Al-Qaida (Asset-Freezing) Regulations 2011

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Wednesday 9th November 2011 Grand Committee

[The Commercial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Sassoon)]

My Lords, asset freezing is a vital and necessary global response to the threat from al-Qaeda. It is a tool to disrupt the flow of funds to al-Qaeda, helping to prevent them executing attacks and supporting their networks.

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, we are committed to meeting our obligations under the UN charter, and we support the UN’s al-Qaeda asset-freezing regime. The regulations before the Committee today will ensure that we continue to meet our international obligations and prevent funds from reaching persons associated with al-Qaeda. In particular, they reflect UN Security Council Resolutions 1988 and 1999, which were agreed in June this year.

I will provide further detail on these changes. First, it is important to clarify that the regulations we are debating today do not apply to the terrorist asset-freezing regime mandated by Resolution 1373. That resolution is implemented in the UK under the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010 passed last December. The regulations under debate apply only to the UN al-Qaeda asset-freezing regime established under UN Security Council Resolution 1267 and amended by Resolution 1333 and subsequent resolutions. That regime, established in 1999, initially applied an asset freeze only against the Taliban. It was subsequently extended by successor resolutions to apply an asset freeze against Osama bin Laden and individuals associated with al-Qaeda or the Taliban.

The changes we are debating today stem from the latest periodic renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Security Council in June 2011 when it unanimously adopted Resolutions 1988 and 1989. These resolutions split the Resolution 1267 al-Qaeda and Taliban asset-freezing regime into two separate regimes, one in relation to Afghanistan and one in relation to al-Qaeda.

Resolution 1989 provides for the al-Qaeda regime, with which we are concerned today. It maintains sanctions on those individuals and entities associated with al-Qaeda who were designated under the Resolution 1267 asset-freezing regime and strengthens existing due process procedures. The improvements include the introduction of triggered sunset clauses. They will make it easier and more transparent to delist individuals who no longer meet the listing criteria and who are no longer considered to be associated with al-Qaeda. Delisting recommendations by the ombudsperson or requests by the state that made the original designation request will trigger the sunset clause. At that point the person will be delisted after 60 days unless the sanctions committee decides unanimously to maintain them on the list. Resolution 1989 also strengthens the role of the ombudsperson. The resolution recommends increased capacity for the ombudsperson’s office and greater provision by member states of information for case reviews, and encourages individuals to submit delisting petitions to the ombudsperson. The Government believe that these changes represent a very good and very necessary outcome that the UK, together with our Security Council partners, worked extremely hard to achieve.

As your Lordships are aware, the UN al-Qaeda asset-freezing regime is global in its application. All listing and delisting decisions are made by a committee of the UN Security Council, and once individuals or entities are listed, their assets must be frozen by all states as a matter of international law. Throughout the European Union, the al-Qaeda asset-freezing regime is implemented by Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002, as subsequently amended, and is directly applicable in national law.

To implement and enforce the al-Qaeda asset-freezing regime fully in the UK, domestic regulations are needed to put in place penalties, and licensing and enforcement mechanisms. The key features of the regulations are that they define: the designated persons covered under the al-Qaeda regime; the prohibitions which apply in respect of designated persons; and the criminal penalties which apply to UK persons who breach the prohibitions. There are also provisions for the granting of licences exempting activities from the prohibitions, for the gathering and sharing of information and for allowing closed material to be employed in proceedings that challenge decisions made under the regulations.

These regulations revoke and replace the Al-Qaida and Taliban (Asset-Freezing) Regulations 2010, but I can assure your Lordships that there is no gap in the powers or penalties required to enforce the al-Qaeda asset-freezing regime in the UK. The 2010 regulations continue to have effect until the 2011 regulations come into force.

I know your Lordships understand the importance of the UK meeting its obligations to enforce the UN al-Qaeda asset-freezing regime. The regulations before the Committee are vital to meeting that obligation. Asset freezing is a critical element of the global response to the threat from al-Qaeda, and the UK fully supports the UN’s al-Qaeda asset-freezing regime. At the same time, UN Security Council Resolution 1989 strengthens existing due process procedures, which the UK has been arguing for at the Security Council.

In the Government’s view, the regulations before the Committee today represent an effective, fair and proportionate way of giving full effect to the EC regulation that meets the obligations of the Security Council resolution within the UK. I therefore commend these regulations to the Committee.

[Baroness Kramer]

My Lords, I have no objection to the regulations and I will take only a few moments of the Committee's time to seek clarification on a couple of points. From the perspective of my colleagues, it is clearly necessary to tackle not only terror but the funding of terror. This legislation is part of that overall approach. We are pleased to see the strengthening of due process and the sunset clauses that are part of the regulations.

I will ask a couple of very small questions. Will the Minister clarify that no practical implications of any significance will follow from separating the al-Qaeda regulations from those applying to the Taliban? Is this just a measure to fall into line with EU and UN resolutions? In moving from the umbrella of one set of regulations to the umbrella of another, will the process be seamless? Is there any possibility of a slip between the two? Obviously, we would not wish to see such an opportunity exploited.

My second question is perhaps of more interest to the wider community. Will the Minister give us some reassurance that these regulations will not put an additional burden on ordinary people? He will be very aware that the combination of anti-money laundering and anti-terror legislation has put a significant burden of cost on both individuals and businesses, not least when it comes to the long delays in fund transfers that the banks explain by saying that it is necessary for them to go through security procedures and checks, during which time the banks seem to hold on to the money and benefit from the interest rather than either party to the transaction. One must live with measures such as that, but we would all find it unfortunate to see any increase in the burden. I would appreciate reassurance on those points, but we support the regulations.

[Lord Myners]

My Lords, like the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, I have no issues of principle with this legislation. However, I would like the Minister's help on a couple of issues. The Explanatory Memorandum states that policy in the area of sanctions needs to be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. I would like the Minister to address Regulation 14(1)(a) and (b) and say whether the levels at which the penalties are set can truly be described as “dissuasive”. Given the consequences of terrorist action, the proposed penalties appear to be quite modest. I would also like the Minister to explain the level 5 standard referred to in Regulation 14(2).

I would also like to know—this is a very important issue—why a proposed breach of Regulation 8(3) by a financial institution does not incur a criminal penalty. Why are financial institutions exempted from criminal penalties while individuals are subject to them?

I turn to Regulation 9(4)(b). Can the Minister explain the criteria employed by HMT in determining an appropriate publicity strategy, and how the licences will be publicised under the regulations—specifically, where and when?

Under Regulation 20(1), how many licences are currently issued under Regulation 7 of the Al-Qaida and Taliban (Asset-Freezing) Regulations 2010, and how many have been issued under the 2010 regulations since they were passed by Parliament?

Finally, it would be helpful if the Minister would confirm that legal aid will be made available to individuals who are subject to freezing orders. The consequences of these freezing orders are draconian and chilling. It is incumbent upon us to ensure that anyone threatened with the consequences of having their assets frozen has access to appropriate legal advice. Will the Minister confirm that that will continue to qualify for legal aid?