragraph 2, the UK

“agrees to expeditiously inform Mauritius of any armed attack on a third State directly emanating from the Base on Diego Garcia”.

It is in the middle of the Indian Ocean, and a territorial armed attack on a third state could theoretically be mounted from the base, albeit that is perhaps unlikely. Can the Minister confirm whether that obligation to inform “expeditiously” extends to assets which, for example, merely called into the base to refuel and are once again at sea or airborne? Does that obligation also apply if UK forces disable hostile aircraft, drones, ships or other devices which present a threat to the base?

I ask these questions because in any live conflict, the environment is kinetic. The last thing on the minds of military commanders will be seeking consents. These questions which I have posed require clear, unambiguous answers.

I turn to how the agreement engages with the Bill. I would have thought that the issues I have already raised, plus the importance of the role of the joint commission under Article 12 and the mechanism for setting disputes under Article 14, all merit a specific mention in the Bill. Can the Minister confirm whether the Government are prepared to look at the drafting of the Bill with a view to incorporating some of these issues into it?

Specifically, there is in the Bill a reservation to His Majesty under his prerogative to make laws for Diego Garcia and to empower His Majesty to make Orders in Council. I raised this at the very helpful briefing meeting held by the Minister, for which I thank her, but I will add this point. His Majesty is commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces. What if a threat to the safety of our Armed Forces manifests in the base itself or in the assets operating from there? If there is a disagreement with Mauritius as to the character and gravity of that threat and how the UK proposes to respond, does the lawmaking power under Clause 3(3) prevail to do whatever is necessary to protect our military and civilian personnel and our assets?

This agreement raises two profound concerns. First, if the Government concede this area of British sovereignty, how safe are our other crown territories—the Falklands, Gibraltar and our sovereign bases in Cyprus? The moment that lawyers come sniffing around any of those, will this Government be resolute and stand up to that? Secondly, this agreement should not be seen as some tying up of loose legal ends with a box ticked. It has a significant impact on the British taxpayer, on the Chagossians themselves and on our defence and security interests.

Notwithstanding the acknowledged authority of the noble Lords, Lord Browne of Ladyton and Lord Beamish, and the respect in which they are held in this House, the lack of support from the Government’s own Back Benches is troubling. I look forward to the Minister’s response, because this debate has raised a series of profoundly concerning substantive issues, and this Chamber needs reassurance.